/* p12_kiss.c */

/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL

 * project 1999.

 */

/* ====================================================================

 * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

 * are met:

 *

 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 

 *

 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

 *    distribution.

 *

 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.

 *

 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

 *

 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

 *    acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

 * ====================================================================

 *

 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

 *

 */

#include <stdio.h>

#include "cryptlib.h"

#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>

/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */

static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,

		EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);

static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,

		       int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

		       STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,

		       char *keymatch);

static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,

			EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,

			ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);

/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert

 * and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,

 * or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be

 * passed unitialised.

 */

EXPORT_C int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

	     STACK_OF(X509) **ca)

{

	/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */

	if(!p12) {

		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);

		return 0;

	}

	/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */

	if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {

		if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new_null())) {

			PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

			return 0;

		}

	}

	if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;

	if(cert) *cert = NULL;

	/* Check the mac */

	/* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases

	 * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that

	 * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length

	 * password are two different things...

	 */

	if(!pass || !*pass) {

		if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;

		else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";

		else {

			PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);

			goto err;

		}

	} else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {

		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);

		goto err;

	}

	if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))

		{

		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);

		goto err;

		}

	return 1;

 err:

	if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);

	if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert);

	if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free);

	return 0;

}

/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */

static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,

	     EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)

{

	STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;

	STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;

	int i, bagnid;

	PKCS7 *p7;

	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;

	char keymatch = 0;

	if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;

	for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {

		p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);

		bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);

		if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {

			bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);

		} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {

			bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);

		} else continue;

		if (!bags) {

			sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

			return 0;

		}

	    	if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,

							 &keyid, &keymatch)) {

			sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);

			sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

			return 0;

		}

		sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);

	}

	sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);

	if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);

	return 1;

}

static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,

		      int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,

		      STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,

		      char *keymatch)

{

	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {

		if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),

			 pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,

							 keymatch)) return 0;

	}

	return 1;

}

#define MATCH_KEY  0x1

#define MATCH_CERT 0x2

#define MATCH_ALL  0x3

static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,

		     EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,

		     ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,

		     char *keymatch)

{

	PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;

	X509 *x509;

	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL, *ckid = NULL;

	ASN1_TYPE *attrib;

	ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;

	if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName)))

		fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;

	if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) {

		lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;

		ckid = lkey;

	}

	/* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */

	if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {

		if (*keyid) {

			if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;

		} else {

			if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) {

				PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAG,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

				return 0;

		    }

		}

	}

	switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag))

	{

	case NID_keyBag:

		if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;	

		if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0;

		*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;

	break;

	case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:

		if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;	

		if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))

				return 0;

		*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);

		PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);

		if (!(*pkey)) return 0;

		*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;

	break;

	case NID_certBag:

		if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )

								 return 1;

		if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;

		if(ckid)

			{

			if (!X509_keyid_set1(x509, ckid->data, ckid->length))

				{

				X509_free(x509);

				return 0;

				}

			}

		if(fname) {

			int len, r;

			unsigned char *data;

			len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);

			if(len > 0) {

				r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);

				OPENSSL_free(data);

				if (!r)

					{

					X509_free(x509);

					return 0;

					}

			}

		}

		if (lkey) {

			*keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;

			if (cert) *cert = x509;

			else X509_free(x509);

		} else {

			if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509);

			else X509_free(x509);

		}

	break;

	case NID_safeContentsBag:

		return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen,

			 		pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch);

	break;

	default:

		return 1;

	break;

	}

	return 1;

}