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1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
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2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
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3 * All rights reserved. |
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4 * |
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5 * This package is an SSL implementation written |
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6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
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7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
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8 * |
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9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
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10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
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11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
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12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
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13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
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14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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15 * |
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16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
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17 * the code are not to be removed. |
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18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
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19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
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20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
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21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
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22 * |
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23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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25 * are met: |
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26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
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27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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32 * must display the following acknowledgement: |
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33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
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34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
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35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
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36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
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37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
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38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
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39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
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40 * |
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41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
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42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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51 * SUCH DAMAGE. |
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52 * |
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53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
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54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
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55 * copied and put under another distribution licence |
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56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
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57 */ |
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58 /* ==================================================================== |
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59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
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60 * |
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61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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63 * are met: |
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64 * |
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65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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67 * |
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68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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71 * distribution. |
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72 * |
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73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
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74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
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75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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77 * |
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78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
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79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
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80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
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81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
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82 * |
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83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
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84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
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85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
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86 * |
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87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
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88 * acknowledgment: |
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89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
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90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
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91 * |
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92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
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93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
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95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
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96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
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97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
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98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
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99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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104 * ==================================================================== |
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105 * |
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106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
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107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
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108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
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109 * |
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110 */ |
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111 |
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112 #include <stdio.h> |
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113 #include <errno.h> |
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114 #define USE_SOCKETS |
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115 #include "ssl_locl.h" |
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116 #include <openssl/evp.h> |
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117 #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
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118 |
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119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
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120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
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121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
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122 |
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123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
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124 { |
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125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase |
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126 * packet by another n bytes. |
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127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified |
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128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. |
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129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf |
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130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) |
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131 */ |
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132 int i,off,newb; |
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133 |
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134 if (!extend) |
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135 { |
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136 /* start with empty packet ... */ |
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137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) |
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138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; |
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139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; |
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140 s->packet_length = 0; |
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141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ |
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142 } |
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143 |
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144 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */ |
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145 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION && |
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146 extend) |
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147 { |
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148 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) |
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149 n = s->s3->rbuf.left; |
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150 } |
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151 |
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152 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ |
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153 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) |
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154 { |
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155 s->packet_length+=n; |
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156 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n; |
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157 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n; |
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158 return(n); |
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159 } |
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160 |
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161 /* else we need to read more data */ |
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162 if (!s->read_ahead) |
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163 max=n; |
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164 |
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165 { |
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166 /* avoid buffer overflow */ |
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167 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; |
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168 if (max > max_max) |
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169 max = max_max; |
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170 } |
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171 if (n > max) /* does not happen */ |
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172 { |
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173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
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174 return -1; |
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175 } |
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176 |
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177 off = s->packet_length; |
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178 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; |
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179 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |
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180 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', |
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181 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */ |
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182 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) |
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183 { |
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184 /* off > 0 */ |
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185 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb); |
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186 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; |
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187 } |
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188 |
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189 while (newb < n) |
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190 { |
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191 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need |
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192 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */ |
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193 |
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194 clear_sys_error(); |
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195 if (s->rbio != NULL) |
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196 { |
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197 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
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198 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb); |
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199 } |
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200 else |
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201 { |
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202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); |
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203 i = -1; |
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204 } |
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205 |
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206 if (i <= 0) |
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207 { |
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208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; |
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209 return(i); |
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210 } |
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211 newb+=i; |
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212 } |
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213 |
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214 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ |
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215 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; |
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216 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; |
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217 s->packet_length += n; |
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218 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
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219 return(n); |
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220 } |
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221 |
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222 /* Call this to get a new input record. |
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223 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
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224 * or non-blocking IO. |
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225 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
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226 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
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227 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
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228 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
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229 */ |
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230 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
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231 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
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232 { |
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233 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; |
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234 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; |
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235 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
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236 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
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237 unsigned char *p; |
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238 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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239 short version; |
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240 unsigned int mac_size; |
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241 int clear=0; |
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242 size_t extra; |
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243 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; |
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244 unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
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245 |
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246 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
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247 sess=s->session; |
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248 |
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249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) |
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250 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; |
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251 else |
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252 extra=0; |
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253 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) |
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254 { |
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255 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER |
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256 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ |
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257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
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258 return -1; |
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259 } |
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260 |
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261 again: |
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262 /* check if we have the header */ |
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263 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
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264 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
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265 { |
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266 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
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267 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
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268 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
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269 |
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270 p=s->packet; |
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271 |
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272 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ |
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273 rr->type= *(p++); |
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274 ssl_major= *(p++); |
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275 ssl_minor= *(p++); |
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276 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
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277 n2s(p,rr->length); |
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278 |
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279 /* Lets check version */ |
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280 if (!s->first_packet) |
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281 { |
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282 if (version != s->version) |
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283 { |
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284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
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285 /* Send back error using their |
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286 * version number :-) */ |
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287 s->version=version; |
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288 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
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289 goto f_err; |
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290 } |
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291 } |
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292 |
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293 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) |
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294 { |
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295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
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296 goto err; |
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297 } |
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298 |
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299 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) |
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300 { |
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301 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
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302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
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303 goto f_err; |
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304 } |
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305 |
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306 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
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307 } |
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308 |
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309 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
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310 |
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311 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
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312 { |
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313 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
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314 i=rr->length; |
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315 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
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316 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
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317 /* now n == rr->length, |
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318 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
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319 } |
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320 |
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321 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
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322 |
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323 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
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324 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
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325 */ |
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326 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
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327 |
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328 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
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329 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
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330 * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
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331 * the decryption or by the decompression |
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332 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
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333 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
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334 |
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335 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
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336 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
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337 |
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338 /* check is not needed I believe */ |
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339 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) |
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340 { |
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341 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
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342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
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343 goto f_err; |
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344 } |
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345 |
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346 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
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347 rr->data=rr->input; |
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348 |
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349 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
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350 if (enc_err <= 0) |
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351 { |
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352 if (enc_err == 0) |
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353 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ |
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354 goto err; |
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355 |
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356 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding |
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357 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). |
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358 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform |
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359 * the MAC computation anyway. */ |
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360 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
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361 } |
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362 |
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363 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
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364 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
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365 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
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366 printf("\n"); |
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367 #endif |
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368 |
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369 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
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370 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
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371 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || |
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372 (s->read_hash == NULL)) |
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373 clear=1; |
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374 |
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375 if (!clear) |
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376 { |
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377 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); |
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378 |
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379 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) |
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380 { |
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381 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ |
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382 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
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383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
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384 goto f_err; |
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385 #else |
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386 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
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387 #endif |
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388 } |
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389 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ |
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390 if (rr->length >= mac_size) |
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391 { |
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392 rr->length -= mac_size; |
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393 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
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394 } |
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395 else |
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396 { |
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397 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ |
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398 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ |
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399 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
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400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
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401 goto f_err; |
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402 #else |
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403 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
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404 rr->length = 0; |
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405 #endif |
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406 } |
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407 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); |
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408 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) |
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409 { |
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410 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
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411 } |
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412 } |
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413 |
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414 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) |
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415 { |
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416 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, |
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417 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption |
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418 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, |
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419 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this |
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420 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ |
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421 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
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422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
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423 goto f_err; |
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424 } |
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425 |
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426 /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
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427 if (s->expand != NULL) |
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428 { |
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429 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) |
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430 { |
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431 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
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432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
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433 goto f_err; |
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434 } |
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435 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
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436 { |
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437 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
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438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); |
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439 goto f_err; |
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440 } |
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441 } |
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442 |
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443 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) |
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444 { |
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445 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
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446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
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447 goto f_err; |
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448 } |
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449 |
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450 rr->off=0; |
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451 /* So at this point the following is true |
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452 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
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453 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
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454 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
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455 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
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456 * after use :-). |
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457 */ |
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458 |
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459 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
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460 s->packet_length=0; |
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461 |
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462 /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
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463 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
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464 |
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465 return(1); |
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466 |
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467 f_err: |
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468 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
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469 err: |
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470 return(ret); |
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471 } |
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472 |
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473 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
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474 { |
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475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
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476 int i; |
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477 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
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478 |
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479 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
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480 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, |
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481 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); |
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482 if (i < 0) |
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483 return(0); |
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484 else |
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485 rr->length=i; |
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486 rr->data=rr->comp; |
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487 #endif |
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488 return(1); |
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489 } |
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490 |
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491 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
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492 { |
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493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
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494 int i; |
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495 SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
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496 |
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497 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
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498 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, |
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499 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, |
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500 wr->input,(int)wr->length); |
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501 if (i < 0) |
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502 return(0); |
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503 else |
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504 wr->length=i; |
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505 |
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506 wr->input=wr->data; |
|
507 #endif |
|
508 return(1); |
|
509 } |
|
510 |
|
511 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
|
512 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
|
513 */ |
|
514 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
|
515 { |
|
516 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; |
|
517 unsigned int tot,n,nw; |
|
518 int i; |
|
519 |
|
520 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
521 tot=s->s3->wnum; |
|
522 s->s3->wnum=0; |
|
523 |
|
524 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
|
525 { |
|
526 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
|
527 if (i < 0) return(i); |
|
528 if (i == 0) |
|
529 { |
|
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
|
531 return -1; |
|
532 } |
|
533 } |
|
534 |
|
535 n=(len-tot); |
|
536 for (;;) |
|
537 { |
|
538 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
|
539 nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
|
540 else |
|
541 nw=n; |
|
542 |
|
543 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); |
|
544 if (i <= 0) |
|
545 { |
|
546 s->s3->wnum=tot; |
|
547 return i; |
|
548 } |
|
549 |
|
550 if ((i == (int)n) || |
|
551 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
|
552 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) |
|
553 { |
|
554 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment |
|
555 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ |
|
556 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; |
|
557 |
|
558 return tot+i; |
|
559 } |
|
560 |
|
561 n-=i; |
|
562 tot+=i; |
|
563 } |
|
564 } |
|
565 |
|
566 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
|
567 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
|
568 { |
|
569 unsigned char *p,*plen; |
|
570 int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
|
571 int prefix_len = 0; |
|
572 SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
|
573 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; |
|
574 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
|
575 |
|
576 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
|
577 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
|
578 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) |
|
579 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
|
580 |
|
581 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
|
582 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
|
583 { |
|
584 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
|
585 if (i <= 0) |
|
586 return(i); |
|
587 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
|
588 } |
|
589 |
|
590 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
|
591 return 0; |
|
592 |
|
593 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
|
594 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); |
|
595 sess=s->session; |
|
596 |
|
597 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
|
598 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
|
599 (s->write_hash == NULL)) |
|
600 clear=1; |
|
601 |
|
602 if (clear) |
|
603 mac_size=0; |
|
604 else |
|
605 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); |
|
606 |
|
607 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ |
|
608 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) |
|
609 { |
|
610 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
|
611 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ |
|
612 |
|
613 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
|
614 { |
|
615 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; |
|
616 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment |
|
617 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later |
|
618 * together with the actual payload) */ |
|
619 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); |
|
620 if (prefix_len <= 0) |
|
621 goto err; |
|
622 |
|
623 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) |
|
624 { |
|
625 /* insufficient space */ |
|
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
627 goto err; |
|
628 } |
|
629 } |
|
630 |
|
631 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; |
|
632 } |
|
633 |
|
634 p = wb->buf + prefix_len; |
|
635 |
|
636 /* write the header */ |
|
637 |
|
638 *(p++)=type&0xff; |
|
639 wr->type=type; |
|
640 |
|
641 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
|
642 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
|
643 |
|
644 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ |
|
645 plen=p; |
|
646 p+=2; |
|
647 |
|
648 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
|
649 wr->data=p; |
|
650 wr->length=(int)len; |
|
651 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
|
652 |
|
653 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
|
654 * wr->data */ |
|
655 |
|
656 /* first we compress */ |
|
657 if (s->compress != NULL) |
|
658 { |
|
659 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
|
660 { |
|
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
|
662 goto err; |
|
663 } |
|
664 } |
|
665 else |
|
666 { |
|
667 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
|
668 wr->input=wr->data; |
|
669 } |
|
670 |
|
671 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
|
672 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
|
673 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
|
674 |
|
675 if (mac_size != 0) |
|
676 { |
|
677 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1); |
|
678 wr->length+=mac_size; |
|
679 wr->input=p; |
|
680 wr->data=p; |
|
681 } |
|
682 |
|
683 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
|
684 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
|
685 |
|
686 /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
|
687 s2n(wr->length,plen); |
|
688 |
|
689 /* we should now have |
|
690 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
|
691 * wr->length long */ |
|
692 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
|
693 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
|
694 |
|
695 if (create_empty_fragment) |
|
696 { |
|
697 /* we are in a recursive call; |
|
698 * just return the length, don't write out anything here |
|
699 */ |
|
700 return wr->length; |
|
701 } |
|
702 |
|
703 /* now let's set up wb */ |
|
704 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
|
705 wb->offset = 0; |
|
706 |
|
707 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ |
|
708 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
|
709 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
|
710 s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
|
711 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
|
712 |
|
713 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
|
714 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
|
715 err: |
|
716 return -1; |
|
717 } |
|
718 |
|
719 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ |
|
720 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
|
721 unsigned int len) |
|
722 { |
|
723 int i; |
|
724 |
|
725 /* XXXX */ |
|
726 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
|
727 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && |
|
728 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) |
|
729 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) |
|
730 { |
|
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); |
|
732 return(-1); |
|
733 } |
|
734 |
|
735 for (;;) |
|
736 { |
|
737 clear_sys_error(); |
|
738 if (s->wbio != NULL) |
|
739 { |
|
740 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
|
741 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, |
|
742 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), |
|
743 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); |
|
744 } |
|
745 else |
|
746 { |
|
747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); |
|
748 i= -1; |
|
749 } |
|
750 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) |
|
751 { |
|
752 s->s3->wbuf.left=0; |
|
753 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
754 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); |
|
755 } |
|
756 else if (i <= 0) |
|
757 return(i); |
|
758 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i; |
|
759 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i; |
|
760 } |
|
761 } |
|
762 |
|
763 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
|
764 * 'type' is one of the following: |
|
765 * |
|
766 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
|
767 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
|
768 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
|
769 * |
|
770 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
|
771 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
|
772 * |
|
773 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
|
774 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
|
775 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
|
776 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
|
777 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
|
778 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
|
779 * Change cipher spec protocol |
|
780 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
|
781 * Alert protocol |
|
782 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
|
783 * Handshake protocol |
|
784 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
|
785 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
|
786 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
|
787 * Application data protocol |
|
788 * none of our business |
|
789 */ |
|
790 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
|
791 { |
|
792 int al,i,j,ret; |
|
793 unsigned int n; |
|
794 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
|
795 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
|
796 |
|
797 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
|
798 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
|
799 return(-1); |
|
800 |
|
801 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || |
|
802 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
|
803 { |
|
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
805 return -1; |
|
806 } |
|
807 |
|
808 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
|
809 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
|
810 { |
|
811 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
|
812 unsigned char *dst = buf; |
|
813 unsigned int k; |
|
814 |
|
815 /* peek == 0 */ |
|
816 n = 0; |
|
817 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
|
818 { |
|
819 *dst++ = *src++; |
|
820 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; |
|
821 n++; |
|
822 } |
|
823 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
|
824 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
|
825 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
|
826 return n; |
|
827 } |
|
828 |
|
829 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
|
830 |
|
831 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
|
832 { |
|
833 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
|
834 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
|
835 if (i < 0) return(i); |
|
836 if (i == 0) |
|
837 { |
|
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
|
839 return(-1); |
|
840 } |
|
841 } |
|
842 start: |
|
843 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
844 |
|
845 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
|
846 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
|
847 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
|
848 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
|
849 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
|
850 |
|
851 /* get new packet if necessary */ |
|
852 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
|
853 { |
|
854 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); |
|
855 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); |
|
856 } |
|
857 |
|
858 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
|
859 |
|
860 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
|
861 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
|
862 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
|
863 { |
|
864 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); |
|
866 goto f_err; |
|
867 } |
|
868 |
|
869 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
|
870 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
|
871 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
|
872 { |
|
873 rr->length=0; |
|
874 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
875 return(0); |
|
876 } |
|
877 |
|
878 |
|
879 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
|
880 { |
|
881 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
|
882 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
|
883 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
|
884 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
|
885 { |
|
886 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
|
888 goto f_err; |
|
889 } |
|
890 |
|
891 if (len <= 0) return(len); |
|
892 |
|
893 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
|
894 n = rr->length; |
|
895 else |
|
896 n = (unsigned int)len; |
|
897 |
|
898 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
|
899 if (!peek) |
|
900 { |
|
901 rr->length-=n; |
|
902 rr->off+=n; |
|
903 if (rr->length == 0) |
|
904 { |
|
905 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
|
906 rr->off=0; |
|
907 } |
|
908 } |
|
909 return(n); |
|
910 } |
|
911 |
|
912 |
|
913 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
|
914 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
|
915 |
|
916 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
|
917 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
|
918 */ |
|
919 { |
|
920 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; |
|
921 unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
|
922 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
|
923 |
|
924 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
|
925 { |
|
926 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
|
927 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
|
928 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; |
|
929 } |
|
930 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
|
931 { |
|
932 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; |
|
933 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; |
|
934 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; |
|
935 } |
|
936 |
|
937 if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
|
938 { |
|
939 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ |
|
940 if (rr->length < n) |
|
941 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ |
|
942 |
|
943 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
|
944 while (n-- > 0) |
|
945 { |
|
946 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
|
947 rr->length--; |
|
948 } |
|
949 |
|
950 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) |
|
951 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ |
|
952 } |
|
953 } |
|
954 |
|
955 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
|
956 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
|
957 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
|
958 |
|
959 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
|
960 if ((!s->server) && |
|
961 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
|
962 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
|
963 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
|
964 { |
|
965 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
|
966 |
|
967 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
|
968 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
|
969 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
|
970 { |
|
971 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
|
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
|
973 goto f_err; |
|
974 } |
|
975 |
|
976 if (s->msg_callback) |
|
977 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
|
978 |
|
979 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
|
980 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
|
981 !s->s3->renegotiate) |
|
982 { |
|
983 ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
|
984 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
|
985 { |
|
986 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
|
987 if (i < 0) return(i); |
|
988 if (i == 0) |
|
989 { |
|
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
|
991 return(-1); |
|
992 } |
|
993 |
|
994 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
|
995 { |
|
996 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
|
997 { |
|
998 BIO *bio; |
|
999 /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
|
1000 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
|
1001 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
|
1002 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
|
1003 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
|
1004 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
|
1005 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
|
1006 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
|
1007 return(-1); |
|
1008 } |
|
1009 } |
|
1010 } |
|
1011 } |
|
1012 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
|
1013 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ |
|
1014 goto start; |
|
1015 } |
|
1016 |
|
1017 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) |
|
1018 { |
|
1019 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; |
|
1020 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; |
|
1021 |
|
1022 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
|
1023 |
|
1024 if (s->msg_callback) |
|
1025 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
|
1026 |
|
1027 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
|
1028 cb=s->info_callback; |
|
1029 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
|
1030 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
|
1031 |
|
1032 if (cb != NULL) |
|
1033 { |
|
1034 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
|
1035 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
|
1036 } |
|
1037 |
|
1038 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
|
1039 { |
|
1040 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
|
1041 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
|
1042 { |
|
1043 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
|
1044 return(0); |
|
1045 } |
|
1046 } |
|
1047 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
|
1048 { |
|
1049 char tmp[16]; |
|
1050 |
|
1051 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
1052 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
|
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
|
1054 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
|
1055 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
|
1056 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
|
1057 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
|
1058 return(0); |
|
1059 } |
|
1060 else |
|
1061 { |
|
1062 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
|
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
|
1064 goto f_err; |
|
1065 } |
|
1066 |
|
1067 goto start; |
|
1068 } |
|
1069 |
|
1070 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ |
|
1071 { |
|
1072 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
|
1073 rr->length=0; |
|
1074 return(0); |
|
1075 } |
|
1076 |
|
1077 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
|
1078 { |
|
1079 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
|
1080 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
|
1081 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || |
|
1082 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
|
1083 { |
|
1084 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
|
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
|
1086 goto f_err; |
|
1087 } |
|
1088 |
|
1089 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ |
|
1090 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
|
1091 { |
|
1092 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
|
1094 goto f_err; |
|
1095 } |
|
1096 |
|
1097 rr->length=0; |
|
1098 |
|
1099 if (s->msg_callback) |
|
1100 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
|
1101 |
|
1102 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
|
1103 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
|
1104 goto err; |
|
1105 else |
|
1106 goto start; |
|
1107 } |
|
1108 |
|
1109 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
|
1110 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) |
|
1111 { |
|
1112 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
|
1113 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
|
1114 { |
|
1115 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
|
1116 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
|
1117 * protocol violations): */ |
|
1118 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
|
1119 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
|
1120 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
|
1121 #else |
|
1122 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
|
1123 #endif |
|
1124 s->new_session=1; |
|
1125 } |
|
1126 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
|
1127 if (i < 0) return(i); |
|
1128 if (i == 0) |
|
1129 { |
|
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
|
1131 return(-1); |
|
1132 } |
|
1133 |
|
1134 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
|
1135 { |
|
1136 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
|
1137 { |
|
1138 BIO *bio; |
|
1139 /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
|
1140 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
|
1141 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
|
1142 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
|
1143 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
|
1144 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
|
1145 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
|
1146 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
|
1147 return(-1); |
|
1148 } |
|
1149 } |
|
1150 goto start; |
|
1151 } |
|
1152 |
|
1153 switch (rr->type) |
|
1154 { |
|
1155 default: |
|
1156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
|
1157 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
|
1158 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
|
1159 { |
|
1160 rr->length = 0; |
|
1161 goto start; |
|
1162 } |
|
1163 #endif |
|
1164 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
|
1166 goto f_err; |
|
1167 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
|
1168 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
|
1169 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
|
1170 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
|
1171 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
|
1172 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
|
1173 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
|
1175 goto f_err; |
|
1176 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
|
1177 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
|
1178 * but have application data. If the library was |
|
1179 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
|
1180 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
|
1181 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
|
1182 * we will indulge it. |
|
1183 */ |
|
1184 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
|
1185 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
|
1186 (( |
|
1187 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
|
1188 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
|
1189 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
|
1190 ) || ( |
|
1191 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
|
1192 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
|
1193 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
|
1194 ) |
|
1195 )) |
|
1196 { |
|
1197 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
|
1198 return(-1); |
|
1199 } |
|
1200 else |
|
1201 { |
|
1202 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
|
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
|
1204 goto f_err; |
|
1205 } |
|
1206 } |
|
1207 /* not reached */ |
|
1208 |
|
1209 f_err: |
|
1210 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
|
1211 err: |
|
1212 return(-1); |
|
1213 } |
|
1214 |
|
1215 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
|
1216 { |
|
1217 int i; |
|
1218 const char *sender; |
|
1219 int slen; |
|
1220 |
|
1221 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) |
|
1222 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; |
|
1223 else |
|
1224 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; |
|
1225 |
|
1226 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) |
|
1227 { |
|
1228 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
|
1229 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); |
|
1230 } |
|
1231 |
|
1232 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) |
|
1233 return(0); |
|
1234 |
|
1235 /* we have to record the message digest at |
|
1236 * this point so we can get it before we read |
|
1237 * the finished message */ |
|
1238 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
|
1239 { |
|
1240 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
|
1241 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; |
|
1242 } |
|
1243 else |
|
1244 { |
|
1245 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
|
1246 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; |
|
1247 } |
|
1248 |
|
1249 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
|
1250 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), |
|
1251 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), |
|
1252 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); |
|
1253 |
|
1254 return(1); |
|
1255 } |
|
1256 |
|
1257 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
|
1258 { |
|
1259 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ |
|
1260 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); |
|
1261 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) |
|
1262 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ |
|
1263 if (desc < 0) return; |
|
1264 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ |
|
1265 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) |
|
1266 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
|
1267 |
|
1268 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
|
1269 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; |
|
1270 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; |
|
1271 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ |
|
1272 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
|
1273 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written |
|
1274 * some time in the future */ |
|
1275 } |
|
1276 |
|
1277 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
|
1278 { |
|
1279 int i,j; |
|
1280 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
|
1281 |
|
1282 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
|
1283 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); |
|
1284 if (i <= 0) |
|
1285 { |
|
1286 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
|
1287 } |
|
1288 else |
|
1289 { |
|
1290 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. |
|
1291 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, |
|
1292 * we will not worry too much. */ |
|
1293 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) |
|
1294 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
|
1295 |
|
1296 if (s->msg_callback) |
|
1297 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
|
1298 |
|
1299 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
|
1300 cb=s->info_callback; |
|
1301 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
|
1302 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
|
1303 |
|
1304 if (cb != NULL) |
|
1305 { |
|
1306 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
|
1307 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
|
1308 } |
|
1309 } |
|
1310 return(i); |
|
1311 } |