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1 EHLO [] |
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2 RSET |
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3 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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4 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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5 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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6 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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7 DATA |
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8 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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9 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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10 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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11 Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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12 Subject: Test message No.9 |
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13 Date: date-replacement-string- |
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14 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-1> |
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15 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
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16 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
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17 Content-Language: i-default |
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18 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
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19 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
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20 |
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21 This msg should be sent 4 times=20 |
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22 -Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients = |
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23 |
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24 should not appear in the msg header. |
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25 |
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26 -Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all = |
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27 the 'To' & 'Cc' |
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28 recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except = |
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29 the one to=20 |
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30 whom the mail is addressed to. |
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31 |
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32 |
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33 End of message. |
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34 |
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35 |
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36 . |
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37 RSET |
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38 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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39 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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40 DATA |
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41 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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42 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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43 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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44 Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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45 Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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46 Subject: Test message No.9 |
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47 Date: date-replacement-string- |
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48 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-2> |
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49 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
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50 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
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51 Content-Language: i-default |
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52 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
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53 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
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54 |
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55 This msg should be sent 4 times=20 |
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56 -Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients = |
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57 |
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58 should not appear in the msg header. |
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59 |
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60 -Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all = |
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61 the 'To' & 'Cc' |
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62 recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except = |
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63 the one to=20 |
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64 whom the mail is addressed to. |
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65 |
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66 |
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67 End of message. |
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68 |
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69 |
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70 . |
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71 RSET |
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72 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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73 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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74 DATA |
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75 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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76 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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77 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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78 Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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79 Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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80 Subject: Test message No.9 |
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81 Date: date-replacement-string- |
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82 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-3> |
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83 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
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84 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
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85 Content-Language: i-default |
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86 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
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87 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
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88 |
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89 This msg should be sent 4 times=20 |
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90 -Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients = |
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91 |
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92 should not appear in the msg header. |
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93 |
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94 -Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all = |
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95 the 'To' & 'Cc' |
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96 recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except = |
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97 the one to=20 |
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98 whom the mail is addressed to. |
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99 |
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100 |
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101 End of message. |
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102 |
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103 |
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104 . |
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105 RSET |
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106 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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107 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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108 DATA |
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109 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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110 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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111 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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112 Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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113 Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
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114 Subject: Test message No.9 |
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115 Date: date-replacement-string- |
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116 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-4> |
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117 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
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118 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
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119 Content-Language: i-default |
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120 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
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121 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
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122 |
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123 This msg should be sent 4 times=20 |
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124 -Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients = |
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125 |
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126 should not appear in the msg header. |
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127 |
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128 -Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all = |
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129 the 'To' & 'Cc' |
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130 recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except = |
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131 the one to=20 |
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132 whom the mail is addressed to. |
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133 |
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134 |
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135 End of message. |
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136 |
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137 |
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138 . |
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139 RSET |
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140 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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141 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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142 DATA |
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143 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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144 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
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145 To: <recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
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146 Subject: Test message No.8 - Long message (206KB) |
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147 Date: date-replacement-string- |
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148 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-5> |
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149 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
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150 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
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151 Content-Language: i-default |
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152 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
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153 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
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154 |
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155 INTRODUCTION |
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156 |
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157 1. The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for = |
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158 the human race. They have=20 |
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159 greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in "advanced" = |
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160 countries, but they have=20 |
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161 destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human = |
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162 beings to indignities, have led to=20 |
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163 widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical = |
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164 suffering as well) and have inflicted=20 |
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165 severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology = |
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166 will worsen the situation. It=20 |
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167 will certainly subject human beings to greater indignities and inflict = |
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168 greater damage on the natural world, it=20 |
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169 will probably lead to greater social disruption and psychological = |
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170 suffering, and it may lead to increased=20 |
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171 physical suffering even in "advanced" countries.=20 |
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172 |
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173 2. The industrial-technological system may survive or it may break down. If = |
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174 it survives, it MAY eventually=20 |
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175 achieve a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after = |
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176 passing through a long and very=20 |
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177 painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently reducing = |
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178 human beings and many other=20 |
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179 living organisms to engineered products and mere cogs in the social = |
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180 machine. Furthermore, if the system=20 |
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181 survives, the consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming = |
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182 or modifying the system so as=20 |
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183 to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.=20 |
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184 |
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185 3. If the system breaks down the consequences will still be very painful. = |
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186 But the bigger the system grows=20 |
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187 the more disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to = |
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188 break down it had best break down=20 |
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189 sooner rather than later.=20 |
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190 |
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191 4. We therefore advocate a revolution against the industrial system. This = |
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192 revolution may or may not make=20 |
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193 use of violence: it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process = |
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194 spanning a few decades. We=20 |
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195 can't predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the = |
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196 measures that those who hate the=20 |
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197 industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution = |
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198 against that form of society. This=20 |
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199 is not to be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not = |
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200 governments but the economic=20 |
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201 and technological basis of the present society.=20 |
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202 |
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203 5. In this article we give attention to only some of the negative = |
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204 developments that have grown out of the=20 |
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205 industrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention only = |
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206 briefly or ignore altogether.=20 |
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207 This does not mean that we regard these other developments as unimportant. = |
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208 For practical reasons we have=20 |
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209 to confine our discussion to areas that have received insufficient public = |
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210 attention or in which we have=20 |
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211 something new to say. For example, since there are well-developed = |
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212 environmental and wilderness=20 |
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213 movements, we have written very little about environmental degradation or = |
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214 the destruction of wild nature,=20 |
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215 even though we consider these to be highly important.=20 |
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216 |
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217 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM |
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218 |
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219 6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in a deeply troubled society. = |
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220 One of the most widespread=20 |
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221 manifestations of the craziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of = |
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222 the psychology of leftism can=20 |
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223 serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modern = |
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224 society in general.=20 |
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225 |
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226 7. But what is leftism? During the first half of the 20th century leftism = |
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227 could have been practically=20 |
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228 identified with socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not = |
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229 clear who can properly be called=20 |
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230 a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we have in mind mainly = |
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231 socialists, collectivists,=20 |
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232 "politically correct" types, feminists, gay and disability activists, = |
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233 animal rights activists and the like. But=20 |
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234 not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is a leftist. = |
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235 What we are trying to get at in=20 |
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236 discussing leftism is not so much a movement or an ideology as a = |
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237 psychological type, or rather a collection=20 |
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238 of related types. Thus, what we mean by "leftism" will emerge more clearly = |
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239 in the course of our discussion=20 |
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240 of leftist psychology (Also, see paragraphs 227-230.)=20 |
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241 |
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242 8. Even so, our conception of leftism will remain a good deal less clear = |
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243 than we would wish, but there=20 |
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244 doesn't seem to be any remedy for this. All we are trying to do is indicate = |
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245 in a rough and approximate way=20 |
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246 the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the main driving force = |
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247 of modern leftism. We by no=20 |
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248 means claim to be telling the WHOLE truth about leftist psychology. Also, = |
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249 our discussion is meant to=20 |
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250 apply to modern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to = |
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251 which our discussion could be=20 |
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252 applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th century.=20 |
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253 |
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254 9. The two psychological tendencies that underlie modern leftism we call = |
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255 "feelings of inferiority" and=20 |
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256 "oversocialization." Feelings of inferiority are characteristic of modern = |
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257 leftism as a whole, while=20 |
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258 oversocialization is characteristic only of a certain segment of modern = |
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259 leftism; but this segment is highly=20 |
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260 influential.=20 |
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261 |
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262 FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY |
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263 |
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264 10. By "feelings of inferiority" we mean not only inferiority feelings in = |
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265 the strictest sense but a whole=20 |
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266 spectrum of related traits: low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, = |
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267 depressive tendencies, defeatism,=20 |
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268 guilt, self-hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have such = |
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269 feelings (possibly more or less=20 |
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270 repressed) and that these feelings are decisive in determining the = |
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271 direction of modern leftism.=20 |
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272 |
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273 11. When someone interprets as derogatory almost anything that is said = |
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274 about him (or about groups with=20 |
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275 whom he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low = |
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276 self-esteem. This tendency is=20 |
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277 pronounced among minority rights advocates, whether or not they belong to = |
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278 the minority groups whose=20 |
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279 rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the words used to = |
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280 designate minorities. The terms=20 |
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281 "negro," "oriental," "handicapped" or "chick" for an African, an Asian, a = |
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282 disabled person or a woman=20 |
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283 originally had no derogatory connotation. "Broad" and "chick" were merely = |
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284 the feminine equivalents of=20 |
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285 "guy," "dude" or "fellow." The negative connotations have been attached to = |
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286 these terms by the activists=20 |
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287 themselves. Some animal rights advocates have gone so far as to reject the = |
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288 word "pet" and=20 |
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289 insist on its replacement by "animal companion." Leftist anthropologists go = |
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290 to great lengths to avoid saying=20 |
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291 anything about primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as = |
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292 negative. They want to replace=20 |
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293 the word "primitive" by "nonliterate." They seem almost paranoid about = |
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294 anything that might suggest that=20 |
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295 any primitive culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that = |
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296 primitive cultures ARE inferior=20 |
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297 to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish = |
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298 anthropologists.)=20 |
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299 |
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300 12. Those who are most sensitive about "politically incorrect" terminology = |
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301 are not the average black=20 |
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302 ghetto-dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a = |
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303 minority of activists, many of=20 |
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304 whom do not even belong to any "oppressed" group but come from privileged = |
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305 strata of society. Political=20 |
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306 correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have secure = |
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307 employment with comfortable=20 |
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308 salaries, and the majority of whom are heterosexual, white males from = |
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309 middle-class families.=20 |
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310 |
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311 13. Many leftists have an intense identification with the problems of = |
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312 groups that have an image of being=20 |
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313 weak (women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals), or = |
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314 otherwise inferior. The leftists=20 |
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315 themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They would never admit it = |
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316 to themselves that they have such=20 |
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317 feelings, but it is precisely because they do see these groups as inferior = |
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318 that they identify with their=20 |
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319 problems. (We do not suggest that women, Indians, etc., ARE inferior; we = |
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320 are only making a point about=20 |
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321 leftist psychology).=20 |
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322 |
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323 14. Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that women are as strong as = |
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324 capable as men. Clearly they=20 |
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325 are nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men. = |
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326 |
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327 |
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328 15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image of being strong, good = |
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329 and successful. They hate=20 |
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330 America, they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they hate = |
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331 rationality. The reasons that=20 |
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332 leftists give for hating the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with = |
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333 their real motives. They SAY they hate=20 |
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334 the West because it is warlike, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so = |
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335 forth, but where these same faults=20 |
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336 appear in socialist countries or in primitive cultures, the leftist finds = |
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337 excuses for them, or at best he=20 |
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338 GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whereas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out = |
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339 (and often greatly=20 |
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340 exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western civilization. Thus = |
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341 it is clear that these faults are not=20 |
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342 the leftist's real motive for hating America and the West. |
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343 He hates America and the West because they are strong and successful. = |
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344 |
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345 |
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346 16. Words like "self-confidence," "self-reliance," "initiative", = |
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347 "enterprise," "optimism," etc. play little role=20 |
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348 in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, = |
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349 pro-collectivist. He wants society to=20 |
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350 solve everyone's needs for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of = |
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351 person who has an inner sense of=20 |
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352 confidence in his own ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own = |
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353 needs. The leftist is=20 |
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354 antagonistic to the concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels = |
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355 like a loser.=20 |
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356 |
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357 17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftist intellectuals tend to focus on = |
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358 sordidness, defeat and despair, or=20 |
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359 else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there = |
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360 were no hope of accomplishing=20 |
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361 anything through rational calculation and all that was left was to immerse = |
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362 oneself in the sensations of the=20 |
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363 moment.=20 |
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364 |
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365 18. Modern leftist philosophers tend to dismiss reason, science, objective = |
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366 reality and to insist that=20 |
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367 everything is culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious = |
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368 questions about the foundations of=20 |
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369 scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of objective = |
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370 reality can be defined. But it is=20 |
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371 obvious that modern leftist philosophers are not simply cool-headed = |
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372 logicians systematically analyzing the=20 |
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373 foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their = |
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374 attack on truth and reality. They=20 |
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375 attack these concepts because of their own psychological needs. For one = |
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376 thing, their attack is an outlet for=20 |
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377 hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive = |
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378 for power. More importantly, the leftist=20 |
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379 hates science and rationality because=20 |
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380 they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and = |
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381 other beliefs as false (i.e. failed, inferior).=20 |
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382 The leftist's feelings of inferiority run so deep that he cannot tolerate = |
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383 any classification of some things as=20 |
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384 successful or superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also = |
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385 underlies the rejection by many=20 |
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386 leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of IQ tests. = |
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387 Leftists are antagonistic to genetic=20 |
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388 explanations of human abilities or behavior because such explanations tend = |
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389 to make some persons appear=20 |
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390 superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit = |
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391 or blame for an individual's ability or=20 |
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392 lack of it. Thus if a person is "inferior" it is not his fault, but = |
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393 society's, because he has not been brought up=20 |
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394 properly.=20 |
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395 |
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396 19. The leftist is not typically the kind of person whose feelings of = |
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397 inferiority make him a braggart, an=20 |
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398 egotist, a bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of = |
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399 person has not wholly lost faith in=20 |
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400 himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can = |
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401 still conceive of himself as having=20 |
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402 the capacity to be strong, and his efforts to make himself strong produce = |
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403 his unpleasant behavior. [1] But=20 |
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404 the leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so = |
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405 ingrained that he cannot conceive of=20 |
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406 himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence the collectivism of the = |
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407 leftist. He can feel strong only as=20 |
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408 a member of a large organization or a mass movement with which he = |
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409 identifies himself.=20 |
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410 |
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411 20. Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics. Leftists protest by = |
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412 lying down in front of vehicles,=20 |
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413 they intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These = |
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414 tactics may often be effective, but=20 |
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415 many leftists use them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER = |
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416 masochistic tactics. Self-hatred=20 |
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417 is a leftist trait.=20 |
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418 |
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419 21. Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated by compassion or by = |
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420 moral principle, and moral=20 |
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421 principle does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But = |
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422 compassion and moral principle=20 |
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423 cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent = |
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424 a component of leftist behavior;=20 |
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425 so is the drive for power. Moreover, much leftist behavior is not = |
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426 rationally calculated to be of benefit to the=20 |
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427 people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one = |
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428 believes that affirmative action is=20 |
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429 good for black people, does it make sense to demand affirmative action in = |
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430 hostile or dogmatic terms?=20 |
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431 Obviously it would be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory = |
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432 approach that would make at=20 |
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433 least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that = |
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434 |
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435 affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not = |
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436 take such an approach because it=20 |
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437 would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black people is not their = |
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438 real goal. Instead, race problems=20 |
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439 serve as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated = |
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440 need for power. In doing so they=20 |
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441 actually harm black people, because the activists' hostile attitude toward = |
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442 the white majority tends to=20 |
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443 intensify race hatred.=20 |
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444 |
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445 22. If our society had no social problems at all, the leftists would have = |
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446 to INVENT problems in order to=20 |
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447 provide themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.=20 |
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448 |
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449 23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend to be an accurate = |
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450 description of everyone who might=20 |
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451 be considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general = |
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452 tendency of leftism.=20 |
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453 |
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454 OVERSOCIALIZATION |
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455 |
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456 24. Psychologists use the term "socialization" to designate the process by = |
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457 which children are trained to=20 |
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458 think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if = |
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459 he believes in and obeys the=20 |
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460 moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that = |
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461 society. It may seem senseless to say=20 |
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462 that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a = |
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463 rebel. Nevertheless, the position can=20 |
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464 be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.=20 |
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465 |
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466 25. The moral code of our society is so demanding that no one can think, = |
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467 feel and act in a completely moral=20 |
|
468 way. For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet almost everyone = |
|
469 hates somebody at some time=20 |
|
470 or other, whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are so highly = |
|
471 socialized that the attempt to=20 |
|
472 think, feel and act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order to = |
|
473 avoid feelings of guilt, they=20 |
|
474 continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find = |
|
475 moral explanations for feelings=20 |
|
476 and actions that in reality have a non-moral origin. We use the term = |
|
477 "oversocialized" to describe such=20 |
|
478 people. [2]=20 |
|
479 |
|
480 26. Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a sense of = |
|
481 powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of=20 |
|
482 the most important means by which our society socializes children is by = |
|
483 making them feel ashamed of=20 |
|
484 behavior or speech that is contrary to society's expectations. If this is = |
|
485 overdone, or if a particular child is=20 |
|
486 especially susceptible to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of = |
|
487 HIMSELF. Moreover the thought=20 |
|
488 and the behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by = |
|
489 society's expectations than are those of=20 |
|
490 the lightly socialized person. The majority of people engage in a = |
|
491 significant amount of naughty behavior.=20 |
|
492 They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off = |
|
493 at work, they hate someone, they=20 |
|
494 say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get ahead of the = |
|
495 |
|
496 other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if he does = |
|
497 do them he generates in himself=20 |
|
498 a sense of shame and self-hatred. The oversocialized person cannot even = |
|
499 experience, without guilt,=20 |
|
500 thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot = |
|
501 think "unclean" thoughts. And=20 |
|
502 socialization is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to = |
|
503 confirm to many norms of behavior that=20 |
|
504 do not fall under the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person = |
|
505 is kept on a psychological leash=20 |
|
506 and spends his life running on rails that society has laid down for him. In = |
|
507 many oversocialized people this=20 |
|
508 results in a sense of constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe = |
|
509 hardship. We suggest that=20 |
|
510 oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings = |
|
511 inflict on one another.=20 |
|
512 |
|
513 27. We argue that a very important and influential segment of the modern = |
|
514 left is oversocialized and that=20 |
|
515 their oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction = |
|
516 of modern leftism. Leftists of the=20 |
|
517 oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the upper-middle = |
|
518 class. Notice that university=20 |
|
519 intellectuals (3) constitute the most highly socialized segment of our = |
|
520 society and also the most left-wing=20 |
|
521 segment.=20 |
|
522 |
|
523 28. The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his = |
|
524 psychological leash and assert his autonomy by=20 |
|
525 rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most = |
|
526 basic values of society. Generally=20 |
|
527 speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict with the = |
|
528 accepted morality. On the contrary, the=20 |
|
529 left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then = |
|
530 accuses mainstream society of=20 |
|
531 violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, = |
|
532 helping poor people, peace as=20 |
|
533 opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to = |
|
534 animals. More fundamentally,=20 |
|
535 the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take = |
|
536 care of the individual. All these=20 |
|
537 have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle = |
|
538 and=20 |
|
539 upper classes (4) for a long time. These values are explicitly or = |
|
540 implicitly expressed or presupposed in most=20 |
|
541 of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and = |
|
542 the educational system.=20 |
|
543 Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel = |
|
544 against these principles but justify=20 |
|
545 their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that = |
|
546 society is not living up to these=20 |
|
547 principles.=20 |
|
548 |
|
549 29. Here is an illustration of the way in which the oversocialized leftist = |
|
550 shows his real attachment to the=20 |
|
551 conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion = |
|
552 against it. Many leftists push for=20 |
|
553 affirmative action, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for = |
|
554 improved education in black=20 |
|
555 schools and more money for such schools; the way of life of the black = |
|
556 "underclass" they regard as a social=20 |
|
557 disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system, make him a = |
|
558 business executive, a lawyer, a=20 |
|
559 scientist just like upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will = |
|
560 reply that the last thing they want is to=20 |
|
561 make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they want to = |
|
562 preserve African American culture.=20 |
|
563 But in what does this preservation of African American culture consist? = |
|
564 |
|
565 It can hardly consist in anything more than eating black-style food, = |
|
566 listening to black-style music, wearing=20 |
|
567 black-style clothing and going to a black-style church or mosque. In other = |
|
568 words, it can express itself only=20 |
|
569 in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects more leftists of the = |
|
570 oversocialized type want to make the=20 |
|
571 black man conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him = |
|
572 study technical subjects, become=20 |
|
573 an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to = |
|
574 prove that black people are as good=20 |
|
575 as white. They want to make black fathers "responsible." they want black = |
|
576 gangs to become nonviolent, etc.=20 |
|
577 But these are exactly the values of the industrial-technological system. = |
|
578 The system couldn't care less what=20 |
|
579 kind of music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what = |
|
580 |
|
581 religion he believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a = |
|
582 respectable job, climbs the status ladder, is a=20 |
|
583 "responsible" parent, is nonviolent and so forth. In effect, however much = |
|
584 he may deny it, the oversocialized=20 |
|
585 leftist wants to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt = |
|
586 its values.=20 |
|
587 |
|
588 30. We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the oversocialized = |
|
589 type, NEVER rebel against the=20 |
|
590 fundamental values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some = |
|
591 oversocialized leftists have gone so=20 |
|
592 far as to rebel against one of modern society's most important principles = |
|
593 by engaging in physical violence.=20 |
|
594 By their own account, violence is for them a form of "liberation." In other = |
|
595 words, by committing violence=20 |
|
596 they break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into = |
|
597 them. Because they are=20 |
|
598 oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for them than for = |
|
599 others; hence their need to break=20 |
|
600 free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion in terms of = |
|
601 mainstream values. If they engage in=20 |
|
602 violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.=20 |
|
603 |
|
604 31. We realize that many objections could be raised to the foregoing = |
|
605 thumb-nail sketch of leftist=20 |
|
606 psychology. The real situation is complex, and anything like a complete = |
|
607 description of it would take=20 |
|
608 several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to = |
|
609 have indicated very roughly=20 |
|
610 the two most important tendencies in the psychology of modern leftism. = |
|
611 |
|
612 |
|
613 32. The problems of the leftist are indicative of the problems of our = |
|
614 society as a whole. Low self-esteem,=20 |
|
615 depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though = |
|
616 they are especially noticeable in=20 |
|
617 the left, they are widespread in our society. And today's society tries to = |
|
618 socialize us to a greater extent than=20 |
|
619 any previous society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to = |
|
620 exercise, how to make love, how to=20 |
|
621 raise our kids and so forth.=20 |
|
622 |
|
623 THE POWER PROCESS |
|
624 |
|
625 33. Human beings have a need (probably based in biology) for something that = |
|
626 we will call the "power=20 |
|
627 process." This is closely related to the need for power (which is widely = |
|
628 recognized) but is not quite the=20 |
|
629 same thing. The power process has four elem ents. The three most clear-cut = |
|
630 of these we call goal, effort=20 |
|
631 and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment = |
|
632 requires effort, and needs to=20 |
|
633 succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is = |
|
634 more difficult to define and may not=20 |
|
635 be necessary for everyone . We call it autonomy and will discuss it l ater = |
|
636 (paragraphs 42-44).=20 |
|
637 |
|
638 34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can have anything he wants = |
|
639 just by wishing for it. Such a=20 |
|
640 man has power, but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first = |
|
641 he will have a lot of fun, but=20 |
|
642 by and by he will become acutely bor ed and demoralized. Eventually he may = |
|
643 becom e clinically=20 |
|
644 depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies tend to become = |
|
645 decadent. This is not true of fighting=20 |
|
646 aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, = |
|
647 secure aristocracies that have no=20 |
|
648 need to exert themselve s usually become bored, hedonistic and demor = |
|
649 alized, even though they have=20 |
|
650 power. This shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward = |
|
651 which to exercise one's power.=20 |
|
652 |
|
653 35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the physical necessities = |
|
654 of life: food, water and whatever=20 |
|
655 clothing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured = |
|
656 aristocrat obtains these things=20 |
|
657 without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.=20 |
|
658 |
|
659 36. Nonattainment of important goals results in death if the goals are = |
|
660 physical necessities, and in frustration=20 |
|
661 if nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent = |
|
662 failure to attain goals throughout life=20 |
|
663 results in defeatism, low se lf-esteem or depression.=20 |
|
664 |
|
665 37. Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being = |
|
666 needs goals whose attainment=20 |
|
667 requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining = |
|
668 his goals.=20 |
|
669 |
|
670 SURROGATE ACTIVITIES |
|
671 |
|
672 38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and demoralized. For = |
|
673 example, the emperor Hirohito,=20 |
|
674 instead of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine = |
|
675 biology, a field in which he became=20 |
|
676 distinguished. When people do not have t o exert themselves to satisfy = |
|
677 their physical needs they often set=20 |
|
678 up artificial goals for themselves. In many cases they then pursue these = |
|
679 goals with the same energy and=20 |
|
680 emotional involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search = |
|
681 for physical necessities. Thus the=20 |
|
682 aristocrats of the Roman Empire had their literary pretentions; many = |
|
683 European aristocrats a few centuries=20 |
|
684 ago invested tremendous time and energy in hunting, though they certainly = |
|
685 didn't need the meat; other=20 |
|
686 aristocracies have competed for status through elaborate displays of = |
|
687 wealth;=20 |
|
688 and a few aristocrats, like Hiroh ito, have turned to science.=20 |
|
689 |
|
690 39. We use the term "surrogate activity" to designate an activity that is = |
|
691 directed toward an artificial goal=20 |
|
692 that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work = |
|
693 toward, or let us say, merely=20 |
|
694 for the sake of the "fulfillment" th at they get from pursuing the goal. = |
|
695 Here is a rule of thumb for the=20 |
|
696 identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much = |
|
697 time and energy to the pursuit of=20 |
|
698 goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote most of his time and energy = |
|
699 to satisfying his biological needs,=20 |
|
700 and if that effort required him to use his physical and mental facilities = |
|
701 in a varied and interesting way,=20 |
|
702 would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain goal X? If the = |
|
703 answer is no, then the person's=20 |
|
704 pursuit of a goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito's studies=20 |
|
705 in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity, since it is = |
|
706 pretty certain that if Hirohito had had=20 |
|
707 to spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to = |
|
708 obtain the necessities of life, he=20 |
|
709 would not have felt deprived because he didn't know all about the anatomy = |
|
710 and life-cycles of marine=20 |
|
711 animals. On the other hand the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not = |
|
712 a surrogate activity, because=20 |
|
713 most people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would = |
|
714 feel deprived if they passed their=20 |
|
715 lives without ever having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex. = |
|
716 (But pursuit of an excessive=20 |
|
717 amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.) = |
|
718 |
|
719 |
|
720 40. In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to = |
|
721 satisfy one's physical needs. It is=20 |
|
722 enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical = |
|
723 skill, then come to work on time=20 |
|
724 and exert very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements = |
|
725 are a moderate amount of=20 |
|
726 intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society = |
|
727 takes care of one from cradle=20 |
|
728 to grave. (Yes, there is an underclass that cannot take physical = |
|
729 necessities for granted, but we are speaking=20 |
|
730 here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern society = |
|
731 is full of surrogate activities.=20 |
|
732 These include scientific work, athletic achievement, humanitarian work, = |
|
733 artistic and literary creation,=20 |
|
734 climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far = |
|
735 |
|
736 beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical = |
|
737 satisfaction, and social activism when=20 |
|
738 it addresses issues that are not important for the activist personally, as = |
|
739 in the case of white activists who=20 |
|
740 work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always pure = |
|
741 surrogate activities, since for many=20 |
|
742 people they may be motivated in part by needs other than the need to have = |
|
743 some goal to pursue. Scientific=20 |
|
744 work may be motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by = |
|
745 a need to express feelings,=20 |
|
746 militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them, = |
|
747 these activities are in large part=20 |
|
748 surrogate activities. For example, the majority of scientists will probably = |
|
749 agree that the "fulfillment" they=20 |
|
750 get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they = |
|
751 earn.=20 |
|
752 |
|
753 41. For many if not most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying = |
|
754 than the pursuit of real goals ( that=20 |
|
755 is, goals that people would want to attain even if their need for the power = |
|
756 process were already fulfilled).=20 |
|
757 One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who = |
|
758 are deeply involved in surrogate=20 |
|
759 activities are never satisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker = |
|
760 constantly strives for more and more=20 |
|
761 wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the = |
|
762 next. The long-distance runner=20 |
|
763 drives himself to run always farther and faster. Many people who pursue = |
|
764 surrogate activities will say that=20 |
|
765 they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from the = |
|
766 "mundane" business of satisfying=20 |
|
767 their biological needs, but that it is because in our society the effort = |
|
768 |
|
769 needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More = |
|
770 importantly, in our society=20 |
|
771 people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by = |
|
772 functioning as parts of an immense=20 |
|
773 social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy = |
|
774 in pursuing their surrogate=20 |
|
775 activities. have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate = |
|
776 activities.=20 |
|
777 |
|
778 AUTONOMY |
|
779 |
|
780 42. Autonomy as a part of the power process may not be necessary for every = |
|
781 individual. But most people=20 |
|
782 need a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. = |
|
783 Their efforts must be=20 |
|
784 undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction = |
|
785 and control. Yet most people do=20 |
|
786 not have to exert this initiative, direction and control as single = |
|
787 individuals. It is usually enough to act as a=20 |
|
788 member of a SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among = |
|
789 themselves and make a=20 |
|
790 successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power = |
|
791 process will be served. But if they work=20 |
|
792 under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for = |
|
793 autonomous decision and=20 |
|
794 initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served. = |
|
795 |
|
796 The same is true when decisions are made on a collective bases if the group = |
|
797 making the collective decision=20 |
|
798 is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant [5]=20 |
|
799 |
|
800 43. It is true that some individuals seem to have little need for autonomy. = |
|
801 Either their drive for power is=20 |
|
802 weak or they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful = |
|
803 organization to which they belong.=20 |
|
804 And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be satisfied with a = |
|
805 purely physical sense of=20 |
|
806 power(the good combat soldier, who gets his sense of power by developing = |
|
807 fighting skills that he is quite=20 |
|
808 content to use in blind obedience to his superiors).=20 |
|
809 |
|
810 44. But for most people it is through the power process-having a goal, = |
|
811 making an AUTONOMOUS effort=20 |
|
812 and attaining t the goal-that self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of = |
|
813 power are acquired. When one does=20 |
|
814 not have adequate opportunity to go throughout the power process the = |
|
815 consequences are (depending on the=20 |
|
816 individual and on the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, = |
|
817 demoralization, low self-esteem,=20 |
|
818 inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, = |
|
819 hostility, spouse or child abuse,=20 |
|
820 insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating = |
|
821 disorders, etc. [6]=20 |
|
822 |
|
823 SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS |
|
824 |
|
825 45. Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur in any society, but in modern = |
|
826 industrial society they are=20 |
|
827 present on a massive scale. We aren't the first to mention that the world = |
|
828 today seems to be going crazy.=20 |
|
829 This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good reason = |
|
830 to believe that primitive man=20 |
|
831 suffered from less stress and frustration and was better satisfied with his = |
|
832 way of life than modern man is. It=20 |
|
833 is true that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse = |
|
834 of women and common among the=20 |
|
835 Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among some of the = |
|
836 American Indian tribes. But is=20 |
|
837 does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the kinds of problems that we have = |
|
838 listed in the preceding=20 |
|
839 paragraph were far less common among primitive peoples than they are in = |
|
840 modern society.=20 |
|
841 |
|
842 46. We attribute the social and psychological problems of modern society to = |
|
843 the fact that that society=20 |
|
844 requires people to live under conditions radically different from those = |
|
845 under which the human race evolved=20 |
|
846 and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that the = |
|
847 human race developed while=20 |
|
848 living under the earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already = |
|
849 written that we consider lack of=20 |
|
850 opportunity to properly experience the power process as the most important = |
|
851 of the abnormal conditions to=20 |
|
852 which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one. Before = |
|
853 dealing with disruption of the=20 |
|
854 power process as a source of social problems we will discuss some of the = |
|
855 other sources.=20 |
|
856 |
|
857 47. Among the abnormal conditions present in modern industrial society are = |
|
858 excessive density of=20 |
|
859 population, isolation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social = |
|
860 change and the break-down of natural=20 |
|
861 small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the = |
|
862 tribe.=20 |
|
863 |
|
864 48. It is well known that crowding increases stress and aggression. The = |
|
865 degree of crowding that exists=20 |
|
866 today and the isolation of man from nature are consequences of = |
|
867 technological progress. All pre-industrial=20 |
|
868 societies were predominantly rural. The industrial Revolution vastly = |
|
869 increased the size of cities and the=20 |
|
870 proportion of the population that lives in them, and modern agricultural = |
|
871 technology has made it possible for=20 |
|
872 the Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. = |
|
873 (Also, technology exacerbates the=20 |
|
874 effects of crowding because it puts increased disruptive powers in people's = |
|
875 hands. For example, a variety of=20 |
|
876 noise-making devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of = |
|
877 these devices is unrestricted,=20 |
|
878 people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise.=20 |
|
879 If their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by = |
|
880 the regulations... But if these=20 |
|
881 machines had never been invented there would have been no conflict and no = |
|
882 frustration generated by=20 |
|
883 them.)=20 |
|
884 |
|
885 49. For primitive societies the natural world (which usually changes only = |
|
886 slowly) provided a stable=20 |
|
887 framework and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it is = |
|
888 human society that dominates nature=20 |
|
889 rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very rapidly = |
|
890 owing to technological change.=20 |
|
891 Thus there is no stable framework.=20 |
|
892 |
|
893 50. The conservatives are fools: They whine about the decay of traditional = |
|
894 values, yet they enthusiastically=20 |
|
895 support technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never = |
|
896 occurs to them that you can't=20 |
|
897 make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a society = |
|
898 with out causing rapid changes=20 |
|
899 in all other aspects of the society as well, and that such rapid changes = |
|
900 inevitably break down traditional=20 |
|
901 values.=20 |
|
902 |
|
903 51.The breakdown of traditional values to some extent implies the breakdown = |
|
904 of the bonds that hold=20 |
|
905 together traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration of = |
|
906 small-scale social groups is also=20 |
|
907 promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt = |
|
908 individuals to move to new locations,=20 |
|
909 separating themselves from their communities. Beyond that, a technological = |
|
910 society HAS TO weaken=20 |
|
911 family ties and local communities if it is to function efficiently. In = |
|
912 modern society an individual's loyalty=20 |
|
913 must be first to the system and only secondarily to a small-scale = |
|
914 community, because if the internal=20 |
|
915 loyalties of small-scale small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty = |
|
916 to the system, such=20 |
|
917 communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system. = |
|
918 |
|
919 |
|
920 52. Suppose that a public official or a corporation executive appoints his = |
|
921 cousin, his friend or his co- |
|
922 religionist to a position rather than appointing the person best qualified = |
|
923 for the job. He has permitted=20 |
|
924 personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is = |
|
925 "nepotism" or "discrimination," both of=20 |
|
926 which are terrible sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies = |
|
927 that have done a poor job of=20 |
|
928 subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are = |
|
929 usually very inefficient. (Look at Latin=20 |
|
930 America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can tolerate only those = |
|
931 small-scale communities that are=20 |
|
932 emasculated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]=20 |
|
933 |
|
934 53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of communities have been = |
|
935 widely recognized as sources of=20 |
|
936 social problems. but we do not believe they are enough to account for the = |
|
937 extent of the problems that are=20 |
|
938 seen today.=20 |
|
939 |
|
940 54. A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crowded, yet their = |
|
941 inhabitants do not seem to have=20 |
|
942 suffered from psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In = |
|
943 America today there still are=20 |
|
944 uncrowded rural areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban = |
|
945 areas, though the problems tend to=20 |
|
946 be less acute in the rural areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the = |
|
947 decisive factor.=20 |
|
948 |
|
949 55. On the growing edge of the American frontier during the 19th century, = |
|
950 the mobility of the population=20 |
|
951 probably broke down extended families and small-scale social groups to at = |
|
952 least the same extent as these=20 |
|
953 are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by choice in = |
|
954 such isolation, having no=20 |
|
955 neighbors within several miles, that they belonged to no community at all, = |
|
956 yet they do not seem to have=20 |
|
957 developed problems as a result.=20 |
|
958 |
|
959 56.Furthermore, change in American frontier society was very rapid and = |
|
960 deep. A man might be born and=20 |
|
961 raised in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and fed largely = |
|
962 on wild meat; and by the time he=20 |
|
963 arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in an = |
|
964 ordered community with effective=20 |
|
965 law enforcement. This was a deeper change that that which typically occurs = |
|
966 in the life of a modern=20 |
|
967 individual, yet it does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In = |
|
968 fact, 19th century American=20 |
|
969 society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that of = |
|
970 today's society. [8]=20 |
|
971 |
|
972 57. The difference, we argue, is that modern man has the sense (largely = |
|
973 justified) that change is IMPOSED=20 |
|
974 on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely = |
|
975 justified) that he created change=20 |
|
976 himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of = |
|
977 his own choosing and made it into=20 |
|
978 a farm through his own effort. In those days an entire county might have = |
|
979 only a couple of hundred=20 |
|
980 inhabitants and was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern = |
|
981 county is. Hence the pioneer=20 |
|
982 farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the creation = |
|
983 of a new, ordered community.=20 |
|
984 One may well question whether the creation of this community was an = |
|
985 improvement, but at any rate it=20 |
|
986 satisfied the pioneer's need for the power process.=20 |
|
987 |
|
988 58. It would be possible to give other examples of societies in which there = |
|
989 has been rapid change and/or=20 |
|
990 lack of close community ties without he kind of massive behavioral = |
|
991 aberration that is seen in today's=20 |
|
992 industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social and = |
|
993 psychological problems in=20 |
|
994 modern society is the fact that people have insufficient opportunity to go = |
|
995 through the power process in a=20 |
|
996 normal way. We don't mean to say that modern society is the only one in = |
|
997 which the power process has been=20 |
|
998 disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have interfered = |
|
999 with the power ' process to a greater or=20 |
|
1000 lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the problem has become = |
|
1001 particularly acute. Leftism, at least=20 |
|
1002 in its recent=20 |
|
1003 (mid-to-late -20th century) form, is in part a symptom of deprivation with = |
|
1004 respect to the power process.=20 |
|
1005 |
|
1006 DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY |
|
1007 |
|
1008 59. We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those drives that can be = |
|
1009 satisfied with minimal effort; (2)=20 |
|
1010 those that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) = |
|
1011 those that cannot be adequately satisfied=20 |
|
1012 no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is the process of = |
|
1013 satisfying the drives of the=20 |
|
1014 second group. The more drives there are in the third group, the more there = |
|
1015 is frustration, anger, eventually=20 |
|
1016 defeatism, depression, etc.=20 |
|
1017 |
|
1018 60. In modern industrial society natural human drives tend to be pushed = |
|
1019 into the first and third groups, and=20 |
|
1020 the second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created = |
|
1021 drives.=20 |
|
1022 |
|
1023 61. In primitive societies, physical necessities generally fall into group = |
|
1024 2: They can be obtained, but only at=20 |
|
1025 the cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the = |
|
1026 physical necessities to everyone [9] in=20 |
|
1027 exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed into = |
|
1028 group 1. (There may be=20 |
|
1029 disagreement about whether the effort needed to hold a job is "minimal"; = |
|
1030 but usually, in lower- to middle- |
|
1031 level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of obedience. You = |
|
1032 sit or stand where you are told to sit=20 |
|
1033 or stand and do what you are told to do in the way you are told to do it. = |
|
1034 Seldom do you have to exert=20 |
|
1035 yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, = |
|
1036 so that the need for the power=20 |
|
1037 process is not well served.)=20 |
|
1038 |
|
1039 62. Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often remain in group 2 in = |
|
1040 modern society, depending on the=20 |
|
1041 situation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a = |
|
1042 particularly strong drive for status, the=20 |
|
1043 effort required to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy = |
|
1044 adequately the need for the power process.=20 |
|
1045 |
|
1046 63. So certain artificial needs have been created that fall into group 2, = |
|
1047 hence serve the need for the power=20 |
|
1048 process. Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make = |
|
1049 many people feel they need=20 |
|
1050 things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It = |
|
1051 requires serious effort to earn enough=20 |
|
1052 money to satisfy these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But = |
|
1053 see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern=20 |
|
1054 man must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of = |
|
1055 the artificial needs created by=20 |
|
1056 the advertising and marketing industry [11], and through surrogate = |
|
1057 activities.=20 |
|
1058 |
|
1059 64. It seems that for many people, maybe the majority, these artificial = |
|
1060 forms of the power process are=20 |
|
1061 insufficient. A theme that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social = |
|
1062 critics of the second half of the=20 |
|
1063 20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in = |
|
1064 modern society. (This=20 |
|
1065 purposelessness is often called by other names such as "anomic" or = |
|
1066 "middle-class vacuity.") We suggest=20 |
|
1067 that the so-called "identity crisis" is actually a search for a sense of = |
|
1068 purpose, often for commitment to a=20 |
|
1069 suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism is in large part = |
|
1070 a response to the purposelessness of=20 |
|
1071 modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for = |
|
1072 "fulfillment." But we think that for=20 |
|
1073 the majority of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment=20 |
|
1074 (that is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satisfactory = |
|
1075 fulfillment. In other words, it does not=20 |
|
1076 fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need = |
|
1077 can be fully satisfied only=20 |
|
1078 through activities that have some external goal, such as physical = |
|
1079 necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.=20 |
|
1080 |
|
1081 65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning money, climbing the = |
|
1082 status ladder or functioning=20 |
|
1083 as part of the system in some other way, most people are not in a position = |
|
1084 to pursue their goals=20 |
|
1085 AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else's employee as, as we pointed = |
|
1086 out in paragraph 61,=20 |
|
1087 must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way they are = |
|
1088 told to do it. Even most people=20 |
|
1089 who are in business for themselves have only limited autonomy. It is a = |
|
1090 chronic complaint of small-business=20 |
|
1091 persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government = |
|
1092 regulation. Some of these=20 |
|
1093 regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part government = |
|
1094 regulations are essential and=20 |
|
1095 inevitable parts of our extremely complex society. A large portion of small = |
|
1096 business today operates on the=20 |
|
1097 franchise system.=20 |
|
1098 It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that many of the = |
|
1099 franchise-granting companies=20 |
|
1100 require applicants for franchises to take a personality test that is = |
|
1101 designed to EXCLUDE those who have=20 |
|
1102 creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile = |
|
1103 to go along obediently with the=20 |
|
1104 franchise system. This excludes from small business many of the people who = |
|
1105 most need autonomy.=20 |
|
1106 |
|
1107 66. Today people live more by virtue of what the system does FOR them or TO = |
|
1108 them than by virtue of=20 |
|
1109 what they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more = |
|
1110 and more along channels laid=20 |
|
1111 down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system = |
|
1112 provides, the opportunities must be=20 |
|
1113 exploited in accord with the rules and regulations [13], and techniques = |
|
1114 prescribed by experts must be=20 |
|
1115 followed if there is to be a chance of success.=20 |
|
1116 |
|
1117 67. Thus the power process is disrupted in our society through a deficiency = |
|
1118 of real goals and a deficiency=20 |
|
1119 of autonomy in pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those = |
|
1120 human drives that fall into group=20 |
|
1121 3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how much effort = |
|
1122 one makes. One of these drives=20 |
|
1123 is the need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by other = |
|
1124 people; we have no control over these=20 |
|
1125 decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. ("We = |
|
1126 live in a world in which=20 |
|
1127 relatively few people - maybe 500 or 1,00 - make the important decisions" - = |
|
1128 Philip B. Heymann of Harvard=20 |
|
1129 Law School, quoted by Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our = |
|
1130 lives depend on whether=20 |
|
1131 safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained;=20 |
|
1132 on how much pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution = |
|
1133 into our air; on how skillful=20 |
|
1134 (or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job may depend on = |
|
1135 decisions made by government=20 |
|
1136 economists or corporation executives; and so forth. Most individuals are = |
|
1137 not in a position to secure=20 |
|
1138 themselves against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The = |
|
1139 individual's search for security is=20 |
|
1140 therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of powerlessness.=20 |
|
1141 |
|
1142 68. It may be objected that primitive man is physically less secure than = |
|
1143 modern man, as is shown by his=20 |
|
1144 shorter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than = |
|
1145 the amount of insecurity that is=20 |
|
1146 normal for human beings. but psychological security does not closely = |
|
1147 correspond with physical security.=20 |
|
1148 What makes us FEEL secure is not so much objective security as a sense of = |
|
1149 confidence in our ability to=20 |
|
1150 take care of ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by = |
|
1151 hunger, can fight in self-defense=20 |
|
1152 or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in these = |
|
1153 efforts, but he is by no means helpless=20 |
|
1154 against the things that threaten him. The modern individual on the other = |
|
1155 hand is threatened by many things=20 |
|
1156 against which he is helpless;=20 |
|
1157 nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, = |
|
1158 increasing taxes, invasion of his=20 |
|
1159 privacy by large organizations, nation-wide social or economic phenomena = |
|
1160 that may disrupt his way of=20 |
|
1161 life.=20 |
|
1162 |
|
1163 69. It is true that primitive man is powerless against some of the things = |
|
1164 that threaten him; disease for=20 |
|
1165 example. But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the = |
|
1166 nature of things, it is no one's fault,=20 |
|
1167 unless is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the = |
|
1168 modern individual tend to be=20 |
|
1169 MAN-MADE. They are not the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by = |
|
1170 other persons whose=20 |
|
1171 decisions he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he = |
|
1172 feels frustrated, humiliated and=20 |
|
1173 angry.=20 |
|
1174 |
|
1175 70. Thus primitive man for the most part has his security in his own hands = |
|
1176 (either as an individual or as a=20 |
|
1177 member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands = |
|
1178 of persons or=20 |
|
1179 organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able = |
|
1180 personally to influence them. So modern=20 |
|
1181 man's drive for security tends to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas = |
|
1182 (food, shelter, etc.) his security is=20 |
|
1183 assured at the cost of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he = |
|
1184 CANNOT attain security. (The foregoing=20 |
|
1185 greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a rough, = |
|
1186 general way how the condition of=20 |
|
1187 modern man differs from that of primitive man.)=20 |
|
1188 |
|
1189 71. People have many transitory drives or impulses that are necessary = |
|
1190 frustrated in modern life, hence fall=20 |
|
1191 into group 3. One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit = |
|
1192 fighting. In many situations it=20 |
|
1193 does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one may be in = |
|
1194 a hurry, or one may be in a=20 |
|
1195 mood to travel slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with the = |
|
1196 flow of traffic and obey the=20 |
|
1197 traffic signals. One may want to do one's work in a different way, but = |
|
1198 usually one can work only according=20 |
|
1199 to the rules laid down by one's employer. In many other ways as well, = |
|
1200 modern man is strapped down by a=20 |
|
1201 network of rules and regulations (explicit or implicit) that frustrate many = |
|
1202 of his impulses and thus interfere=20 |
|
1203 with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be disposed with, = |
|
1204 |
|
1205 because the are necessary for the functioning of industrial society. = |
|
1206 |
|
1207 |
|
1208 72. Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters = |
|
1209 that are irrelevant to the=20 |
|
1210 functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can = |
|
1211 believe in any religion we like (as=20 |
|
1212 long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We = |
|
1213 can go to bed with anyone we=20 |
|
1214 like (as long as we practice "safe sex"). We can do anything we like as = |
|
1215 long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But=20 |
|
1216 in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our = |
|
1217 behavior.=20 |
|
1218 |
|
1219 73. Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by = |
|
1220 the government. Control is often=20 |
|
1221 exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or = |
|
1222 manipulation, and by=20 |
|
1223 organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most = |
|
1224 large organizations use some=20 |
|
1225 form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. = |
|
1226 Propaganda is not limited to=20 |
|
1227 "commercials" and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously = |
|
1228 intended as propaganda by=20 |
|
1229 the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment = |
|
1230 programming is a powerful form of=20 |
|
1231 propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we = |
|
1232 have to go to work every day=20 |
|
1233 and follow our employer's orders. Legally there is=20 |
|
1234 nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people = |
|
1235 or from going into business for=20 |
|
1236 ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and = |
|
1237 there is room in the economy for only a=20 |
|
1238 limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only = |
|
1239 as someone else's employee.=20 |
|
1240 |
|
1241 74. We suggest that modern man's obsession with longevity, and with = |
|
1242 maintaining physical vigor and=20 |
|
1243 sexual attractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment = |
|
1244 resulting from deprivation with=20 |
|
1245 respect to the power process. The "mid-life crisis" also is such a symptom. = |
|
1246 So is the lack of interest in=20 |
|
1247 having children that is fairly common in modern society but almost = |
|
1248 unheard-of in primitive societies.=20 |
|
1249 |
|
1250 75. In primitive societies life is a succession of stages. The needs and = |
|
1251 purposes of one stage having been=20 |
|
1252 fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next = |
|
1253 stage. A young man goes through the=20 |
|
1254 power process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for = |
|
1255 fulfillment but to get meat that is=20 |
|
1256 necessary for food. (In young women the process is more complex, with = |
|
1257 greater emphasis on social power;=20 |
|
1258 we won't discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed = |
|
1259 through, the young man has no=20 |
|
1260 reluctance about settling down to the responsibilities of raising a family. = |
|
1261 (In contrast, some modern people=20 |
|
1262 indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking = |
|
1263 some kind of "fulfillment." We=20 |
|
1264 suggest that the=20 |
|
1265 fulfillment they need is adequate experience of the power process -- with = |
|
1266 real goals instead of the artificial=20 |
|
1267 goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised his = |
|
1268 children, going through the power=20 |
|
1269 process by providing them with the physi cal necessities, the primitive man = |
|
1270 feels tha t his work is done and=20 |
|
1271 he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many = |
|
1272 modern people, on the other=20 |
|
1273 hand, are disturbed by the prospect of death, as is shown by the amount of = |
|
1274 effort they expend trying to=20 |
|
1275 maintain their physical condition, appearance and health. We argue t hat = |
|
1276 this is due to unfulfillment=20 |
|
1277 resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to = |
|
1278 any use, have never gone through=20 |
|
1279 the power process using their bodies in a serious way.=20 |
|
1280 It is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical = |
|
1281 purposes, who fears the deteriora tion=20 |
|
1282 of age, but the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his body = |
|
1283 beyond walking from his car to=20 |
|
1284 his house. It is the man whose need for the power process has been = |
|
1285 satisfied during his life who is best=20 |
|
1286 prepared to accept the end of that life .=20 |
|
1287 |
|
1288 76. In response to the arguments of this section someone will say, "Society = |
|
1289 must find a way to give people=20 |
|
1290 the opportunity to go through the power process." For such people the value = |
|
1291 of the opportunity is destroyed=20 |
|
1292 by the very fact that society gives i t to them. What they need is to find = |
|
1293 or make their own opportunities. As=20 |
|
1294 long as the system GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a = |
|
1295 leash. To attain autonomy they=20 |
|
1296 must get off that leash. Manifesto Contents=20 |
|
1297 |
|
1298 |
|
1299 |
|
1300 HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST |
|
1301 |
|
1302 77. Not everyone in industrial-technological society suffers from = |
|
1303 psychological problems. Some people=20 |
|
1304 even profess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss = |
|
1305 some of the reasons why people=20 |
|
1306 differ so greatly in their response to modern society.=20 |
|
1307 |
|
1308 78. First, there doubtless are differences in the strength of the drive for = |
|
1309 power. Individuals with a weak=20 |
|
1310 drive for power may have relatively little need to go through the power = |
|
1311 process, or at least relatively little=20 |
|
1312 need for autonomy in the power pro cess. These are docile types who would = |
|
1313 have been happy as plantation=20 |
|
1314 darkies in the Old South. (We don't mean to sneer at "plantation darkies" = |
|
1315 of the Old South. To their credit,=20 |
|
1316 most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at = |
|
1317 people who ARE content with=20 |
|
1318 servitude.)=20 |
|
1319 |
|
1320 79. Some people may have some exceptional drive, in pursuing which they = |
|
1321 satisfy their need for the power=20 |
|
1322 process. For example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social = |
|
1323 status may spend their whole=20 |
|
1324 lives climbing the status ladder without ev er getting bored with that = |
|
1325 game.=20 |
|
1326 |
|
1327 80. People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and marketing = |
|
1328 techniques. Some people are so=20 |
|
1329 susceptible that, even if they make a great deal of money, they cannot = |
|
1330 satisfy their constant craving for the=20 |
|
1331 shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So = |
|
1332 they always f eel hard-pressed=20 |
|
1333 financially even if their income is large, and their cravings are = |
|
1334 frustrated.=20 |
|
1335 |
|
1336 81. Some people have low susceptibility to advertising and marketing = |
|
1337 techniques. These are the people=20 |
|
1338 who aren't interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their = |
|
1339 need for the power process.=20 |
|
1340 |
|
1341 82. People who have medium susceptibility to advertising and marketing = |
|
1342 techniques are able to earn=20 |
|
1343 enough money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but only at = |
|
1344 the cost of serious effort (putting=20 |
|
1345 in overtime, taking a second job, earning p romotions, etc.) Thus material = |
|
1346 acquisition s erves their need for=20 |
|
1347 the power process. But it does not necessarily follow that their need is = |
|
1348 fully satisfied. They may have=20 |
|
1349 insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of = |
|
1350 following orders) and some of their=20 |
|
1351 drives may be frustrated (e.g., security, aggression). (We are guilt y of = |
|
1352 oversimplification in paragraphs 80- |
|
1353 82 because we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is = |
|
1354 entirely a creation of the advertising=20 |
|
1355 and marketing industry. Of course it's not that simple.=20 |
|
1356 |
|
1357 83. Some people partly satisfy their need for power by identifying = |
|
1358 themselves with a powerful organization=20 |
|
1359 or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or = |
|
1360 an organization, adopts its=20 |
|
1361 goals as his own, then works toward these goals. When some of the goals are = |
|
1362 attained, the individual, even=20 |
|
1363 though his personal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the = |
|
1364 attainment of the goals, feels=20 |
|
1365 (through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had = |
|
1366 gone through the power=20 |
|
1367 process. This phenomenon was e xploited by the fascists, nazis and communis = |
|
1368 ts. Our society uses it, too,=20 |
|
1369 though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the U.S. = |
|
1370 (goal: punish Noriega). The U.S.=20 |
|
1371 invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attainment of goal).=20 |
|
1372 The U.S. went through the power process and many Ame ricans, because of = |
|
1373 their identification with the=20 |
|
1374 U.S., experienced the power process vicariously. Hence the widespread = |
|
1375 public approval of the Panama=20 |
|
1376 invasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the same phenomenon = |
|
1377 in armies, corporations,=20 |
|
1378 political parties, humanitarian organizations, rel igious or ideological = |
|
1379 movements. In particul ar, leftist=20 |
|
1380 movements tend to attract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for = |
|
1381 power. But for most people=20 |
|
1382 identification with a large organization or a mass movement does not fully = |
|
1383 satisfy the need for power.=20 |
|
1384 |
|
1385 84. Another way in which people satisfy their need for the power process is = |
|
1386 through surrogate activities. As=20 |
|
1387 we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity that is directed = |
|
1388 toward an artificial goal that the=20 |
|
1389 individual pursues for the sake of t he "fulfillment" that he gets from = |
|
1390 pursuing the goal, not because he=20 |
|
1391 needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is no practical motive = |
|
1392 for building enormous muscles,=20 |
|
1393 hitting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage = |
|
1394 stamps. Yet many people in our=20 |
|
1395 society devote t hemselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or stamp = |
|
1396 collecting. Some people are more=20 |
|
1397 "other-directed" than others, and therefore will more readily attack = |
|
1398 importance to a surrogate activity=20 |
|
1399 simply because the people around them treat it as important=20 |
|
1400 or because society tells them it is important. T hat is why some people get = |
|
1401 very serious abou t essentially=20 |
|
1402 trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly = |
|
1403 pursuits, whereas others who are=20 |
|
1404 more clear-sighted never see these things as anything but the surrogate = |
|
1405 activities that they are, and=20 |
|
1406 consequently never attach enou gh importance to them to satisfy their need = |
|
1407 for the power process in that=20 |
|
1408 way. It only remains to point out that in many cases a person's way of = |
|
1409 earning a living is also a surrogate=20 |
|
1410 activity. Not a PURE surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the = |
|
1411 activity is to gain the physical=20 |
|
1412 necessitie s and (for some people) social status and th e luxuries that = |
|
1413 advertising makes them want. But=20 |
|
1414 many people put into their=20 |
|
1415 work far more effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status = |
|
1416 they require, and this extra effort=20 |
|
1417 constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together with the = |
|
1418 emotional investment that accompanies=20 |
|
1419 it, i s one of the most potent forces acting toward the continual = |
|
1420 development and perfecting of the system,=20 |
|
1421 with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131). = |
|
1422 Especially, for the most creative=20 |
|
1423 scientists and engineers, work tends to be large ly a surrogate activity. = |
|
1424 This point is so im portant that is=20 |
|
1425 deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs = |
|
1426 87-92).=20 |
|
1427 |
|
1428 85. In this section we have explained how many people in modern society do = |
|
1429 satisfy their need for the=20 |
|
1430 power process to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the = |
|
1431 majority of people the need for the=20 |
|
1432 power process is not fully satisfied. In th e first place, those who have = |
|
1433 an insatiable drive for status, or who=20 |
|
1434 get firmly "hooked" or a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly = |
|
1435 enough with a movement or=20 |
|
1436 organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional = |
|
1437 personalities. Others are not fully=20 |
|
1438 satisfied with surrogate activities or by identification with an org = |
|
1439 anization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the=20 |
|
1440 second place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit = |
|
1441 regulation or through=20 |
|
1442 socialization,=20 |
|
1443 which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustration due to the = |
|
1444 impossibility of attaining cer tain=20 |
|
1445 goals and the necessity of restraining too many impulses.=20 |
|
1446 |
|
1447 86. But even if most people in industrial-technological society were well = |
|
1448 satisfied, we (FC) would still be=20 |
|
1449 opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider = |
|
1450 it demeaning to fulfill one's=20 |
|
1451 need for the power process through surr ogate activities or through = |
|
1452 identification w ith an organization,=20 |
|
1453 rather then through pursuit of real goals.=20 |
|
1454 |
|
1455 THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS |
|
1456 |
|
1457 87. Science and technology provide the most important examples of surrogate = |
|
1458 activities. Some scientists=20 |
|
1459 claim that they are motivated by "curiosity," that notion is simply absurd. = |
|
1460 Most scientists work on highly=20 |
|
1461 specialized problem that are not the obje ct of any normal curiosity. For = |
|
1462 example, is an astronomer, a=20 |
|
1463 mathematician or an entomologist curious about the properties of = |
|
1464 isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course=20 |
|
1465 not. Only a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about = |
|
1466 it only because chemistry is his=20 |
|
1467 surrogate activity. Is the c hemist curious about the appropriate classif = |
|
1468 ication of a new species of beetle?=20 |
|
1469 No. That question is of interest only to the entomologist, and he is = |
|
1470 interested in it only because entomology=20 |
|
1471 is his surrogate activity.=20 |
|
1472 If the chemist and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to = |
|
1473 obtain th e physical necessities,=20 |
|
1474 and if that effort e xercised their abilities in an interesting way but in = |
|
1475 some nonscientific pursuit, then they=20 |
|
1476 couldn't giver a damn about isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification = |
|
1477 of beetles. Suppose that lack of=20 |
|
1478 funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist t o become an = |
|
1479 insurance broker instead of a ch emist.=20 |
|
1480 In that case he would have been very interested in insurance matters but = |
|
1481 would have cared nothing about=20 |
|
1482 isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to put into the = |
|
1483 satisfaction of mere curiosity the=20 |
|
1484 amount of time and effort that scient ists put into their work. The = |
|
1485 "curiosity" ex planation for the scientists'=20 |
|
1486 motive just doesn't stand up.=20 |
|
1487 |
|
1488 88. The "benefit of humanity" explanation doesn't work any better. Some = |
|
1489 scientific work has no=20 |
|
1490 conceivable relation to the welfare of the human race - most of archaeology = |
|
1491 or comparative linguistics for=20 |
|
1492 example. Some other areas of science present obvio usly dangerous = |
|
1493 possibilities. Yet scientists in these=20 |
|
1494 areas are just as enthusiastic about their work as those who develop = |
|
1495 vaccines or study air pollution.=20 |
|
1496 Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional = |
|
1497 involvement in promoting nuclear=20 |
|
1498 power plants. Did this involvement stem f rom a desire to benefit humanity? = |
|
1499 If so, the n why didn't Dr.=20 |
|
1500 Teller get emotional about other "humanitarian" causes? If he was such a = |
|
1501 humanitarian then why did he=20 |
|
1502 help to develop the H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, = |
|
1503 |
|
1504 it is very much open to question whether nuclear power plants ac tually do = |
|
1505 benefit humanity. Does the=20 |
|
1506 cheap e lectricity outweigh the accumulating waste and risk of accidents? = |
|
1507 Dr. Teller saw only one side of=20 |
|
1508 the question. Clearly his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose = |
|
1509 not from a desire to "benefit=20 |
|
1510 humanity" but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from = |
|
1511 seeing it put to practical use.=20 |
|
1512 |
|
1513 89. The same is true of scientists generally. With possible rare = |
|
1514 exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity=20 |
|
1515 nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power = |
|
1516 process: to have a goal (a scientific=20 |
|
1517 problem to solve), to make an eff ort (research) and to attain the goal = |
|
1518 (solut ion of the problem.) Science is=20 |
|
1519 a surrogate activity because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment = |
|
1520 they get out of the work itself.=20 |
|
1521 |
|
1522 90. Of course, it's not that simple. Other motives do play a role for many = |
|
1523 scientists. Money and status for=20 |
|
1524 example. Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable = |
|
1525 drive for status (see paragraph=20 |
|
1526 79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt = |
|
1527 the majo rity of scientists, like=20 |
|
1528 the majority of the general population, are more or less susceptible to = |
|
1529 advertising and marketing techniques=20 |
|
1530 and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus = |
|
1531 science is not a PURE surrogate=20 |
|
1532 activity. But it is in large part a surrogate activity.=20 |
|
1533 |
|
1534 91. Also, science and technology constitute a mass power movement, and many = |
|
1535 scientists gratify their need=20 |
|
1536 for power through identification with this mass movement (see paragraph = |
|
1537 83).=20 |
|
1538 |
|
1539 92. Thus science marches on blindly, without regard to the real welfare of = |
|
1540 the human race or to any other=20 |
|
1541 standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of = |
|
1542 the government officials and=20 |
|
1543 corporation executives who provide the fu nds for research.=20 |
|
1544 |
|
1545 THE NATURE OF FREEDOM |
|
1546 |
|
1547 93. We are going to argue that industrial-technological society cannot be = |
|
1548 reformed in such a way as to=20 |
|
1549 prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But = |
|
1550 because "freedom" is a word=20 |
|
1551 that can be interpreted in many ways, we must fi rst make clear what kind = |
|
1552 of freedom we are c oncerned=20 |
|
1553 with.=20 |
|
1554 |
|
1555 94. By "freedom" we mean the opportunity to go through the power process, = |
|
1556 with real goals not the=20 |
|
1557 artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, = |
|
1558 manipulation or supervision from anyone,=20 |
|
1559 especially from any large organization. Freed om means being in control = |
|
1560 (either as an indi vidual or as a=20 |
|
1561 member of a SMALL group) of the life-and-death issues of one's existence; = |
|
1562 food, clothing, shelter and=20 |
|
1563 defense against whatever threats there may be in one's environment. Freedom = |
|
1564 means having power; not the=20 |
|
1565 power to control other people but the power to control the circumstances of = |
|
1566 on e's own life. One does not=20 |
|
1567 have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organization) has power = |
|
1568 over one, no matter how=20 |
|
1569 benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. = |
|
1570 |
|
1571 It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permissivene ss (see = |
|
1572 paragraph 72).=20 |
|
1573 |
|
1574 95. It is said that we live in a free society because we have a certain = |
|
1575 number of constitutionally guaranteed=20 |
|
1576 rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal = |
|
1577 freedom that exists in a society=20 |
|
1578 is determined more by the economi c and technological structure of the = |
|
1579 society than by its laws or its form=20 |
|
1580 of government. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England were = |
|
1581 monarchies, and many of the cities=20 |
|
1582 of the Italian Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading = |
|
1583 about these societies one gets the=20 |
|
1584 impression that they allowed far more personal freedom than out society = |
|
1585 does. In part this was because=20 |
|
1586 they lacked efficient mechanisms for enforcing the ruler's will: There were = |
|
1587 no modern, well-organized=20 |
|
1588 police forces, no rapid long-distance communications,=20 |
|
1589 no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of information abou t the lives of = |
|
1590 average citizens. Hence it wa s=20 |
|
1591 relatively easy to evade control.=20 |
|
1592 |
|
1593 96. As for our constitutional rights, consider for example that of freedom = |
|
1594 of the press. We certainly don't=20 |
|
1595 mean to knock that right: it is very important tool for limiting = |
|
1596 concentration of political power and for=20 |
|
1597 keeping those who do have political po wer in line by publicly exposing any = |
|
1598 misbeha vior on their part.=20 |
|
1599 But freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an = |
|
1600 individual. The mass media are=20 |
|
1601 mostly under the control of large organizations that are integrated into = |
|
1602 the system. Anyone who has a little=20 |
|
1603 money can have some thing printed, or can distribute it on the I nternet or = |
|
1604 in some such way, but what he=20 |
|
1605 has to say will be swamped by the vast volume of material put out by the = |
|
1606 media, hence it will have no=20 |
|
1607 practical effect.=20 |
|
1608 To make an impression on society with words is therefore almost impossible = |
|
1609 for most individual s and=20 |
|
1610 small groups. Take us (FC) for example . If we had never done anything = |
|
1611 violent and had submitted the=20 |
|
1612 present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been = |
|
1613 accepted. If they had been accepted and=20 |
|
1614 published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because = |
|
1615 it's more fun to watch the=20 |
|
1616 entertainment put out by the me dia than to read a sober essay. Even if = |
|
1617 these writings had had many=20 |
|
1618 readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read = |
|
1619 as their minds were flooded=20 |
|
1620 by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our = |
|
1621 message before the public with=20 |
|
1622 some chance of makin g a lasting impression, we've had to kill people. = |
|
1623 |
|
1624 |
|
1625 97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but they do not serve = |
|
1626 to guarantee much more than what=20 |
|
1627 could be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the = |
|
1628 bourgeois conception, a "free" man=20 |
|
1629 is essentially an element of a social ma chine and has only a certain set = |
|
1630 of prescrib ed and delimited=20 |
|
1631 freedoms; freedoms that are designed to serve the needs of the social = |
|
1632 machine more than those of the=20 |
|
1633 individual. Thus the bourgeois's "free" man has economic freedom because = |
|
1634 that promotes growth and=20 |
|
1635 progress; he has freedom of the press b ecause public criticism restrains = |
|
1636 misbehavio r by political leaders;=20 |
|
1637 he has a rights to a fair trial because imprisonment at the whim of the = |
|
1638 powerful would be bad for the=20 |
|
1639 system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar.=20 |
|
1640 To him, people deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress = |
|
1641 (progress as conceived by the=20 |
|
1642 bourgeois). Ot her bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom = |
|
1643 as a mere means to collective=20 |
|
1644 ends. Chester C. Tan, "Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century," = |
|
1645 page 202, explains the=20 |
|
1646 philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: "An individual is granted = |
|
1647 rights because he is a=20 |
|
1648 member of soc iety and his community life requires such rights. By = |
|
1649 community Hu meant the whole=20 |
|
1650 society of the nation." And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum = |
|
1651 Chang (Chang Chun-mai,=20 |
|
1652 head of the State Socialist Party in China) freedom had to be used in the = |
|
1653 interest of the state and of the=20 |
|
1654 people as a whole. But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it = |
|
1655 only as someone else=20 |
|
1656 prescribes?=20 |
|
1657 FC's conception of freedom is not that of Bolivar, Hu, Chang or other = |
|
1658 bourgeois theorists. The trouble with=20 |
|
1659 such theorists is that they have made the develop ment and application of = |
|
1660 social theories thei r surrogate=20 |
|
1661 activity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the needs of the = |
|
1662 theorists more than the needs of=20 |
|
1663 any people who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which the = |
|
1664 theories are imposed.=20 |
|
1665 |
|
1666 98. One more point to be made in this section: It should not be assumed = |
|
1667 that a person has enough freedom=20 |
|
1668 just because he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by = |
|
1669 psychological control of which=20 |
|
1670 people are unconscious, and moreover many peopl e's ideas of what = |
|
1671 constitutes freedom are go verned=20 |
|
1672 more by social convention than by their real needs. For example, it's = |
|
1673 likely that many leftists of the=20 |
|
1674 oversocialized type would say that most people, including themselves are = |
|
1675 socialized too little rather than=20 |
|
1676 too much, yet the oversocialized lefti st pays a heavy psychological price = |
|
1677 for his high level of socialization.=20 |
|
1678 |
|
1679 SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY |
|
1680 |
|
1681 99. Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic = |
|
1682 component that consists of=20 |
|
1683 unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular = |
|
1684 component that consists of long-term=20 |
|
1685 historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends. = |
|
1686 |
|
1687 |
|
1688 100. FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term = |
|
1689 historical trend, then the=20 |
|
1690 effect of that change will almost always be transitory - the trend will = |
|
1691 soon revert to its original state.=20 |
|
1692 (Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a = |
|
1693 society rarely has more than a=20 |
|
1694 short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption = |
|
1695 creeps back in. The level of political=20 |
|
1696 corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only = |
|
1697 slowly with the evolution of the=20 |
|
1698 society. Normally, a p olitical cleanup will be permanent only if a = |
|
1699 ccompanied by widespread social=20 |
|
1700 changes; a SMALL change in the society won't be enough.) If a small change = |
|
1701 in a long-term historical=20 |
|
1702 trend appears to be permanent, i |
|
1703 t is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is = |
|
1704 already moving, s o that the trend is=20 |
|
1705 not altered but only pus hed a step ahead.=20 |
|
1706 |
|
1707 101. The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable = |
|
1708 with respect to small changes, it=20 |
|
1709 would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other = |
|
1710 words it would not be a long- |
|
1711 term trend at all.=20 |
|
1712 |
|
1713 102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to = |
|
1714 alter permanently a long-term=20 |
|
1715 historical trend, than it will alter the society as a whole. In other = |
|
1716 words, a society is a system in which all=20 |
|
1717 parts are interrelated, and you can't permanently change any important part = |
|
1718 witho ut change all the other=20 |
|
1719 parts as well.=20 |
|
1720 |
|
1721 103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter = |
|
1722 permanently a long-term trend,=20 |
|
1723 then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in = |
|
1724 advance. (Unless various other=20 |
|
1725 societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the = |
|
1726 same consequenc es, in which=20 |
|
1727 case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes = |
|
1728 through the same change will be=20 |
|
1729 like to experience similar consequences.)=20 |
|
1730 |
|
1731 104. FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. = |
|
1732 That is, you cannot plan=20 |
|
1733 out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to = |
|
1734 function as it was designed to.=20 |
|
1735 |
|
1736 105. The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human = |
|
1737 societies. A change in human=20 |
|
1738 behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; = |
|
1739 the economy will affect the=20 |
|
1740 environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the = |
|
1741 environment will affec t human=20 |
|
1742 behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of = |
|
1743 causes and effects is far too=20 |
|
1744 complex to be untangled and understood.=20 |
|
1745 |
|
1746 106. FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the = |
|
1747 form of their society.=20 |
|
1748 Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under = |
|
1749 rational human control.=20 |
|
1750 |
|
1751 107. The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.=20 |
|
1752 |
|
1753 108. To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt = |
|
1754 at social reform either acts in the=20 |
|
1755 direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely = |
|
1756 accelerates a change that would have=20 |
|
1757 occurred in any case) or else it o nly has a transitory effect, so that the = |
|
1758 soc iety soon slips back into its old=20 |
|
1759 groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any = |
|
1760 important aspect of a society,=20 |
|
1761 reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not = |
|
1762 necessarily involve an armed=20 |
|
1763 uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second p rinciple, a = |
|
1764 revolution never changes only one=20 |
|
1765 aspect of a society; and by the third principle changes occur that were = |
|
1766 never expected or desired by the=20 |
|
1767 revolutionaries.=20 |
|
1768 By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind = |
|
1769 of society, it never works out as=20 |
|
1770 planned.=20 |
|
1771 |
|
1772 109. The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The = |
|
1773 American "Revolution" was not a=20 |
|
1774 revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by = |
|
1775 a rather far-reaching political=20 |
|
1776 reform. The Founding Fathers did not change t he direction of development = |
|
1777 of American soci ety, nor did=20 |
|
1778 they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society = |
|
1779 from the retarding effect of=20 |
|
1780 British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but = |
|
1781 only pushed American political=20 |
|
1782 culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of = |
|
1783 which A merican society was an off- |
|
1784 shoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative = |
|
1785 democracy. And prior to the War=20 |
|
1786 of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant = |
|
1787 |
|
1788 degree of representative democracy in the colonial ass emblies. The = |
|
1789 political system established by the=20 |
|
1790 Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial = |
|
1791 assemblies. With major alteration, to=20 |
|
1792 be sure - there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important = |
|
1793 step. But it was a step along the=20 |
|
1794 road the English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that = |
|
1795 Britai n and all of its colonies that=20 |
|
1796 were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with = |
|
1797 systems of representative=20 |
|
1798 democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding = |
|
1799 Fathers had lost their nerve and=20 |
|
1800 declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today = |
|
1801 would not have been significantly=20 |
|
1802 different.=20 |
|
1803 Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had = |
|
1804 a Parliament and Prime=20 |
|
1805 Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the = |
|
1806 American Revolution provides not a=20 |
|
1807 counterexample to our principles but a go od illustration of them.=20 |
|
1808 |
|
1809 110. Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They = |
|
1810 are expressed in imprecise=20 |
|
1811 language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them = |
|
1812 can be found. So we present these=20 |
|
1813 principles not as inviolable laws but as rule s of thumb, or guides to = |
|
1814 thinking, that may provide a partial=20 |
|
1815 antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should = |
|
1816 be borne constantly in mind, and=20 |
|
1817 whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should = |
|
1818 carefully reexamine one's thinking=20 |
|
1819 and retain the conclusio n only if one has good, solid reasons for do ing = |
|
1820 so.=20 |
|
1821 |
|
1822 INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE REFORMED |
|
1823 |
|
1824 111. The foregoing principles help to show how hopelessly difficult it = |
|
1825 would be to reform the industrial=20 |
|
1826 system in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our = |
|
1827 sphere of freedom. There has been=20 |
|
1828 a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolution for = |
|
1829 technology to strengthen the=20 |
|
1830 system at a high cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence any = |
|
1831 change designed to protect=20 |
|
1832 freedom from technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the = |
|
1833 development of our society.=20 |
|
1834 |
|
1835 Consequently, such a change either would be a transitory one -- soon = |
|
1836 swamped by the tide of history -- or,=20 |
|
1837 if large enough to be permanent would alter the nature of our whole = |
|
1838 society. This by the first and second=20 |
|
1839 principles. Moreover, since society wo uld be altered in a way that could = |
|
1840 not be pr edicted in advance (third=20 |
|
1841 principle) there would be great risk. Changes large enough to make a = |
|
1842 lasting difference in favor of freedom=20 |
|
1843 would not be initiated because it would realized that they would gravely = |
|
1844 disrupt the system. So any=20 |
|
1845 attempts at reform w ould be too timid to be effective. Even if c hanges = |
|
1846 large enough to make a lasting=20 |
|
1847 difference were initiated, they would be retracted when their disruptive = |
|
1848 effects became apparent. Thus,=20 |
|
1849 permanent changes=20 |
|
1850 in favor of freedom could be brought about only by persons prepared to = |
|
1851 accept radical, dangero us and=20 |
|
1852 unpredictable alteration of the entir e system. In other words, by = |
|
1853 revolutionaries, not reformers.=20 |
|
1854 |
|
1855 112. People anxious to rescue freedom without sacrificing the supposed = |
|
1856 benefits of technology will suggest=20 |
|
1857 naive schemes for some new form of society that would reconcile freedom = |
|
1858 with technology. Apart from the=20 |
|
1859 fact that people who make suggestions sel dom propose any practical means = |
|
1860 by which the new form of=20 |
|
1861 society could be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth = |
|
1862 principle that even if the new form of=20 |
|
1863 society could be once established, it either would collapse or would give = |
|
1864 results very different from those=20 |
|
1865 expected.=20 |
|
1866 |
|
1867 113. So even on very general grounds it seems highly improbably that any = |
|
1868 way of changing society could=20 |
|
1869 be found that would reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next = |
|
1870 few sections we will give more=20 |
|
1871 specific reasons for concluding that freedo m and technological progress = |
|
1872 are incompatibl e.=20 |
|
1873 |
|
1874 |
|
1875 |
|
1876 RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY |
|
1877 |
|
1878 |
|
1879 |
|
1880 114. As explained in paragraph 65-67, 70-73, modern man is strapped down by = |
|
1881 a network of rules and=20 |
|
1882 regulations, and his fate depends on the actions of persons remote from him = |
|
1883 whose decisions he cannot=20 |
|
1884 influence. This is not accidental or a result of t he arbitrariness of = |
|
1885 arrogant bureaucrats. I t is necessary and=20 |
|
1886 inevitable in any technologically advanced society. The system HAS TO = |
|
1887 regulate human behavior closely=20 |
|
1888 in order to function. At work, people have to do what they are told to do, = |
|
1889 otherwise production would be=20 |
|
1890 thrown into chaos. Bureaucra cies HAVE TO be run according to rigid rules . = |
|
1891 To allow any substantial=20 |
|
1892 personal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt the system and = |
|
1893 lead to charges of unfairness=20 |
|
1894 due to differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their = |
|
1895 discretion.=20 |
|
1896 It is true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but = |
|
1897 GENERALLY S PEAKING the=20 |
|
1898 regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for the = |
|
1899 functioning of industrial-technological=20 |
|
1900 society. The result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the average = |
|
1901 person. It may be, however, that=20 |
|
1902 formal regulations will ten d increasingly to be replaced by psychologic al = |
|
1903 tools that make us want to do=20 |
|
1904 what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14], educational techniques, = |
|
1905 "mental health" programs, etc.)=20 |
|
1906 |
|
1907 115. The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways that are increasingly = |
|
1908 remote from the natural=20 |
|
1909 pattern of human behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, = |
|
1910 mathematicians and engineers. It can't=20 |
|
1911 function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in = |
|
1912 these fields. It isn't natural for an=20 |
|
1913 adolescent human being to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk = |
|
1914 absorbed in study. A normal=20 |
|
1915 adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. = |
|
1916 Among primitive peoples the=20 |
|
1917 things that children are trained to do are in natural harmony with natural = |
|
1918 h uman impulses. Among the=20 |
|
1919 American Indians, for example, boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits = |
|
1920 -- just the sort of things that=20 |
|
1921 boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical = |
|
1922 subjects,=20 |
|
1923 which most do grudgingly.=20 |
|
1924 |
|
1925 117. In any technologically advanced society the individual's fate MUST = |
|
1926 depend on decisions that he=20 |
|
1927 personally cannot influence to any great extent. A technological society = |
|
1928 cannot be broken down into small,=20 |
|
1929 autonomous communities, because production de pends on the cooperation of = |
|
1930 very large numbe rs of=20 |
|
1931 people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of the = |
|
1932 affected individuals has, on the=20 |
|
1933 average, only a one-millionth share in making the decision. What usually = |
|
1934 happens in practice is that=20 |
|
1935 decisions are made by public officials or corporation executives, or by = |
|
1936 technical spe cialists, but even when=20 |
|
1937 the public votes on a decision the number of voters ordinarily is too large = |
|
1938 for the vote of any one individual=20 |
|
1939 to be significant. [17]=20 |
|
1940 Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major = |
|
1941 decisions that affect their l ives. Their=20 |
|
1942 is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. = |
|
1943 The system tries to "solve" this=20 |
|
1944 problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have = |
|
1945 been made for them, but even=20 |
|
1946 if this "solution" were completely successful in making people feel better, = |
|
1947 it would be demeaning.=20 |
|
1948 |
|
1949 118 Conservatives and some others advocate more "local autonomy." Local = |
|
1950 communities once did have=20 |
|
1951 autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local = |
|
1952 communities become more=20 |
|
1953 enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, = |
|
1954 computer networks, highway=20 |
|
1955 syste ms, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. = |
|
1956 Also operating against=20 |
|
1957 autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects = |
|
1958 people at other locations far=20 |
|
1959 away. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contam inate the = |
|
1960 water supply hundreds of miles=20 |
|
1961 dow nstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.=20 |
|
1962 |
|
1963 119. The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, = |
|
1964 it is human behavior that has to=20 |
|
1965 be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the = |
|
1966 political or social ideology that=20 |
|
1967 may pretend to guide the technolog ical system. It is the fault of = |
|
1968 technology, because the system is guided=20 |
|
1969 not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does = |
|
1970 satisfy many human needs, but=20 |
|
1971 generally speaking it does this only to the extent that it is to the = |
|
1972 advantage of the system to do it. It is the=20 |
|
1973 needs of the system that are paramount, not those of the human being. For = |
|
1974 example, the system provides=20 |
|
1975 people with food because the system couldn't function if everyone starved; = |
|
1976 |
|
1977 it attends to people's psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do = |
|
1978 so, because it couldn't=20 |
|
1979 function if too many people be came depressed or rebellious. But the system = |
|
1980 , for good, solid, practical=20 |
|
1981 reasons, must exert constant pressure on people to mold their behavior to = |
|
1982 the needs of the system. Too=20 |
|
1983 much waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system, = |
|
1984 environmentalists,=20 |
|
1985 everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about recycling. Need mo re = |
|
1986 technical personnel? A=20 |
|
1987 chorus of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask whether = |
|
1988 it is inhumane to force=20 |
|
1989 adolescents to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them = |
|
1990 hate. When skilled workers are=20 |
|
1991 put out of a job by tec hnical advances and have to undergo "retrain ing," = |
|
1992 no one asks=20 |
|
1993 whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in this way. It is = |
|
1994 simply taken for granted that=20 |
|
1995 everyone must bow to technical necessity and for good reason: If human = |
|
1996 needs were put before technical=20 |
|
1997 necessity there would be econo mic problems, unemployment, shortages or wor = |
|
1998 se. The concept of "mental=20 |
|
1999 health" in our society is defined largely by the extent to which an = |
|
2000 individual behaves in accord with the=20 |
|
2001 needs of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.=20 |
|
2002 |
|
2003 120. Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and for autonomy within = |
|
2004 the system are no better than a=20 |
|
2005 joke. For example, one company, instead of having each of its employees = |
|
2006 assemble only one section of a=20 |
|
2007 catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalog ue, and this was supposed to = |
|
2008 give them a sen se of purpose=20 |
|
2009 and achievement. Some companies have tried to give their employees more = |
|
2010 autonomy in their work, but for=20 |
|
2011 practical reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, = |
|
2012 and in any case employees are=20 |
|
2013 never given autonomy as to ultima te goals -- their "autonomous" efforts = |
|
2014 can n ever be directed toward=20 |
|
2015 goals that they select personally, but only toward their employer's goals, = |
|
2016 such as the survival and growth of=20 |
|
2017 the company. Any company would=20 |
|
2018 soon go out of business if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. = |
|
2019 Similarly, in any enterprise within a=20 |
|
2020 socialist system, worker s must direct their efforts toward the goals of = |
|
2021 the enterprise, otherwise the=20 |
|
2022 enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the system. Once again, = |
|
2023 for purely technical reasons it is not=20 |
|
2024 possible for most individuals or small groups to have much autono my in = |
|
2025 industrial society. Even the=20 |
|
2026 small-bus iness owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the = |
|
2027 necessity of government=20 |
|
2028 regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must fit into the economic = |
|
2029 system and conform to its=20 |
|
2030 requirements. For instance, when someone develops a new technology , the = |
|
2031 small-business person often=20 |
|
2032 has to use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain = |
|
2033 competitive.=20 |
|
2034 |
|
2035 |
|
2036 |
|
2037 THE 'BAD' PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'GOOD' = |
|
2038 PARTS |
|
2039 |
|
2040 |
|
2041 |
|
2042 121. A further reason why industrial society cannot be reformed in favor of = |
|
2043 freedom is that modern=20 |
|
2044 technology is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one = |
|
2045 another. You can't get rid of the=20 |
|
2046 "bad" parts of technology and retain only the "g ood" parts. Take modern = |
|
2047 medicine, for exampl e. Progress=20 |
|
2048 in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, = |
|
2049 computer science and other fields.=20 |
|
2050 Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can = |
|
2051 be made available only by a=20 |
|
2052 technologically progressive, econ omically rich society. Clearly you can't = |
|
2053 hav e much progress in medicine=20 |
|
2054 without the whole technological system and everything that goes with it. = |
|
2055 |
|
2056 |
|
2057 122. Even if medical progress could be maintained without the rest of the = |
|
2058 technological system, it would by=20 |
|
2059 itself bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is = |
|
2060 discovered. People with a genetic=20 |
|
2061 tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as well as = |
|
2062 an yone else. Natural selection=20 |
|
2063 against genes for diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout = |
|
2064 the population. (This may be=20 |
|
2065 occurring to some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be = |
|
2066 controlled through the use of=20 |
|
2067 insulin.) The s ame thing will happen with many other diseas es = |
|
2068 susceptibility to which is affected by=20 |
|
2069 genetic degradation of the population. The only solution will be some sort = |
|
2070 of eugenics program or=20 |
|
2071 extensive genetic engineering of human beings,=20 |
|
2072 so that man in the future will no longer be a creation of nature, or of = |
|
2073 chance, or of God (depending on your=20 |
|
2074 rel igious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.=20 |
|
2075 |
|
2076 123. If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, = |
|
2077 just wait till the government=20 |
|
2078 starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such = |
|
2079 regulation will inevitably follow the=20 |
|
2080 introduction of genetic engineering of hum an beings, because the = |
|
2081 consequences of unreg ulated genetic=20 |
|
2082 engineering would be disastrous. [19]=20 |
|
2083 |
|
2084 124. The usual response to such concerns is to talk about "medical ethics." = |
|
2085 But a code of ethics would not=20 |
|
2086 serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only = |
|
2087 make matters worse. A code of=20 |
|
2088 ethics applicable to genetic engineering wo uld be in effect a means of = |
|
2089 regulating the g enetic constitution=20 |
|
2090 of human beings. Somebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would = |
|
2091 decide that such and such=20 |
|
2092 applications of genetic engineering were "ethical" and others were not, so = |
|
2093 that in effect they would be=20 |
|
2094 imposing their own values on th e genetic constitution of the population at = |
|
2095 large. Even if a code of ethics=20 |
|
2096 were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be = |
|
2097 imposing their own values on any=20 |
|
2098 minorities who might have a=20 |
|
2099 different idea of what constituted an "ethical" use of genetic engineering. = |
|
2100 The only code of e thics that=20 |
|
2101 would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic = |
|
2102 engineering of human beings, and=20 |
|
2103 you can be sure that no such code will ever be applied in a technological = |
|
2104 society. No code that reduced=20 |
|
2105 genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for long, because the = |
|
2106 temptatio n presented by the=20 |
|
2107 immense power of biotechn ology would be irresistible, especially since to = |
|
2108 the majority of people many of=20 |
|
2109 its applications will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating = |
|
2110 physical and mental diseases,=20 |
|
2111 giving people the abilities they need to get along in today's world). In = |
|
2112 evitably, genetic engineering will be=20 |
|
2113 used e xtensively, but only in ways consistent with the needs of the = |
|
2114 industrial-technological system. [20]=20 |
|
2115 |
|
2116 TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR=20 |
|
2117 FREEDOM |
|
2118 |
|
2119 125. It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and = |
|
2120 freedom, because=20 |
|
2121 technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually = |
|
2122 encroaches on freedom through=20 |
|
2123 REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at = |
|
2124 the outset owns the same=20 |
|
2125 amount of land, but one of whom is more powerful than the other. The = |
|
2126 powerful one demands a piece of=20 |
|
2127 the other's land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, "OK, let's = |
|
2128 compromise. Give me half of=20 |
|
2129 what I asked." The weak one has little choice but to give in. Some time = |
|
2130 later the powerful neighbor demand=20 |
|
2131 s another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By = |
|
2132 forcing a long series of compromises=20 |
|
2133 on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his land. So it = |
|
2134 goes in the conflict between=20 |
|
2135 technology and freedom.=20 |
|
2136 |
|
2137 126. Let us explain why technology is a more powerful social force than the = |
|
2138 aspiration for freedom.=20 |
|
2139 |
|
2140 127. A technological advance that appears not to threaten freedom often = |
|
2141 turns out to threaten freedom often=20 |
|
2142 turns out to threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider = |
|
2143 motorized transport. A walking man=20 |
|
2144 formerly could go where he pleased, g o at his own pace without observing = |
|
2145 any traf fic regulations, and=20 |
|
2146 was independent of technological support-systems. When motor vehicles were = |
|
2147 introduced they appeared to=20 |
|
2148 increase man's freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no = |
|
2149 one had to have an=20 |
|
2150 automobile if he didn't want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an = |
|
2151 automobile could travel much=20 |
|
2152 faster than the walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport = |
|
2153 soon changed society in such a=20 |
|
2154 way as to restrict greatly man's freedom of locomotion. When automobiles = |
|
2155 became numerous,=20 |
|
2156 it became necessary to regulate their use e xtensively. In a car, = |
|
2157 especially in densely populated areas, one=20 |
|
2158 cannot just go where one likes at one's own pace one's movement is governed = |
|
2159 by the flow of traffic and by=20 |
|
2160 various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obligations: license = |
|
2161 requirements, driver test, renewing=20 |
|
2162 registration, insuran ce, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments = |
|
2163 on purchase price. Moreover,=20 |
|
2164 the use of motorized transport is no longer optional. Since the = |
|
2165 introduction of motorized transport the=20 |
|
2166 arrangement of our cities has changed in such a way that the majority of = |
|
2167 people no longer live within=20 |
|
2168 walking di stance of their place of employment, shoppin g areas and = |
|
2169 recreational opportunities, so that they=20 |
|
2170 HAVE TO depend on the automobile for transportation.=20 |
|
2171 Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they have even = |
|
2172 less control over their own=20 |
|
2173 movement than when driving a car. Even the wal ker's freedom is now greatly = |
|
2174 restricted. In the city he=20 |
|
2175 continually has to stop and wait for traffic lights that are designed = |
|
2176 mainly to serve auto traffic. In the=20 |
|
2177 country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along the = |
|
2178 highway. (Note the important=20 |
|
2179 point we have illustrated with t he case of motorized transport: When a new = |
|
2180 i tem of technology is=20 |
|
2181 introduced as an option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, = |
|
2182 it does not necessarily REMAIN=20 |
|
2183 optional. In many cases the new technology changes society in such a way = |
|
2184 that people eventually find=20 |
|
2185 themselves FORCED to use i t.)=20 |
|
2186 |
|
2187 128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE continually narrows our sphere = |
|
2188 of freedom, each new=20 |
|
2189 technical advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. = |
|
2190 Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid=20 |
|
2191 long-distance communications . . . how could one argue against any of these = |
|
2192 things, or against any other of=20 |
|
2193 the innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would = |
|
2194 have been absurd to resist the=20 |
|
2195 introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and = |
|
2196 no disadvantages. Yet as we=20 |
|
2197 explained in paragraphs 59-76, all th ese technical advances taken together = |
|
2198 have c reated world in which=20 |
|
2199 the average man's fate is no longer in his own hands or in the hands of his = |
|
2200 neighbors and friends, but in=20 |
|
2201 those of politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous = |
|
2202 technicians=20 |
|
2203 and bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] = |
|
2204 The same process wi ll continue=20 |
|
2205 in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few people will = |
|
2206 resist the introduction of a genetic=20 |
|
2207 technique that eliminates a hereditary disease It does no apparent harm and = |
|
2208 prevents much suffering. Yet a=20 |
|
2209 large number of genetic impr ovements taken together will make the human = |
|
2210 being into an engineered=20 |
|
2211 product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or whatever, = |
|
2212 depending on your religious beliefs).=20 |
|
2213 |
|
2214 129 Another reason why technology is such a powerful social force is that, = |
|
2215 within the context of a given=20 |
|
2216 society, technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never = |
|
2217 be reversed. Once a technical=20 |
|
2218 innovation has been introduced, people us ually become dependent on it, = |
|
2219 unless it is r eplaced by some still=20 |
|
2220 more advanced innovation. Not only do people become dependent as = |
|
2221 individuals on a new item of=20 |
|
2222 technology, but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. = |
|
2223 (Imagine what would happen=20 |
|
2224 to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.) Thus the = |
|
2225 system can move in only one=20 |
|
2226 direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces = |
|
2227 freedom to take a step back --=20 |
|
2228 short of the overthrow of the whole technological system.=20 |
|
2229 |
|
2230 130. Technology advances with great rapidity and threatens freedom at many = |
|
2231 different points at the same=20 |
|
2232 time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals = |
|
2233 on large organizations,=20 |
|
2234 propaganda and other psychological techniques, g enetic engineering, = |
|
2235 invasion of privacy thro ugh=20 |
|
2236 surveillance devices and computers, etc.) To hold back any ONE of the = |
|
2237 threats to freedom would require a=20 |
|
2238 long different social struggle. Those who want to protect freedom are = |
|
2239 overwhelmed by the sheer number of=20 |
|
2240 new attacks and the rapidity with which t hey develop, hence they become = |
|
2241 pathetic and no longer resist. To=20 |
|
2242 fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success can be hoped = |
|
2243 for only by fighting the=20 |
|
2244 technological system as a whole; but that is revolution not reform. = |
|
2245 |
|
2246 |
|
2247 131. Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to describe all those = |
|
2248 who perform a specialized task=20 |
|
2249 that requires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their = |
|
2250 surrogate activity) that when a conflict=20 |
|
2251 arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost always decide = |
|
2252 in fa vor of their technical=20 |
|
2253 work. This is obvious in the case of scientists, but it also appears = |
|
2254 elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian=20 |
|
2255 groups, conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or = |
|
2256 other psychological techniques to=20 |
|
2257 help them achieve thei r laudable ends. Corporations and government = |
|
2258 agencies, when they find it useful, do=20 |
|
2259 not hesitate to collect information about individuals without regard to = |
|
2260 their privacy. Law enforcement=20 |
|
2261 agencies are=20 |
|
2262 frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects and = |
|
2263 often of completely innocent=20 |
|
2264 persons, and they do whatever they can do l egally (or sometimes illegally) = |
|
2265 to restrict or circumvent those=20 |
|
2266 rights. Most of these educators, government officials and law officers = |
|
2267 believe in freedom, privacy and=20 |
|
2268 constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they = |
|
2269 usually feel that t heir work is more=20 |
|
2270 important.=20 |
|
2271 |
|
2272 132. It is well known that people generally work better and more = |
|
2273 persistently when striving for a reward=20 |
|
2274 than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists = |
|
2275 and other technicians are=20 |
|
2276 motivated mainly by the rewards they get throu gh their work. But those who = |
|
2277 oppose technilo giccal=20 |
|
2278 invasions of freedom are working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently = |
|
2279 there are a few who work=20 |
|
2280 persistently and well at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved = |
|
2281 a signal victory that seemed to set=20 |
|
2282 up a solid barrier against further e rosion of freedom through = |
|
2283 technological prog ress, most would tend to=20 |
|
2284 relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits. But the = |
|
2285 scientists would remain busy in their=20 |
|
2286 laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways,=20 |
|
2287 in spite of any barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals = |
|
2288 and make them always more=20 |
|
2289 depend ent on the system.=20 |
|
2290 |
|
2291 133. No social arrangements, whether laws, institutions, customs or ethical = |
|
2292 codes, can provide permanent=20 |
|
2293 protection against technology. History shows that all social arrangements = |
|
2294 are transitory; they all change or=20 |
|
2295 break down eventually. But technologic al advances are permanent within the = |
|
2296 context of a given=20 |
|
2297 civilization. Suppose for example that it were possible to arrive at some = |
|
2298 social arrangements that would=20 |
|
2299 prevent genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent = |
|
2300 it from being applied in such a=20 |
|
2301 ways as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology would remain = |
|
2302 waiting. Sooner or later the=20 |
|
2303 social arrangement would break down. Probably sooner, given that pace of = |
|
2304 change in our society. Then=20 |
|
2305 genetic engineering would begin to invade our=20 |
|
2306 sphere of freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short of a = |
|
2307 breakdo wn of technological=20 |
|
2308 civilization itself). An y illusions about achieving anything permanent = |
|
2309 through social arrangements should=20 |
|
2310 be dispelled by what is currently happening with environmental legislation. = |
|
2311 A few years ago it seemed that=20 |
|
2312 there were secure legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the w orst = |
|
2313 forms of environmental=20 |
|
2314 degradation. A c hange in the political wind, and those barriers begin to = |
|
2315 crumble.=20 |
|
2316 |
|
2317 134. For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a more powerful social = |
|
2318 force than the aspiration for=20 |
|
2319 freedom. But this statement requires an important qualification. It appears = |
|
2320 that during the next several=20 |
|
2321 decades the industrial-technological syst em will be undergoing severe = |
|
2322 stresses due to economic and=20 |
|
2323 environmental problems, and especially due to problems of human behavior = |
|
2324 (alienation, rebellion, hostility,=20 |
|
2325 a variety of social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the = |
|
2326 stresses through which the system is=20 |
|
2327 likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least weaken it suff = |
|
2328 iciently so that a revolution occurs and=20 |
|
2329 is successful, then at that particular moment the aspiration for freedom = |
|
2330 will have proved more powerful=20 |
|
2331 than technology.=20 |
|
2332 |
|
2333 135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak neighbor who is left = |
|
2334 destitute by a strong neighbor=20 |
|
2335 who takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compromises. But = |
|
2336 suppose now that the strong=20 |
|
2337 neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak = |
|
2338 neighbor can force the str ong one to=20 |
|
2339 give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man = |
|
2340 survive and only forces him to give his=20 |
|
2341 land back, he is a fool, because when the strong man gets well he will = |
|
2342 again take all the land for himself.=20 |
|
2343 The only sensible alternat ive for the weaker man is to kill the strong one = |
|
2344 while he has the chance. In the=20 |
|
2345 same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we = |
|
2346 compromise with it and let it=20 |
|
2347 recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom. = |
|
2348 |
|
2349 |
|
2350 SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED INTRACTABLE |
|
2351 |
|
2352 136. If anyone still imagines that it would be possible to reform the = |
|
2353 system in such a way as to protect=20 |
|
2354 freedom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most = |
|
2355 part unsuccessfully our society=20 |
|
2356 has dealt with other social problems that a re far more simple and = |
|
2357 straightforward. Amon g other things, the=20 |
|
2358 system has failed to stop environmental degradation, political corruption, = |
|
2359 drug trafficking or domestic=20 |
|
2360 abuse.=20 |
|
2361 |
|
2362 137. Take our environmental problems, for example. Here the conflict of = |
|
2363 values is straightforward:=20 |
|
2364 economic expedience now versus saving some of our natural resources for our = |
|
2365 grandchildren [22] But on=20 |
|
2366 this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfus cation from the people = |
|
2367 who have power, and n othing=20 |
|
2368 like a clear, consistent line of action, and we keep on piling up = |
|
2369 environmental problems that our=20 |
|
2370 grandchildren will have to live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental = |
|
2371 issue consist of struggles and=20 |
|
2372 compromises between different factions, som e of which are ascendant at one = |
|
2373 moment, othe rs at another=20 |
|
2374 moment. The line of struggle changes with the shifting currents of public = |
|
2375 opinion. This is not a rational=20 |
|
2376 process, or is it one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful = |
|
2377 solution to the problem.=20 |
|
2378 Major social problems, if they get "so lved" at all, are rarely or never = |
|
2379 solved thr ough any rational,=20 |
|
2380 comprehensive plan. They just work themselves out through a process in = |
|
2381 which various competing groups=20 |
|
2382 pursing their own usually short-term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by = |
|
2383 luck) at some more or less stable=20 |
|
2384 modus vivendi. In fact, t he principles we formulated in paragraphs 10 = |
|
2385 0-106 make it seem doubtful that=20 |
|
2386 rational, long-term social planning can EVER be successful. 138. Thus it is = |
|
2387 clear that the human race has at=20 |
|
2388 best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward = |
|
2389 social problems. How then is it=20 |
|
2390 going to solve the far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling = |
|
2391 freedom with technology?=20 |
|
2392 Technology presents clear-cut material advantages,=20 |
|
2393 whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different = |
|
2394 people, and its loss is easily=20 |
|
2395 obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.=20 |
|
2396 |
|
2397 139. And note this important difference: It is conceivable that our = |
|
2398 environmental problems (for example)=20 |
|
2399 may some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this = |
|
2400 happens it will be only because=20 |
|
2401 it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these problems. But = |
|
2402 it is NOT in the interest of the=20 |
|
2403 system to preserve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is = |
|
2404 in the interest of the system to=20 |
|
2405 bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. Thus, = |
|
2406 while practical considerations=20 |
|
2407 may eventually force the system to take a rational, prudent approach to = |
|
2408 environmental problems, equally=20 |
|
2409 practical considerations will force the system to regulate human behavior = |
|
2410 ever more closely (preferably by=20 |
|
2411 indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom.)=20 |
|
2412 This isn't just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. = |
|
2413 Wilson) have stressed the importance of=20 |
|
2414 "socializing" people more effectively. |
|
2415 |
|
2416 |
|
2417 |
|
2418 REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM |
|
2419 |
|
2420 140. We hope we have convinced the reader that the system cannot be = |
|
2421 reformed in a such a way as to=20 |
|
2422 reconcile freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense with the = |
|
2423 industrial-technological=20 |
|
2424 system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed = |
|
2425 uprising, but certainly a radical and=20 |
|
2426 fundamental change in the nature of society.=20 |
|
2427 |
|
2428 141. People tend to assume that because a revolution involves a much = |
|
2429 greater change than reform does, it is=20 |
|
2430 more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain = |
|
2431 circumstances revolution is much=20 |
|
2432 easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can inspire = |
|
2433 an intensity of commitment=20 |
|
2434 that a reform movement cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers to = |
|
2435 solve a particular social=20 |
|
2436 problem A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke = |
|
2437 and create a whole new=20 |
|
2438 world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great risks = |
|
2439 and make great sacrifices. For this=20 |
|
2440 reasons it would be much easier to overthrow the whole technological system = |
|
2441 than to put effective,=20 |
|
2442 permanent restraints on the development of application of any one segment = |
|
2443 of technology, s |
|
2444 uch as genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of = |
|
2445 people may devote themselves=20 |
|
2446 passionately=20 |
|
2447 to a revolution against the industrial-technological system. As we noted in = |
|
2448 paragraph 132, reformers=20 |
|
2449 seeking to limite certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a = |
|
2450 negative outcome. But=20 |
|
2451 revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward -- fulfillment of their = |
|
2452 revolutionary vision -- and therefore=20 |
|
2453 work harder and more persistently than reformers do.=20 |
|
2454 |
|
2455 142. Reform is always restrainde by the fear of painful consequences if = |
|
2456 changes go too far. But once a=20 |
|
2457 revolutionary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing to = |
|
2458 undergo unlimited hardships for the=20 |
|
2459 sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian = |
|
2460 Revolutions. It may be that in=20 |
|
2461 such cases only a minority of the population is really committed to the = |
|
2462 revolution, but this minority is=20 |
|
2463 sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in = |
|
2464 society. We will have more to say=20 |
|
2465 about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.=20 |
|
2466 |
|
2467 |
|
2468 |
|
2469 CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR |
|
2470 |
|
2471 143. Since the beginning of civilization, organized societies have had to = |
|
2472 put pressures on human beings of=20 |
|
2473 the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures = |
|
2474 vary greatly from one society to=20 |
|
2475 another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, excessive labor, = |
|
2476 environmental pollution), some are=20 |
|
2477 psychological (noise, crowding, forcing humans behavior into the mold that = |
|
2478 society requires). In the past,=20 |
|
2479 human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied = |
|
2480 only within certain bounds.=20 |
|
2481 Consequently, societies have been able to push people only up to certain = |
|
2482 limits. When the limit of human=20 |
|
2483 endurance has been passed, things start going rong: rebellion, or crime, or = |
|
2484 corruption, or evasion of work,=20 |
|
2485 or depression and other mental problems,=20 |
|
2486 or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth rate or something else, so = |
|
2487 that either the society breaks down,=20 |
|
2488 or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or gradually, = |
|
2489 through conquest, attrition or=20 |
|
2490 evolution) replaces by some more efficient form of society. |
|
2491 |
|
2492 [25]=20 |
|
2493 |
|
2494 144. Thus human nature has in the past put certain limits on the = |
|
2495 development of societies. People coud be=20 |
|
2496 pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because = |
|
2497 modern technology is=20 |
|
2498 developing way of modifying human beings. |
|
2499 |
|
2500 145. Imagine a society that subjects people to conditions that amke them = |
|
2501 terribley unhappy, then gives=20 |
|
2502 them the drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is = |
|
2503 already happening to some extent in=20 |
|
2504 our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression had = |
|
2505 been greatly increasing in recent=20 |
|
2506 decades. We believe that this is due to disruption fo the power process, as = |
|
2507 explained in paragraphs 59-76.=20 |
|
2508 But even if we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly = |
|
2509 the result of SOME conditions that=20 |
|
2510 exist in today's society. Instead of removing the conditions that make = |
|
2511 people depressed, modern society=20 |
|
2512 gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antidepressants area a means of = |
|
2513 modifying an individual's=20 |
|
2514 internal state in such a way as to=20 |
|
2515 enable him to toelrate social conditions that he would otherwise find = |
|
2516 intolerable. (Yes, we know that=20 |
|
2517 depression is often of purely genetic origin. We are referring here to = |
|
2518 those cases in which environment=20 |
|
2519 plays the predominant role.)=20 |
|
2520 |
|
2521 146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one example of the methods of = |
|
2522 controlling human behavior that=20 |
|
2523 modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the other methods. = |
|
2524 |
|
2525 |
|
2526 147. To start with, there are the techniques of surveillance. Hidden video = |
|
2527 cameras are now used in most=20 |
|
2528 stores and in many other places, computers are used to collect and process = |
|
2529 vast amounts of information=20 |
|
2530 about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the = |
|
2531 effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law=20 |
|
2532 enforcement).[26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which the = |
|
2533 mass communication media=20 |
|
2534 provide effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for = |
|
2535 winning elections, selling=20 |
|
2536 products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment industry serves as = |
|
2537 an important psychological tool=20 |
|
2538 of the system, possibly even when it is dishing out large amounts of sex = |
|
2539 and violence. Entertainment=20 |
|
2540 provides modern man with an essential means of escape.=20 |
|
2541 While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, = |
|
2542 frustration, dissatisfaction. Many=20 |
|
2543 primitive peoples, when they don't have work to do, are quite content to = |
|
2544 sit for hours at a time doing=20 |
|
2545 nothing at all, because they are at peace with themselves and their world. = |
|
2546 But most modern people must be=20 |
|
2547 contantly occupied or entertained, otherwise the get "bored," i.e., they = |
|
2548 get fidgety, uneasy, irritable.=20 |
|
2549 |
|
2550 148. Other techniques strike deeper that the foregoing. Education is no = |
|
2551 longer a simple affair of paddling a=20 |
|
2552 kid's behind when he doesn't know his lessons and patting him on the head = |
|
2553 when he does know them. It is=20 |
|
2554 becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child's development. = |
|
2555 Sylvan Learning Centers, for=20 |
|
2556 example, have had great success in motivating children to study, and = |
|
2557 psychological techniques are also=20 |
|
2558 used with more or less success in many conventional schools. "Parenting" = |
|
2559 techniques that are taught to=20 |
|
2560 parents are designed to make children accept fundamental values of the = |
|
2561 system and behave in ways that the=20 |
|
2562 system finds desirable. "Mental health" programs, "intervention" = |
|
2563 techniques, psychotherapy and so forth=20 |
|
2564 are ostensibly designed to benefit individuals,=20 |
|
2565 but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to = |
|
2566 think and behave as the system=20 |
|
2567 requires. (There is no contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or = |
|
2568 behavior bring him into conflict=20 |
|
2569 with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to = |
|
2570 conquer or escape from, hence he is=20 |
|
2571 likely to suffer from stress, frustration, defeat. His path will be much = |
|
2572 easier if he thinks and behaves as the=20 |
|
2573 system requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the = |
|
2574 individual when it brainwashes him=20 |
|
2575 into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious forms is disapproved = |
|
2576 in most if not all cultures.=20 |
|
2577 Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at all is something = |
|
2578 that appalls almost everyone.=20 |
|
2579 But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is = |
|
2580 spanking, when used as part=20 |
|
2581 of a rational and consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The = |
|
2582 question will ultimately be decided=20 |
|
2583 by whether or not spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person = |
|
2584 fit in well with the existing=20 |
|
2585 system of society. In practice, the word "abuse" tends to be interpreted to = |
|
2586 include any method of child- |
|
2587 rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they = |
|
2588 go beyond the prevention of=20 |
|
2589 obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing "child abuse" are = |
|
2590 directed toward the control of human=20 |
|
2591 behavior of the system.=20 |
|
2592 |
|
2593 149. Presumably, research will continue to increas the effectiveness of = |
|
2594 psychological techniques for=20 |
|
2595 controlling human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological = |
|
2596 techniques alone will be=20 |
|
2597 sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is = |
|
2598 creating. Biological methods=20 |
|
2599 probably will have to be used. We have already mentiond the use of drugs in = |
|
2600 this connection. Neurology=20 |
|
2601 may provide other avenues of modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering = |
|
2602 of human beings is already=20 |
|
2603 beginning to occur in the form of "gene therapy," and there is no reason to = |
|
2604 assume the such methods will=20 |
|
2605 not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body that affect = |
|
2606 mental funtioning.=20 |
|
2607 |
|
2608 150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial society seems likely to = |
|
2609 be entering a period of severe=20 |
|
2610 stress, due in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic = |
|
2611 and environmental problems.=20 |
|
2612 And a considerable proportion of the system's economic and environmental = |
|
2613 problems result from the way=20 |
|
2614 human beings behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility, = |
|
2615 rebellion; children who won't=20 |
|
2616 study, youth gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse , other crimes, = |
|
2617 unsafe sex, teen pregnancy,=20 |
|
2618 population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic rivalry, = |
|
2619 bitter ideological conflict (i.e., pro- |
|
2620 choice vs. pro-life), political extremism, terrorism, sabotage, = |
|
2621 anti-government groups, hate groups. All=20 |
|
2622 these threaten the very survival of the system.=20 |
|
2623 The system will be FORCED to use every practical means of controlling human = |
|
2624 behavior.=20 |
|
2625 |
|
2626 151. The social disruption that we see today is certainly not the result of = |
|
2627 mere chance. It can only be a=20 |
|
2628 result fo the conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We = |
|
2629 have argued that the most important=20 |
|
2630 of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems = |
|
2631 succeeds in imposing sufficient=20 |
|
2632 control over human behavior to assure itw own survival, a new watershed in = |
|
2633 human history will have=20 |
|
2634 passed. Whereas formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits = |
|
2635 on the development of=20 |
|
2636 societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), = |
|
2637 industrial-technological society will be able to pass=20 |
|
2638 those limits by modifying human beings, whether by psychological methods or = |
|
2639 biological methods or both.=20 |
|
2640 In the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of = |
|
2641 human beings.=20 |
|
2642 Instead, human being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the = |
|
2643 system. |
|
2644 |
|
2645 [27] 152. Generally speaking, technological control over human behavior = |
|
2646 will probably not be introduced=20 |
|
2647 with a totalitarian intention or even through a conscious desire to = |
|
2648 restrict human freedom. [28] Each new=20 |
|
2649 step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as a = |
|
2650 rational response to a problem that=20 |
|
2651 faces society, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate or = |
|
2652 inducing young people to study science=20 |
|
2653 and engineering. In many cases, there will be humanitarian justification. = |
|
2654 For example, when a psychiatrist=20 |
|
2655 prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing = |
|
2656 that individual a favor. It would be=20 |
|
2657 inhumane to withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send = |
|
2658 their children to Sylvan=20 |
|
2659 Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic about = |
|
2660 their studies,=20 |
|
2661 they do so from concern for their children's welfare. It may be that some = |
|
2662 of these parents wish that one=20 |
|
2663 didn't have to have specialized training to get a job and that their kid = |
|
2664 didn't have to be brainwashed into=20 |
|
2665 becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can't change society, = |
|
2666 and their child may be=20 |
|
2667 unemployable if he doesn't have certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan. = |
|
2668 |
|
2669 |
|
2670 153. Thus control over human behavior will be introduced not by a = |
|
2671 calculated decision of the authorities=20 |
|
2672 but through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The = |
|
2673 process will be impossible to=20 |
|
2674 resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear to be = |
|
2675 beneficial, or at least the evil involved=20 |
|
2676 in making the advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil = |
|
2677 involved in making the advance will=20 |
|
2678 seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see = |
|
2679 paragraph 127). Propaganda for=20 |
|
2680 example is used for many good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or = |
|
2681 race hatred. [14] Sex=20 |
|
2682 education is obviously useful, yet the effect of sex education (to the = |
|
2683 extent that it is successful) is to take=20 |
|
2684 the shaping of sexual attitudes=20 |
|
2685 away from the family and put it into the hands of the state as represented = |
|
2686 by the public school system.=20 |
|
2687 |
|
2688 154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered that increases the likelihood = |
|
2689 that a child will grow up to be a=20 |
|
2690 criminal and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] = |
|
2691 Of course most parents whose=20 |
|
2692 children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would be = |
|
2693 inhumane to do otherwise, since=20 |
|
2694 the child would probably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a = |
|
2695 criminal. But many or most primitive=20 |
|
2696 societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, = |
|
2697 even though they have neither high- |
|
2698 tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems of punishment. Since there = |
|
2699 is no reason to suppose that=20 |
|
2700 more modern men than primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the = |
|
2701 high crime rate of our society=20 |
|
2702 must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people,=20 |
|
2703 to which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to = |
|
2704 remove potential criminal tendencies=20 |
|
2705 is at least in part a way of re-engineering people so that they suit the = |
|
2706 requirements of the system.=20 |
|
2707 |
|
2708 155. Our society tends to regard as a "sickness" any mode of thought or = |
|
2709 behavior that is inconvenient for=20 |
|
2710 the system, and this is plausible because when an individual doesn't fit = |
|
2711 into the system it causes pain to the=20 |
|
2712 individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation of an = |
|
2713 individual to adjust him to the=20 |
|
2714 system is seen as a "cure" for a "sickness" and therefore as good.=20 |
|
2715 |
|
2716 156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use of a new item of = |
|
2717 technology is INITIALLY optional, it=20 |
|
2718 does not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to = |
|
2719 change society in such a way=20 |
|
2720 that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to function = |
|
2721 without using that technology. This=20 |
|
2722 applies also to the technology of human behavior. In a world in which most = |
|
2723 children are put through a=20 |
|
2724 program to make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be = |
|
2725 forced to put his kid through=20 |
|
2726 such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow up to be, = |
|
2727 comparatively speaking, an=20 |
|
2728 ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or suppose a biological treatment is = |
|
2729 discovered that, without=20 |
|
2730 undesirable side-effects,=20 |
|
2731 will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many people = |
|
2732 suffer in our society. If large=20 |
|
2733 numbers of people choose to undergo the treatment, then the general level = |
|
2734 of stress in society will be=20 |
|
2735 reduced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase the = |
|
2736 stress-producing pressures. In fact,=20 |
|
2737 something like this seems to have happened already with one of our = |
|
2738 society's most important psychological=20 |
|
2739 tools for enabling people to reduce (or at least temporarily escape from) = |
|
2740 stress, namely, mass entertainment=20 |
|
2741 (see paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is "optional": No law = |
|
2742 requires us to watch television,=20 |
|
2743 listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass entertainment is a means of = |
|
2744 escape and stress-reduction on=20 |
|
2745 which most of us have become dependent.=20 |
|
2746 Everyone complains about the trashiness of television, but almost everyone = |
|
2747 watches it. A few have kicked=20 |
|
2748 the TV habit, but it would be a rare person who could get along today = |
|
2749 without using ANY form of mass=20 |
|
2750 entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got = |
|
2751 along very nicely with no other=20 |
|
2752 entertainment than that which each local community created for itself.) = |
|
2753 Without the entertainment industry=20 |
|
2754 the system probably would not have been able to get away with putting as = |
|
2755 much stress-producing pressure=20 |
|
2756 on us as it does.=20 |
|
2757 |
|
2758 157. Assuming that industrial society survives, it is likely that = |
|
2759 technology will eventually acquire=20 |
|
2760 something approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been = |
|
2761 established beyond any rational=20 |
|
2762 doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As = |
|
2763 experimenters have=20 |
|
2764 demonstrated, feelings such as hunger, pleasure, anger and fear can be = |
|
2765 turned on and off by electrical=20 |
|
2766 stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by = |
|
2767 damaging parts of the brain or=20 |
|
2768 they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation. = |
|
2769 Hallucinations can be induced or moods=20 |
|
2770 changed by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human soul, but if = |
|
2771 there is one it clearly is less=20 |
|
2772 powerful that the biological mechanisms of human behavior.=20 |
|
2773 For if that were not the case then researchers would not be able so easily = |
|
2774 to manipulate human feelings and=20 |
|
2775 behavior with drugs and electrical currents.=20 |
|
2776 |
|
2777 158. It presumably would be impractical for all people to have electrodes = |
|
2778 inserted in their heads so that=20 |
|
2779 they could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human = |
|
2780 thoughts and feelings are so open to=20 |
|
2781 biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling human = |
|
2782 behavior is mainly a technical=20 |
|
2783 problem; a problem of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind of = |
|
2784 problem that is accessible to=20 |
|
2785 scientific attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving = |
|
2786 technical problems, it is=20 |
|
2787 overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the control of = |
|
2788 human behavior.=20 |
|
2789 |
|
2790 159. Will public resistance prevent the introduction of technological = |
|
2791 control of human behavior? It=20 |
|
2792 certainly would if an attempt were made to introduce such control all at = |
|
2793 once. But since technological=20 |
|
2794 control will be introduced through a long sequence of small advances, there = |
|
2795 will be no rational and=20 |
|
2796 effective public resistance. (See paragraphs 127,132, 153.)=20 |
|
2797 |
|
2798 160. To those who think that all this sounds like science fiction, we point = |
|
2799 out that yesterday's science=20 |
|
2800 fiction is today's fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered = |
|
2801 man's environment and way of life,=20 |
|
2802 and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly applied to = |
|
2803 the human body and mind, man=20 |
|
2804 himself will be altered as radically as his environment and way of life = |
|
2805 have been.=20 |
|
2806 |
|
2807 |
|
2808 |
|
2809 HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS |
|
2810 |
|
2811 161. But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one thing to develop in = |
|
2812 the laboratory a series of=20 |
|
2813 psychological or biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and = |
|
2814 quite another to integrate=20 |
|
2815 these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem is = |
|
2816 the more difficult of the two. For=20 |
|
2817 example, while the techniques of educational psychology doubtless work = |
|
2818 quite well in the "lab schools"=20 |
|
2819 where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them = |
|
2820 effectively throughout our educational=20 |
|
2821 system. We all know what many of our schools are like. The teachers are too = |
|
2822 busy taking knives and guns=20 |
|
2823 away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques for making them = |
|
2824 into computer nerds. Thus, in=20 |
|
2825 spite of all its technical advances relating=20 |
|
2826 to human behavior the system to date has not been impressively successful = |
|
2827 in controlling human beings.=20 |
|
2828 The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the system = |
|
2829 are those of the type that might be=20 |
|
2830 called "bourgeois." But there are growing numbers of people who in one way = |
|
2831 or another are rebels against=20 |
|
2832 the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs cultists, satanists, nazis, = |
|
2833 radical environmentalists, militiamen,=20 |
|
2834 etc..=20 |
|
2835 |
|
2836 162. The system is currently engaged in a desperate struggle to overcome = |
|
2837 certain problems that threaten its=20 |
|
2838 survival, among which the problems of human behavior are the most = |
|
2839 important. If the system succeeds in=20 |
|
2840 acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly enough, it will = |
|
2841 probably survive. Otherwise it=20 |
|
2842 will break down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved within the = |
|
2843 next several decades, say 40 to=20 |
|
2844 100 years.=20 |
|
2845 |
|
2846 163. Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next several decades. By = |
|
2847 that time it will have to have=20 |
|
2848 solved, or at least brought under control, the principal problems that = |
|
2849 confront it, in particular that of=20 |
|
2850 "socializing" human beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so = |
|
2851 that their behavior no longer=20 |
|
2852 threatens the system. That being accomplished, it does not appear that = |
|
2853 there would be any further obstacle=20 |
|
2854 to the development of technology, and it would presumably advance toward = |
|
2855 its logical conclusion, which is=20 |
|
2856 complete control over everything on Earth, including human beings and all = |
|
2857 other important organisms. The=20 |
|
2858 system may become a unitary, monolithic organization, or it may be more or = |
|
2859 less fragmented and consist of=20 |
|
2860 a number of organizations coexisting=20 |
|
2861 in a relationship that includes elements of both cooperation and = |
|
2862 competition, just as today the government,=20 |
|
2863 the corporations and other large organizations both cooperate and compete = |
|
2864 with one another. Human=20 |
|
2865 freedom mostly will have vanished, because individuals and small groups = |
|
2866 will be impotent vis-a-vis large=20 |
|
2867 organizations armed with supertechnology and an arsenal of advanced = |
|
2868 psychological and biological tools=20 |
|
2869 for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of surveillance and = |
|
2870 physical coercion. Only a small=20 |
|
2871 number of people will have any real power, and even these probably will = |
|
2872 have only very limited freedom,=20 |
|
2873 because their behavior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians = |
|
2874 and corporation executives can=20 |
|
2875 retain their positions of power only as long=20 |
|
2876 as their behavior remains within certain fairly narrow limits.=20 |
|
2877 |
|
2878 164. Don't imagine that the systems will stop developing further techniques = |
|
2879 for controlling human beings=20 |
|
2880 and nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing = |
|
2881 control is no longer necessary for=20 |
|
2882 the system's survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over the = |
|
2883 system will increase its control over=20 |
|
2884 people and nature more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by = |
|
2885 difficulties of the kind that it is=20 |
|
2886 currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending = |
|
2887 control. As we explained in=20 |
|
2888 paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry on their work largely as = |
|
2889 a surrogate activity; that is, they=20 |
|
2890 satisfy their need for power by solving technical problems. They will = |
|
2891 continue to do this with unabated=20 |
|
2892 enthusiasm,=20 |
|
2893 and among the most interesting and challenging problems for them to solve = |
|
2894 will be those of understanding=20 |
|
2895 the human body and mind and intervening in their development. For the "good = |
|
2896 of humanity," of course.=20 |
|
2897 |
|
2898 165. But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of the coming decades = |
|
2899 prove to be too much for the=20 |
|
2900 system. If the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a "time = |
|
2901 of troubles" such as those that=20 |
|
2902 history has recorded: at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to = |
|
2903 predict what would emerge from such=20 |
|
2904 a time of troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new = |
|
2905 chance. The greatest danger is that=20 |
|
2906 industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself within the first few = |
|
2907 years after the breakdown. Certainly=20 |
|
2908 there will be many people (power-hungry types especially) who will be = |
|
2909 anxious to get the factories running=20 |
|
2910 again.=20 |
|
2911 |
|
2912 166. Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the = |
|
2913 industrial system is reducing=20 |
|
2914 the human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within = |
|
2915 the system so as to increase the=20 |
|
2916 likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a = |
|
2917 revolution against it becomes=20 |
|
2918 possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that = |
|
2919 opposes technology and the=20 |
|
2920 industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. = |
|
2921 And such an ideology will help=20 |
|
2922 to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants = |
|
2923 will be smashed beyond repair, so=20 |
|
2924 that the system cannot be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, = |
|
2925 technical books burned, etc.=20 |
|
2926 |
|
2927 |
|
2928 |
|
2929 HUMAN SUFFERING |
|
2930 |
|
2931 167. The industrial system will not break down purely as a result of = |
|
2932 revolutionary action. It will not be=20 |
|
2933 vulnerable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of = |
|
2934 development lead it into very serious=20 |
|
2935 difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so either = |
|
2936 spontaneously, or through a process that is in=20 |
|
2937 part spontaneous but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is = |
|
2938 sudden, many people will die,=20 |
|
2939 since the world's population has become so overblown that it cannot even = |
|
2940 feed itself any longer without=20 |
|
2941 advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is gradual enough so that = |
|
2942 reduction of the population can=20 |
|
2943 occur more through lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the = |
|
2944 death rate, the process of de- |
|
2945 industrialization probably will=20 |
|
2946 be very chaotic and involve much suffering. It is naive to think it likely = |
|
2947 that technology can be phased out=20 |
|
2948 in a smoothly managed orderly way, especially since the technophiles will = |
|
2949 fight stubbornly at every step. Is=20 |
|
2950 it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of the system? Maybe, but = |
|
2951 maybe not. In the first place,=20 |
|
2952 revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down unless it is = |
|
2953 already in deep trouble so that there=20 |
|
2954 would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway; = |
|
2955 and the bigger the system=20 |
|
2956 grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it = |
|
2957 may be that revolutionaries, by=20 |
|
2958 hastening the onset of the breakdown will be reducing the extent of the = |
|
2959 disaster.=20 |
|
2960 |
|
2961 168. In the second place, one has to balance the struggle and death against = |
|
2962 the loss of freedom and dignity.=20 |
|
2963 To many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or = |
|
2964 avoidance of physical pain.=20 |
|
2965 Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting = |
|
2966 for survival, or for a cause, than=20 |
|
2967 to live a long but empty and purposeless life.=20 |
|
2968 |
|
2969 169. In the third place, it is not all certain that the survival of the = |
|
2970 system will lead to less suffering than the=20 |
|
2971 breakdown of the system would. The system has already caused, and is = |
|
2972 continuing to cause , immense=20 |
|
2973 suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of years = |
|
2974 gave p eople a satisfactory=20 |
|
2975 relationship with each other and their environment, have been shattered by = |
|
2976 contact with industrial society,=20 |
|
2977 and the result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, = |
|
2978 social and psychological problems.=20 |
|
2979 One of the effects o f the intrusion of industrial society has be en that = |
|
2980 over much of the world traditional=20 |
|
2981 controls on population have been thrown out of balance. Hence the = |
|
2982 population explosion, with all that it=20 |
|
2983 implies.=20 |
|
2984 Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread throughout the = |
|
2985 supposedly fortunate countries=20 |
|
2986 of the West (see paragraphs 44, 4 5). No one knows what will happen as a = |
|
2987 result of ozone depletion, the=20 |
|
2988 greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be = |
|
2989 foreseen. And, as nuclear=20 |
|
2990 proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands of = |
|
2991 dictators an d irresponsible=20 |
|
2992 Third World nations. Would you like to speculate abut what Iraq or North = |
|
2993 Korea will do with genetic=20 |
|
2994 engineering?=20 |
|
2995 |
|
2996 170. "Oh!" say the technophiles, "Science is going to fix all that! We will = |
|
2997 conquer famine, eliminate=20 |
|
2998 psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!" Yeah, sure. = |
|
2999 That's what they said 200 years=20 |
|
3000 ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make = |
|
3001 everybody happy, etc. The actual=20 |
|
3002 result has been quite different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or = |
|
3003 self-deceiving) in their=20 |
|
3004 understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) = |
|
3005 the fact that when large=20 |
|
3006 changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced into a society, = |
|
3007 they le ad to a long sequence of=20 |
|
3008 other changes, most of which are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The = |
|
3009 result is disruption of the=20 |
|
3010 society. So it is very probable that=20 |
|
3011 in their attempt to end poverty and disease, engineer docile, happy = |
|
3012 personalities and s o forth, the=20 |
|
3013 technophiles will create socia l systems that are terribly troubled, even = |
|
3014 more so that the present one. For=20 |
|
3015 example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by creating new, = |
|
3016 genetically engineered food plants.=20 |
|
3017 But this will allow the human population to keep expanding indefini tely, = |
|
3018 and it is well known that=20 |
|
3019 crowding lea ds to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one = |
|
3020 example of the PREDICTABLE=20 |
|
3021 problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has shown, = |
|
3022 technical progress will lead to=20 |
|
3023 other new problems for society far more rapidly that it has b een solving = |
|
3024 old ones. Thus it will take a l ong=20 |
|
3025 difficult period of=20 |
|
3026 trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their Brave = |
|
3027 New World (if they ever do). In the=20 |
|
3028 meantime there will be great suffering. So it is not all clear that the = |
|
3029 survival of industrial society would=20 |
|
3030 involve les s suffering than the breakdown of that socie ty would. = |
|
3031 Technology has gotten the human race=20 |
|
3032 into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy escape.=20 |
|
3033 |
|
3034 |
|
3035 |
|
3036 THE FUTURE |
|
3037 |
|
3038 171. But suppose now that industrial society does survive the next several = |
|
3039 decade and that the bugs do=20 |
|
3040 eventually get worked out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. = |
|
3041 What kind of system will it be? We=20 |
|
3042 will consider several possibilities.=20 |
|
3043 |
|
3044 172. First let us postulate that the computer scientists succeed in = |
|
3045 developing intelligent machines that can=20 |
|
3046 do all things better that human beings can do them. In that case presumably = |
|
3047 all work will be done by vast,=20 |
|
3048 highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be necessary. = |
|
3049 Eith er of two cases might=20 |
|
3050 occur. The machines might be permitted to make all of their own decisions = |
|
3051 without human oversight, or=20 |
|
3052 else human control over the machines might be retained.=20 |
|
3053 |
|
3054 173. If the machines are permitted to make all their own decisions, we = |
|
3055 can't make any conjectures as to the=20 |
|
3056 results, because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. = |
|
3057 We only point out that the fate=20 |
|
3058 of the human race would be at the merc y of the machines. It might be = |
|
3059 argued that the human race would=20 |
|
3060 never be foolish enough to hand over all the power to the machines. But we = |
|
3061 are suggesting neither that the=20 |
|
3062 human race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the = |
|
3063 machines would willfully seize=20 |
|
3064 power. What we do su ggest is that the human race might easily pe rmit = |
|
3065 itself to drift into a position of such=20 |
|
3066 dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to = |
|
3067 accept all of the machines=20 |
|
3068 decisions.=20 |
|
3069 As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and = |
|
3070 machines become more and=20 |
|
3071 more intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decision for = |
|
3072 them, simply because machine- |
|
3073 made decisions will bring better result than man-made ones. Eventually a = |
|
3074 stage may be reached at which=20 |
|
3075 the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that = |
|
3076 human beings wi ll be incapable=20 |
|
3077 of making them intelligently . At that stage the machines will be in = |
|
3078 effective control. People won't be able=20 |
|
3079 to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them = |
|
3080 that turning them off would=20 |
|
3081 amount to suicide.=20 |
|
3082 |
|
3083 174. On the other hand it is possible that human control over the machines = |
|
3084 may be retained. In that case the=20 |
|
3085 average man may have control over certain private machines of his own, such = |
|
3086 as his car of his personal=20 |
|
3087 computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in the hands = |
|
3088 of a tiny e lite -- just as it is=20 |
|
3089 today, but with two difference. Due to improved techniques the elite will = |
|
3090 have greater control over the=20 |
|
3091 masses; and because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will = |
|
3092 be superfluous, a useless=20 |
|
3093 burden on the system. If t he elite is ruthless the may simply decide t o = |
|
3094 exterminate the mass of humanity.=20 |
|
3095 If they are humane they may use propaganda or other psychological or = |
|
3096 biological techniques to reduce the=20 |
|
3097 birth rate until=20 |
|
3098 the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, = |
|
3099 if the elite consist of soft-hearted=20 |
|
3100 liberals, they may decide to play the role of good shepherds to the rest of = |
|
3101 the human race. They will see to=20 |
|
3102 it that everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are = |
|
3103 raised under psychologically hygienic=20 |
|
3104 conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy , and that = |
|
3105 anyone who may become=20 |
|
3106 dissatisfie d undergoes "treatment" to cure his "problem." Of course, life = |
|
3107 will be so purposeless that people=20 |
|
3108 will have to be biologically or psychologically engineered either to remove = |
|
3109 their need for the power=20 |
|
3110 process or to make them "sublimate" their drive for pow er into some = |
|
3111 harmless hobby. These engineer ed=20 |
|
3112 human beings=20 |
|
3113 may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly will not be free. = |
|
3114 They will have been reduced to=20 |
|
3115 the status of domestic animals.=20 |
|
3116 |
|
3117 175. But suppose now that the computer scientists do not succeed in = |
|
3118 developing artificial intelligence, so=20 |
|
3119 that human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more = |
|
3120 and more of the simpler=20 |
|
3121 tasks so that there will be an increasing surp lus of human workers at the = |
|
3122 lower levels of ability. (We see=20 |
|
3123 this happening already. There are many people who find it difficult or = |
|
3124 impossible to get work, because for=20 |
|
3125 intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of = |
|
3126 training necessary to make themselves=20 |
|
3127 useful in the presen t system.) On those who are employed, ever- increasing = |
|
3128 demands will be placed; They=20 |
|
3129 will need more and m ore training, more and more ability, and will have to = |
|
3130 be ever more reliable,=20 |
|
3131 conforming and docile,=20 |
|
3132 because they will be more and more like cells of a giant organism. Their = |
|
3133 tasks will be incre asingly=20 |
|
3134 specialized so that their work will be, in a sense, out of touch with the = |
|
3135 real world, being concentrated on=20 |
|
3136 one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that I = |
|
3137 can, whether psychological or=20 |
|
3138 biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that the = |
|
3139 syst em requires and to "sublimate"=20 |
|
3140 their drive f or power into some specialized task. But the statement that = |
|
3141 the people of such a society will=20 |
|
3142 have to be docile may require qualification. The society may find = |
|
3143 competitiveness useful, provided that=20 |
|
3144 ways are found of directing competitiveness into channe ls that serve that = |
|
3145 needs of the system. We can=20 |
|
3146 imagine=20 |
|
3147 into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a future = |
|
3148 society in which there is endless=20 |
|
3149 competition for positions of prestige an power. But no more than a very few = |
|
3150 people will ever reach the top,=20 |
|
3151 where the only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repell ent is = |
|
3152 a society in which a person can=20 |
|
3153 satisfy his needs for power only by pushing large numbers of other people = |
|
3154 out of the way and depriving=20 |
|
3155 them of THEIR opportunity for power.=20 |
|
3156 |
|
3157 176. Once can envision scenarios that incorporate aspects of more than one = |
|
3158 of the possibilities that we have=20 |
|
3159 just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will take over most = |
|
3160 of the work that is of real,=20 |
|
3161 practical importance, but that human bei ngs will be kept busy by being = |
|
3162 given relativ ely unimportant=20 |
|
3163 work. It has been suggested, for example, that a great development of the = |
|
3164 service of industries might=20 |
|
3165 provide work for human beings. Thus people will would spend their time = |
|
3166 shinning each others shoes,=20 |
|
3167 driving each other around inn taxica b, making handicrafts for one another, = |
|
3168 waiti ng on each other's tables,=20 |
|
3169 etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human race to = |
|
3170 end up, and we doubt that many=20 |
|
3171 people would find=20 |
|
3172 fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, = |
|
3173 dangerous outlets (drugs, , crime,=20 |
|
3174 "cults," hate groups) unless they were biol ogical or psychologically = |
|
3175 engineered to adapt them to such a=20 |
|
3176 way of life.=20 |
|
3177 |
|
3178 177. Needless to day, the scenarios outlined above do not exhaust all the = |
|
3179 possibilities. They only indicate=20 |
|
3180 the kinds of outcomes that seem to us mots likely. But wee can envision no = |
|
3181 plausible scenarios that are any=20 |
|
3182 more palatable that the ones we've j ust described. It is overwhelmingly = |
|
3183 probabl e that if the industrial- |
|
3184 technological system survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that = |
|
3185 time have developed certain general=20 |
|
3186 characteristics: Individuals (at least those of the "bourgeois" type, who = |
|
3187 are integrated into the system and=20 |
|
3188 make it run, and who therefore have all the power) will b e more dependent = |
|
3189 than ever on large=20 |
|
3190 organizations; they will be more "socialized" that ever and their physical = |
|
3191 and mental qualities to a=20 |
|
3192 significant=20 |
|
3193 extent (possibly to a very great extent ) will be those that are engineered = |
|
3194 into them rather than being th e=20 |
|
3195 results of chance (or of God's will, or wh atever); and whatever may be = |
|
3196 left of wild nature will be reduced=20 |
|
3197 to remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision = |
|
3198 and management of scientists=20 |
|
3199 (hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long run (say a few = |
|
3200 centuries from no w) it is it is likely that=20 |
|
3201 neither the human race nor any other important organisms will exist as we = |
|
3202 know them today, because once=20 |
|
3203 you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is no = |
|
3204 reason to stop at any particular=20 |
|
3205 point, so that the modifications will probably continue until man and other = |
|
3206 organisms have been utterly=20 |
|
3207 trans formed.=20 |
|
3208 |
|
3209 178. Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that technology is = |
|
3210 creating for human begins a new=20 |
|
3211 physical and social environment radically different from the spectrum of = |
|
3212 environments to which natural=20 |
|
3213 selection has adapted the human race physically an d psychological. If man = |
|
3214 is not adjust to th is new=20 |
|
3215 environment by being artificially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to = |
|
3216 it through a long an painful=20 |
|
3217 process of natural selection. The former is far more likely that the = |
|
3218 latter.=20 |
|
3219 |
|
3220 179. It would be better to dump the whole stinking system and take the = |
|
3221 consequences.=20 |
|
3222 |
|
3223 STRATEGY |
|
3224 |
|
3225 180. The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into = |
|
3226 the unknown. Many people=20 |
|
3227 understand something of what technological progress is doing to us yet take = |
|
3228 a passive attitude toward it=20 |
|
3229 because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don't think it is = |
|
3230 inevitable. We think it c an be stopped, and=20 |
|
3231 we will give here some indications of how to go about stopping it.=20 |
|
3232 |
|
3233 181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks for the present are = |
|
3234 to promote social stress and=20 |
|
3235 instability in industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology = |
|
3236 that opposes technology and the=20 |
|
3237 industrial system. When the system become s sufficiently stressed and = |
|
3238 unstable, a revo lution against=20 |
|
3239 technology may be possible. The pattern would be similar to that of the = |
|
3240 French and Russian Revolutions.=20 |
|
3241 French society and Russian society, for several decades prior to their = |
|
3242 respective revolutions, showed=20 |
|
3243 increasing signs of stress and w eakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were being = |
|
3244 d eveloped that offered a new=20 |
|
3245 world view that was quite different from the old one. In the Russian case, = |
|
3246 revolutionaries were actively=20 |
|
3247 working to undermine=20 |
|
3248 the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient = |
|
3249 additional stress (by financial c risis in=20 |
|
3250 France, by military defeat in Russi a) it was swept away by revolution. = |
|
3251 What we propose in something=20 |
|
3252 along the same lines.=20 |
|
3253 |
|
3254 182. It will be objected that the French and Russian Revolutions were = |
|
3255 failures. But most revolutions have=20 |
|
3256 two goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set = |
|
3257 up the new form of society=20 |
|
3258 envisioned by the revolutionaries. The Fre nch and Russian revolutionaries = |
|
3259 failed (fort unately!) to create=20 |
|
3260 the new kind of society of which they dreamed, but they were quite = |
|
3261 successful in destroying the existing=20 |
|
3262 form of society.=20 |
|
3263 |
|
3264 183. But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic support, must have a = |
|
3265 positive ideals well as a negative=20 |
|
3266 one; it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive = |
|
3267 ideal that we propose is=20 |
|
3268 Nature. That is , WILD nature; those aspects o f the functioning of the = |
|
3269 Earth and its livin g things that are=20 |
|
3270 independent of human management and free of human interference and control. = |
|
3271 And with wild nature we=20 |
|
3272 include human nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of = |
|
3273 the human individual that are=20 |
|
3274 not subject to regulation by o rganized society but are products of chance, = |
|
3275 or free will, or God (depending=20 |
|
3276 on your religious or philosophical opinions).=20 |
|
3277 |
|
3278 184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several = |
|
3279 reasons. Nature (that which is outside=20 |
|
3280 the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to = |
|
3281 expand indefinitely the power of the=20 |
|
3282 system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has = |
|
3283 treme ndous popular appeal. The=20 |
|
3284 radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and = |
|
3285 opposes technology. [30] It is=20 |
|
3286 not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or = |
|
3287 any new kind of social order.=20 |
|
3288 Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous creation th at existed = |
|
3289 long before any human society, and=20 |
|
3290 for countless centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted = |
|
3291 with nature without doing it an=20 |
|
3292 excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the = |
|
3293 effect of human society on nat=20 |
|
3294 ure become really devastating. To relieve t he pressure on nature it is not = |
|
3295 necessary to create a special kind=20 |
|
3296 of social system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. = |
|
3297 Granted, this will not solve all=20 |
|
3298 problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous damage to nature = |
|
3299 and i t will take a very long=20 |
|
3300 time for the scars t o heal. Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do = |
|
3301 significant damage to nature.=20 |
|
3302 Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great = |
|
3303 deal. It will relieve the worst of the=20 |
|
3304 pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the = |
|
3305 capacity of organized soc iety=20 |
|
3306 to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature). = |
|
3307 Whatever kind of society may exist=20 |
|
3308 after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people = |
|
3309 will live close to nature, because in=20 |
|
3310 the absence of advanced technolog y there is not other way that people CAN = |
|
3311 liv e. To feed themselves they=20 |
|
3312 must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter, etc., And, generally = |
|
3313 speaking, local autonomy should=20 |
|
3314 tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid = |
|
3315 communications will limit the capacity of=20 |
|
3316 governments o r other large organizations to control local communities. = |
|
3317 |
|
3318 |
|
3319 185. As for the negative consequences of eliminating industrial society -- = |
|
3320 well, you can't eat your cake and=20 |
|
3321 have it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.=20 |
|
3322 |
|
3323 186. Most people hate psychological conflict. For this reason they avoid = |
|
3324 doing any serious thinking about=20 |
|
3325 difficult social issues, and they like to have such issues presented to = |
|
3326 them in simple, black-and-white terms:=20 |
|
3327 THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology should = |
|
3328 therefore be developed on two=20 |
|
3329 levels.=20 |
|
3330 |
|
3331 187. On the more sophisticated level the ideology should address itself to = |
|
3332 people who are intelligent,=20 |
|
3333 thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a core of people = |
|
3334 who will be opposed to the=20 |
|
3335 industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appreciation = |
|
3336 of the problems and ambiguities=20 |
|
3337 involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the = |
|
3338 system. It is particularly important to=20 |
|
3339 attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be = |
|
3340 instrumental in influencing others. These=20 |
|
3341 people should be addres sed on as rational a level as possible. Fact s = |
|
3342 should never intentionally be distorted=20 |
|
3343 and intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no = |
|
3344 appeal can be made to the=20 |
|
3345 emotions,=20 |
|
3346 but in making such appeal care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting the = |
|
3347 truth or doing anything else t=20 |
|
3348 hat would destroy the intellectual respectab ility of the ideology. = |
|
3349 |
|
3350 |
|
3351 188. On a second level, the ideology should be propagated in a simplified = |
|
3352 form that will enable the=20 |
|
3353 unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in = |
|
3354 unambiguous terms. But even on this=20 |
|
3355 second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so = |
|
3356 cheap, intemperate or irrational=20 |
|
3357 that it alienates people of the thoughtful and rational type. Cheap, = |
|
3358 intemperate propaganda sometimes=20 |
|
3359 achieves impressive short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in = |
|
3360 the long run to keep the loyalty=20 |
|
3361 of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the = |
|
3362 passion s of an unthinking, fickle=20 |
|
3363 mob who will change their attitude as soon as someone comes along with a = |
|
3364 better propaganda gimmick.=20 |
|
3365 However, propaganda of the=20 |
|
3366 rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point = |
|
3367 of collapse and there is a final=20 |
|
3368 struggle between rival ideologies to d etermine which will become dominant = |
|
3369 when the old world-view goes=20 |
|
3370 under.=20 |
|
3371 |
|
3372 189. Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to = |
|
3373 have a majority of people on their=20 |
|
3374 side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the = |
|
3375 majority, which seldom has a clear and=20 |
|
3376 consistent idea of what it really wan ts. Until the time comes for the = |
|
3377 final push toward revolution [31], the=20 |
|
3378 task of revolutionaries will be less to win the shallow support of the = |
|
3379 majority than to build a small core of=20 |
|
3380 deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make = |
|
3381 them aware of the existence of the=20 |
|
3382 new ideolo gy and remind them of it frequently; though of course it will be = |
|
3383 desirable to get majority=20 |
|
3384 support to the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of = |
|
3385 seriously committed people.=20 |
|
3386 |
|
3387 190. Any kind of social conflict helps to destabilize the system, but one = |
|
3388 should be careful about what kind=20 |
|
3389 of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between = |
|
3390 the mass of the people and the=20 |
|
3391 power-holding elite of industrial society ( politicians, scientists, = |
|
3392 upper-level busines s executives,=20 |
|
3393 government officials, etc..). It should NOT be drawn between the = |
|
3394 revolutionaries and the mass of the=20 |
|
3395 people. For example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to = |
|
3396 condemn Americans for their=20 |
|
3397 habits of consumption. Instead, the ave rage American should be portrayed = |
|
3398 as a victi m of the advertising=20 |
|
3399 and marketing industry, which has suckered him into buying a lot of junk = |
|
3400 that he doesn't need and that is=20 |
|
3401 very poor compensation |
|
3402 for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the facts. It is = |
|
3403 merely a matter of attitude whether=20 |
|
3404 you blame the advertising industry for manipulating the public or blame the = |
|
3405 public for allowing itself to be=20 |
|
3406 manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the = |
|
3407 public.=20 |
|
3408 |
|
3409 191. One should think twice before encouraging any other social conflict = |
|
3410 than that between the power- |
|
3411 holding elite (which wields technology) and the general public (over which = |
|
3412 technology exerts its power).=20 |
|
3413 For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the = |
|
3414 important conflicts (betw een power-elite=20 |
|
3415 and ordinary people, between technology and nature); for another thing, = |
|
3416 other conflicts may actually tend=20 |
|
3417 to encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants = |
|
3418 to use technological power to=20 |
|
3419 gain advantages over its adve rsary. This is clearly seen in rivalries bet = |
|
3420 ween nations. It also appears in=20 |
|
3421 ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America many black leaders = |
|
3422 are anxious to gain power for=20 |
|
3423 African=20 |
|
3424 Americans by placing back individuals in the technological power-elite. = |
|
3425 They want there to be many black=20 |
|
3426 gov ernment officials, scientists, corporation e xecutives and so forth. In = |
|
3427 this way they are helping to=20 |
|
3428 absorb the African American subculture into the technological system. = |
|
3429 Generally speaking, one should=20 |
|
3430 encourage only those social conflicts that can be fitted into the framework = |
|
3431 of the conflicts of po wer--elite=20 |
|
3432 vs. ordinary people, technology v s nature.=20 |
|
3433 |
|
3434 192. But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT through militant = |
|
3435 advocacy of minority rights (see=20 |
|
3436 paragraphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that = |
|
3437 although minorities do suffer more=20 |
|
3438 or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is o f peripheral significance. Our = |
|
3439 real enemy is the industrial- |
|
3440 technological system, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic = |
|
3441 distinctions are of no importance.=20 |
|
3442 |
|
3443 193. The kind of revolution we have in mind will not necessarily involve an = |
|
3444 armed uprising against any=20 |
|
3445 government. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be = |
|
3446 a POLITICAL revolution. Its=20 |
|
3447 focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]=20 |
|
3448 |
|
3449 194. Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID assuming political = |
|
3450 power, whether by legal or=20 |
|
3451 illegal means, until the industrial system is stressed to the danger point = |
|
3452 and has proved itself to be a failure=20 |
|
3453 in the eyes of most people. Suppose for exa mple that some "green" party = |
|
3454 should win cont rol of the United=20 |
|
3455 States Congress in an election. In order to avoid betraying or watering = |
|
3456 down their own ideology they would=20 |
|
3457 have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic = |
|
3458 shrinkage. To the average man the=20 |
|
3459 results would appear disast rous: There would be massive unemployment, s = |
|
3460 hortages of commodities, etc.=20 |
|
3461 Even if the grosser ill effects could be avoided through superhumanly = |
|
3462 skillful management, still people=20 |
|
3463 would have=20 |
|
3464 to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted. = |
|
3465 Dissatisfaction would grow, the=20 |
|
3466 "green" pa rty would be voted out of of fice and the re volutionaries would = |
|
3467 have suffered a severe setback.=20 |
|
3468 For this reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political = |
|
3469 power until the system has gotten=20 |
|
3470 itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as resulting from = |
|
3471 the failures of the ind ustrial system=20 |
|
3472 itself and not from the polic ies of the revolutionaries. The revolution = |
|
3473 against technology will probably=20 |
|
3474 have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from = |
|
3475 above.=20 |
|
3476 |
|
3477 195. The revolution must be international and worldwide. It cannot be = |
|
3478 carried out on a nation-by-nation=20 |
|
3479 basis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for example, should = |
|
3480 cut back on technological=20 |
|
3481 progress or economic growth, people get hysteric al and start screaming = |
|
3482 that if we fall behin d in=20 |
|
3483 technology the Japanese will get ahead of us. Holy robots The world will = |
|
3484 fly off its orbit if the Japanese=20 |
|
3485 ever sell more cars than we do! (Nationalism is a great promoter of = |
|
3486 technology.) More reasonably, it is=20 |
|
3487 argued that if the relatively democrati c nations of the world fall behind = |
|
3488 in techno logy while nasty,=20 |
|
3489 dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea continue to = |
|
3490 progress, eventually the dictators may=20 |
|
3491 come to dominate the world.=20 |
|
3492 That is why the industrial system should be attacked in all nations = |
|
3493 simultaneously, to the extent that this=20 |
|
3494 may be possible. True, there is no ass urance that the industrial system = |
|
3495 can be destroyed at approximately=20 |
|
3496 the same time all over the world, and it is even conceivable that the = |
|
3497 attempt to overthrow the system could=20 |
|
3498 lead instead to the domination of the system by dictators. That is a risk = |
|
3499 that has to be taken. And it is worth=20 |
|
3500 taking, sin ce the difference between a "democratic" industrial system and = |
|
3501 one controlled by dictators is=20 |
|
3502 small compared with the difference between an industrial system and a = |
|
3503 non-industrial one. [33] It might=20 |
|
3504 even be argued that an industrial system controlled by di ctators would be = |
|
3505 preferable, because dictato=20 |
|
3506 r-controlled systems usually have proved inefficient, hence they are = |
|
3507 presumably more likely to break down.=20 |
|
3508 Look at Cuba.=20 |
|
3509 |
|
3510 196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures that tend to bind the = |
|
3511 world economy into a unified=20 |
|
3512 whole. Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to = |
|
3513 the environment in the short=20 |
|
3514 run, but in the long run they may perhaps be ad vantageous because they = |
|
3515 foster economic inte rdependence=20 |
|
3516 between nations. I will be eaier to destroy the industrial system on a = |
|
3517 worldwide basis if he world economy=20 |
|
3518 is so unified that its breakdown in any on major nation will lead to its = |
|
3519 breakdwon in al industrialized=20 |
|
3520 nations.=20 |
|
3521 |
|
3522 the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic = |
|
3523 interdependence between=20 |
|
3524 nations. It will be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide = |
|
3525 basis if the world economy is so=20 |
|
3526 unified that its breakdown in any one major nat ion will lead to its = |
|
3527 breakdown in all indust rialized nations. |
|
3528 |
|
3529 197. Some people take the line that modern man has too much power, too much = |
|
3530 control over nature; they=20 |
|
3531 argue for a more passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best = |
|
3532 these people are expressing=20 |
|
3533 themselves unclearly, because they fail to distingu ish between power for = |
|
3534 LARGE ORGANIZATIONS an=20 |
|
3535 d power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for = |
|
3536 powerlessness and=20 |
|
3537 passivity, because people NEED power. Modern man as a collective = |
|
3538 entity--that is, the industrial system-- |
|
3539 has immense power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as e vil. But modern = |
|
3540 INDIVIDUALS and=20 |
|
3541 SMALL GROUP S OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever = |
|
3542 did. Generally=20 |
|
3543 speaking, the vast power of "modern man" over nature is exercised not = |
|
3544 |
|
3545 by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the extent = |
|
3546 that the average modern=20 |
|
3547 INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he is pe rmitted to do so = |
|
3548 only within narrow limits and=20 |
|
3549 only under the supervision and control of the system. (You need a license = |
|
3550 for everything and with the=20 |
|
3551 license come rules and regulations). The individual has only those = |
|
3552 technological powers with which the s=20 |
|
3553 ystem chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is = |
|
3554 slight. |
|
3555 |
|
3556 198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS actually had considerable power = |
|
3557 over nature; or=20 |
|
3558 maybe it would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When primitive man = |
|
3559 needed food he knew how to=20 |
|
3560 find and prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it wi th homemade = |
|
3561 weapons. He knew how to=20 |
|
3562 protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But = |
|
3563 primitive man did relatively little damage=20 |
|
3564 to nature because the COLLECTIVE power of primitive society was negligible = |
|
3565 compared to the=20 |
|
3566 COLLECTIVE power of industrial society. |
|
3567 |
|
3568 199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passivity, one should argue = |
|
3569 that the power of the=20 |
|
3570 INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the = |
|
3571 power and freedom=20 |
|
3572 of INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. |
|
3573 |
|
3574 200. Until the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked, the = |
|
3575 destruction of that system must be the=20 |
|
3576 revolutionaries' ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy = |
|
3577 from the main goal. More=20 |
|
3578 importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themse lves to have any other = |
|
3579 goal than the destruc tion of=20 |
|
3580 technology, they will be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching = |
|
3581 that other goal. If they give in to=20 |
|
3582 that temptation, they will fall right back into the technological trap, = |
|
3583 because modern technology is a=20 |
|
3584 unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain SOME = |
|
3585 technology , one finds oneself obliged=20 |
|
3586 to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing only token amounts = |
|
3587 of technology. |
|
3588 |
|
3589 201. Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took "social justice" as = |
|
3590 a goal. Human nature being what=20 |
|
3591 it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to = |
|
3592 be enforced. In order to enforce it=20 |
|
3593 the revolutionaries would have to ret ain central organization and control. = |
|
3594 For th at they would need rapid=20 |
|
3595 long-distance transportation and communication, and therefore all the = |
|
3596 technology needed to support the=20 |
|
3597 transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor people = |
|
3598 they would have to use=20 |
|
3599 agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so forth. So that the attemp = |
|
3600 t to insure social justice would=20 |
|
3601 force them to retain most parts of the technological system. Not that we = |
|
3602 have anything against social=20 |
|
3603 justice,=20 |
|
3604 but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get rid of the = |
|
3605 technological system. |
|
3606 |
|
3607 202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system = |
|
3608 without using SOME modern=20 |
|
3609 technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to = |
|
3610 spread their message. But they=20 |
|
3611 should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the = |
|
3612 technological system. |
|
3613 |
|
3614 203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine in front of him. = |
|
3615 Suppose he starts saying to himself,=20 |
|
3616 "Wine isn't bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts = |
|
3617 of wine are even good for you!=20 |
|
3618 It won't do me any harm if I take just one little drink..." Well you know = |
|
3619 what is g oing to happen. Never=20 |
|
3620 forget that the human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a = |
|
3621 barrel of wine. |
|
3622 |
|
3623 204. Revolutionaries should have as many children as they can. There is = |
|
3624 strong scientific evidence that=20 |
|
3625 social attitudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests = |
|
3626 that a social attitude is a direct=20 |
|
3627 outcome of a person's genetic constitution, but it appears that personality = |
|
3628 traits tend , within the context of=20 |
|
3629 our society, to make a person more likely to hold this or that social = |
|
3630 attitude. Objections to these findings=20 |
|
3631 have been raised, but objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically = |
|
3632 motivated. In any event, no one=20 |
|
3633 denies that child ren tend on the average to hold social attit udes similar = |
|
3634 to those of their parents. From our=20 |
|
3635 point of view it doesn't matter all that much whether the attitudes are = |
|
3636 passed on genetically or through=20 |
|
3637 childhood training. In either case the ARE passed on. |
|
3638 |
|
3639 205. The trouble is that many of the people who are inclined to rebel = |
|
3640 against the industrial system are also=20 |
|
3641 concerned about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or = |
|
3642 no children. In this way they=20 |
|
3643 may be handing the world over to the sort of people who support or at least = |
|
3644 accept th e industrial system.=20 |
|
3645 To insure the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the = |
|
3646 present generation must reproduce itself=20 |
|
3647 abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only = |
|
3648 slightly. And the most=20 |
|
3649 important problem is to ge t rid of the industrial system, because once the = |
|
3650 industrial system is gone the=20 |
|
3651 world's population necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, = |
|
3652 if the industrial system survives,=20 |
|
3653 it will continue developing new techniques of food production that may = |
|
3654 enable the world's population to=20 |
|
3655 keep i ncreasing almost indefinitely. |
|
3656 |
|
3657 206. With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only points on which we = |
|
3658 absolutely insist are that the single=20 |
|
3659 overriding goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no = |
|
3660 other goal can be allowed to=20 |
|
3661 compete with this one. For the rest, revol utionaries should take an = |
|
3662 empirical approach . If experience=20 |
|
3663 indicates that some of the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs = |
|
3664 are not going to give good=20 |
|
3665 results, then those recommendations should be discarded. |
|
3666 |
|
3667 |
|
3668 |
|
3669 TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY |
|
3670 |
|
3671 207. An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is = |
|
3672 that it is bound to fail, because (it is=20 |
|
3673 claimed) throughout history technology has always progressed, never = |
|
3674 regressed, hence technological=20 |
|
3675 regression is impossible. But this claim is false. |
|
3676 |
|
3677 208. We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call = |
|
3678 small-scale technology and=20 |
|
3679 organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is technology = |
|
3680 that can be used by small-scale=20 |
|
3681 communities without outside assistance. Organization -dependent technology = |
|
3682 is technology that de pends=20 |
|
3683 on large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of = |
|
3684 regression in small-scale=20 |
|
3685 technology. But organization-dependent technology DOES regress when the = |
|
3686 social organization on which=20 |
|
3687 it depends breaks down. Example: When the Roma n Empire fell apart the = |
|
3688 Romans' small-scale technology=20 |
|
3689 survived because any clever village craftsman could build, for instance, a = |
|
3690 water wheel, any skilled smith=20 |
|
3691 could make steel by Roman methods,=20 |
|
3692 and so forth. But the Romans' organization-dependent technology DID = |
|
3693 regress. Their aqueducts fell into=20 |
|
3694 disrepair and were never rebuilt.=20 |
|
3695 Their tech niques of road construction were lost. The Roman system of urban = |
|
3696 sanitation was forgotten, so=20 |
|
3697 that until rather recent times did the sanitation of European cities that = |
|
3698 of Ancient Rome. |
|
3699 |
|
3700 209. The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until = |
|
3701 perhaps a century or two=20 |
|
3702 before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale = |
|
3703 technology. But most of the technology=20 |
|
3704 developed since the Industrial Revolution is orga nization-dependent = |
|
3705 technology. Take the refr igerator for=20 |
|
3706 example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a post-industrial = |
|
3707 machine shop it would be=20 |
|
3708 virtually impossible for a handful of local craftsmen to build a = |
|
3709 refrigerator. If by some miracle they did=20 |
|
3710 succeed in building one it would be useless to them without a reliable = |
|
3711 source o f electric power. So they=20 |
|
3712 would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators require large = |
|
3713 amounts of copper wire.=20 |
|
3714 Imagine trying to make that=20 |
|
3715 wire without modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for = |
|
3716 refrigeration? It would be=20 |
|
3717 much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or picking, as = |
|
3718 was done before the invention=20 |
|
3719 of the refrigerator. |
|
3720 |
|
3721 210. So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly = |
|
3722 broken down, refrigeration technology=20 |
|
3723 would quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-dependent = |
|
3724 technology. And once this=20 |
|
3725 technology had been lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to = |
|
3726 rebuild it, just as it took centuries=20 |
|
3727 to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be few = |
|
3728 and scattered. An industrial=20 |
|
3729 society, if built from scratch without outside help, can only be built in a = |
|
3730 series of stages: You need tools to=20 |
|
3731 make tools to make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic = |
|
3732 development and progress in social=20 |
|
3733 organization is required. And, even in the absence of an ideology opposed = |
|
3734 to technology, there is no reason=20 |
|
3735 to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding industrial = |
|
3736 society. The enthusiasm for "progre ss"=20 |
|
3737 is a phenomenon particular to the modern form of society, and it seems not = |
|
3738 to have existed prior to the 17th=20 |
|
3739 century or thereabouts. |
|
3740 |
|
3741 211. In the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were = |
|
3742 about equally "advanced":=20 |
|
3743 Europe, the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). = |
|
3744 Three of those civilizations=20 |
|
3745 remained more or less stable, and only Europe became dynamic. No one knows = |
|
3746 why Europe became dyn=20 |
|
3747 amic at that time; historians have their theories but these are only = |
|
3748 speculation. At any rate, it is clear that=20 |
|
3749 rapid development toward a technological form of society occurs only under = |
|
3750 special conditions. So there is=20 |
|
3751 no reason to assume that long-lastin g technological regression cannot be = |
|
3752 brought about. |
|
3753 |
|
3754 212. Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an = |
|
3755 industrial-technological form? Maybe, but=20 |
|
3756 there is no use in worrying about it, since we can't predict or control = |
|
3757 events 500 or 1,000 years in the=20 |
|
3758 future. Those problems must be dealt with by the peopl e who will live at = |
|
3759 that time. |
|
3760 |
|
3761 |
|
3762 |
|
3763 THE DANGER OF LEFTISM |
|
3764 |
|
3765 213. Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, = |
|
3766 leftists or persons of similar=20 |
|
3767 psychological type are often unattracted to a rebellious or activist = |
|
3768 movement whose goals and membership=20 |
|
3769 are not initially leftist. The resulting inf lux of leftish types can = |
|
3770 easily turn a non-l eftist movement into a=20 |
|
3771 leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of = |
|
3772 the movement. |
|
3773 |
|
3774 214. To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature and opposes technology = |
|
3775 must take a resolutely anti-leftist=20 |
|
3776 stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Leftism is in the = |
|
3777 long run inconsistent with wild=20 |
|
3778 nature, with human freedom and with the e limination of modern technology. = |
|
3779 Leftism is collectivist; it=20 |
|
3780 seeks to bind together the entire world (both nature and the human race) = |
|
3781 into a unified whole. But this=20 |
|
3782 implies management of nature and of human life by organized society, and it = |
|
3783 requires advanced=20 |
|
3784 technology. You can't have a united worl d without rapid transportation and = |
|
3785 communica tion, you can't=20 |
|
3786 make all people love one another without sophisticated psychological = |
|
3787 techniques, you can't have a=20 |
|
3788 "planned society" without the necessary technological base.=20 |
|
3789 Above all, leftism is driven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks = |
|
3790 power o n a collective basis,=20 |
|
3791 through identification with a mass movement or an organization. Leftism is = |
|
3792 unlikely ever to give up=20 |
|
3793 technology, because technology is too valuable a source of collective = |
|
3794 power.=20 |
|
3795 |
|
3796 215. The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks it on an individual = |
|
3797 or small-group basis; he wants=20 |
|
3798 individuals and small groups to be able to control the circumstances of = |
|
3799 their own lives. He opposes=20 |
|
3800 technology because it makes small groups dependent on large = |
|
3801 organizations. |
|
3802 |
|
3803 216. Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but they will oppose it = |
|
3804 only so long as they are=20 |
|
3805 outsiders and the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If = |
|
3806 leftism ever becomes dominant in=20 |
|
3807 society, so that the technological system becomes a tool in the hands of = |
|
3808 leftists, they will e nthusiastically=20 |
|
3809 use it and promote its growth. In doing this they will be repeating a = |
|
3810 pattern that leftism has shown again=20 |
|
3811 and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in Russia were outsiders, they = |
|
3812 vigorously opposed censorship=20 |
|
3813 and the secret police, they advocated self-determination for ethnic mino = |
|
3814 rities, and so forth;=20 |
|
3815 but as soon as they came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter = |
|
3816 censorship and created a more=20 |
|
3817 ruthless secret police than any that had existed under the tsars, and they = |
|
3818 oppressed ethnic minorities at least=20 |
|
3819 as much as the tsars had done. In the United States, a couple of decades = |
|
3820 ago when leftists were a minority=20 |
|
3821 in our universities, leftist professors were vigorous proponents of = |
|
3822 academic freedom, but today, in those=20 |
|
3823 universities where leftists have become dominant, they have shown = |
|
3824 themselves ready to take away from=20 |
|
3825 every one else's academic freedom. (This is "polit ical correctness.") The = |
|
3826 same will happen with leftists and=20 |
|
3827 technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if they ever get it = |
|
3828 under their own control. |
|
3829 |
|
3830 217. In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-hungry type, = |
|
3831 repeatedly, have first cooperated with=20 |
|
3832 non-leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more libertarian = |
|
3833 inclination, and later have double- |
|
3834 crossed them to seize power for them selves. Robespierre did this in the = |
|
3835 French R evolution, the Bolsheviks=20 |
|
3836 did it in the Russian Revolution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 = |
|
3837 and Castro and his followers did it=20 |
|
3838 in Cuba. Given the past history of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for = |
|
3839 non-leftist revolutionaries today to=20 |
|
3840 collabo rate with leftists. |
|
3841 |
|
3842 218. Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a kind of religion. = |
|
3843 Leftism is not a religion in the=20 |
|
3844 strict sense because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of = |
|
3845 any supernatural being. But for the=20 |
|
3846 leftist, leftism plays a psychologica l role much like that which religion = |
|
3847 plays f or some people. The leftist=20 |
|
3848 NEEDS to believe in leftism; it plays a vital role in his psychological = |
|
3849 economy. His beliefs are not easily=20 |
|
3850 modified by logic or facts. He has a deep conviction that leftism is = |
|
3851 morally Right with a capital R, and that=20 |
|
3852 he has no t only a right but a duty to impose leftist morality on everyone. = |
|
3853 (However, many of the people we=20 |
|
3854 are referring to as "leftists" do not think of themselves as leftists and = |
|
3855 would not describe=20 |
|
3856 their system of beliefs as leftism. We use the term "leftism" because we = |
|
3857 don't know of any better words to=20 |
|
3858 d esignate the spectrum of related creeds that includes the feminist, gay = |
|
3859 rights, political correctness, etc.,=20 |
|
3860 movements, and because these movements have a strong affinity with the old = |
|
3861 left. See paragraphs 227- |
|
3862 230.) |
|
3863 |
|
3864 219. Leftism is totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is in a position of = |
|
3865 power it tends to invade every private=20 |
|
3866 corner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part this is because = |
|
3867 of the quasi-religious character of=20 |
|
3868 leftism; everything contrary to leftists beliefs represents Sin. More impor = |
|
3869 tantly, leftism is a totalitarian=20 |
|
3870 force because of the leftists' drive for power. The leftist seeks to = |
|
3871 satisfy his need for power through=20 |
|
3872 identification with a social movement and he tries to go through the power = |
|
3873 process by helping to pursue=20 |
|
3874 and attain th e goals of the movement (see paragraph 83). But no matter how = |
|
3875 far the movement has gone in=20 |
|
3876 attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, because his activism is = |
|
3877 a surrogate activity (see paragraph=20 |
|
3878 41).=20 |
|
3879 That is, the leftist's real motive is not to attain the ostensible goals of = |
|
3880 leftism; in rea lity he is motivated by=20 |
|
3881 the sense of power h e gets from struggling for and then reaching a social = |
|
3882 goal.[35] |
|
3883 |
|
3884 Consequently the leftist is never satisfied with the goals he has already = |
|
3885 attained; his need for the power=20 |
|
3886 process leads him always to pursue some new goal. The leftist wants equal = |
|
3887 opportunities for minorities.=20 |
|
3888 When that is attained he insists on statisti cal equality of achievement by = |
|
3889 minorities. A nd as long as=20 |
|
3890 anyone harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude toward some = |
|
3891 minority, the leftist has to=20 |
|
3892 re-educated him. And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be = |
|
3893 allowed to have a negative attitude=20 |
|
3894 toward homosexuals, disabled peop le, fat people, old people, ugly people, = |
|
3895 and on and on and on. It's not=20 |
|
3896 enough that the public should be informed about the hazards of smoking; a = |
|
3897 warning has to be stamped on=20 |
|
3898 every package of cigarettes.=20 |
|
3899 Then cigarette advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The = |
|
3900 activists will never be sati sfied until=20 |
|
3901 tobacco is outlawed, and after t hat it will be alco hot then junk food, = |
|
3902 etc. Activists have fought gross child=20 |
|
3903 abuse, which is reasonable. But now they want to stop all spanking. When = |
|
3904 they have done that they will=20 |
|
3905 want to ban something else they consider unwholesome, then another thing = |
|
3906 and then another. They will=20 |
|
3907 never be satisfi ed until they have complete control over all child rearing = |
|
3908 practices. And then they will=20 |
|
3909 move on to another cause.=20 |
|
3910 |
|
3911 220. Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL the things that were = |
|
3912 wrong with society, and then=20 |
|
3913 suppose you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded. It is safe = |
|
3914 to say that within a couple of=20 |
|
3915 years the majority of leftists would find some thing new to complain about, = |
|
3916 some new social "evil" to=20 |
|
3917 correct because, once again, the leftist is motivated less by distress at = |
|
3918 society's ills than by the need to=20 |
|
3919 satisfy his drive for power by imposing his solutions on society.=20 |
|
3920 |
|
3921 221. Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts and behavior by = |
|
3922 their high level of socialization,=20 |
|
3923 many leftists of the over-socialized type cannot pursue power in the ways = |
|
3924 that other people do. For them=20 |
|
3925 the drive for power has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in = |
|
3926 the strugg le to impose their=20 |
|
3927 morality on everyone.=20 |
|
3928 |
|
3929 222. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, are True = |
|
3930 Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer's=20 |
|
3931 book, "The True Believer." But not all True Believers are of the same = |
|
3932 psychological type as leftists.=20 |
|
3933 Presumably a truebelieving nazi, for instanc e is very different = |
|
3934 psychologically from a t ruebelieving leftist.=20 |
|
3935 Because of their capacity for single-minded devotion to a cause, True = |
|
3936 Believers are a useful, perhaps a=20 |
|
3937 necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary movement. This presents a = |
|
3938 problem with which we must admit=20 |
|
3939 we don't know how to deal. We aren't sure how to harness the energies o f = |
|
3940 the True Believer to a revolution=20 |
|
3941 against technology. At present all we can say is that no True Believer will = |
|
3942 make a safe recruit to the=20 |
|
3943 revolution=20 |
|
3944 unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of technology. If = |
|
3945 he is committed also to another=20 |
|
3946 ideal, he may want to use technology as a t ool for pursuing that other = |
|
3947 ideal (see paragraphs 220, 221). |
|
3948 |
|
3949 223. Some readers may say, "This stuff about leftism is a lot of crap. I = |
|
3950 know John and Jane who are leftish=20 |
|
3951 types and they don't have all these totalitarian tendencies." It's quite = |
|
3952 true that many leftists, possibly even a=20 |
|
3953 numerical majority, are decent pe ople who sincerely believe in tolerating = |
|
3954 oth ers' values (up to a point) and=20 |
|
3955 wouldn't want to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals. Our = |
|
3956 remarks about leftism are not=20 |
|
3957 meant to apply to every individual leftist but to describe the general = |
|
3958 character of leftism as a movement.=20 |
|
3959 And the gene ral character of a movement is not necessari ly determined by = |
|
3960 the numerical proportions of=20 |
|
3961 the various kinds of people involved in the movement.=20 |
|
3962 |
|
3963 224. The people who rise to positions of power in leftist movements tend to = |
|
3964 be leftists of the most power- |
|
3965 hungry type because power-hungry people are those who strive hardest to get = |
|
3966 into positions of power.=20 |
|
3967 Once the power-hungry types have captured contro l of the movement, there = |
|
3968 are many leftists o f a gentler=20 |
|
3969 breed who inwardly disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but = |
|
3970 cannot bring themselves to=20 |
|
3971 oppose them. They NEED their faith in the movement, and because they cannot = |
|
3972 give up this faith they go=20 |
|
3973 along with the leaders. True, SOME lefti sts do have the guts to oppose the = |
|
3974 totalitar ian tendencies that=20 |
|
3975 emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-hungry types are better = |
|
3976 organized, are more ruthless=20 |
|
3977 and Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a strong power = |
|
3978 base.=20 |
|
3979 |
|
3980 225. These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and other countries that = |
|
3981 were taken over by leftists.=20 |
|
3982 Similarly, before the breakdown of communism in the USSR, leftish types in = |
|
3983 the West would seldom=20 |
|
3984 criticize that country. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many = |
|
3985 wrong things, but then th ey=20 |
|
3986 would try to find excuses for the communists and begin talking about the = |
|
3987 faults of the West. They always=20 |
|
3988 opposed Western military resistance to communist aggression. Leftish types = |
|
3989 all over the world vigorously=20 |
|
3990 protested the U.S. military action in Viet nam, but when the USSR invaded = |
|
3991 Afghanistan t hey did nothing.=20 |
|
3992 Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because of their leftist = |
|
3993 faith, they just couldn't bear to put=20 |
|
3994 themselves in opposition to communism.=20 |
|
3995 Today, in those of our universities where "political correctness" has = |
|
3996 become dominant, there are probably=20 |
|
3997 many leftish types who p rivately disapprove of the suppression of academic = |
|
3998 freedom, but they go along=20 |
|
3999 with it anyway.=20 |
|
4000 |
|
4001 226. Thus the fact that many individual leftists are personally mild and = |
|
4002 fairly tolerant people by no means=20 |
|
4003 prevents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian tendency.=20 |
|
4004 |
|
4005 227. Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It is still far from = |
|
4006 clear what we mean by the word=20 |
|
4007 "leftist." There doesn't seem to be much we can do about this. Today = |
|
4008 leftism is fragmented into a whole=20 |
|
4009 spectrum of activist movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, = |
|
4010 and some act ivist movements=20 |
|
4011 (e.g.., radical environmentalism) seem to include both personalities of the = |
|
4012 leftist type and personalities of=20 |
|
4013 thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to know better than to collaborate = |
|
4014 with leftists. Varieties of leftists=20 |
|
4015 fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and we oursel ves would = |
|
4016 often be hard-pressed to decide=20 |
|
4017 whether a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent that it is = |
|
4018 defined at all, our conception of=20 |
|
4019 leftism=20 |
|
4020 is defined by the discussion of it that we have given in this article, and = |
|
4021 we can only advise t he reader to=20 |
|
4022 use his own judgment in decidin g who is a leftist.=20 |
|
4023 |
|
4024 228. But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diagnosing leftism. = |
|
4025 These criteria cannot be applied in a=20 |
|
4026 cut and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of the criteria = |
|
4027 without being leftists, some leftists=20 |
|
4028 may not meet any of the criteria. Ag ain, you just have to use your = |
|
4029 judgment. |
|
4030 |
|
4031 229. The leftist is oriented toward largescale collectivism. He emphasizes = |
|
4032 the duty of the individual to=20 |
|
4033 serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. He = |
|
4034 has a negative attitude toward=20 |
|
4035 individualism. He often takes a moralistic ton e. He tends to be for gun = |
|
4036 control, for sex e ducation and=20 |
|
4037 other psychologically "enlightened" educational methods, for planning, for = |
|
4038 affirmative action, for=20 |
|
4039 multiculturalism. He tends to identify with victims. He tends to be against = |
|
4040 competition and against=20 |
|
4041 violence, but he often finds excuses for th ose leftists who do commit = |
|
4042 violence. He is f ond of using the=20 |
|
4043 common catch-phrases of the left like "racism, " "sexism, " "homophobia, " = |
|
4044 "capitalism," "imperialism,"=20 |
|
4045 "neocolonialism " "genocide,"=20 |
|
4046 "social change," "social justice," "social responsibility." Maybe the best = |
|
4047 diagnostic trait of the leftist is his=20 |
|
4048 tendency to sympathize with the following movements: feminism, gay rights, = |
|
4049 ethnic rights, disabi lity=20 |
|
4050 rights, animal rights political correct ness. Anyone who strongly = |
|
4051 sympathizes with ALL of these=20 |
|
4052 movements is almost certainly a leftist. [36]=20 |
|
4053 |
|
4054 230. The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who are most power-hungry, = |
|
4055 are often characterized by=20 |
|
4056 arrogance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However, the most = |
|
4057 dangerous leftists of all may be=20 |
|
4058 certain oversocialized types who avoid irritating di splays of = |
|
4059 aggressiveness and refrain from ad vertising=20 |
|
4060 their leftism, but work quietly and unobtrusively to promote collectivist = |
|
4061 values, "enlightened"=20 |
|
4062 psychological techniques for socializing children, dependence of the = |
|
4063 individual on the system, and so forth.=20 |
|
4064 These crypto-leftists (as we may call th em) approximate certain bourgeois = |
|
4065 types as f ar as practical action=20 |
|
4066 is concerned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and motivation. = |
|
4067 The ordinary bourgeois tries to=20 |
|
4068 bring people under control=20 |
|
4069 of the system in order to protect his way of life, or he does so simply = |
|
4070 because his attitudes are=20 |
|
4071 conventional. The crypto-leftist tries to br ing people under control of = |
|
4072 the system because he is a True=20 |
|
4073 Believer in a collectivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated = |
|
4074 from the average leftist of the=20 |
|
4075 oversocialized type by the fact that his rebellious impulse is weaker and = |
|
4076 he is more se curely socialized. He=20 |
|
4077 is differentiated from the ordinary well-socialized bourgeois by the fact = |
|
4078 that there is some deep lack within=20 |
|
4079 him that makes it necessary for him to devote himself to a cause and = |
|
4080 immerse himself in a collectivity. And=20 |
|
4081 maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is stronger tha n that of the = |
|
4082 average bourgeois. |
|
4083 |
|
4084 FINAL NOTE |
|
4085 |
|
4086 231. Throughout this article we've made imprecise statements and statements = |
|
4087 that ought to have had all=20 |
|
4088 sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and some of our = |
|
4089 statements may be flatly false.=20 |
|
4090 Lack of sufficient information and the need f or brevity made it impossible = |
|
4091 for us to fomu late our=20 |
|
4092 assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of = |
|
4093 course in a discussion of this=20 |
|
4094 |
|
4095 kind one must rely heavily on intuitive judgment, and that can sometimes be = |
|
4096 wrong. So we don't claim that=20 |
|
4097 this article expresses more than a crude approximation to the truth. = |
|
4098 |
|
4099 |
|
4100 232. All the same we are reasonably confident that the general outlines of = |
|
4101 the picture we have painted here=20 |
|
4102 are roughly correct. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form as a = |
|
4103 phenomenon peculiar to our time=20 |
|
4104 and as a symptom of the disruption of the power process. But we might = |
|
4105 possibly be wrong about this.=20 |
|
4106 Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing = |
|
4107 their morality on everyone have=20 |
|
4108 certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role = |
|
4109 played by feelings of=20 |
|
4110 inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by = |
|
4111 people who are not themselves=20 |
|
4112 victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by = |
|
4113 people not themselves victims can=20 |
|
4114 be seen to some extent in=20 |
|
4115 19th century leftism and early Christianity but as far as we can make out, = |
|
4116 symptoms of low self-esteem,=20 |
|
4117 etc., were not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other = |
|
4118 movements, as they are in modern=20 |
|
4119 leftism. But we are not in a position to assert confidently that no such = |
|
4120 movements have existed prior to=20 |
|
4121 modern leftism. This is a significant question to which historians ought to = |
|
4122 give their attention.=20 |
|
4123 |
|
4124 NOTES=20 |
|
4125 |
|
4126 1. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even most, bullies and = |
|
4127 ruthless competitors suffer from=20 |
|
4128 feelings of inferiority.=20 |
|
4129 |
|
4130 2. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many oversocialized people = |
|
4131 suffered from serious=20 |
|
4132 psychological problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their = |
|
4133 sexual feelings. Freud apparently=20 |
|
4134 based his theories on people of this type. Today the focus of socialization = |
|
4135 has shifted from sex to=20 |
|
4136 aggression.=20 |
|
4137 |
|
4138 3. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists in engineering = |
|
4139 "hard" sciences.=20 |
|
4140 |
|
4141 4. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the middle and upper = |
|
4142 classes who resist some of these=20 |
|
4143 values, but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such = |
|
4144 resistance appears in the mass media only to=20 |
|
4145 a very limited extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is in = |
|
4146 favor of the stated values.=20 |
|
4147 |
|
4148 The main reasons why these values have become, so to speak, the official = |
|
4149 values of our society is that they=20 |
|
4150 are useful to the industrial system. Violence is discouraged because it = |
|
4151 disrupts the functioning of the=20 |
|
4152 system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts also disrupt the = |
|
4153 system, and discrimination wastes=20 |
|
4154 the talent of minority-group members who could be useful to the system. = |
|
4155 Poverty must be "cured" because=20 |
|
4156 the underclass causes problems for the system and contact with the = |
|
4157 underclass lowers the moral of the other=20 |
|
4158 classes. Women are encouraged to have careers because their talents are = |
|
4159 useful to the system and, more=20 |
|
4160 importantly because by having regular jobs women become better integrated = |
|
4161 into the system and tied=20 |
|
4162 directly to it rather than to their families.=20 |
|
4163 This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders of the system say they = |
|
4164 want to strengthen the family,=20 |
|
4165 but they really mean is that they want the family to serve as an effective = |
|
4166 tool for socializing children in=20 |
|
4167 accord with the needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51,52 that the = |
|
4168 system cannot afford to let the=20 |
|
4169 family or other small-scale social groups be strong or autonomous.) = |
|
4170 |
|
4171 |
|
4172 5. (Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority of people don't want = |
|
4173 to make their own decisions but=20 |
|
4174 want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an element of truth in = |
|
4175 this. People like to make their=20 |
|
4176 own decisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult, = |
|
4177 fundamental questions require facing up=20 |
|
4178 to psychological conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict. = |
|
4179 Hence they tend to lean on others in=20 |
|
4180 making difficult decisions. The majority of people are natural followers, = |
|
4181 not leaders, but they like to have=20 |
|
4182 direct personal access to their leaders and participate to some extent in = |
|
4183 making difficult decisions. At least=20 |
|
4184 to that degree they need autonomy.=20 |
|
4185 |
|
4186 6. (Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by = |
|
4187 caged animals.=20 |
|
4188 |
|
4189 To explain how these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the = |
|
4190 power process:=20 |
|
4191 |
|
4192 Common-sense understanding of human nature tells one that lack of goals = |
|
4193 whose attainment requires effort=20 |
|
4194 leads to boredom and that boredom, long continued, often leads eventually = |
|
4195 to depression. Failure to obtain=20 |
|
4196 goals leads to frustration and lowering of self-esteem. Frustration leads = |
|
4197 to anger, anger to aggression, often=20 |
|
4198 in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been shown that long-continued = |
|
4199 frustration commonly leads to=20 |
|
4200 depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep disorders, = |
|
4201 eating disorders and bad feelings about=20 |
|
4202 oneself. Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure as an = |
|
4203 antidote; hence insatiable hedonism=20 |
|
4204 and excessive sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. = |
|
4205 Boredom too tends to cause excessive=20 |
|
4206 pleasure-seeking since,=20 |
|
4207 lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal. See accompanying = |
|
4208 diagram. The foregoing is a=20 |
|
4209 simplification. Reality is more complex, and of course deprivation with = |
|
4210 respect to the power process is not=20 |
|
4211 the ONLY cause of the symptoms described. By the way, when we mention = |
|
4212 depression we do not=20 |
|
4213 necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be treated by a = |
|
4214 psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of=20 |
|
4215 depression are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not necessarily = |
|
4216 mean long-term, thought out=20 |
|
4217 goals. For many or most people through much of human history, the goals of = |
|
4218 a hand-to-mouth existence=20 |
|
4219 (merely providing oneself and one's family with food from day to day) have = |
|
4220 been quite sufficient.=20 |
|
4221 |
|
4222 7. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for a few passive, inward = |
|
4223 looking groups, such as the=20 |
|
4224 Amish, which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from these, = |
|
4225 some genuine small-scale=20 |
|
4226 communities do exist in America today. For instance, youth gangs and = |
|
4227 "cults". Everyone regards them as=20 |
|
4228 dangerous, and so they are, because the members of these groups are loyal = |
|
4229 primarily to one another rather=20 |
|
4230 than to the system, hence the system cannot control them. Or take the = |
|
4231 gypsies. The gypsies commonly get=20 |
|
4232 away with theft and fraud because their loyalties are such that they can = |
|
4233 always get other gypsies to give=20 |
|
4234 testimony that "proves" their innocence. Obviously the system would be in = |
|
4235 serious trouble if too many=20 |
|
4236 people belonged to such groups. Some of the=20 |
|
4237 early-20th century Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing = |
|
4238 China recognized the necessity=20 |
|
4239 of breaking down small-scale social groups such as the family: "(According = |
|
4240 to Sun Yat-sen) The Chinese=20 |
|
4241 people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of = |
|
4242 loyalty from the family to the=20 |
|
4243 state. . .(According to Li Huang) traditional attachments, particularly to = |
|
4244 the family had to be abandoned if=20 |
|
4245 nationalism were to develop to China." (Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political = |
|
4246 Thought in the Twentieth=20 |
|
4247 Century," page 125, page 297.)=20 |
|
4248 |
|
4249 8. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, = |
|
4250 and serious ones, but for the=20 |
|
4251 sake of breviety we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.=20 |
|
4252 |
|
4253 9. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the underclass. We are speaking of the = |
|
4254 mainstream.=20 |
|
4255 |
|
4256 10. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators, "mental health" = |
|
4257 professionals and the like are doing=20 |
|
4258 their best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see to it = |
|
4259 that everyone has a satisfactory social=20 |
|
4260 life.=20 |
|
4261 |
|
4262 11. (Paragraphs 63, 82) Is the drive for endless material acquisition = |
|
4263 really an artificial creation of the=20 |
|
4264 advertising and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate human = |
|
4265 drive for material acquisition.=20 |
|
4266 There have been many cultures in which people have desired little material = |
|
4267 wealth beyond what was=20 |
|
4268 necessary to satisfy their basic physical needs (Australian aborigines, = |
|
4269 traditional Mexican peasant culture,=20 |
|
4270 some African cultures). On the other hand there have also been many = |
|
4271 pre-industrial cultures in which=20 |
|
4272 material acquisition has played an important role. So we can't claim that = |
|
4273 today's acquisition-oriented=20 |
|
4274 culture is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing = |
|
4275 industry. But it is clear that the=20 |
|
4276 advertising and marketing industry has had an=20 |
|
4277 important part in creating that culture. The big corporations that spend = |
|
4278 millions on advertising wouldn't be=20 |
|
4279 spending that kind of money without solid proof that they were getting it = |
|
4280 back in increased sales. One=20 |
|
4281 member of FC met a sales manager a couple of years ago who was frank enough = |
|
4282 to tell him, "Our job is to=20 |
|
4283 make people buy things they don't want and don't need." He then described = |
|
4284 how an untrained novice could=20 |
|
4285 present people with the facts about a product, and make no sales at all, = |
|
4286 while a trained and experienced=20 |
|
4287 professional salesman would make lots of sales to the same people. This = |
|
4288 shows that people are manipulated=20 |
|
4289 into buying things they don't really want.=20 |
|
4290 |
|
4291 12. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness seems to have become less = |
|
4292 serious during the last 15=20 |
|
4293 years or so, because people now feel less secure physically and = |
|
4294 economically than they did earlier, and the=20 |
|
4295 need for security provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has been = |
|
4296 replaced by frustration over the=20 |
|
4297 difficulty of attaining security. We emphasize the problem of = |
|
4298 purposelessness because the liberals and=20 |
|
4299 leftists would wish to solve our social problems by having society = |
|
4300 guarantee everyone's security; but if that=20 |
|
4301 could be done it would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The = |
|
4302 real issue is not whether=20 |
|
4303 society provides well or poorly for people's security; the trouble is that = |
|
4304 people are dependent on the system=20 |
|
4305 for=20 |
|
4306 their security rather than having it in their own hands. This, by the way, = |
|
4307 is part of the reason why some=20 |
|
4308 people get worked up about the right to bear arms; possession of a gun puts = |
|
4309 that aspect of their security in=20 |
|
4310 their own hands.=20 |
|
4311 |
|
4312 13. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives' efforts to decrease the amount of = |
|
4313 government regulation are of little=20 |
|
4314 benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the = |
|
4315 regulations can be eliminated because most=20 |
|
4316 regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation = |
|
4317 affects business rather than the=20 |
|
4318 average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the = |
|
4319 government and give it to private=20 |
|
4320 corporations. What this means for the average man is that government = |
|
4321 interference in his life is replaced by=20 |
|
4322 interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for e xample, = |
|
4323 to dump more chemicals that=20 |
|
4324 get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just = |
|
4325 taking the average man for a=20 |
|
4326 sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of = |
|
4327 Big Business.=20 |
|
4328 |
|
4329 14. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the purpose for which = |
|
4330 propaganda is being used in a given=20 |
|
4331 case, he generally calls it "education" or applies to it some similar = |
|
4332 euphemism. But propaganda is=20 |
|
4333 propaganda regardless of the purpose for which it i s used.=20 |
|
4334 |
|
4335 15. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or disapproval of the = |
|
4336 Panama invasion. We only use it=20 |
|
4337 to illustrate a point.=20 |
|
4338 |
|
4339 16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there = |
|
4340 were fewer and less effective=20 |
|
4341 legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution = |
|
4342 went into effect, yet there was=20 |
|
4343 more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the = |
|
4344 War of Independence, than=20 |
|
4345 there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We = |
|
4346 quote from "Violence in America:=20 |
|
4347 Historical and Comparative perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and = |
|
4348 Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12=20 |
|
4349 by Roger Lane, pages 476-478: "The progressive heightening of standards o f = |
|
4350 property, and with it the=20 |
|
4351 increasing reliance on official law enforcement (in 19th century America). = |
|
4352 .. .were common to the whole=20 |
|
4353 society. . .[T]he change in social behavior=20 |
|
4354 is so long term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with the most = |
|
4355 funda mental of contemporary=20 |
|
4356 social processes; tha t of industrial urbanization itself. . = |
|
4357 .."Massachusetts in 1835 had a population of some=20 |
|
4358 660,940, 81 percent rural, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. = |
|
4359 It's citizens were used to=20 |
|
4360 considerable personal freedom. Whether teamsters, farmers or artisa ns, = |
|
4361 they were all accustomed to setting=20 |
|
4362 thei r own schedules, and the nature of their work made them physically = |
|
4363 dependent on each other. .=20 |
|
4364 ..Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not generally cause for = |
|
4365 wider social concern. . ."But the=20 |
|
4366 impact of the twin movements to the city and to the fac tory, both just = |
|
4367 gathering force in 1835, had a=20 |
|
4368 progressive effect on personal behavior=20 |
|
4369 throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. The factory demanded = |
|
4370 regularity of behavior, a life=20 |
|
4371 governed by obedience to the rhythms of clock and calendar, the demands of = |
|
4372 foreman and supervisor. In=20 |
|
4373 the city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neighborhoods = |
|
4374 inhibited many actions previously=20 |
|
4375 unobjectionable.=20 |
|
4376 |
|
4377 Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger establishments were = |
|
4378 mutually dependent on their fellows.=20 |
|
4379 as one man's work fit into another's, so one man's business was no longer = |
|
4380 his own. "The results of the new=20 |
|
4381 organization of life and work were appar ent by 1900, when some 76 percent = |
|
4382 of the 2,8 05,346 inhabitants=20 |
|
4383 of Massachusetts were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular = |
|
4384 behavior which had been tolerable=20 |
|
4385 in a casual, independent society was no longer acceptable in the more = |
|
4386 formalized, cooperative atmosphere=20 |
|
4387 of the later period. . . The move to the cities had, in short, produc ed a = |
|
4388 more tractable, more socialized,=20 |
|
4389 more 'civilized' generation than its predecessors."=20 |
|
4390 |
|
4391 17. (Paragraph 117) Apologists for the system are fond of citing cases in = |
|
4392 which elections have been=20 |
|
4393 decided by one or two votes, but such cases are rare.=20 |
|
4394 |
|
4395 18. (Paragraph 119) "Today, in technologically advanced lands, men live = |
|
4396 very similar lives in spite of=20 |
|
4397 geographical, religious and political differences. The daily lives of a = |
|
4398 Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a=20 |
|
4399 Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo, a Communist bank clerk in Moscow are far more = |
|
4400 alike than the life any one=20 |
|
4401 of them is like that of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. = |
|
4402 These similarities are the result of a=20 |
|
4403 common technology. . ." L. Sprague de Camp, "The Ancient Engineers," = |
|
4404 Ballentine edition, page 17.=20 |
|
4405 |
|
4406 The lives of the three bank clerks are not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have = |
|
4407 SOME effect. But all=20 |
|
4408 technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve along = |
|
4409 APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.=20 |
|
4410 |
|
4411 19. (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic engineer might = |
|
4412 create a lot of terrorists.=20 |
|
4413 |
|
4414 20. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of undesirable consequences of = |
|
4415 medical progress, suppose a=20 |
|
4416 reliable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment is too = |
|
4417 expensive to be available to any but the=20 |
|
4418 elite, it will greatly reduce their incen tive to stop the escape of = |
|
4419 carcinogens into the environment.=20 |
|
4420 |
|
4421 21. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that = |
|
4422 a large number of good things=20 |
|
4423 can add up to a bad thing, we will illustrate with an analogy. Suppose Mr. = |
|
4424 A is playing chess with Mr. B.=20 |
|
4425 Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over Mr . A's shoulder. Mr. A of course = |
|
4426 wants to win his game, so if Mr.=20 |
|
4427 C points out a good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But = |
|
4428 suppose now that Mr. C tells Mr.=20 |
|
4429 A how to make ALL of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A a = |
|
4430 favor by showing him his=20 |
|
4431 best move, but by making AL L of his moves for him he spoils the game, s = |
|
4432 ince there is not point in Mr.=20 |
|
4433 A's playing the game at all if someone else makes all his moves.=20 |
|
4434 |
|
4435 The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system makes = |
|
4436 an individual's life easier for=20 |
|
4437 him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him of control over = |
|
4438 his own fate.=20 |
|
4439 |
|
4440 22. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the conflict of values = |
|
4441 within the mainstream. For the=20 |
|
4442 sake of simplicity we leave out of the picture "outsider" values like the = |
|
4443 idea that wild nature is more=20 |
|
4444 important than human economic welfare.=20 |
|
4445 |
|
4446 23. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MATERIAL = |
|
4447 self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of=20 |
|
4448 some psychological need, for example, by promoting one's own ideology or = |
|
4449 religion.=20 |
|
4450 |
|
4451 24. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest of the system to = |
|
4452 permit a certain prescribed degree=20 |
|
4453 of freedom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with suitable = |
|
4454 limitations and restraints) has=20 |
|
4455 proved effective in promoting economic growth. But only planned, = |
|
4456 circumscribed, li mited freedom is in=20 |
|
4457 the interest of the system. The individual must always be kept on a leash, = |
|
4458 even if the leash is sometimes=20 |
|
4459 long( see paragraphs 94, 97).=20 |
|
4460 |
|
4461 25. (Paragraph 143) We don't mean to suggest that the efficiency or the = |
|
4462 potential for survival of a society=20 |
|
4463 has always been inversely proportional to the amount of pressure or = |
|
4464 discomfort to which the society=20 |
|
4465 subjects people. That is certainly not the c ase. There is good reason to = |
|
4466 believe that ma ny primitive=20 |
|
4467 societies subjected people to less pressure than the European society did, = |
|
4468 but European society proved far=20 |
|
4469 more efficient than any primitive society and always won out in conflicts = |
|
4470 with such societies because of the=20 |
|
4471 advantages conferred by te chnology.=20 |
|
4472 |
|
4473 26. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law enforcement is = |
|
4474 unequivocally good because it=20 |
|
4475 suppresses crime, then remember that crime as defined by the system is not = |
|
4476 necessarily what YOU would=20 |
|
4477 call crime. Today, smoking marijuana is a "crime ," and, in some places in = |
|
4478 the U.S.., so is p ossession of=20 |
|
4479 ANY firearm, registered or not, may be made a crime, and the same thing may = |
|
4480 happen with disapproved=20 |
|
4481 methods of child-rearing, such as spanking. In some countries, expression = |
|
4482 of dissident political opinions is=20 |
|
4483 a crime, and there is no certaint y that this will never happen in the = |
|
4484 U.S., s ince no constitution or political=20 |
|
4485 system lasts forever.=20 |
|
4486 |
|
4487 If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then = |
|
4488 there is something gravely wrong=20 |
|
4489 with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so = |
|
4490 many refuse to follow the rules, or=20 |
|
4491 follow them only because forced. Man y societies in the past have gotten by = |
|
4492 with little or no formal law- |
|
4493 enforcement.=20 |
|
4494 |
|
4495 27. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have had means of = |
|
4496 influencing behavior, but these have been=20 |
|
4497 primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the technological means = |
|
4498 that are now being developed.=20 |
|
4499 |
|
4500 28. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have publicly expressed = |
|
4501 opinions indicating their=20 |
|
4502 contempt for human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon was quoted = |
|
4503 in Omni (August 1987)=20 |
|
4504 as saying, "I visualize a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to = |
|
4505 humans, and I'm rooting fo r the=20 |
|
4506 machines."=20 |
|
4507 |
|
4508 29. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After writing paragraph 154 = |
|
4509 we came across an article in=20 |
|
4510 Scientific American according to which scientists are actively developing = |
|
4511 techniques for identifying=20 |
|
4512 possible future criminals and for treating the m by a combination of = |
|
4513 biological and psychol ogical means.=20 |
|
4514 Some scientists advocate compulsory application of the treatment, which may = |
|
4515 be available in the near=20 |
|
4516 future. (See "Seeking the Criminal Element", by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific = |
|
4517 American, March 1995.)=20 |
|
4518 Maybe you think this is OK because the trea tment would be applied to those = |
|
4519 who might be come drunk=20 |
|
4520 drivers (they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who spank = |
|
4521 their children, then to=20 |
|
4522 environmentalists who sabotage logging equipment,=20 |
|
4523 eventually to anyone whose behavior is inconvenient for the system. = |
|
4524 |
|
4525 |
|
4526 30. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as a counter-ideal to = |
|
4527 technology is that, in many people,=20 |
|
4528 nature inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with religion, so = |
|
4529 that nature could perhaps be=20 |
|
4530 idealized on a religious basis. It is tr ue that in many societies religion = |
|
4531 has serve d as a support and=20 |
|
4532 justification for the established order, but it is also true that religion = |
|
4533 has often provided a basis for=20 |
|
4534 rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce a religious element into the = |
|
4535 rebellion against technology, the=20 |
|
4536 more so because Weste rn society today has no strong religious fou ndation. = |
|
4537 |
|
4538 |
|
4539 Religion, nowadays either is used as cheap and transparent support for = |
|
4540 narrow, short-sighted selfishness=20 |
|
4541 (some conservatives use it this way), or even is cynically exploited to = |
|
4542 make easy money (by many=20 |
|
4543 evangelists), or has degenerated into crude irrati onalism (fundamentalist = |
|
4544 Protestant sects, "c ults"), or is=20 |
|
4545 simply stagnant (Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing = |
|
4546 to a strong, widespread, dynamic=20 |
|
4547 religion that the West has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion = |
|
4548 of leftism, but leftism today is=20 |
|
4549 fragmented and has no cle ar, unified inspiring goal.=20 |
|
4550 |
|
4551 Thus there is a religious vaccuum in our society that could perhaps be = |
|
4552 filled by a religion focused on nature=20 |
|
4553 in opposition to technology. But it would be a mistake to try to concoct = |
|
4554 artificially a religion to fill this=20 |
|
4555 role. Such an invented religion would probably be a failure. Take the = |
|
4556 "Gaia" religion for example. Do its=20 |
|
4557 adherents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If they are = |
|
4558 just play-acting their religion will=20 |
|
4559 be a flop in the end.=20 |
|
4560 |
|
4561 It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into the conflict of = |
|
4562 nature vs. technology unless you=20 |
|
4563 REALLY believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a deep, = |
|
4564 strong, genuine response in many=20 |
|
4565 other people.=20 |
|
4566 |
|
4567 31. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push occurs. Conceivably the = |
|
4568 industrial system might be=20 |
|
4569 eliminated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion. (see paragraphs 4, = |
|
4570 167 and Note 4).=20 |
|
4571 |
|
4572 32. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely) that the revolution = |
|
4573 might consist only of a massive=20 |
|
4574 change of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively gradual and = |
|
4575 painless disintegration of the=20 |
|
4576 industrial system. But if this happens we'll be very lucky. It's far more = |
|
4577 probably that the transition to a=20 |
|
4578 nontechnological society will be very difficult and full of conflicts and = |
|
4579 disasters.=20 |
|
4580 |
|
4581 33. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological structure of a society = |
|
4582 are far more important than its=20 |
|
4583 political structure in determining the way the average man lives (see = |
|
4584 paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).=20 |
|
4585 |
|
4586 34. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our particular brand of = |
|
4587 anarchism. A wide variety of social=20 |
|
4588 attitudes have been called "anarchist," and it may be that many who = |
|
4589 consider themselves anarchists would=20 |
|
4590 not accept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted, by the way, = |
|
4591 that there is a nonviolent=20 |
|
4592 anarchist movement whose members probably would not accept FC as anarchist = |
|
4593 and certainly would not=20 |
|
4594 approve of FC's violent methods.=20 |
|
4595 |
|
4596 35. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by hostility, but the = |
|
4597 hostility probably results in part=20 |
|
4598 from a frustrated need for power.=20 |
|
4599 |
|
4600 36. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that we mean someone who = |
|
4601 sympathizes with these=20 |
|
4602 MOVEMENTS as they exist today in our society. One who believes that women, = |
|
4603 homosexuals, etc., should=20 |
|
4604 have equal rights is not necessarily a leftist. The f eminist, gay rights, = |
|
4605 etc., movements that ex ist in our=20 |
|
4606 society have the particular ideological tone that characterizes leftism, = |
|
4607 and if one believes, for example, that=20 |
|
4608 women should have equal rights it does not necessarily follow that one must = |
|
4609 sympathize with the feminist=20 |
|
4610 movement as it exists today .=20 |
|
4611 |
|
4612 If copyright problems make it impossible for this long quotation to be = |
|
4613 printed, then please change Note 16=20 |
|
4614 to read as follows:=20 |
|
4615 |
|
4616 16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there = |
|
4617 were fewer and less effective=20 |
|
4618 legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution = |
|
4619 went into effect, yet there was=20 |
|
4620 more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the = |
|
4621 War of Independence, than=20 |
|
4622 there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. In = |
|
4623 "Violence in America: Historical and=20 |
|
4624 Comparative Perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, = |
|
4625 Chapter 12 by Roger=20 |
|
4626 Lane, it is explained how in pr e-industrial America the average person had = |
|
4627 greater independence and=20 |
|
4628 autonomy than he does today, and how the process of industrialization = |
|
4629 necessarily led to the restriction of=20 |
|
4630 personal freedom. |
|
4631 |
|
4632 |
|
4633 End of message. |
|
4634 |
|
4635 |
|
4636 . |
|
4637 RSET |
|
4638 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4639 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4640 DATA |
|
4641 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4642 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4643 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4644 Subject: Test message No. 7 - MIME text and attachment |
|
4645 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4646 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-6> |
|
4647 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4648 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4649 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4650 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; |
|
4651 boundary="boundary-replacement-string-1" |
|
4652 |
|
4653 This is a MIME Message |
|
4654 |
|
4655 --boundary-replacement-string-1 |
|
4656 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4657 Content-Disposition: inline |
|
4658 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4659 |
|
4660 here is some text |
|
4661 |
|
4662 --boundary-replacement-string-1 |
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4663 Content-Description: deisl1.isu |
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4664 Content-Type: application/octet-stream |
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4665 Content-Disposition: attachment; |
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4681 d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3dwAAAAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiIgHd3 |
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4682 d3d3d3d3d3d3d3CIiIB3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3dwiIiAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiI |
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4685 d3d3cIiIgHd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIB3d3d3d3d3 |
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4686 d3d3d3d3d3cHd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3 |
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4690 t7e3t7e3t7e3sIMHd3h7e3t7e3t7e3t7e4CzB3d4t7e3t7e3t7e3t7eAcwd3 |
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4691 eP//////////////CLMHd3eId3d3d3d3d3d3d3tzB3d3d4+3t7e3t7e3t7e3 |
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4692 swd3d3ePe3t7e3t7e3t7e3MHd3d3j7e3t7e3t7e3t7ezB3d3d497e3t7e3t7 |
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4693 ////8Hd3d3ePt7e3t7e3uIiIiId3d3d3j/t7e3t7ewoA3NDMJkfRzSafhwoA |
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4694 3NDMJkjRzSafhz0A5NAgnFU/PZBVNs4mItHMJ/jS1CZTRj+Vdjo4jBnRQJyG |
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4695 Pz2Qhjb7i5o23iZ9Rj+VoDo4jHs2NpWxRRiMAA== |
|
4696 |
|
4697 --boundary-replacement-string-1 |
|
4698 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4699 Content-Disposition: inline |
|
4700 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4701 |
|
4702 Here is some more text. The attachment is above. |
|
4703 --=20 |
|
4704 The curator |
|
4705 |
|
4706 --boundary-replacement-string-1-- |
|
4707 |
|
4708 |
|
4709 . |
|
4710 RSET |
|
4711 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4712 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4713 DATA |
|
4714 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4715 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4716 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4717 Subject: Test message No.6 - Encoded "=" characters |
|
4718 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4719 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-7> |
|
4720 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4721 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4722 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4723 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4724 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4725 |
|
4726 The following line contains 5 "equals" characters. These should |
|
4727 arrive MIME-encoded. |
|
4728 |
|
4729 =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D |
|
4730 |
|
4731 End of message. |
|
4732 |
|
4733 . |
|
4734 RSET |
|
4735 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4736 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4737 DATA |
|
4738 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4739 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4740 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4741 Subject: Test message No.5 - Empty message body |
|
4742 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4743 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-8> |
|
4744 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4745 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4746 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4747 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4748 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4749 |
|
4750 |
|
4751 . |
|
4752 RSET |
|
4753 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4754 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4755 DATA |
|
4756 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4757 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4758 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4759 Subject: Test message No.4 - Trailing spaces and tab characters |
|
4760 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4761 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-9> |
|
4762 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4763 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4764 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4765 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4766 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4767 |
|
4768 This line has 1 trailing space character >=20 |
|
4769 This line has 2 trailing space characters> =20 |
|
4770 This line has 3 trailing space characters> =20 |
|
4771 This line has 4 trailing space characters> =20 |
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4772 |
|
4773 This line has 1 trailing TAB character >=09 |
|
4774 This line has 2 trailing TAB characters> =09 |
|
4775 This line has 3 trailing TAB characters> =09 |
|
4776 This line has 4 trailing TAB characters> =09 |
|
4777 |
|
4778 End of message. |
|
4779 |
|
4780 . |
|
4781 RSET |
|
4782 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4783 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4784 DATA |
|
4785 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4786 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4787 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4788 Subject: Test message No.3 - Wrapped lines |
|
4789 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4790 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-10> |
|
4791 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4792 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4793 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4794 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4795 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4796 |
|
4797 This message contains a series of lines - which |
|
4798 range between 90 and 70 characters in length. |
|
4799 |
|
4800 |
|
4801 90CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4802 78901234567890 |
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4803 |
|
4804 89CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
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4805 7890123456789 |
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4806 |
|
4807 88CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4808 789012345678 |
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4809 |
|
4810 87CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4811 78901234567 |
|
4812 |
|
4813 86CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4814 7890123456 |
|
4815 |
|
4816 85CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4817 789012345 |
|
4818 |
|
4819 84CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4820 78901234 |
|
4821 |
|
4822 83CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4823 7890123 |
|
4824 |
|
4825 82CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4826 789012 |
|
4827 |
|
4828 81CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4829 78901 |
|
4830 |
|
4831 80CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4832 7890 |
|
4833 |
|
4834 79CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4835 789 |
|
4836 |
|
4837 78CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4838 78 |
|
4839 |
|
4840 77CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4841 7 |
|
4842 |
|
4843 76CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4844 |
|
4845 |
|
4846 75CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345 |
|
4847 |
|
4848 74CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234 |
|
4849 |
|
4850 73CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 |
|
4851 |
|
4852 72CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012 |
|
4853 |
|
4854 71CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901 |
|
4855 |
|
4856 70CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890 |
|
4857 |
|
4858 End of message. |
|
4859 |
|
4860 . |
|
4861 RSET |
|
4862 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4863 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4864 DATA |
|
4865 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4866 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4867 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4868 Subject: Test message No.2 - Dot stuffing test |
|
4869 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4870 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-11> |
|
4871 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4872 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4873 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4874 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4875 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4876 |
|
4877 This message contains a block of dot characters,=20 |
|
4878 arranged into the shape of a triangle. There are=20 |
|
4879 four rows in the triangle; the first row contains |
|
4880 4 dots, the last row contains 1 dot. |
|
4881 |
|
4882 ..... |
|
4883 .... |
|
4884 ... |
|
4885 .. |
|
4886 |
|
4887 ..This line should contain a "dot" as its first character. |
|
4888 |
|
4889 End of message. |
|
4890 |
|
4891 . |
|
4892 RSET |
|
4893 MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4894 RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra> |
|
4895 DATA |
|
4896 From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4897 Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk> |
|
4898 To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra |
|
4899 Subject: Test message No.1 - 1000 character line in message |
|
4900 Date: date-replacement-string- |
|
4901 Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-12> |
|
4902 X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 |
|
4903 MIME-Version: 1.0 |
|
4904 Content-Language: i-default |
|
4905 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 |
|
4906 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable |
|
4907 |
|
4908 The line in the following 3 paragraphs each contain 1000 characters: = |
|
4909 |
|
4910 the maximum limit of linelength for SMTP mail. Each should arrive as |
|
4911 one wrapped paragraph in the received message. The dot-stuffed |
|
4912 paragraph is the absolute maximum line length permissable in SMTP |
|
4913 protocol - although in practice IMCV wraps the data into shorter |
|
4914 lines before it is actually sent. |
|
4915 |
|
4916 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4917 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4918 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4919 9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234= |
|
4920 5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890= |
|
4921 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4922 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4923 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4924 9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234= |
|
4925 5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890= |
|
4926 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4927 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4928 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4929 901234567890 |
|
4930 |
|
4931 The following paragraph will be dot stuffed into 1001 characters: |
|
4932 |
|
4933 ..123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345= |
|
4934 6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901= |
|
4935 2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567= |
|
4936 8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123= |
|
4937 4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789= |
|
4938 0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345= |
|
4939 6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901= |
|
4940 2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567= |
|
4941 8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123= |
|
4942 4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789= |
|
4943 0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345= |
|
4944 6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901= |
|
4945 2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567= |
|
4946 890123456789 |
|
4947 |
|
4948 Start67890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4949 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4950 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4951 9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234= |
|
4952 5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890= |
|
4953 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4954 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4955 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4956 9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234= |
|
4957 5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890= |
|
4958 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456= |
|
4959 7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012= |
|
4960 3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678= |
|
4961 901234567End |
|
4962 |
|
4963 End of message. |
|
4964 |
|
4965 . |
|
4966 QUIT |