author | Eckhart Koeppen <eckhart.koppen@nokia.com> |
Wed, 21 Apr 2010 11:15:19 +0300 | |
branch | RCL_3 |
changeset 11 | 25a739ee40f4 |
parent 4 | 3b1da2848fc7 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
0 | 1 |
/**************************************************************************** |
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** |
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3b1da2848fc7
Revision: 201003
Dremov Kirill (Nokia-D-MSW/Tampere) <kirill.dremov@nokia.com>
parents:
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diff
changeset
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** Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). |
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** All rights reserved. |
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** Contact: Nokia Corporation (qt-info@nokia.com) |
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** |
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** This file is part of the QtGui module of the Qt Toolkit. |
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** |
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** $QT_BEGIN_LICENSE:LGPL$ |
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** No Commercial Usage |
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** This file contains pre-release code and may not be distributed. |
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** You may use this file in accordance with the terms and conditions |
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** contained in the Technology Preview License Agreement accompanying |
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** this package. |
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** |
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** GNU Lesser General Public License Usage |
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** Alternatively, this file may be used under the terms of the GNU Lesser |
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** General Public License version 2.1 as published by the Free Software |
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** Foundation and appearing in the file LICENSE.LGPL included in the |
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** packaging of this file. Please review the following information to |
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** ensure the GNU Lesser General Public License version 2.1 requirements |
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** will be met: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/lgpl-2.1.html. |
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** |
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** In addition, as a special exception, Nokia gives you certain additional |
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** rights. These rights are described in the Nokia Qt LGPL Exception |
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** version 1.1, included in the file LGPL_EXCEPTION.txt in this package. |
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** |
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** If you have questions regarding the use of this file, please contact |
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** Nokia at qt-info@nokia.com. |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** |
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** $QT_END_LICENSE$ |
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** |
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****************************************************************************/ |
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#include "qtransportauth_qws.h" |
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#include "qtransportauth_qws_p.h" |
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#ifndef QT_NO_SXE |
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#include "../../3rdparty/md5/md5.h" |
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#include "../../3rdparty/md5/md5.cpp" |
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#include "qwsutils_qws.h" |
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#include "qwssocket_qws.h" |
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#include "qwscommand_qws_p.h" |
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#include "qwindowsystem_qws.h" |
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#include "qbuffer.h" |
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#include "qthread.h" |
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#include "qabstractsocket.h" |
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#include "qlibraryinfo.h" |
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#include "qfile.h" |
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#include "qdebug.h" |
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#include <private/qcore_unix_p.h> // overrides QT_OPEN |
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#include <syslog.h> |
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#include <unistd.h> |
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#include <fcntl.h> |
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#include <sys/stat.h> |
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#include <sys/types.h> |
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#include <sys/socket.h> |
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#include <sys/file.h> |
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#include <stdio.h> |
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#include <stdlib.h> |
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#include <errno.h> |
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#include <time.h> |
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#include <QtCore/qcache.h> |
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#define BUF_SIZE 512 |
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QT_BEGIN_NAMESPACE |
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/*! |
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\internal |
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memset for security purposes, guaranteed not to be optimized away |
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http://www.faqs.org/docs/Linux-HOWTO/Secure-Programs-HOWTO.html |
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*/ |
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Q_GUI_EXPORT void *guaranteed_memset(void *v,int c,size_t n) |
|
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{ |
|
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volatile char *p = (char *)v; while (n--) *p++=c; return v; |
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} |
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/*! |
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\class QTransportAuth |
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\internal |
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\brief Authenticate a message transport. |
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For performance reasons, message authentication is tied to an individual |
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message transport instance. For example in connection oriented transports |
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the authentication cookie can be cached against the connection avoiding |
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the overhead of authentication on every message. |
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For each process there is one instance of the QTransportAuth object. |
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For server processes it can determine the \link secure-exe-environ.html SXE |
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Program Identity \endlink and provide access to policy data to determine if |
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the message should be forwarded for action. If not actioned, the message |
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may be treated as being from a flawed or malicious process. |
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Retrieve the instance with the getInstance() method. The constructor is |
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disabled and instances of QTransportAuth should never be constructed by |
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calling classes. |
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To make the Authentication easier to use a proxied QIODevice is provided |
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which uses an internal QBuffer. |
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In the server code first get a pointer to a QTransportAuth::Data object |
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using the connectTransport() method: |
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\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src_gui_embedded_qtransportauth_qws.cpp 0 |
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Here it is asserted that the transport is trusted. See the assumptions |
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listed in the \link secure-exe-environ.html SXE documentation \endlink |
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Then proxy in the authentication device: |
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\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src_gui_embedded_qtransportauth_qws.cpp 1 |
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In the client code it is similar. Use the connectTransport() method |
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just the same then proxy in the authentication device instead of the |
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socket in write calls: |
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\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src_gui_embedded_qtransportauth_qws.cpp 2 |
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*/ |
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static int hmac_md5( |
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unsigned char* text, /* pointer to data stream */ |
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int text_length, /* length of data stream */ |
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const unsigned char* key, /* pointer to authentication key */ |
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int key_length, /* length of authentication key */ |
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unsigned char * digest /* caller digest to be filled in */ |
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); |
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#define KEY_CACHE_SIZE 30 |
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const char * const errorStrings[] = { |
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"pending identity verification", |
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"message too small to carry auth data", |
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"cache miss on connection oriented transport", |
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"no magic bytes on message", |
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"key not found for prog id", |
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"authorization key match failed", |
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"key out of date" |
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}; |
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const char *QTransportAuth::errorString( const Data &d ) |
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{ |
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if (( d.status & ErrMask ) == Success ) |
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return "success"; |
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int e = d.status & ErrMask; |
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if ( e > OutOfDate ) |
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return "unknown"; |
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return errorStrings[e]; |
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} |
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||
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SxeRegistryLocker::SxeRegistryLocker( QObject *reg ) |
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: m_success( false ) |
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, m_reg( 0 ) |
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{ |
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if ( reg ) |
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if ( !QMetaObject::invokeMethod( reg, "lockManifest", Q_RETURN_ARG(bool, m_success) )) |
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m_success = false; |
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m_reg = reg; |
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} |
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SxeRegistryLocker::~SxeRegistryLocker() |
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{ |
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if ( m_success ) |
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QMetaObject::invokeMethod( m_reg, "unlockManifest" ); |
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} |
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QTransportAuthPrivate::QTransportAuthPrivate() |
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: keyInitialised(false) |
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, m_packageRegistry( 0 ) |
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{ |
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} |
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QTransportAuthPrivate::~QTransportAuthPrivate() |
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{ |
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} |
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/*! |
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\internal |
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Construct a new QTransportAuth |
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*/ |
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QTransportAuth::QTransportAuth() : QObject(*new QTransportAuthPrivate) |
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{ |
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// qDebug( "creating transport auth" ); |
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} |
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/*! |
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\internal |
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Destructor |
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*/ |
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QTransportAuth::~QTransportAuth() |
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{ |
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// qDebug( "deleting transport auth" ); |
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} |
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/*! |
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Set the process key for this currently running Qt Extended process to |
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the \a authdata. \a authdata should be sizeof(struct AuthCookie) |
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in length and contain the key and program id. Use this method |
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when setting or changing the SXE identity of the current program. |
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*/ |
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void QTransportAuth::setProcessKey( const char *authdata ) |
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{ |
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Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
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::memcpy(&d->authKey, authdata, sizeof(struct AuthCookie)); |
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QFile proc_key( QLatin1String("/proc/self/lids_key") ); |
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// where proc key exists use that instead |
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if ( proc_key.open( QIODevice::ReadOnly )) |
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{ |
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qint64 kb = proc_key.read( (char*)&d->authKey.key, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
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#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
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qDebug( "Using %li bytes of /proc/%i/lids_key\n", (long int)kb, getpid() ); |
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#else |
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Q_UNUSED( kb ); |
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#endif |
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} |
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d->keyInitialised = true; |
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} |
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233 |
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/*! |
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Apply \a key as the process key for the currently running application. |
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\a prog is current ignored |
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Deprecated function |
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*/ |
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void QTransportAuth::setProcessKey( const char *key, const char *prog ) |
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{ |
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Q_UNUSED(prog); |
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setProcessKey( key ); |
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#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
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char displaybuf[QSXE_KEY_LEN*2+1]; |
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hexstring( displaybuf, (const unsigned char *)key, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
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qDebug() << "key" << displaybuf << "set"; |
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#endif |
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} |
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/*! |
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Register \a pr as a policy handler object. The object pointed to |
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by \a pr should have a slot as follows |
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\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src_gui_embedded_qtransportauth_qws.cpp 3 |
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All requests received by this server will then generate a call to |
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this slot, and may be processed for policy compliance. |
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*/ |
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void QTransportAuth::registerPolicyReceiver( QObject *pr ) |
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{ |
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// not every policy receiver needs setup - no error if this fails |
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QMetaObject::invokeMethod( pr, "setupPolicyCheck" ); |
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connect( this, SIGNAL(policyCheck(QTransportAuth::Data&,QString)), |
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pr, SLOT(policyCheck(QTransportAuth::Data&,QString)), Qt::DirectConnection ); |
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} |
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/*! |
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Unregister the \a pr from being a policy handler. No more policyCheck signals |
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are received by this object. |
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*/ |
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void QTransportAuth::unregisterPolicyReceiver( QObject *pr ) |
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{ |
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disconnect( pr ); |
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// not every policy receiver needs tear down - no error if this fails |
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QMetaObject::invokeMethod( pr, "teardownPolicyCheck" ); |
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} |
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||
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/*! |
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Record a new transport connection with \a properties and \a descriptor. |
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The calling code is responsible for destroying the returned data when the |
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tranport connection is closed. |
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*/ |
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QTransportAuth::Data *QTransportAuth::connectTransport( unsigned char properties, int descriptor ) |
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{ |
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Data *data = new Data(properties, descriptor); |
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data->status = Pending; |
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return data; |
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} |
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||
292 |
/*! |
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Is the transport trusted. This is true iff data written into the |
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transport medium cannot be intercepted or modified by another process. |
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This is for example true for Unix Domain Sockets, but not for shared |
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memory or UDP sockets. |
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298 |
There is of course an underlying assumption that the kernel implementing |
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the transport is sound, ie it cannot be compromised by writing to |
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/dev/kmem or loading untrusted modules |
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*/ |
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inline bool QTransportAuth::Data::trusted() const |
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{ |
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return (bool)(properties & Trusted); |
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} |
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||
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/*! |
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Assert that the transport is trusted. |
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310 |
For example with respect to shared memory, if it is ensured that no untrusted |
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root processes are running, and that unix permissions have been set such that |
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any untrusted non-root processes do not have access rights, then a shared |
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memory transport could be asserted to be trusted. |
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\sa trusted() |
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*/ |
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inline void QTransportAuth::Data::setTrusted( bool t ) |
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{ |
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properties = t ? properties | Trusted : properties & ~Trusted; |
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} |
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321 |
||
322 |
/*! |
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Is the transport connection oriented. This is true iff once a connection |
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has been accepted, and state established, then further messages over the |
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transport are guaranteed to have come from the original connecting entity. |
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326 |
This is for example true for Unix Domain Sockets, but not |
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for shared memory or UDP sockets. |
|
328 |
||
329 |
By extension if the transport is not trusted() then it should not be |
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assumed to be connection oriented, since spoofed connection information |
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could be created. For example if we assume the TCP/IP transport is |
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trusted, it can be treated as connection oriented; but this is only the |
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case if intervening routers are trusted. |
|
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||
335 |
Connection oriented transports have authorization cached against the |
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connection, and thus authorization is only done at connect time. |
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*/ |
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inline bool QTransportAuth::Data::connection() const |
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{ |
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340 |
return (bool)(properties & Connection); |
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341 |
} |
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342 |
||
343 |
/*! |
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344 |
Assert that the transport is connection oriented. |
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345 |
||
346 |
\sa connection() |
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*/ |
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inline void QTransportAuth::Data::setConnection( bool t ) |
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{ |
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350 |
properties = t ? properties | Connection : properties & ~Connection; |
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} |
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352 |
||
353 |
/*! |
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Return a pointer to the instance of this process's QTransportAuth object |
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*/ |
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QTransportAuth *QTransportAuth::getInstance() |
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{ |
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358 |
static QTransportAuth theInstance; |
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359 |
||
360 |
return &theInstance; |
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361 |
} |
|
362 |
||
363 |
/*! |
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364 |
Set the full path to the key file |
|
365 |
||
366 |
Since this is normally relative to Qtopia::qpeDir() this needs to be |
|
367 |
set within the Qt Extended framework. |
|
368 |
||
369 |
The keyfile should be protected by file permissions or by MAC rules |
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370 |
such that it can only be read/written by the "qpe" server process |
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371 |
*/ |
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372 |
void QTransportAuth::setKeyFilePath( const QString &path ) |
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373 |
{ |
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374 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
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375 |
d->m_keyFilePath = path; |
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376 |
} |
|
377 |
||
378 |
QString QTransportAuth::keyFilePath() const |
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379 |
{ |
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380 |
Q_D(const QTransportAuth); |
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381 |
return d->m_keyFilePath; |
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382 |
} |
|
383 |
||
384 |
void QTransportAuth::setLogFilePath( const QString &path ) |
|
385 |
{ |
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386 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
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387 |
d->m_logFilePath = path; |
|
388 |
} |
|
389 |
||
390 |
QString QTransportAuth::logFilePath() const |
|
391 |
{ |
|
392 |
Q_D(const QTransportAuth); |
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393 |
return d->m_logFilePath; |
|
394 |
} |
|
395 |
||
396 |
void QTransportAuth::setPackageRegistry( QObject *registry ) |
|
397 |
{ |
|
398 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
|
399 |
d->m_packageRegistry = registry; |
|
400 |
} |
|
401 |
||
402 |
bool QTransportAuth::isDiscoveryMode() const |
|
403 |
{ |
|
404 |
#if defined(SXE_DISCOVERY) |
|
405 |
static bool checked = false; |
|
406 |
static bool yesItIs = false; |
|
407 |
||
408 |
if ( checked ) return yesItIs; |
|
409 |
||
410 |
yesItIs = ( getenv( "SXE_DISCOVERY_MODE" ) != 0 ); |
|
411 |
if ( yesItIs ) |
|
412 |
{ |
|
413 |
qWarning("SXE Discovery mode on, ALLOWING ALL requests and logging to %s", |
|
414 |
qPrintable(logFilePath())); |
|
415 |
QFile::remove( logFilePath() ); |
|
416 |
} |
|
417 |
checked = true; |
|
418 |
return yesItIs; |
|
419 |
#else |
|
420 |
return false; |
|
421 |
#endif |
|
422 |
} |
|
423 |
||
424 |
/*! |
|
425 |
\internal |
|
426 |
Return the authorizer device mapped to this client. Note that this |
|
427 |
could probably all be void* instead of QWSClient* for generality. |
|
428 |
Until the need for that rears its head its QWSClient* to save the casts. |
|
429 |
||
430 |
#### OK the need has arrived, but the public API is frozen. |
|
431 |
*/ |
|
432 |
QIODevice *QTransportAuth::passThroughByClient( QWSClient *client ) const |
|
433 |
{ |
|
434 |
Q_D(const QTransportAuth); |
|
435 |
||
436 |
if ( client == 0 ) return 0; |
|
437 |
if ( d->buffersByClient.contains( client )) |
|
438 |
{ |
|
439 |
return d->buffersByClient[client]; |
|
440 |
} |
|
441 |
// qWarning( "buffer not found for client %p", client ); |
|
442 |
return 0; |
|
443 |
} |
|
444 |
||
445 |
/*! |
|
446 |
\internal |
|
447 |
Return a QIODevice pointer (to an internal QBuffer) which can be used |
|
448 |
to receive data after authorisation on transport \a d. |
|
449 |
||
450 |
The return QIODevice will act as a pass-through. |
|
451 |
||
452 |
The data will be consumed from \a iod and forwarded on to the returned |
|
453 |
QIODevice which can be connected to readyRead() signal handlers in |
|
454 |
place of the original QIODevice \a iod. |
|
455 |
||
456 |
This will be called in the server process to handle incoming |
|
457 |
authenticated requests. |
|
458 |
||
459 |
The returned QIODevice will take ownership of \a data which will be deleted |
|
460 |
when the QIODevice is delected. |
|
461 |
||
462 |
\sa setTargetDevice() |
|
463 |
*/ |
|
464 |
QAuthDevice *QTransportAuth::recvBuf( QTransportAuth::Data *data, QIODevice *iod ) |
|
465 |
{ |
|
466 |
return new QAuthDevice( iod, data, QAuthDevice::Receive ); |
|
467 |
} |
|
468 |
||
469 |
/*! |
|
470 |
Return a QIODevice pointer (to an internal QBuffer) which can be used |
|
471 |
to write data onto, for authorisation on transport \a d. |
|
472 |
||
473 |
The return QIODevice will act as a pass-through. |
|
474 |
||
475 |
The data written to the return QIODevice will be forwarded on to the |
|
476 |
returned QIODevice. In the case of a QTcpSocket, this will cause it |
|
477 |
to send out the data with the authentication information on it. |
|
478 |
||
479 |
This will be called in the client process to generate outgoing |
|
480 |
authenticated requests. |
|
481 |
||
482 |
The returned QIODevice will take ownership of \a data which will be deleted |
|
483 |
when the QIODevice is delected. |
|
484 |
||
485 |
\sa setTargetDevice() |
|
486 |
*/ |
|
487 |
QAuthDevice *QTransportAuth::authBuf( QTransportAuth::Data *data, QIODevice *iod ) |
|
488 |
{ |
|
489 |
return new QAuthDevice( iod, data, QAuthDevice::Send ); |
|
490 |
} |
|
491 |
||
492 |
const unsigned char *QTransportAuth::getClientKey( unsigned char progId ) |
|
493 |
{ |
|
494 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
|
495 |
return d->getClientKey( progId ); |
|
496 |
} |
|
497 |
||
498 |
void QTransportAuth::invalidateClientKeyCache() |
|
499 |
{ |
|
500 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
|
501 |
d->invalidateClientKeyCache(); |
|
502 |
} |
|
503 |
||
504 |
QMutex *QTransportAuth::getKeyFileMutex() |
|
505 |
{ |
|
506 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
|
507 |
return &d->keyfileMutex; |
|
508 |
} |
|
509 |
||
510 |
/* |
|
511 |
\internal |
|
512 |
Respond to the destroyed(QObject*) signal of the QAuthDevice's |
|
513 |
client object and remove it from the buffersByClient lookup hash. |
|
514 |
*/ |
|
515 |
void QTransportAuth::bufferDestroyed( QObject *cli ) |
|
516 |
{ |
|
517 |
Q_D(QTransportAuth); |
|
518 |
if ( cli == NULL ) return; |
|
519 |
||
520 |
if ( d->buffersByClient.contains( cli )) |
|
521 |
{ |
|
522 |
d->buffersByClient.remove( cli ); |
|
523 |
// qDebug( "@@@@@@@ client %p removed @@@@@@@@@", cli ); |
|
524 |
} |
|
525 |
// qDebug( " client count %d", d->buffersByClient.count() ); |
|
526 |
} |
|
527 |
||
528 |
bool QTransportAuth::authorizeRequest( QTransportAuth::Data &d, const QString &request ) |
|
529 |
{ |
|
530 |
bool isAuthorized = true; |
|
531 |
||
532 |
if ( !request.isEmpty() && request != QLatin1String("Unknown") ) |
|
533 |
{ |
|
534 |
d.status &= QTransportAuth::ErrMask; // clear the status |
|
535 |
emit policyCheck( d, request ); |
|
536 |
isAuthorized = (( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) == QTransportAuth::Allow ); |
|
537 |
} |
|
538 |
#if defined(SXE_DISCOVERY) |
|
539 |
if (isDiscoveryMode()) { |
|
540 |
#ifndef QT_NO_TEXTSTREAM |
|
541 |
if (!logFilePath().isEmpty()) { |
|
542 |
QFile log( logFilePath() ); |
|
543 |
if (!log.open(QIODevice::WriteOnly | QIODevice::Append)) { |
|
544 |
qWarning("Could not write to log in discovery mode: %s", |
|
545 |
qPrintable(logFilePath())); |
|
546 |
} else { |
|
547 |
QTextStream ts( &log ); |
|
548 |
ts << d.progId << '\t' << ( isAuthorized ? "Allow" : "Deny" ) << '\t' << request << endl; |
|
549 |
} |
|
550 |
} |
|
551 |
#endif |
|
552 |
isAuthorized = true; |
|
553 |
} |
|
554 |
#endif |
|
555 |
if ( !isAuthorized ) |
|
556 |
{ |
|
557 |
qWarning( "%s - denied: for Program Id %u [PID %d]" |
|
558 |
, qPrintable(request), d.progId, d.processId ); |
|
559 |
||
560 |
char linkTarget[BUF_SIZE]=""; |
|
561 |
char exeLink[BUF_SIZE]=""; |
|
562 |
char cmdlinePath[BUF_SIZE]=""; |
|
563 |
char cmdline[BUF_SIZE]=""; |
|
564 |
||
565 |
//get executable from /proc/pid/exe |
|
566 |
snprintf( exeLink, BUF_SIZE, "/proc/%d/exe", d.processId ); |
|
567 |
if ( -1 == ::readlink( exeLink, linkTarget, BUF_SIZE - 1 ) ) |
|
568 |
{ |
|
569 |
qWarning( "SXE:- Error encountered in retrieving executable link target from /proc/%u/exe : %s", |
|
570 |
d.processId, strerror(errno) ); |
|
571 |
snprintf( linkTarget, BUF_SIZE, "%s", linkTarget ); |
|
572 |
} |
|
573 |
||
574 |
//get cmdline from proc/pid/cmdline |
|
575 |
snprintf( cmdlinePath, BUF_SIZE, "/proc/%d/cmdline", d.processId ); |
|
576 |
int cmdlineFd = QT_OPEN( cmdlinePath, O_RDONLY ); |
|
577 |
if ( cmdlineFd == -1 ) |
|
578 |
{ |
|
579 |
qWarning( "SXE:- Error encountered in opening /proc/%u/cmdline: %s", |
|
580 |
d.processId, strerror(errno) ); |
|
581 |
snprintf( cmdline, BUF_SIZE, "%s", "Unknown" ); |
|
582 |
} |
|
583 |
else |
|
584 |
{ |
|
585 |
if ( -1 == QT_READ(cmdlineFd, cmdline, BUF_SIZE - 1 ) ) |
|
586 |
{ |
|
587 |
qWarning( "SXE:- Error encountered in reading /proc/%u/cmdline : %s", |
|
588 |
d.processId, strerror(errno) ); |
|
589 |
snprintf( cmdline, BUF_SIZE, "%s", "Unknown" ); |
|
590 |
} |
|
591 |
QT_CLOSE( cmdlineFd ); |
|
592 |
} |
|
593 |
||
594 |
syslog( LOG_ERR | LOG_LOCAL6, "%s // PID:%u // ProgId:%u // Exe:%s // Request:%s // Cmdline:%s", |
|
595 |
"<SXE Breach>", d.processId, d.progId, linkTarget, qPrintable(request), cmdline); |
|
596 |
} |
|
597 |
||
598 |
return isAuthorized; |
|
599 |
} |
|
600 |
||
601 |
inline bool __fileOpen( QFile *f ) |
|
602 |
{ |
|
603 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
604 |
if ( f->open( QIODevice::ReadOnly )) |
|
605 |
{ |
|
606 |
qDebug( "Opened file: %s\n", qPrintable( f->fileName() )); |
|
607 |
return true; |
|
608 |
} |
|
609 |
else |
|
610 |
{ |
|
611 |
qWarning( "Could not open file: %s\n", qPrintable( f->fileName() )); |
|
612 |
return false; |
|
613 |
} |
|
614 |
#else |
|
615 |
return ( f->open( QIODevice::ReadOnly )); |
|
616 |
#endif |
|
617 |
} |
|
618 |
||
619 |
/*! |
|
620 |
\internal |
|
621 |
Find client keys for the \a progId. If it is cached should be very |
|
622 |
fast, otherwise requires a read of the secret key file |
|
623 |
||
624 |
In the success case a pointer to the keys is returned. The pointer is |
|
625 |
to storage allocated for the internal cache and must be used asap. |
|
626 |
||
627 |
The list returned is a sequence of one or more keys which match the |
|
628 |
progId. There is no separator, each 16 byte sequence represents a key. |
|
629 |
The sequence is followed by two iterations of the SXE magic |
|
630 |
bytes,eg 0xBA, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0xBA, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xBA |
|
631 |
||
632 |
NULL is returned in the following cases: |
|
633 |
\list |
|
634 |
\o the keyfiles could not be accessed - error condition |
|
635 |
\o there was no key for the supplied program id - key auth failed |
|
636 |
\endlist |
|
637 |
||
638 |
Note that for the keyfiles, there is multi-thread and multi-process |
|
639 |
concurrency issues: they can be read by the qpe process when |
|
640 |
QTransportAuth calls getClientKey to verify a request, and they can be |
|
641 |
read or written by the packagemanager when updating package data. |
|
642 |
||
643 |
To protect against this, the keyfileMutex & SxeRegistryLocker is used. |
|
644 |
||
645 |
The sxe_installer tool can also update inode and device numbers in |
|
646 |
the manifest file, but this only occurs outside of normal operation, |
|
647 |
so qpe and packagemanager are never running when this occurs. |
|
648 |
*/ |
|
649 |
const unsigned char *QTransportAuthPrivate::getClientKey(unsigned char progId) |
|
650 |
{ |
|
651 |
int manifestMatchCount = 0; |
|
652 |
struct IdBlock mr; |
|
653 |
int total_size = 0; |
|
654 |
char *result = 0; |
|
655 |
char *result_ptr; |
|
656 |
int keysFound = 0; |
|
657 |
bool foundKey; |
|
658 |
int keysRead = 0; |
|
659 |
struct usr_key_entry keys_list[128]; |
|
660 |
||
661 |
if ( keyCache.contains( progId )) |
|
662 |
return (const unsigned char *)keyCache[progId]; |
|
663 |
||
664 |
SxeRegistryLocker rlock( m_packageRegistry ); |
|
665 |
||
666 |
// ### Qt 4.3: this is hacky - see documentation for setKeyFilePath |
|
667 |
QString manifestPath = m_keyFilePath + QLatin1String("/manifest"); |
|
668 |
QString actualKeyPath = QLatin1String("/proc/lids/keys"); |
|
669 |
bool noFailOnKeyMissing = true; |
|
670 |
if ( !QFile::exists( actualKeyPath )) { |
|
671 |
actualKeyPath = m_keyFilePath + QLatin1String( "/" QSXE_KEYFILE ); |
|
672 |
} |
|
673 |
QFile kf( actualKeyPath ); |
|
674 |
QFile mn( manifestPath ); |
|
675 |
if ( !__fileOpen( &mn )) |
|
676 |
goto key_not_found; |
|
677 |
// first find how much storage is needed |
|
678 |
while ( mn.read( (char*)&mr, sizeof(struct IdBlock)) > 0 ) |
|
679 |
if ( mr.progId == progId ) |
|
680 |
manifestMatchCount++; |
|
681 |
if ( manifestMatchCount == 0 ) |
|
682 |
goto key_not_found; |
|
683 |
if ( !__fileOpen( &kf )) |
|
684 |
{ |
|
685 |
noFailOnKeyMissing = false; |
|
686 |
goto key_not_found; |
|
687 |
} |
|
688 |
total_size = 2 * QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES + manifestMatchCount * QSXE_KEY_LEN; |
|
689 |
result = (char*)malloc( total_size ); |
|
690 |
Q_CHECK_PTR( result ); |
|
691 |
mn.seek( 0 ); |
|
692 |
result_ptr = result; |
|
693 |
/* reading whole key array in is much more efficient, 99% case is this loop only |
|
694 |
executes once, should not have more than 128 keyed items */ |
|
695 |
while (( keysRead = kf.read( (char*)keys_list, sizeof(struct usr_key_entry)*128 )) > 0 ) |
|
696 |
{ |
|
697 |
/* qDebug("PID %d: getClientKey() - read %d bytes = %d keys from %s", getpid(), keysRead, |
|
698 |
keysRead/sizeof(struct usr_key_entry), qPrintable(actualKeyPath)); */ |
|
699 |
keysRead /= sizeof(struct usr_key_entry); |
|
700 |
while ( mn.read( (char*)&mr, sizeof(struct IdBlock)) > 0 ) |
|
701 |
{ |
|
702 |
if ( mr.progId == progId ) |
|
703 |
{ |
|
704 |
foundKey = false; |
|
705 |
for ( int i = 0; i < keysRead; ++i ) |
|
706 |
{ |
|
707 |
/* if ( i == 0 ) |
|
708 |
qDebug() << " pid" << getpid() << "looking for device" << (dev_t)mr.device << "inode" << (ino_t)mr.inode; |
|
709 |
qDebug() << " pid" << getpid() << "trying device" << keys_list[i].dev << "inode" << keys_list[i].ino; */ |
|
710 |
if ( keys_list[i].ino == (ino_t)mr.inode && keys_list[i].dev == (dev_t)mr.device ) |
|
711 |
{ |
|
712 |
memcpy( result_ptr, keys_list[i].key, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
|
713 |
result_ptr += QSXE_KEY_LEN; |
|
714 |
foundKey = true; |
|
715 |
break; |
|
716 |
} |
|
717 |
} |
|
718 |
if ( foundKey ) |
|
719 |
{ |
|
720 |
keysFound++; |
|
721 |
if ( keysFound == manifestMatchCount ) |
|
722 |
break; |
|
723 |
} |
|
724 |
} |
|
725 |
} |
|
726 |
} |
|
727 |
if ( result_ptr == result ) // nothing found! |
|
728 |
goto key_not_found; |
|
729 |
// 2 x magic bytes sentinel at end of sequence |
|
730 |
for ( int i = 0; i < 2; ++i ) |
|
731 |
for ( int j = 0; j < QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES; ++j ) |
|
732 |
*result_ptr++ = magic[j]; |
|
733 |
keyCache.insert( progId, result, total_size / 10 ); |
|
734 |
/* qDebug( "PID %d : Found %d client keys for prog %u", getpid(), keysFound, progId ); */ |
|
735 |
goto success_out; |
|
736 |
||
737 |
key_not_found: |
|
738 |
if ( noFailOnKeyMissing ) // return an "empty" set of keys in this case |
|
739 |
{ |
|
740 |
if ( result == 0 ) |
|
741 |
{ |
|
742 |
result = (char*)malloc( 2 * QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES ); |
|
743 |
Q_CHECK_PTR( result ); |
|
744 |
} |
|
745 |
result_ptr = result; |
|
746 |
for ( int i = 0; i < 2; ++i ) |
|
747 |
for ( int j = 0; j < QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES; ++j ) |
|
748 |
*result_ptr++ = magic[j]; |
|
749 |
return (unsigned char *)result; |
|
750 |
} |
|
751 |
qWarning( "PID %d : Not found client key for prog %u", getpid(), progId ); |
|
752 |
if ( result ) |
|
753 |
{ |
|
754 |
free( result ); |
|
755 |
result = 0; |
|
756 |
} |
|
757 |
success_out: |
|
758 |
if ( mn.isOpen() ) |
|
759 |
mn.close(); |
|
760 |
if ( kf.isOpen() ) |
|
761 |
kf.close(); |
|
762 |
return (unsigned char *)result; |
|
763 |
} |
|
764 |
||
765 |
void QTransportAuthPrivate::invalidateClientKeyCache() |
|
766 |
{ |
|
767 |
keyfileMutex.lock(); |
|
768 |
keyCache.clear(); |
|
769 |
keyfileMutex.unlock(); |
|
770 |
} |
|
771 |
||
772 |
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
|
773 |
//// |
|
774 |
//// RequestAnalyzer definition |
|
775 |
//// |
|
776 |
||
777 |
||
778 |
RequestAnalyzer::RequestAnalyzer() |
|
779 |
: moreData( false ) |
|
780 |
, dataSize( 0 ) |
|
781 |
{ |
|
782 |
} |
|
783 |
||
784 |
RequestAnalyzer::~RequestAnalyzer() |
|
785 |
{ |
|
786 |
} |
|
787 |
||
788 |
/*! |
|
789 |
Analzye the data in the\a msgQueue according to some protocol |
|
790 |
and produce a request string for policy analysis. |
|
791 |
||
792 |
If enough data is in the queue for analysis of a complete message, |
|
793 |
return a non-null string, and set a flag so requireMoreData() will |
|
794 |
return false; otherwise return a null string and requireMoreData() |
|
795 |
return true. |
|
796 |
||
797 |
The amount of bytes analyzed is then available via bytesAnalyzed(). |
|
798 |
||
799 |
A null string is also returned in the case where the message was |
|
800 |
corrupt and could not be analyzed. In this case requireMoreData() |
|
801 |
returns false. |
|
802 |
||
803 |
Note: this method will modify the msgQueue and pull off the data |
|
804 |
deemed to be corrupt, in the case of corrupt data. |
|
805 |
||
806 |
In all other cases the msgQueue is left alone. The calling code |
|
807 |
should then pull off the analyzed data. Use bytesAnalzyed() to |
|
808 |
find how much data to pull off the queue. |
|
809 |
*/ |
|
810 |
QString RequestAnalyzer::analyze( QByteArray *msgQueue ) |
|
811 |
{ |
|
812 |
#ifdef Q_WS_QWS |
|
813 |
dataSize = 0; |
|
814 |
moreData = false; |
|
815 |
QBuffer cmdBuf( msgQueue ); |
|
816 |
cmdBuf.open( QIODevice::ReadOnly | QIODevice::Unbuffered ); |
|
817 |
QWSCommand::Type command_type = (QWSCommand::Type)(qws_read_uint( &cmdBuf )); |
|
818 |
QWSCommand *command = QWSCommand::factory(command_type); |
|
819 |
// if NULL, factory will have already printed warning for bogus |
|
820 |
// command_type just purge the bad stuff and attempt to recover |
|
821 |
if ( command == NULL ) |
|
822 |
{ |
|
823 |
*msgQueue = msgQueue->mid( sizeof(int) ); |
|
824 |
return QString(); |
|
825 |
} |
|
826 |
QString request = QLatin1String(qws_getCommandTypeString(command_type)); |
|
827 |
#ifndef QT_NO_COP |
|
828 |
if ( !command->read( &cmdBuf )) |
|
829 |
{ |
|
830 |
// not all command arrived yet - come back later |
|
831 |
delete command; |
|
832 |
moreData = true; |
|
833 |
return QString(); |
|
834 |
} |
|
835 |
if ( command_type == QWSCommand::QCopSend ) |
|
836 |
{ |
|
837 |
QWSQCopSendCommand *sendCommand = static_cast<QWSQCopSendCommand*>(command); |
|
838 |
request += QString::fromLatin1("/QCop/%1/%2").arg( sendCommand->channel ).arg( sendCommand->message ); |
|
839 |
} |
|
840 |
if ( command_type == QWSCommand::QCopRegisterChannel ) |
|
841 |
{ |
|
842 |
QWSQCopRegisterChannelCommand *registerCommand = static_cast<QWSQCopRegisterChannelCommand*>(command); |
|
843 |
request += QString::fromLatin1("/QCop/RegisterChannel/%1").arg( registerCommand->channel ); |
|
844 |
} |
|
845 |
#endif |
|
846 |
dataSize = QWS_PROTOCOL_ITEM_SIZE( *command ); |
|
847 |
delete command; |
|
848 |
return request; |
|
849 |
#else |
|
850 |
Q_UNUSED(msgQueue); |
|
851 |
return QString(); |
|
852 |
#endif |
|
853 |
} |
|
854 |
||
855 |
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
|
856 |
//// |
|
857 |
//// AuthDevice definition |
|
858 |
//// |
|
859 |
||
860 |
/*! |
|
861 |
Constructs a new auth device for the transport \a data and I/O device \a parent. |
|
862 |
||
863 |
Incoming or outgoing data will be authenticated according to the auth direction \a dir. |
|
864 |
||
865 |
The auth device will take ownership of the transport \a data and delete it when the device |
|
866 |
is destroyed. |
|
867 |
*/ |
|
868 |
QAuthDevice::QAuthDevice( QIODevice *parent, QTransportAuth::Data *data, AuthDirection dir ) |
|
869 |
: QIODevice( parent ) |
|
870 |
, d( data ) |
|
871 |
, way( dir ) |
|
872 |
, m_target( parent ) |
|
873 |
, m_client( 0 ) |
|
874 |
, m_bytesAvailable( 0 ) |
|
875 |
, m_skipWritten( 0 ) |
|
876 |
, analyzer( 0 ) |
|
877 |
{ |
|
878 |
if ( dir == Receive ) // server side |
|
879 |
{ |
|
880 |
connect( m_target, SIGNAL(readyRead()), |
|
881 |
this, SLOT(recvReadyRead())); |
|
882 |
} else { |
|
883 |
connect( m_target, SIGNAL(readyRead()), |
|
884 |
this, SIGNAL(readyRead())); |
|
885 |
} |
|
886 |
connect( m_target, SIGNAL(bytesWritten(qint64)), |
|
887 |
this, SLOT(targetBytesWritten(qint64)) ); |
|
888 |
open( QIODevice::ReadWrite | QIODevice::Unbuffered ); |
|
889 |
} |
|
890 |
||
891 |
QAuthDevice::~QAuthDevice() |
|
892 |
{ |
|
893 |
if ( analyzer ) |
|
894 |
delete analyzer; |
|
895 |
delete d; |
|
896 |
} |
|
897 |
||
898 |
/*! |
|
899 |
\internal |
|
900 |
Store a pointer to the related device or instance which this |
|
901 |
authorizer is proxying for |
|
902 |
*/ |
|
903 |
void QAuthDevice::setClient( QObject *cli ) |
|
904 |
{ |
|
905 |
m_client = cli; |
|
906 |
QTransportAuth::getInstance()->d_func()->buffersByClient[cli] = this; |
|
907 |
QObject::connect( cli, SIGNAL(destroyed(QObject*)), |
|
908 |
QTransportAuth::getInstance(), SLOT(bufferDestroyed(QObject*)) ); |
|
909 |
// qDebug( "@@@@@@@@@@@@ client set %p @@@@@@@@@", cli ); |
|
910 |
// qDebug( " client count %d", QTransportAuth::getInstance()->d_func()->buffersByClient.count() ); |
|
911 |
} |
|
912 |
||
913 |
QObject *QAuthDevice::client() const |
|
914 |
{ |
|
915 |
return m_client; |
|
916 |
} |
|
917 |
||
918 |
/* |
|
919 |
\fn void QAuthDevice::authViolation(QTransportAuth::Data &) |
|
920 |
||
921 |
This signal is emitted if an authorization failure is generated, as |
|
922 |
described in checkAuth(); |
|
923 |
||
924 |
\sa checkAuth() |
|
925 |
*/ |
|
926 |
||
927 |
||
928 |
/* |
|
929 |
\fn void QAuthDevice::policyCheck(QTransportAuth::Data &transport, const QString &request ) |
|
930 |
||
931 |
This signal is emitted when a transport successfully delivers a request |
|
932 |
and gives the opportunity to either deny or accept the request. |
|
933 |
||
934 |
This signal must be connected in the same thread, ie it cannot be queued. |
|
935 |
||
936 |
As soon as all handlers connected to this signal are processed the Allow or |
|
937 |
Deny state on the \a transport is checked, and the request is allowed or denied |
|
938 |
accordingly. |
|
939 |
||
940 |
\sa checkAuth() |
|
941 |
*/ |
|
942 |
||
943 |
/*! |
|
944 |
\internal |
|
945 |
Reimplement QIODevice writeData method. |
|
946 |
||
947 |
For client end, when the device is written to the incoming data is |
|
948 |
processed and an authentication header calculated. This is pushed |
|
949 |
into the target device, followed by the actual incoming data (the |
|
950 |
payload). |
|
951 |
||
952 |
For server end, it is a fatal error to write to the device. |
|
953 |
*/ |
|
954 |
qint64 QAuthDevice::writeData(const char *data, qint64 len) |
|
955 |
{ |
|
956 |
if ( way == Receive ) // server |
|
957 |
return m_target->write( data, len ); |
|
958 |
// client |
|
959 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
960 |
char displaybuf[1024]; |
|
961 |
#endif |
|
962 |
char header[QSXE_HEADER_LEN]; |
|
963 |
::memset( header, 0, QSXE_HEADER_LEN ); |
|
964 |
qint64 bytes = 0; |
|
965 |
if ( QTransportAuth::getInstance()->authToMessage( *d, header, data, len )) |
|
966 |
{ |
|
967 |
m_target->write( header, QSXE_HEADER_LEN ); |
|
968 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
969 |
hexstring( displaybuf, (const unsigned char *)header, QSXE_HEADER_LEN ); |
|
970 |
qDebug( "%d QAuthDevice::writeData - CLIENT: Header written: %s", getpid(), displaybuf ); |
|
971 |
#endif |
|
972 |
m_skipWritten += QSXE_HEADER_LEN; |
|
973 |
} |
|
974 |
m_target->write( data, len ); |
|
975 |
bytes += len; |
|
976 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
977 |
int bytesToDisplay = bytes; |
|
978 |
const unsigned char *dataptr = (const unsigned char *)data; |
|
979 |
while ( bytesToDisplay > 0 ) |
|
980 |
{ |
|
981 |
int amt = bytes < 500 ? bytes : 500; |
|
982 |
hexstring( displaybuf, dataptr, amt ); |
|
983 |
qDebug( "%d QAuthDevice::writeData - CLIENT: %s", getpid(), bytes > 0 ? displaybuf : "(null)" ); |
|
984 |
dataptr += 500; |
|
985 |
bytesToDisplay -= 500; |
|
986 |
} |
|
987 |
#endif |
|
988 |
if ( m_target->inherits( "QAbstractSocket" )) |
|
989 |
static_cast<QAbstractSocket*>(m_target)->flush(); |
|
990 |
return bytes; |
|
991 |
} |
|
992 |
||
993 |
/*! |
|
994 |
Reimplement from QIODevice |
|
995 |
||
996 |
Read data out of the internal message queue, reduce the queue by the amount |
|
997 |
read. Note that the amount available is only ever the size of a command |
|
998 |
(although a command can be very big) since we need to check at command |
|
999 |
boundaries for new authentication headers. |
|
1000 |
*/ |
|
1001 |
qint64 QAuthDevice::readData( char *data, qint64 maxSize ) |
|
1002 |
{ |
|
1003 |
if ( way == Send ) // client |
|
1004 |
return m_target->read( data, maxSize ); |
|
1005 |
if ( msgQueue.size() == 0 ) |
|
1006 |
return 0; |
|
1007 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1008 |
char displaybuf[1024]; |
|
1009 |
hexstring( displaybuf, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(msgQueue.constData()), |
|
1010 |
msgQueue.size() > 500 ? 500 : msgQueue.size() ); |
|
1011 |
qDebug() << getpid() << "QAuthDevice::readData() buffered/requested/avail" |
|
1012 |
<< msgQueue.size() << maxSize << m_bytesAvailable << displaybuf; |
|
1013 |
#endif |
|
1014 |
Q_ASSERT( m_bytesAvailable <= msgQueue.size() ); |
|
1015 |
qint64 bytes = ( maxSize > m_bytesAvailable ) ? m_bytesAvailable : maxSize; |
|
1016 |
::memcpy( data, msgQueue.constData(), bytes ); |
|
1017 |
msgQueue = msgQueue.mid( bytes ); |
|
1018 |
m_bytesAvailable -= bytes; |
|
1019 |
return bytes; |
|
1020 |
} |
|
1021 |
||
1022 |
/*! |
|
1023 |
\internal |
|
1024 |
Receive readyRead signal from the target recv device. In response |
|
1025 |
authorize the data, and write results out to the recvBuf() device |
|
1026 |
for processing by the application. Trigger the readyRead signal. |
|
1027 |
||
1028 |
Authorizing involves first checking the transport is valid, ie the |
|
1029 |
handshake has either already been done and is cached on a trusted |
|
1030 |
transport, or was valid with this message; then second passing the |
|
1031 |
string representation of the service request up to any policyReceivers |
|
1032 |
||
1033 |
If either of these fail, the message is denied. In discovery mode |
|
1034 |
denied messages are allowed, but the message is logged. |
|
1035 |
*/ |
|
1036 |
void QAuthDevice::recvReadyRead() |
|
1037 |
{ |
|
1038 |
qint64 bytes = m_target->bytesAvailable(); |
|
1039 |
if ( bytes <= 0 ) return; |
|
1040 |
open( QIODevice::ReadWrite | QIODevice::Unbuffered ); |
|
1041 |
QUnixSocket *usock = static_cast<QUnixSocket*>(m_target); |
|
1042 |
QUnixSocketMessage msg = usock->read(); |
|
1043 |
msgQueue.append( msg.bytes() ); |
|
1044 |
d->processId = msg.processId(); |
|
1045 |
// if "fragmented" packet 1/2 way through start of a command, ie |
|
1046 |
// in the QWS msg type, cant do anything, come back later when |
|
1047 |
// there's more of the packet |
|
1048 |
if ( msgQueue.size() < (int)sizeof(int) ) |
|
1049 |
{ |
|
1050 |
// qDebug() << "returning: msg size too small" << msgQueue.size(); |
|
1051 |
return; |
|
1052 |
} |
|
1053 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1054 |
char displaybuf[1024]; |
|
1055 |
hexstring( displaybuf, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(msgQueue.constData()), |
|
1056 |
msgQueue.size() > 500 ? 500 : msgQueue.size() ); |
|
1057 |
qDebug( "%d ***** SERVER read %lli bytes - msg %s", getpid(), bytes, displaybuf ); |
|
1058 |
#endif |
|
1059 |
||
1060 |
bool bufHasMessages = msgQueue.size() >= (int)sizeof(int); |
|
1061 |
while ( bufHasMessages ) |
|
1062 |
{ |
|
1063 |
unsigned char saveStatus = d->status; |
|
1064 |
if (( d->status & QTransportAuth::ErrMask ) == QTransportAuth::NoSuchKey ) |
|
1065 |
{ |
|
1066 |
QTransportAuth::getInstance()->authorizeRequest( *d, QLatin1String("NoSuchKey") ); |
|
1067 |
break; |
|
1068 |
} |
|
1069 |
if ( !QTransportAuth::getInstance()->authFromMessage( *d, msgQueue, msgQueue.size() )) |
|
1070 |
{ |
|
1071 |
// not all arrived yet? come back later |
|
1072 |
if (( d->status & QTransportAuth::ErrMask ) == QTransportAuth::TooSmall ) |
|
1073 |
{ |
|
1074 |
d->status = saveStatus; |
|
1075 |
return; |
|
1076 |
} |
|
1077 |
} |
|
1078 |
if (( d->status & QTransportAuth::ErrMask ) == QTransportAuth::NoMagic ) |
|
1079 |
{ |
|
1080 |
// no msg auth header, don't change the success status for connections |
|
1081 |
if ( d->connection() ) |
|
1082 |
d->status = saveStatus; |
|
1083 |
} |
|
1084 |
else |
|
1085 |
{ |
|
1086 |
// msg auth header detected and auth determined, remove hdr |
|
1087 |
msgQueue = msgQueue.mid( QSXE_HEADER_LEN ); |
|
1088 |
} |
|
1089 |
if ( !authorizeMessage() ) |
|
1090 |
break; |
|
1091 |
bufHasMessages = msgQueue.size() >= (int)sizeof(int); |
|
1092 |
} |
|
1093 |
} |
|
1094 |
||
1095 |
/** |
|
1096 |
\internal |
|
1097 |
Handle bytesWritten signals from the underlying target device. |
|
1098 |
We adjust the target's value for bytes that are part of auth packets. |
|
1099 |
*/ |
|
1100 |
void QAuthDevice::targetBytesWritten( qint64 bytes ) |
|
1101 |
{ |
|
1102 |
if ( m_skipWritten >= bytes ) { |
|
1103 |
m_skipWritten -= bytes; |
|
1104 |
bytes = 0; |
|
1105 |
} else if ( m_skipWritten > 0 ) { |
|
1106 |
bytes -= m_skipWritten; |
|
1107 |
m_skipWritten = 0; |
|
1108 |
} |
|
1109 |
if ( bytes > 0 ) { |
|
1110 |
emit bytesWritten( bytes ); |
|
1111 |
} |
|
1112 |
} |
|
1113 |
||
1114 |
/** |
|
1115 |
\internal |
|
1116 |
Pre-process the message to determine what QWS command it is. This |
|
1117 |
information is used as the "request" for the purposes of authorization. |
|
1118 |
||
1119 |
The request and other data on the connection (id, PID, etc.) are forwarded |
|
1120 |
to all policy listeners by emitting a signal. |
|
1121 |
||
1122 |
The signal must be processed synchronously because on return the allow/deny |
|
1123 |
status is used immediately to either drop or continue processing the message. |
|
1124 |
*/ |
|
1125 |
bool QAuthDevice::authorizeMessage() |
|
1126 |
{ |
|
1127 |
if ( analyzer == NULL ) |
|
1128 |
analyzer = new RequestAnalyzer(); |
|
1129 |
QString request = (*analyzer)( &msgQueue ); |
|
1130 |
if ( analyzer->requireMoreData() ) |
|
1131 |
return false; |
|
1132 |
bool isAuthorized = true; |
|
1133 |
||
1134 |
if ( !request.isEmpty() && request != QLatin1String("Unknown") ) |
|
1135 |
{ |
|
1136 |
isAuthorized = QTransportAuth::getInstance()->authorizeRequest( *d, request ); |
|
1137 |
} |
|
1138 |
||
1139 |
bool moreToProcess = ( msgQueue.size() - analyzer->bytesAnalyzed() ) > (int)sizeof(int); |
|
1140 |
if ( isAuthorized ) |
|
1141 |
{ |
|
1142 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1143 |
qDebug() << getpid() << "SERVER authorized: releasing" << analyzer->bytesAnalyzed() << "byte command" << request; |
|
1144 |
#endif |
|
1145 |
m_bytesAvailable = analyzer->bytesAnalyzed(); |
|
1146 |
emit QIODevice::readyRead(); |
|
1147 |
return moreToProcess; |
|
1148 |
} |
|
1149 |
else |
|
1150 |
{ |
|
1151 |
msgQueue = msgQueue.mid( analyzer->bytesAnalyzed() ); |
|
1152 |
} |
|
1153 |
||
1154 |
return true; |
|
1155 |
} |
|
1156 |
||
1157 |
void QAuthDevice::setRequestAnalyzer( RequestAnalyzer *ra ) |
|
1158 |
{ |
|
1159 |
Q_ASSERT( ra ); |
|
1160 |
if ( analyzer ) |
|
1161 |
delete analyzer; |
|
1162 |
analyzer = ra; |
|
1163 |
} |
|
1164 |
||
1165 |
/*! |
|
1166 |
\internal |
|
1167 |
Add authentication header to the beginning of a message |
|
1168 |
||
1169 |
Note that the per-process auth cookie is used. This key should be rewritten in |
|
1170 |
the binary image of the executable at install time to make it unique. |
|
1171 |
||
1172 |
For this to be secure some mechanism (eg MAC kernel or other |
|
1173 |
permissions) must prevent other processes from reading the key. |
|
1174 |
||
1175 |
The buffer must have AUTH_SPACE(0) bytes spare at the beginning for the |
|
1176 |
authentication header to be added. |
|
1177 |
||
1178 |
Returns true if header successfully added. Will fail if the |
|
1179 |
per-process key has not yet been set with setProcessKey() |
|
1180 |
*/ |
|
1181 |
bool QTransportAuth::authToMessage( QTransportAuth::Data &d, char *hdr, const char *msg, int msgLen ) |
|
1182 |
{ |
|
1183 |
// qDebug( "authToMessage(): prog id %u", d.progId ); |
|
1184 |
// only authorize connection oriented transports once, unless key has changed |
|
1185 |
if ( d.connection() && ((d.status & QTransportAuth::ErrMask) != QTransportAuth::Pending) && |
|
1186 |
d_func()->authKey.progId == d.progId ) |
|
1187 |
return false; |
|
1188 |
d.progId = d_func()->authKey.progId; |
|
1189 |
// If Unix socket credentials are being used the key wont be set |
|
1190 |
if ( !d_func()->keyInitialised ) |
|
1191 |
return false; |
|
1192 |
unsigned char digest[QSXE_KEY_LEN]; |
|
1193 |
char *msgPtr = hdr; |
|
1194 |
// magic always goes on the beginning |
|
1195 |
for ( int m = 0; m < QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES; ++m ) |
|
1196 |
*msgPtr++ = magic[m]; |
|
1197 |
hdr[ QSXE_LEN_IDX ] = (unsigned char)msgLen; |
|
1198 |
if ( !d.trusted()) |
|
1199 |
{ |
|
1200 |
// Use HMAC |
|
1201 |
int rc = hmac_md5( (unsigned char *)msg, msgLen, d_func()->authKey.key, QSXE_KEY_LEN, digest ); |
|
1202 |
if ( rc == -1 ) |
|
1203 |
return false; |
|
1204 |
memcpy( hdr + QSXE_KEY_IDX, digest, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
|
1205 |
} |
|
1206 |
else |
|
1207 |
{ |
|
1208 |
memcpy( hdr + QSXE_KEY_IDX, d_func()->authKey.key, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
|
1209 |
} |
|
1210 |
||
1211 |
hdr[ QSXE_PROG_IDX ] = d_func()->authKey.progId; |
|
1212 |
||
1213 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1214 |
char keydisplay[QSXE_KEY_LEN*2+1]; |
|
1215 |
hexstring( keydisplay, d_func()->authKey.key, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
|
1216 |
||
1217 |
qDebug( "%d CLIENT Auth to message %s against prog id %u and key %s\n", |
|
1218 |
getpid(), msg, d_func()->authKey.progId, keydisplay ); |
|
1219 |
#endif |
|
1220 |
||
1221 |
// TODO implement sequence to prevent replay attack, not required |
|
1222 |
// for trusted transports |
|
1223 |
hdr[ QSXE_SEQ_IDX ] = 1; // dummy sequence |
|
1224 |
||
1225 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::Success; |
|
1226 |
return true; |
|
1227 |
} |
|
1228 |
||
1229 |
||
1230 |
/*! |
|
1231 |
Check authorization on the \a msg, which must be of size \a msgLen, |
|
1232 |
for the transport \a d. |
|
1233 |
||
1234 |
If able to determine authorization, return the program identity of |
|
1235 |
the message source in the reference \a progId, and return true. |
|
1236 |
||
1237 |
Otherwise return false. |
|
1238 |
||
1239 |
If data is being received on a socket, it may be that more data is yet |
|
1240 |
needed before authentication can proceed. |
|
1241 |
||
1242 |
Also the message may not be an authenticated at all. |
|
1243 |
||
1244 |
In these cases the method returns false to indicate authorization could |
|
1245 |
not be determined: |
|
1246 |
\list |
|
1247 |
\i The message is too small to carry the authentication data |
|
1248 |
(status TooSmall is set on the \a d transport ) |
|
1249 |
\i The 4 magic bytes are missing from the message start |
|
1250 |
(status NoMagic is set on the \a d transport ) |
|
1251 |
\i The message is too small to carry the auth + claimed payload |
|
1252 |
(status TooSmall is set on the \a d transport ) |
|
1253 |
\endlist |
|
1254 |
||
1255 |
If however the authentication header (preceded by the magic bytes) and |
|
1256 |
any authenticated payload is received the method will determine the |
|
1257 |
authentication status, and return true. |
|
1258 |
||
1259 |
In the following cases as well as returning true it will also emit |
|
1260 |
an authViolation(): |
|
1261 |
\list |
|
1262 |
\i If the program id claimed by the message is not found in the key file |
|
1263 |
(status NoSuchKey is set on the \a d transport ) |
|
1264 |
\i The authentication token failed against the claimed program id: |
|
1265 |
\list |
|
1266 |
\i in the case of trusted transports, the secret did not match |
|
1267 |
\i in the case of untrusted transports the HMAC code did not match |
|
1268 |
\endlist |
|
1269 |
(status FailMatch is set on the \a d transport ) |
|
1270 |
\endlist |
|
1271 |
||
1272 |
In these cases the authViolation( QTransportAuth::Data d ) signal is emitted |
|
1273 |
and the error string can be obtained from the status like this: |
|
1274 |
\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src_gui_embedded_qtransportauth_qws.cpp 4 |
|
1275 |
*/ |
|
1276 |
bool QTransportAuth::authFromMessage( QTransportAuth::Data &d, const char *msg, int msgLen ) |
|
1277 |
{ |
|
1278 |
if ( msgLen < QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES ) |
|
1279 |
{ |
|
1280 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::TooSmall; |
|
1281 |
return false; |
|
1282 |
} |
|
1283 |
// if no magic bytes, exit straight away |
|
1284 |
int m; |
|
1285 |
const unsigned char *mptr = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(msg); |
|
1286 |
for ( m = 0; m < QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES; ++m ) |
|
1287 |
{ |
|
1288 |
if ( *mptr++ != magic[m] ) |
|
1289 |
{ |
|
1290 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::NoMagic; |
|
1291 |
return false; |
|
1292 |
} |
|
1293 |
} |
|
1294 |
||
1295 |
if ( msgLen < AUTH_SPACE(1) ) |
|
1296 |
{ |
|
1297 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::TooSmall; |
|
1298 |
return false; |
|
1299 |
} |
|
1300 |
||
1301 |
// At this point we know the header is at least long enough to contain valid auth |
|
1302 |
// data, however the data may be spoofed. If it is not verified then the status will |
|
1303 |
// be set to uncertified so the spoofed data will not be relied on. However we want to |
|
1304 |
// know the program id which is being reported (even if it might be spoofed) for |
|
1305 |
// policy debugging purposes. So set it here, rather than after verification. |
|
1306 |
d.progId = msg[QSXE_PROG_IDX]; |
|
1307 |
||
1308 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1309 |
char authhdr[QSXE_HEADER_LEN*2+1]; |
|
1310 |
hexstring( authhdr, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(msg), QSXE_HEADER_LEN ); |
|
1311 |
qDebug( "%d SERVER authFromMessage(): message header is %s", |
|
1312 |
getpid(), authhdr ); |
|
1313 |
#endif |
|
1314 |
||
1315 |
unsigned char authLen = (unsigned char)(msg[ QSXE_LEN_IDX ]); |
|
1316 |
||
1317 |
if ( msgLen < AUTH_SPACE(authLen) ) |
|
1318 |
{ |
|
1319 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::TooSmall; |
|
1320 |
return false; |
|
1321 |
} |
|
1322 |
||
1323 |
bool isCached = d_func()->keyCache.contains( d.progId ); |
|
1324 |
const unsigned char *clientKey = d_func()->getClientKey( d.progId ); |
|
1325 |
if ( clientKey == NULL ) |
|
1326 |
{ |
|
1327 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::NoSuchKey; |
|
1328 |
return false; |
|
1329 |
} |
|
1330 |
||
1331 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1332 |
char keydisplay[QSXE_KEY_LEN*2+1]; |
|
1333 |
hexstring( keydisplay, clientKey, QSXE_KEY_LEN ); |
|
1334 |
qDebug( "\t\tauthFromMessage(): message %s against prog id %u and key %s\n", |
|
1335 |
AUTH_DATA(msg), ((unsigned int)d.progId), keydisplay ); |
|
1336 |
#endif |
|
1337 |
||
1338 |
const unsigned char *auth_tok; |
|
1339 |
unsigned char digest[QSXE_KEY_LEN]; |
|
1340 |
bool multi_tok = false; |
|
1341 |
||
1342 |
bool need_to_recheck=false; |
|
1343 |
do |
|
1344 |
{ |
|
1345 |
if ( !d.trusted()) |
|
1346 |
{ |
|
1347 |
hmac_md5( AUTH_DATA(msg), authLen, clientKey, QSXE_KEY_LEN, digest ); |
|
1348 |
auth_tok = digest; |
|
1349 |
} |
|
1350 |
else |
|
1351 |
{ |
|
1352 |
auth_tok = clientKey; |
|
1353 |
multi_tok = true; // 1 or more keys are in the clientKey |
|
1354 |
} |
|
1355 |
while( true ) |
|
1356 |
{ |
|
1357 |
if ( memcmp( auth_tok, magic, QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES ) == 0 |
|
1358 |
&& memcmp( auth_tok + QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES, magic, QSXE_MAGIC_BYTES ) == 0 ) |
|
1359 |
break; |
|
1360 |
if ( memcmp( msg + QSXE_KEY_IDX, auth_tok, QSXE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 ) |
|
1361 |
{ |
|
1362 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::Success; |
|
1363 |
return true; |
|
1364 |
} |
|
1365 |
if ( !multi_tok ) |
|
1366 |
break; |
|
1367 |
auth_tok += QSXE_KEY_LEN; |
|
1368 |
} |
|
1369 |
//the keys cached on d.progId may not contain the binary key because the cache entry was made |
|
1370 |
//before the binary had first started, must search for client key again. |
|
1371 |
if ( isCached ) |
|
1372 |
{ |
|
1373 |
d_func()->keyCache.remove(d.progId); |
|
1374 |
isCached = false; |
|
1375 |
||
1376 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1377 |
qDebug() << "QTransportAuth::authFromMessage(): key not found in set of keys cached" |
|
1378 |
<< "against prog Id =" << d.progId << ". Re-obtaining client key. "; |
|
1379 |
#endif |
|
1380 |
clientKey = d_func()->getClientKey( d.progId ); |
|
1381 |
if ( clientKey == NULL ) |
|
1382 |
{ |
|
1383 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::NoSuchKey; |
|
1384 |
return false; |
|
1385 |
} |
|
1386 |
need_to_recheck = true; |
|
1387 |
} |
|
1388 |
else |
|
1389 |
{ |
|
1390 |
need_to_recheck = false; |
|
1391 |
} |
|
1392 |
} while( need_to_recheck ); |
|
1393 |
||
1394 |
d.status = ( d.status & QTransportAuth::StatusMask ) | QTransportAuth::FailMatch; |
|
1395 |
qWarning() << "QTransportAuth::authFromMessage():failed authentication"; |
|
1396 |
FAREnforcer::getInstance()->logAuthAttempt( QDateTime::currentDateTime() ); |
|
1397 |
emit authViolation( d ); |
|
1398 |
return false; |
|
1399 |
} |
|
1400 |
||
1401 |
||
1402 |
#ifdef QTRANSPORTAUTH_DEBUG |
|
1403 |
/*! |
|
1404 |
sprintf into hex - dest \a buf, src \a key, \a key_len is length of key. |
|
1405 |
||
1406 |
The target buf should be [ key_len * 2 + 1 ] in size |
|
1407 |
*/ |
|
1408 |
void hexstring( char *buf, const unsigned char* key, size_t key_len ) |
|
1409 |
{ |
|
1410 |
unsigned int i, p; |
|
1411 |
for ( i = 0, p = 0; i < key_len; i++, p+=2 ) |
|
1412 |
{ |
|
1413 |
unsigned char lo_nibble = key[i] & 0x0f; |
|
1414 |
unsigned char hi_nibble = key[i] >> 4; |
|
1415 |
buf[p] = (int)hi_nibble > 9 ? hi_nibble-10 + 'A' : hi_nibble + '0'; |
|
1416 |
buf[p+1] = (int)lo_nibble > 9 ? lo_nibble-10 + 'A' : lo_nibble + '0'; |
|
1417 |
} |
|
1418 |
buf[p] = '\0'; |
|
1419 |
} |
|
1420 |
#endif |
|
1421 |
||
1422 |
/* |
|
1423 |
HMAC MD5 as listed in RFC 2104 |
|
1424 |
||
1425 |
This code is taken from: |
|
1426 |
||
1427 |
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2104.html |
|
1428 |
||
1429 |
with the allowance for keys other than length 16 removed, but otherwise |
|
1430 |
a straight cut-and-paste. |
|
1431 |
||
1432 |
The HMAC_MD5 transform looks like: |
|
1433 |
||
1434 |
\snippet doc/src/snippets/code/src.gui.embedded.qtransportauth_qws.cpp 5 |
|
1435 |
||
1436 |
\list |
|
1437 |
\i where K is an n byte key |
|
1438 |
\i ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times |
|
1439 |
\i opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times |
|
1440 |
\i and text is the data being protected |
|
1441 |
\endlist |
|
1442 |
||
1443 |
Hardware is available with accelerated implementations of HMAC-MD5 and |
|
1444 |
HMAC-SHA1. Where this hardware is available, this routine should be |
|
1445 |
replaced with a call into the accelerated version. |
|
1446 |
*/ |
|
1447 |
||
1448 |
static int hmac_md5( |
|
1449 |
unsigned char* text, /* pointer to data stream */ |
|
1450 |
int text_length, /* length of data stream */ |
|
1451 |
const unsigned char* key, /* pointer to authentication key */ |
|
1452 |
int key_length, /* length of authentication key */ |
|
1453 |
unsigned char * digest /* caller digest to be filled in */ |
|
1454 |
) |
|
1455 |
{ |
|
1456 |
MD5Context context; |
|
1457 |
unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - * key XORd with ipad */ |
|
1458 |
unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - * key XORd with opad */ |
|
1459 |
int i; |
|
1460 |
||
1461 |
/* in this implementation key_length == 16 */ |
|
1462 |
if ( key_length != 16 ) |
|
1463 |
{ |
|
1464 |
fprintf( stderr, "Key length was %d - must be 16 bytes", key_length ); |
|
1465 |
return 0; |
|
1466 |
} |
|
1467 |
||
1468 |
/* start out by storing key in pads */ |
|
1469 |
memset( k_ipad, 0, sizeof k_ipad ); |
|
1470 |
memset( k_opad, 0, sizeof k_opad ); |
|
1471 |
memcpy( k_ipad, key, key_length ); |
|
1472 |
memcpy( k_opad, key, key_length ); |
|
1473 |
||
1474 |
/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */ |
|
1475 |
for (i=0; i<64; i++) { |
|
1476 |
k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36; |
|
1477 |
k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c; |
|
1478 |
} |
|
1479 |
||
1480 |
/* perform inner MD5 */ |
|
1481 |
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 1st pass */ |
|
1482 |
MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad */ |
|
1483 |
MD5Update(&context, text, text_length); /* then text of datagram */ |
|
1484 |
MD5Final(&context, digest); /* finish up 1st pass */ |
|
1485 |
||
1486 |
/* perform outer MD5 */ |
|
1487 |
MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd pass */ |
|
1488 |
MD5Update(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */ |
|
1489 |
MD5Update(&context, digest, 16); /* then results of 1st * hash */ |
|
1490 |
MD5Final(&context, digest); /* finish up 2nd pass */ |
|
1491 |
return 1; |
|
1492 |
} |
|
1493 |
||
1494 |
||
1495 |
const int FAREnforcer::minutelyRate = 4; //allowed number of false authentication attempts per minute |
|
1496 |
const QString FAREnforcer::FARMessage = QLatin1String("FAR_Exceeded"); |
|
1497 |
const QString FAREnforcer::SxeTag = QLatin1String("<SXE Breach>"); |
|
1498 |
const int FAREnforcer::minute = 60; |
|
1499 |
||
1500 |
FAREnforcer::FAREnforcer():authAttempts() |
|
1501 |
{ |
|
1502 |
QDateTime nullDateTime = QDateTime(); |
|
1503 |
for (int i = 0; i < minutelyRate; i++ ) |
|
1504 |
authAttempts << nullDateTime; |
|
1505 |
} |
|
1506 |
||
1507 |
||
1508 |
FAREnforcer *FAREnforcer::getInstance() |
|
1509 |
{ |
|
1510 |
static FAREnforcer theInstance; |
|
1511 |
return &theInstance; |
|
1512 |
} |
|
1513 |
||
1514 |
void FAREnforcer::logAuthAttempt( QDateTime time ) |
|
1515 |
{ |
|
1516 |
QDateTime dt = authAttempts.takeFirst(); |
|
1517 |
||
1518 |
authAttempts.append( time ); |
|
1519 |
if ( dt.secsTo( authAttempts.last() ) <= minute ) |
|
1520 |
{ |
|
1521 |
#if defined(SXE_DISCOVERY) |
|
1522 |
if ( QTransportAuth::getInstance()->isDiscoveryMode() ) { |
|
1523 |
static QBasicAtomicInt reported = Q_BASIC_ATOMIC_INITIALIZER(0); |
|
1524 |
if ( reported.testAndSetRelaxed(0,1) ) { |
|
1525 |
#ifndef QT_NO_TEXTSTREAM |
|
1526 |
QString logFilePath = QTransportAuth::getInstance()->logFilePath(); |
|
1527 |
if ( !logFilePath.isEmpty() ) { |
|
1528 |
QFile log( logFilePath ); |
|
1529 |
if ( !log.open(QIODevice::WriteOnly | QIODevice::Append) ) { |
|
1530 |
qWarning("Could not write to log in discovery mode: %s", |
|
1531 |
qPrintable(logFilePath) ); |
|
1532 |
} else { |
|
1533 |
QTextStream ts( &log ); |
|
1534 |
ts << "\t\tWarning: False Authentication Rate of " << minutelyRate << "\n" |
|
1535 |
<< "\t\tserver connections/authentications per minute has been exceeded,\n" |
|
1536 |
<< "\t\tno further warnings will be issued\n"; |
|
1537 |
} |
|
1538 |
} |
|
1539 |
} |
|
1540 |
#endif |
|
1541 |
reset(); |
|
1542 |
return; |
|
1543 |
} |
|
1544 |
#endif |
|
1545 |
syslog( LOG_ERR | LOG_LOCAL6, "%s %s", |
|
1546 |
qPrintable( FAREnforcer::SxeTag ), |
|
1547 |
qPrintable( FAREnforcer::FARMessage ) ); |
|
1548 |
reset(); |
|
1549 |
} |
|
1550 |
} |
|
1551 |
||
1552 |
void FAREnforcer::reset() |
|
1553 |
{ |
|
1554 |
QDateTime nullDateTime = QDateTime(); |
|
1555 |
for (int i = 0; i < minutelyRate; i++ ) |
|
1556 |
authAttempts[i] = nullDateTime; |
|
1557 |
} |
|
1558 |
||
1559 |
QT_END_NAMESPACE |
|
1560 |
||
1561 |
#include "moc_qtransportauth_qws_p.cpp" |
|
1562 |
||
1563 |
#endif // QT_NO_SXE |