--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/crypto/weakcrypto/source/padding/padding.cpp Wed Jul 08 11:25:26 2009 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+/*
+* Copyright (c) 1999-2009 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+* All rights reserved.
+* This component and the accompanying materials are made available
+* under the terms of the License "Eclipse Public License v1.0"
+* which accompanies this distribution, and is available
+* at the URL "http://www.eclipse.org/legal/epl-v10.html".
+*
+* Initial Contributors:
+* Nokia Corporation - initial contribution.
+*
+* Contributors:
+*
+* Description:
+*
+*/
+
+
+#include <e32base.h>
+#include <random.h>
+#include <padding.h>
+#include <securityerr.h>
+#include <cryptopanic.h>
+
+/* CPadding */
+CPadding::CPadding(void) : iBlockBytes(-1)
+ {
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPadding::CPadding(TInt aBlockBytes) : iBlockBytes(aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ __ASSERT_ALWAYS(aBlockBytes > 0, User::Invariant());
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C void CPadding::SetBlockSize(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ __ASSERT_ALWAYS(aBlockBytes > 0, User::Invariant());
+ iBlockBytes = aBlockBytes;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C TInt CPadding::BlockSize(void) const
+ {
+ return iBlockBytes;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C TInt CPadding::MaxPaddedLength(TInt /*aInputBytes*/) const
+ {
+ return BlockSize();
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C TInt CPadding::MaxUnPaddedLength(TInt aInputBytes) const
+ {
+ return aInputBytes - MinPaddingLength();
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C void CPadding::PadL(const TDesC8& aInput, TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ // Check that the input is small enough to fit inside one padded block
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aInput.Length() <= BlockSize() - MinPaddingLength(),
+ User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicPadInputTooLarge));
+
+ // Check that the output descriptor supplied is large enough to store the result
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aOutput.MaxLength() >= MaxPaddedLength(aInput.Length()),
+ User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicOutputDescriptorOverflow));
+
+ // Call the virtual function, implemented by derived classes
+ DoPadL(aInput, aOutput);
+ }
+
+/* CPaddingNone */
+EXPORT_C CPaddingNone* CPaddingNone::NewL(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ __ASSERT_ALWAYS(aBlockBytes > 0, User::Leave(KErrArgument));
+ return new(ELeave)CPaddingNone(aBlockBytes);
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingNone* CPaddingNone::NewLC(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ CPaddingNone* self = CPaddingNone::NewL(aBlockBytes);
+ CleanupStack::PushL(self);
+ return self;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingNone::CPaddingNone(TInt aBlockBytes):CPadding(aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ }
+
+void CPaddingNone::DoPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ aOutput.Append(aInput);
+ }
+
+void CPaddingNone::UnPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aOutput.MaxLength() >= MaxPaddedLength(aInput.Length()), User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicOutputDescriptorOverflow));
+ aOutput.Append(aInput);
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingNone::MinPaddingLength(void) const
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingNone::MaxPaddedLength(TInt aInputSize) const
+ {
+ return aInputSize;
+ }
+
+/* CPaddingSSLv3 */
+EXPORT_C CPaddingSSLv3* CPaddingSSLv3::NewL(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ __ASSERT_ALWAYS(aBlockBytes > 0, User::Leave(KErrArgument));
+ return new(ELeave)CPaddingSSLv3(aBlockBytes);
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingSSLv3* CPaddingSSLv3::NewLC(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ CPaddingSSLv3* self = CPaddingSSLv3::NewL(aBlockBytes);
+ CleanupStack::PushL(self);
+ return self;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingSSLv3::CPaddingSSLv3(TInt aBlockBytes):CPadding(aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ }
+
+void CPaddingSSLv3::DoPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ TInt paddingBytes=BlockSize()-(aInput.Length()%BlockSize());
+ aOutput.Append(aInput);
+ aOutput.SetLength(aOutput.Length()+paddingBytes);
+ for (TInt i=1;i<=paddingBytes;i++)
+ {
+ aOutput[aOutput.Length()-i]=(TUint8)(paddingBytes-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+void CPaddingSSLv3::UnPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ TInt paddingLen = aInput[aInput.Length()-1] + 1;
+
+ if (paddingLen > aInput.Length())
+ {
+ User::Leave(KErrInvalidPadding);
+ }
+
+ TInt outlen = aInput.Length() - paddingLen;
+
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aOutput.MaxLength() >= outlen, User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicOutputDescriptorOverflow));
+
+ aOutput.Append(aInput.Left(outlen));
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingSSLv3::MinPaddingLength(void) const
+ {
+ //if aInputBytes is 1 less than the blocksize then we get 1 byte of padding
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingSSLv3::MaxPaddedLength(TInt aInputBytes) const
+ {
+ TUint padBytes = BlockSize() - (aInputBytes % BlockSize());
+ return padBytes + aInputBytes;
+ }
+
+/* CPaddingPKCS1Signature */
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Signature* CPaddingPKCS1Signature::NewL(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ return new(ELeave)CPaddingPKCS1Signature(aBlockBytes);
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Signature* CPaddingPKCS1Signature::NewLC(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ CPaddingPKCS1Signature* self = CPaddingPKCS1Signature::NewL(aBlockBytes);
+ CleanupStack::PushL(self);
+ return self;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Signature::CPaddingPKCS1Signature(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ : CPadding(aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ }
+
+void CPaddingPKCS1Signature::DoPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ aOutput.SetLength(BlockSize());
+ TInt i;
+ TInt j;
+ aOutput[0]=0;
+ TInt startOfData=BlockSize()-aInput.Length();
+ // PKCS1 also specifies a block type 0 for private key operations but
+ // does not recommend its use. This block type (0) is compatible with
+ // unpadded data though so you can create PKCS1 type 0 blocks using
+ // CPaddingNone.
+ aOutput[1]=1; // Block type 1 (private key operation)
+ for (i=2;i<(startOfData-1);i++)
+ {
+ aOutput[i]=0xff;
+ }
+ j=0;
+ aOutput[startOfData-1]=0; // separator
+ for (i=startOfData;i<BlockSize();i++,j++)
+ {
+ aOutput[i]=aInput[j];
+ }
+ }
+
+void CPaddingPKCS1Signature::UnPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ // erm, oops, this is not quite as simplistic as it first looks...
+ // our integer class will strip any leading zeros so we might actually
+ // get some real data that starts out looking like padding but isn't
+ // really
+
+ TInt inputLen = aInput.Length();
+ if (inputLen <=0 )
+ User::Leave(KErrInvalidPadding); // Invalid padding data
+
+ // Leading zero may have been stripped off by integer class
+ TInt dataStart=0;
+ if (aInput[dataStart] == 0)
+ {
+ ++dataStart;
+ }
+
+ if (dataStart < inputLen && aInput[dataStart]) // might be mode one or mode zero,
+ {
+ ++dataStart;
+ while (dataStart < inputLen && aInput[dataStart] == 0xff)
+ {
+ ++dataStart;
+ }
+
+ if (dataStart == inputLen || aInput[dataStart]) // this would mean theres no zero between 0x01ff and data...so its not mode one
+ dataStart=0; // mode zero, start from begining of data
+ else
+ ++dataStart;
+ }
+ else // We've definitely got a mode zero
+ { // or broken data, assume mode zero
+ dataStart=0;
+ }
+
+ TInt len=inputLen-dataStart;
+
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aOutput.MaxLength() >= len, User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicOutputDescriptorOverflow));
+
+ aOutput.SetLength(len);
+ TInt i=0;
+ while (dataStart<inputLen)
+ {
+ aOutput[i++]=aInput[dataStart++];
+ }
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingPKCS1Signature::MinPaddingLength(void) const
+ {
+ return 11; //0x00, 0x01, <MIN of 8 0xFF octets> , 0x00
+ }
+
+/* CPaddingPKCS1Encryption */
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Encryption* CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::NewL(
+ TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ return new(ELeave)CPaddingPKCS1Encryption(aBlockBytes);
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Encryption* CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::NewLC(
+ TInt aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ CPaddingPKCS1Encryption* self = CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::NewL(aBlockBytes);
+ CleanupStack::PushL(self);
+ return self;
+ }
+
+EXPORT_C CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::CPaddingPKCS1Encryption(TInt aBlockBytes)
+ : CPadding(aBlockBytes)
+ {
+ }
+
+void CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::DoPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ aOutput.SetLength(BlockSize());
+
+ aOutput[0]=0;
+ TInt startOfData=BlockSize()-aInput.Length();
+ aOutput[1]=2; // Block type 2 (public key operation)
+ TBuf8<256> rnd(256);
+ GenerateRandomBytesL(rnd);
+
+ TInt i = 2;
+ TInt j = 0;
+ for (; i<(startOfData-1);)
+ {
+ if (rnd[j])
+ {
+ aOutput[i++]=rnd[j];
+ }
+ if (++j==256)
+ {
+ GenerateRandomBytesL(rnd);
+ j=0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ j=0;
+ aOutput[startOfData-1]=0; // separator
+ for (i=startOfData;i<BlockSize();i++,j++)
+ {
+ aOutput[i]=aInput[j];
+ }
+ }
+
+void CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::UnPadL(const TDesC8& aInput,TDes8& aOutput)
+ {
+ TInt inputLen = aInput.Length();
+ if (inputLen <= 0)
+ User::Leave(KErrInvalidPadding); // Invalid padding data
+
+ // Leading zero may have been stripped off by integer class
+ TInt dataStart=0;
+ if (aInput[dataStart] == 0)
+ {
+ ++dataStart;
+ }
+
+ // expecting mode 2 padding, otherwise broken
+ if (dataStart == inputLen || aInput[dataStart] != 2)
+ {
+ User::Leave(KErrInvalidPadding);
+ }
+ ++dataStart;
+
+ // skip random non zero bytes
+ while (dataStart < inputLen && aInput[dataStart])
+ {
+ ++dataStart;
+ }
+
+ // expecting zero separator
+ if (dataStart == inputLen || aInput[dataStart] != 0)
+ {
+ User::Leave(KErrInvalidPadding);
+ }
+ ++dataStart;
+
+ TInt len = inputLen - dataStart;
+ __ASSERT_DEBUG(aOutput.MaxLength() >= len, User::Panic(KCryptoPanic, ECryptoPanicOutputDescriptorOverflow));
+
+ aOutput.SetLength(len);
+ TInt i=0;
+ while (dataStart<inputLen)
+ {
+ aOutput[i++]=aInput[dataStart++];
+ }
+ }
+
+TInt CPaddingPKCS1Encryption::MinPaddingLength(void) const
+ {
+ return 11; //0x00, 0x02, <min of 8 random octets>, 0x00
+ }