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INTRODUCTION

1. The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for =
the human race. They have=20
greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in "advanced" =
countries, but they have=20
destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human =
beings to indignities, have led to=20
widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical =
suffering as well) and have inflicted=20
severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology =
will worsen the situation. It=20
will certainly subject human beings to greater indignities and inflict =
greater damage on the natural world, it=20
will probably lead to greater social disruption and psychological =
suffering, and it may lead to increased=20
physical suffering even in "advanced" countries.=20

2. The industrial-technological system may survive or it may break down. If =
it survives, it MAY eventually=20
achieve a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after =
passing through a long and very=20
painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently reducing =
human beings and many other=20
living organisms to engineered products and mere cogs in the social =
machine. Furthermore, if the system=20
survives, the consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming =
or modifying the system so as=20
to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.=20

3. If the system breaks down the consequences will still be very painful. =
But the bigger the system grows=20
the more disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to =
break down it had best break down=20
sooner rather than later.=20

4. We therefore advocate a revolution against the industrial system. This =
revolution may or may not make=20
use of violence: it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process =
spanning a few decades. We=20
can't predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the =
measures that those who hate the=20
industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution =
against that form of society. This=20
is not to be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not =
governments but the economic=20
and technological basis of the present society.=20

5. In this article we give attention to only some of the negative =
developments that have grown out of the=20
industrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention only =
briefly or ignore altogether.=20
This does not mean that we regard these other developments as unimportant. =
For practical reasons we have=20
to confine our discussion to areas that have received insufficient public =
attention or in which we have=20
something new to say. For example, since there are well-developed =
environmental and wilderness=20
movements, we have written very little about environmental degradation or =
the destruction of wild nature,=20
even though we consider these to be highly important.=20

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM

6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in a deeply troubled society. =
One of the most widespread=20
manifestations of the craziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of =
the psychology of leftism can=20
serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modern =
society in general.=20

7. But what is leftism? During the first half of the 20th century leftism =
could have been practically=20
identified with socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not =
clear who can properly be called=20
a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we have in mind mainly =
socialists, collectivists,=20
"politically correct" types, feminists, gay and disability activists, =
animal rights activists and the like. But=20
not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is a leftist. =
What we are trying to get at in=20
discussing leftism is not so much a movement or an ideology as a =
psychological type, or rather a collection=20
of related types. Thus, what we mean by "leftism" will emerge more clearly =
in the course of our discussion=20
of leftist psychology (Also, see paragraphs 227-230.)=20

8. Even so, our conception of leftism will remain a good deal less clear =
than we would wish, but there=20
doesn't seem to be any remedy for this. All we are trying to do is indicate =
in a rough and approximate way=20
the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the main driving force =
of modern leftism. We by no=20
means claim to be telling the WHOLE truth about leftist psychology. Also, =
our discussion is meant to=20
apply to modern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to =
which our discussion could be=20
applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th century.=20

9. The two psychological tendencies that underlie modern leftism we call =
"feelings of inferiority" and=20
"oversocialization." Feelings of inferiority are characteristic of modern =
leftism as a whole, while=20
oversocialization is characteristic only of a certain segment of modern =
leftism; but this segment is highly=20
influential.=20

FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY

10. By "feelings of inferiority" we mean not only inferiority feelings in =
the strictest sense but a whole=20
spectrum of related traits: low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, =
depressive tendencies, defeatism,=20
guilt, self-hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have such =
feelings (possibly more or less=20
repressed) and that these feelings are decisive in determining the =
direction of modern leftism.=20

11. When someone interprets as derogatory almost anything that is said =
about him (or about groups with=20
whom he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low =
self-esteem. This tendency is=20
pronounced among minority rights advocates, whether or not they belong to =
the minority groups whose=20
rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the words used to =
designate minorities. The terms=20
"negro," "oriental," "handicapped" or "chick" for an African, an Asian, a =
disabled person or a woman=20
originally had no derogatory connotation. "Broad" and "chick" were merely =
the feminine equivalents of=20
"guy," "dude" or "fellow." The negative connotations have been attached to =
these terms by the activists=20
themselves. Some animal rights advocates have gone so far as to reject the =
word "pet" and=20
insist on its replacement by "animal companion." Leftist anthropologists go =
to great lengths to avoid saying=20
anything about primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as =
negative. They want to replace=20
the word "primitive" by "nonliterate." They seem almost paranoid about =
anything that might suggest that=20
any primitive culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that =
primitive cultures ARE inferior=20
to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish =
anthropologists.)=20

12. Those who are most sensitive about "politically incorrect" terminology =
are not the average black=20
ghetto-dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a =
minority of activists, many of=20
whom do not even belong to any "oppressed" group but come from privileged =
strata of society. Political=20
correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have secure =
employment with comfortable=20
salaries, and the majority of whom are heterosexual, white males from =
middle-class families.=20

13. Many leftists have an intense identification with the problems of =
groups that have an image of being=20
weak (women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals), or =
otherwise inferior. The leftists=20
themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They would never admit it =
to themselves that they have such=20
feelings, but it is precisely because they do see these groups as inferior =
that they identify with their=20
problems. (We do not suggest that women, Indians, etc., ARE inferior; we =
are only making a point about=20
leftist psychology).=20

14. Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that women are as strong as =
capable as men. Clearly they=20
are nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men. =


15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image of being strong, good =
and successful. They hate=20
America, they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they hate =
rationality. The reasons that=20
leftists give for hating the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with =
their real motives. They SAY they hate=20
the West because it is warlike, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so =
forth, but where these same faults=20
appear in socialist countries or in primitive cultures, the leftist finds =
excuses for them, or at best he=20
GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whereas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out =
(and often greatly=20
exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western civilization. Thus =
it is clear that these faults are not=20
the leftist's real motive for hating America and the West.
 He hates America and the West because they are strong and successful. =


16. Words like "self-confidence," "self-reliance," "initiative", =
"enterprise," "optimism," etc. play little role=20
in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, =
pro-collectivist. He wants society to=20
solve everyone's needs for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of =
person who has an inner sense of=20
confidence in his own ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own =
needs. The leftist is=20
antagonistic to the concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels =
like a loser.=20

17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftist intellectuals tend to focus on =
sordidness, defeat and despair, or=20
else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there =
were no hope of accomplishing=20
anything through rational calculation and all that was left was to immerse =
oneself in the sensations of the=20
moment.=20

18. Modern leftist philosophers tend to dismiss reason, science, objective =
reality and to insist that=20
everything is culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious =
questions about the foundations of=20
scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of objective =
reality can be defined. But it is=20
obvious that modern leftist philosophers are not simply cool-headed =
logicians systematically analyzing the=20
foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their =
attack on truth and reality. They=20
attack these concepts because of their own psychological needs. For one =
thing, their attack is an outlet for=20
hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive =
for power. More importantly, the leftist=20
hates science and rationality because=20
they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and =
other beliefs as false (i.e. failed, inferior).=20
The leftist's feelings of inferiority run so deep that he cannot tolerate =
any classification of some things as=20
successful or superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also =
underlies the rejection by many=20
leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of IQ tests. =
Leftists are antagonistic to genetic=20
explanations of human abilities or behavior because such explanations tend =
to make some persons appear=20
superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit =
or blame for an individual's ability or=20
lack of it. Thus if a person is "inferior" it is not his fault, but =
society's, because he has not been brought up=20
properly.=20

19. The leftist is not typically the kind of person whose feelings of =
inferiority make him a braggart, an=20
egotist, a bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of =
person has not wholly lost faith in=20
himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can =
still conceive of himself as having=20
the capacity to be strong, and his efforts to make himself strong produce =
his unpleasant behavior. [1] But=20
the leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so =
ingrained that he cannot conceive of=20
himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence the collectivism of the =
leftist. He can feel strong only as=20
a member of a large organization or a mass movement with which he =
identifies himself.=20

20. Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics. Leftists protest by =
lying down in front of vehicles,=20
they intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These =
tactics may often be effective, but=20
many leftists use them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER =
masochistic tactics. Self-hatred=20
is a leftist trait.=20

21. Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated by compassion or by =
moral principle, and moral=20
principle does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But =
compassion and moral principle=20
cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent =
a component of leftist behavior;=20
so is the drive for power. Moreover, much leftist behavior is not =
rationally calculated to be of benefit to the=20
people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one =
believes that affirmative action is=20
good for black people, does it make sense to demand affirmative action in =
hostile or dogmatic terms?=20
Obviously it would be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory =
approach that would make at=20
least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that =

affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not =
take such an approach because it=20
would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black people is not their =
real goal. Instead, race problems=20
serve as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated =
need for power. In doing so they=20
actually harm black people, because the activists' hostile attitude toward =
the white majority tends to=20
intensify race hatred.=20

22. If our society had no social problems at all, the leftists would have =
to INVENT problems in order to=20
provide themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.=20

23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend to be an accurate =
description of everyone who might=20
be considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general =
tendency of leftism.=20

OVERSOCIALIZATION

24. Psychologists use the term "socialization" to designate the process by =
which children are trained to=20
think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if =
he believes in and obeys the=20
moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that =
society. It may seem senseless to say=20
that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a =
rebel. Nevertheless, the position can=20
be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.=20

25. The moral code of our society is so demanding that no one can think, =
feel and act in a completely moral=20
way. For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet almost everyone =
hates somebody at some time=20
or other, whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are so highly =
socialized that the attempt to=20
think, feel and act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order to =
avoid feelings of guilt, they=20
continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find =
moral explanations for feelings=20
and actions that in reality have a non-moral origin. We use the term =
"oversocialized" to describe such=20
people. [2]=20

26. Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a sense of =
powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of=20
the most important means by which our society socializes children is by =
making them feel ashamed of=20
behavior or speech that is contrary to society's expectations. If this is =
overdone, or if a particular child is=20
especially susceptible to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of =
HIMSELF. Moreover the thought=20
and the behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by =
society's expectations than are those of=20
the lightly socialized person. The majority of people engage in a =
significant amount of naughty behavior.=20
They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off =
at work, they hate someone, they=20
say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get ahead of the =

other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if he does =
do them he generates in himself=20
a sense of shame and self-hatred. The oversocialized person cannot even =
experience, without guilt,=20
thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot =
think "unclean" thoughts. And=20
socialization is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to =
confirm to many norms of behavior that=20
do not fall under the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person =
is kept on a psychological leash=20
and spends his life running on rails that society has laid down for him. In =
many oversocialized people this=20
results in a sense of constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe =
hardship. We suggest that=20
oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings =
inflict on one another.=20

27. We argue that a very important and influential segment of the modern =
left is oversocialized and that=20
their oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction =
of modern leftism. Leftists of the=20
oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the upper-middle =
class. Notice that university=20
intellectuals (3) constitute the most highly socialized segment of our =
society and also the most left-wing=20
segment.=20

28. The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his =
psychological leash and assert his autonomy by=20
rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most =
basic values of society. Generally=20
speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict with the =
accepted morality. On the contrary, the=20
left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then =
accuses mainstream society of=20
violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, =
helping poor people, peace as=20
opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to =
animals. More fundamentally,=20
the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take =
care of the individual. All these=20
have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle =
and=20
upper classes (4) for a long time. These values are explicitly or =
implicitly expressed or presupposed in most=20
of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and =
the educational system.=20
Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel =
against these principles but justify=20
their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that =
society is not living up to these=20
principles.=20

29. Here is an illustration of the way in which the oversocialized leftist =
shows his real attachment to the=20
conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion =
against it. Many leftists push for=20
affirmative action, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for =
improved education in black=20
schools and more money for such schools; the way of life of the black =
"underclass" they regard as a social=20
disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system, make him a =
business executive, a lawyer, a=20
scientist just like upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will =
reply that the last thing they want is to=20
make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they want to =
preserve African American culture.=20
But in what does this preservation of African American culture consist? =

It can hardly consist in anything more than eating black-style food, =
listening to black-style music, wearing=20
black-style clothing and going to a black-style church or mosque. In other =
words, it can express itself only=20
in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects more leftists of the =
oversocialized type want to make the=20
black man conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him =
study technical subjects, become=20
an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to =
prove that black people are as good=20
as white. They want to make black fathers "responsible." they want black =
gangs to become nonviolent, etc.=20
But these are exactly the values of the industrial-technological system. =
The system couldn't care less what=20
kind of music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what =

religion he believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a =
respectable job, climbs the status ladder, is a=20
"responsible" parent, is nonviolent and so forth. In effect, however much =
he may deny it, the oversocialized=20
leftist wants to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt =
its values.=20

30. We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the oversocialized =
type, NEVER rebel against the=20
fundamental values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some =
oversocialized leftists have gone so=20
far as to rebel against one of modern society's most important principles =
by engaging in physical violence.=20
By their own account, violence is for them a form of "liberation." In other =
words, by committing violence=20
they break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into =
them. Because they are=20
oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for them than for =
others; hence their need to break=20
free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion in terms of =
mainstream values. If they engage in=20
violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.=20

31. We realize that many objections could be raised to the foregoing =
thumb-nail sketch of leftist=20
psychology. The real situation is complex, and anything like a complete =
description of it would take=20
several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to =
have indicated very roughly=20
the two most important tendencies in the psychology of modern leftism. =


32. The problems of the leftist are indicative of the problems of our =
society as a whole. Low self-esteem,=20
depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though =
they are especially noticeable in=20
the left, they are widespread in our society. And today's society tries to =
socialize us to a greater extent than=20
any previous society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to =
exercise, how to make love, how to=20
raise our kids and so forth.=20

THE POWER PROCESS

33. Human beings have a need (probably based in biology) for something that =
we will call the "power=20
process." This is closely related to the need for power (which is widely =
recognized) but is not quite the=20
same thing. The power process has four elem ents. The three most clear-cut =
of these we call goal, effort=20
and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment =
requires effort, and needs to=20
succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is =
more difficult to define and may not=20
be necessary for everyone . We call it autonomy and will discuss it l ater =
(paragraphs 42-44).=20

34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can have anything he wants =
just by wishing for it. Such a=20
man has power, but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first =
he will have a lot of fun, but=20
by and by he will become acutely bor ed and demoralized. Eventually he may =
becom e clinically=20
depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies tend to become =
decadent. This is not true of fighting=20
aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, =
secure aristocracies that have no=20
need to exert themselve s usually become bored, hedonistic and demor =
alized, even though they have=20
power. This shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward =
which to exercise one's power.=20

35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the physical necessities =
of life: food, water and whatever=20
clothing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured =
aristocrat obtains these things=20
without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.=20

36. Nonattainment of important goals results in death if the goals are =
physical necessities, and in frustration=20
if nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent =
failure to attain goals throughout life=20
results in defeatism, low se lf-esteem or depression.=20

37. Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being =
needs goals whose attainment=20
requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining =
his goals.=20

SURROGATE ACTIVITIES

38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and demoralized. For =
example, the emperor Hirohito,=20
instead of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine =
biology, a field in which he became=20
distinguished. When people do not have t o exert themselves to satisfy =
their physical needs they often set=20
up artificial goals for themselves. In many cases they then pursue these =
goals with the same energy and=20
emotional involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search =
for physical necessities. Thus the=20
aristocrats of the Roman Empire had their literary pretentions; many =
European aristocrats a few centuries=20
ago invested tremendous time and energy in hunting, though they certainly =
didn't need the meat; other=20
aristocracies have competed for status through elaborate displays of =
wealth;=20
and a few aristocrats, like Hiroh ito, have turned to science.=20

39. We use the term "surrogate activity" to designate an activity that is =
directed toward an artificial goal=20
that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work =
toward, or let us say, merely=20
for the sake of the "fulfillment" th at they get from pursuing the goal. =
Here is a rule of thumb for the=20
identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much =
time and energy to the pursuit of=20
goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote most of his time and energy =
to satisfying his biological needs,=20
and if that effort required him to use his physical and mental facilities =
in a varied and interesting way,=20
would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain goal X? If the =
answer is no, then the person's=20
pursuit of a goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito's studies=20
in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity, since it is =
pretty certain that if Hirohito had had=20
to spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to =
obtain the necessities of life, he=20
would not have felt deprived because he didn't know all about the anatomy =
and life-cycles of marine=20
animals. On the other hand the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not =
a surrogate activity, because=20
most people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would =
feel deprived if they passed their=20
lives without ever having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex. =
(But pursuit of an excessive=20
amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.) =


40. In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to =
satisfy one's physical needs. It is=20
enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical =
skill, then come to work on time=20
and exert very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements =
are a moderate amount of=20
intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society =
takes care of one from cradle=20
to grave. (Yes, there is an underclass that cannot take physical =
necessities for granted, but we are speaking=20
here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern society =
is full of surrogate activities.=20
These include scientific work, athletic achievement, humanitarian work, =
artistic and literary creation,=20
climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far =

beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical =
satisfaction, and social activism when=20
it addresses issues that are not important for the activist personally, as =
in the case of white activists who=20
work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always pure =
surrogate activities, since for many=20
people they may be motivated in part by needs other than the need to have =
some goal to pursue. Scientific=20
work may be motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by =
a need to express feelings,=20
militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them, =
these activities are in large part=20
surrogate activities. For example, the majority of scientists will probably =
agree that the "fulfillment" they=20
get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they =
earn.=20

41. For many if not most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying =
than the pursuit of real goals ( that=20
is, goals that people would want to attain even if their need for the power =
process were already fulfilled).=20
One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who =
are deeply involved in surrogate=20
activities are never satisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker =
constantly strives for more and more=20
wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the =
next. The long-distance runner=20
drives himself to run always farther and faster. Many people who pursue =
surrogate activities will say that=20
they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from the =
"mundane" business of satisfying=20
their biological needs, but that it is because in our society the effort =

needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More =
importantly, in our society=20
people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by =
functioning as parts of an immense=20
social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy =
in pursuing their surrogate=20
activities. have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate =
activities.=20

AUTONOMY

42. Autonomy as a part of the power process may not be necessary for every =
individual. But most people=20
need a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. =
Their efforts must be=20
undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction =
and control. Yet most people do=20
not have to exert this initiative, direction and control as single =
individuals. It is usually enough to act as a=20
member of a SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among =
themselves and make a=20
successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power =
process will be served. But if they work=20
under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for =
autonomous decision and=20
initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served. =

The same is true when decisions are made on a collective bases if the group =
making the collective decision=20
is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant [5]=20

43. It is true that some individuals seem to have little need for autonomy. =
Either their drive for power is=20
weak or they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful =
organization to which they belong.=20
And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be satisfied with a =
purely physical sense of=20
power(the good combat soldier, who gets his sense of power by developing =
fighting skills that he is quite=20
content to use in blind obedience to his superiors).=20

44. But for most people it is through the power process-having a goal, =
making an AUTONOMOUS effort=20
and attaining t the goal-that self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of =
power are acquired. When one does=20
not have adequate opportunity to go throughout the power process the =
consequences are (depending on the=20
individual and on the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, =
demoralization, low self-esteem,=20
inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, =
hostility, spouse or child abuse,=20
insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating =
disorders, etc. [6]=20

SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

45. Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur in any society, but in modern =
industrial society they are=20
present on a massive scale. We aren't the first to mention that the world =
today seems to be going crazy.=20
This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good reason =
to believe that primitive man=20
suffered from less stress and frustration and was better satisfied with his =
way of life than modern man is. It=20
is true that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse =
of women and common among the=20
Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among some of the =
American Indian tribes. But is=20
does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the kinds of problems that we have =
listed in the preceding=20
paragraph were far less common among primitive peoples than they are in =
modern society.=20

46. We attribute the social and psychological problems of modern society to =
the fact that that society=20
requires people to live under conditions radically different from those =
under which the human race evolved=20
and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that the =
human race developed while=20
living under the earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already =
written that we consider lack of=20
opportunity to properly experience the power process as the most important =
of the abnormal conditions to=20
which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one. Before =
dealing with disruption of the=20
power process as a source of social problems we will discuss some of the =
other sources.=20

47. Among the abnormal conditions present in modern industrial society are =
excessive density of=20
population, isolation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social =
change and the break-down of natural=20
small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the =
tribe.=20

48. It is well known that crowding increases stress and aggression. The =
degree of crowding that exists=20
today and the isolation of man from nature are consequences of =
technological progress. All pre-industrial=20
societies were predominantly rural. The industrial Revolution vastly =
increased the size of cities and the=20
proportion of the population that lives in them, and modern agricultural =
technology has made it possible for=20
the Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. =
(Also, technology exacerbates the=20
effects of crowding because it puts increased disruptive powers in people's =
hands. For example, a variety of=20
noise-making devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of =
these devices is unrestricted,=20
people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise.=20
If their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by =
the regulations... But if these=20
machines had never been invented there would have been no conflict and no =
frustration generated by=20
them.)=20

49. For primitive societies the natural world (which usually changes only =
slowly) provided a stable=20
framework and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it is =
human society that dominates nature=20
rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very rapidly =
owing to technological change.=20
Thus there is no stable framework.=20

50. The conservatives are fools: They whine about the decay of traditional =
values, yet they enthusiastically=20
support technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never =
occurs to them that you can't=20
make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a society =
with out causing rapid changes=20
in all other aspects of the society as well, and that such rapid changes =
inevitably break down traditional=20
values.=20

51.The breakdown of traditional values to some extent implies the breakdown =
of the bonds that hold=20
together traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration of =
small-scale social groups is also=20
promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt =
individuals to move to new locations,=20
separating themselves from their communities. Beyond that, a technological =
society HAS TO weaken=20
family ties and local communities if it is to function efficiently. In =
modern society an individual's loyalty=20
must be first to the system and only secondarily to a small-scale =
community, because if the internal=20
loyalties of small-scale small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty =
to the system, such=20
communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system. =


52. Suppose that a public official or a corporation executive appoints his =
cousin, his friend or his co-
religionist to a position rather than appointing the person best qualified =
for the job. He has permitted=20
personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is =
"nepotism" or "discrimination," both of=20
which are terrible sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies =
that have done a poor job of=20
subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are =
usually very inefficient. (Look at Latin=20
America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can tolerate only those =
small-scale communities that are=20
emasculated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]=20

53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of communities have been =
widely recognized as sources of=20
social problems. but we do not believe they are enough to account for the =
extent of the problems that are=20
seen today.=20

54. A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crowded, yet their =
inhabitants do not seem to have=20
suffered from psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In =
America today there still are=20
uncrowded rural areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban =
areas, though the problems tend to=20
be less acute in the rural areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the =
decisive factor.=20

55. On the growing edge of the American frontier during the 19th century, =
the mobility of the population=20
probably broke down extended families and small-scale social groups to at =
least the same extent as these=20
are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by choice in =
such isolation, having no=20
neighbors within several miles, that they belonged to no community at all, =
yet they do not seem to have=20
developed problems as a result.=20

56.Furthermore, change in American frontier society was very rapid and =
deep. A man might be born and=20
raised in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and fed largely =
on wild meat; and by the time he=20
arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in an =
ordered community with effective=20
law enforcement. This was a deeper change that that which typically occurs =
in the life of a modern=20
individual, yet it does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In =
fact, 19th century American=20
society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that of =
today's society. [8]=20

57. The difference, we argue, is that modern man has the sense (largely =
justified) that change is IMPOSED=20
on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely =
justified) that he created change=20
himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of =
his own choosing and made it into=20
a farm through his own effort. In those days an entire county might have =
only a couple of hundred=20
inhabitants and was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern =
county is. Hence the pioneer=20
farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the creation =
of a new, ordered community.=20
One may well question whether the creation of this community was an =
improvement, but at any rate it=20
satisfied the pioneer's need for the power process.=20

58. It would be possible to give other examples of societies in which there =
has been rapid change and/or=20
lack of close community ties without he kind of massive behavioral =
aberration that is seen in today's=20
industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social and =
psychological problems in=20
modern society is the fact that people have insufficient opportunity to go =
through the power process in a=20
normal way. We don't mean to say that modern society is the only one in =
which the power process has been=20
disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have interfered =
with the power ' process to a greater or=20
lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the problem has become =
particularly acute. Leftism, at least=20
in its recent=20
(mid-to-late -20th century) form, is in part a symptom of deprivation with =
respect to the power process.=20

DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY

59. We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those drives that can be =
satisfied with minimal effort; (2)=20
those that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) =
those that cannot be adequately satisfied=20
no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is the process of =
satisfying the drives of the=20
second group. The more drives there are in the third group, the more there =
is frustration, anger, eventually=20
defeatism, depression, etc.=20

60. In modern industrial society natural human drives tend to be pushed =
into the first and third groups, and=20
the second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created =
drives.=20

61. In primitive societies, physical necessities generally fall into group =
2: They can be obtained, but only at=20
the cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the =
physical necessities to everyone [9] in=20
exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed into =
group 1. (There may be=20
disagreement about whether the effort needed to hold a job is "minimal"; =
but usually, in lower- to middle-
level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of obedience. You =
sit or stand where you are told to sit=20
or stand and do what you are told to do in the way you are told to do it. =
Seldom do you have to exert=20
yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, =
so that the need for the power=20
process is not well served.)=20

62. Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often remain in group 2 in =
modern society, depending on the=20
situation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a =
particularly strong drive for status, the=20
effort required to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy =
adequately the need for the power process.=20

63. So certain artificial needs have been created that fall into group 2, =
hence serve the need for the power=20
process. Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make =
many people feel they need=20
things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It =
requires serious effort to earn enough=20
money to satisfy these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But =
see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern=20
man must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of =
the artificial needs created by=20
the advertising and marketing industry [11], and through surrogate =
activities.=20

64. It seems that for many people, maybe the majority, these artificial =
forms of the power process are=20
insufficient. A theme that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social =
critics of the second half of the=20
20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in =
modern society. (This=20
purposelessness is often called by other names such as "anomic" or =
"middle-class vacuity.") We suggest=20
that the so-called "identity crisis" is actually a search for a sense of =
purpose, often for commitment to a=20
suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism is in large part =
a response to the purposelessness of=20
modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for =
"fulfillment." But we think that for=20
the majority of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment=20
(that is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satisfactory =
fulfillment. In other words, it does not=20
fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need =
can be fully satisfied only=20
through activities that have some external goal, such as physical =
necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.=20

65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning money, climbing the =
status ladder or functioning=20
as part of the system in some other way, most people are not in a position =
to pursue their goals=20
AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else's employee as, as we pointed =
out in paragraph 61,=20
must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way they are =
told to do it. Even most people=20
who are in business for themselves have only limited autonomy. It is a =
chronic complaint of small-business=20
persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government =
regulation. Some of these=20
regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part government =
regulations are essential and=20
inevitable parts of our extremely complex society. A large portion of small =
business today operates on the=20
franchise system.=20
It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that many of the =
franchise-granting companies=20
require applicants for franchises to take a personality test that is =
designed to EXCLUDE those who have=20
creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile =
to go along obediently with the=20
franchise system. This excludes from small business many of the people who =
most need autonomy.=20

66. Today people live more by virtue of what the system does FOR them or TO =
them than by virtue of=20
what they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more =
and more along channels laid=20
down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system =
provides, the opportunities must be=20
exploited in accord with the rules and regulations [13], and techniques =
prescribed by experts must be=20
followed if there is to be a chance of success.=20

67. Thus the power process is disrupted in our society through a deficiency =
of real goals and a deficiency=20
of autonomy in pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those =
human drives that fall into group=20
3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how much effort =
one makes. One of these drives=20
is the need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by other =
people; we have no control over these=20
decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. ("We =
live in a world in which=20
relatively few people - maybe 500 or 1,00 - make the important decisions" - =
Philip B. Heymann of Harvard=20
Law School, quoted by Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our =
lives depend on whether=20
safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained;=20
on how much pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution =
into our air; on how skillful=20
(or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job may depend on =
decisions made by government=20
economists or corporation executives; and so forth. Most individuals are =
not in a position to secure=20
themselves against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The =
individual's search for security is=20
therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of powerlessness.=20

68. It may be objected that primitive man is physically less secure than =
modern man, as is shown by his=20
shorter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than =
the amount of insecurity that is=20
normal for human beings. but psychological security does not closely =
correspond with physical security.=20
What makes us FEEL secure is not so much objective security as a sense of =
confidence in our ability to=20
take care of ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by =
hunger, can fight in self-defense=20
or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in these =
efforts, but he is by no means helpless=20
against the things that threaten him. The modern individual on the other =
hand is threatened by many things=20
against which he is helpless;=20
nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, =
increasing taxes, invasion of his=20
privacy by large organizations, nation-wide social or economic phenomena =
that may disrupt his way of=20
life.=20

69. It is true that primitive man is powerless against some of the things =
that threaten him; disease for=20
example. But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the =
nature of things, it is no one's fault,=20
unless is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the =
modern individual tend to be=20
MAN-MADE. They are not the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by =
other persons whose=20
decisions he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he =
feels frustrated, humiliated and=20
angry.=20

70. Thus primitive man for the most part has his security in his own hands =
(either as an individual or as a=20
member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands =
of persons or=20
organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able =
personally to influence them. So modern=20
man's drive for security tends to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas =
(food, shelter, etc.) his security is=20
assured at the cost of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he =
CANNOT attain security. (The foregoing=20
greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a rough, =
general way how the condition of=20
modern man differs from that of primitive man.)=20

71. People have many transitory drives or impulses that are necessary =
frustrated in modern life, hence fall=20
into group 3. One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit =
fighting. In many situations it=20
does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one may be in =
a hurry, or one may be in a=20
mood to travel slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with the =
flow of traffic and obey the=20
traffic signals. One may want to do one's work in a different way, but =
usually one can work only according=20
to the rules laid down by one's employer. In many other ways as well, =
modern man is strapped down by a=20
network of rules and regulations (explicit or implicit) that frustrate many =
of his impulses and thus interfere=20
with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be disposed with, =

because the are necessary for the functioning of industrial society. =


72. Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters =
that are irrelevant to the=20
functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can =
believe in any religion we like (as=20
long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We =
can go to bed with anyone we=20
like (as long as we practice "safe sex"). We can do anything we like as =
long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But=20
in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our =
behavior.=20

73. Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by =
the government. Control is often=20
exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or =
manipulation, and by=20
organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most =
large organizations use some=20
form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. =
Propaganda is not limited to=20
"commercials" and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously =
intended as propaganda by=20
the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment =
programming is a powerful form of=20
propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we =
have to go to work every day=20
and follow our employer's orders. Legally there is=20
nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people =
or from going into business for=20
ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and =
there is room in the economy for only a=20
limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only =
as someone else's employee.=20

74. We suggest that modern man's obsession with longevity, and with =
maintaining physical vigor and=20
sexual attractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment =
resulting from deprivation with=20
respect to the power process. The "mid-life crisis" also is such a symptom. =
So is the lack of interest in=20
having children that is fairly common in modern society but almost =
unheard-of in primitive societies.=20

75. In primitive societies life is a succession of stages. The needs and =
purposes of one stage having been=20
fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next =
stage. A young man goes through the=20
power process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for =
fulfillment but to get meat that is=20
necessary for food. (In young women the process is more complex, with =
greater emphasis on social power;=20
we won't discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed =
through, the young man has no=20
reluctance about settling down to the responsibilities of raising a family. =
(In contrast, some modern people=20
indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking =
some kind of "fulfillment." We=20
suggest that the=20
fulfillment they need is adequate experience of the power process -- with =
real goals instead of the artificial=20
goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised his =
children, going through the power=20
process by providing them with the physi cal necessities, the primitive man =
feels tha t his work is done and=20
he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many =
modern people, on the other=20
hand, are disturbed by the prospect of death, as is shown by the amount of =
effort they expend trying to=20
maintain their physical condition, appearance and health. We argue t hat =
this is due to unfulfillment=20
resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to =
any use, have never gone through=20
the power process using their bodies in a serious way.=20
It is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical =
purposes, who fears the deteriora tion=20
of age, but the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his body =
beyond walking from his car to=20
his house. It is the man whose need for the power process has been =
satisfied during his life who is best=20
prepared to accept the end of that life .=20

76. In response to the arguments of this section someone will say, "Society =
must find a way to give people=20
the opportunity to go through the power process." For such people the value =
of the opportunity is destroyed=20
by the very fact that society gives i t to them. What they need is to find =
or make their own opportunities. As=20
long as the system GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a =
leash. To attain autonomy they=20
must get off that leash. Manifesto Contents=20



HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST

77. Not everyone in industrial-technological society suffers from =
psychological problems. Some people=20
even profess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss =
some of the reasons why people=20
differ so greatly in their response to modern society.=20

78. First, there doubtless are differences in the strength of the drive for =
power. Individuals with a weak=20
drive for power may have relatively little need to go through the power =
process, or at least relatively little=20
need for autonomy in the power pro cess. These are docile types who would =
have been happy as plantation=20
darkies in the Old South. (We don't mean to sneer at "plantation darkies" =
of the Old South. To their credit,=20
most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at =
people who ARE content with=20
servitude.)=20

79. Some people may have some exceptional drive, in pursuing which they =
satisfy their need for the power=20
process. For example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social =
status may spend their whole=20
lives climbing the status ladder without ev er getting bored with that =
game.=20

80. People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
techniques. Some people are so=20
susceptible that, even if they make a great deal of money, they cannot =
satisfy their constant craving for the=20
shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So =
they always f eel hard-pressed=20
financially even if their income is large, and their cravings are =
frustrated.=20

81. Some people have low susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
techniques. These are the people=20
who aren't interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their =
need for the power process.=20

82. People who have medium susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
techniques are able to earn=20
enough money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but only at =
the cost of serious effort (putting=20
in overtime, taking a second job, earning p romotions, etc.) Thus material =
acquisition s erves their need for=20
the power process. But it does not necessarily follow that their need is =
fully satisfied. They may have=20
insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of =
following orders) and some of their=20
drives may be frustrated (e.g., security, aggression). (We are guilt y of =
oversimplification in paragraphs 80-
82 because we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is =
entirely a creation of the advertising=20
and marketing industry. Of course it's not that simple.=20

83. Some people partly satisfy their need for power by identifying =
themselves with a powerful organization=20
or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or =
an organization, adopts its=20
goals as his own, then works toward these goals. When some of the goals are =
attained, the individual, even=20
though his personal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the =
attainment of the goals, feels=20
(through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had =
gone through the power=20
process. This phenomenon was e xploited by the fascists, nazis and communis =
ts. Our society uses it, too,=20
though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the U.S. =
(goal: punish Noriega). The U.S.=20
invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attainment of goal).=20
The U.S. went through the power process and many Ame ricans, because of =
their identification with the=20
U.S., experienced the power process vicariously. Hence the widespread =
public approval of the Panama=20
invasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the same phenomenon =
in armies, corporations,=20
political parties, humanitarian organizations, rel igious or ideological =
movements. In particul ar, leftist=20
movements tend to attract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for =
power. But for most people=20
identification with a large organization or a mass movement does not fully =
satisfy the need for power.=20

84. Another way in which people satisfy their need for the power process is =
through surrogate activities. As=20
we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity that is directed =
toward an artificial goal that the=20
individual pursues for the sake of t he "fulfillment" that he gets from =
pursuing the goal, not because he=20
needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is no practical motive =
for building enormous muscles,=20
hitting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage =
stamps. Yet many people in our=20
society devote t hemselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or stamp =
collecting. Some people are more=20
"other-directed" than others, and therefore will more readily attack =
importance to a surrogate activity=20
simply because the people around them treat it as important=20
or because society tells them it is important. T hat is why some people get =
very serious abou t essentially=20
trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly =
pursuits, whereas others who are=20
more clear-sighted never see these things as anything but the surrogate =
activities that they are, and=20
consequently never attach enou gh importance to them to satisfy their need =
for the power process in that=20
way. It only remains to point out that in many cases a person's way of =
earning a living is also a surrogate=20
activity. Not a PURE surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the =
activity is to gain the physical=20
necessitie s and (for some people) social status and th e luxuries that =
advertising makes them want. But=20
many people put into their=20
work far more effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status =
they require, and this extra effort=20
constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together with the =
emotional investment that accompanies=20
it, i s one of the most potent forces acting toward the continual =
development and perfecting of the system,=20
with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131). =
Especially, for the most creative=20
scientists and engineers, work tends to be large ly a surrogate activity. =
This point is so im portant that is=20
deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs =
87-92).=20

85. In this section we have explained how many people in modern society do =
satisfy their need for the=20
power process to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the =
majority of people the need for the=20
power process is not fully satisfied. In th e first place, those who have =
an insatiable drive for status, or who=20
get firmly "hooked" or a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly =
enough with a movement or=20
organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional =
personalities. Others are not fully=20
satisfied with surrogate activities or by identification with an org =
anization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the=20
second place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit =
regulation or through=20
socialization,=20
which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustration due to the =
impossibility of attaining cer tain=20
goals and the necessity of restraining too many impulses.=20

86. But even if most people in industrial-technological society were well =
satisfied, we (FC) would still be=20
opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider =
it demeaning to fulfill one's=20
need for the power process through surr ogate activities or through =
identification w ith an organization,=20
rather then through pursuit of real goals.=20

THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS

87. Science and technology provide the most important examples of surrogate =
activities. Some scientists=20
claim that they are motivated by "curiosity," that notion is simply absurd. =
Most scientists work on highly=20
specialized problem that are not the obje ct of any normal curiosity. For =
example, is an astronomer, a=20
mathematician or an entomologist curious about the properties of =
isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course=20
not. Only a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about =
it only because chemistry is his=20
surrogate activity. Is the c hemist curious about the appropriate classif =
ication of a new species of beetle?=20
No. That question is of interest only to the entomologist, and he is =
interested in it only because entomology=20
is his surrogate activity.=20
If the chemist and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to =
obtain th e physical necessities,=20
and if that effort e xercised their abilities in an interesting way but in =
some nonscientific pursuit, then they=20
couldn't giver a damn about isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification =
of beetles. Suppose that lack of=20
funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist t o become an =
insurance broker instead of a ch emist.=20
In that case he would have been very interested in insurance matters but =
would have cared nothing about=20
isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to put into the =
satisfaction of mere curiosity the=20
amount of time and effort that scient ists put into their work. The =
"curiosity" ex planation for the scientists'=20
motive just doesn't stand up.=20

88. The "benefit of humanity" explanation doesn't work any better. Some =
scientific work has no=20
conceivable relation to the welfare of the human race - most of archaeology =
or comparative linguistics for=20
example. Some other areas of science present obvio usly dangerous =
possibilities. Yet scientists in these=20
areas are just as enthusiastic about their work as those who develop =
vaccines or study air pollution.=20
Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional =
involvement in promoting nuclear=20
power plants. Did this involvement stem f rom a desire to benefit humanity? =
If so, the n why didn't Dr.=20
Teller get emotional about other "humanitarian" causes? If he was such a =
humanitarian then why did he=20
help to develop the H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, =

it is very much open to question whether nuclear power plants ac tually do =
benefit humanity. Does the=20
cheap e lectricity outweigh the accumulating waste and risk of accidents? =
Dr. Teller saw only one side of=20
the question. Clearly his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose =
not from a desire to "benefit=20
humanity" but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from =
seeing it put to practical use.=20

89. The same is true of scientists generally. With possible rare =
exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity=20
nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power =
process: to have a goal (a scientific=20
problem to solve), to make an eff ort (research) and to attain the goal =
(solut ion of the problem.) Science is=20
a surrogate activity because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment =
they get out of the work itself.=20

90. Of course, it's not that simple. Other motives do play a role for many =
scientists. Money and status for=20
example. Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable =
drive for status (see paragraph=20
79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt =
the majo rity of scientists, like=20
the majority of the general population, are more or less susceptible to =
advertising and marketing techniques=20
and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus =
science is not a PURE surrogate=20
activity. But it is in large part a surrogate activity.=20

91. Also, science and technology constitute a mass power movement, and many =
scientists gratify their need=20
for power through identification with this mass movement (see paragraph =
83).=20

92. Thus science marches on blindly, without regard to the real welfare of =
the human race or to any other=20
standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of =
the government officials and=20
corporation executives who provide the fu nds for research.=20

THE NATURE OF FREEDOM

93. We are going to argue that industrial-technological society cannot be =
reformed in such a way as to=20
prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But =
because "freedom" is a word=20
that can be interpreted in many ways, we must fi rst make clear what kind =
of freedom we are c oncerned=20
with.=20

94. By "freedom" we mean the opportunity to go through the power process, =
with real goals not the=20
artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, =
manipulation or supervision from anyone,=20
especially from any large organization. Freed om means being in control =
(either as an indi vidual or as a=20
member of a SMALL group) of the life-and-death issues of one's existence; =
food, clothing, shelter and=20
defense against whatever threats there may be in one's environment. Freedom =
means having power; not the=20
power to control other people but the power to control the circumstances of =
on e's own life. One does not=20
have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organization) has power =
over one, no matter how=20
benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. =

It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permissivene ss (see =
paragraph 72).=20

95. It is said that we live in a free society because we have a certain =
number of constitutionally guaranteed=20
rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal =
freedom that exists in a society=20
is determined more by the economi c and technological structure of the =
society than by its laws or its form=20
of government. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England were =
monarchies, and many of the cities=20
of the Italian Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading =
about these societies one gets the=20
impression that they allowed far more personal freedom than out society =
does. In part this was because=20
they lacked efficient mechanisms for enforcing the ruler's will: There were =
no modern, well-organized=20
police forces, no rapid long-distance communications,=20
no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of information abou t the lives of =
average citizens. Hence it wa s=20
relatively easy to evade control.=20

96. As for our constitutional rights, consider for example that of freedom =
of the press. We certainly don't=20
mean to knock that right: it is very important tool for limiting =
concentration of political power and for=20
keeping those who do have political po wer in line by publicly exposing any =
misbeha vior on their part.=20
But freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an =
individual. The mass media are=20
mostly under the control of large organizations that are integrated into =
the system. Anyone who has a little=20
money can have some thing printed, or can distribute it on the I nternet or =
in some such way, but what he=20
has to say will be swamped by the vast volume of material put out by the =
media, hence it will have no=20
practical effect.=20
To make an impression on society with words is therefore almost impossible =
for most individual s and=20
small groups. Take us (FC) for example . If we had never done anything =
violent and had submitted the=20
present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been =
accepted. If they had been accepted and=20
published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because =
it's more fun to watch the=20
entertainment put out by the me dia than to read a sober essay. Even if =
these writings had had many=20
readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read =
as their minds were flooded=20
by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our =
message before the public with=20
some chance of makin g a lasting impression, we've had to kill people. =


97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but they do not serve =
to guarantee much more than what=20
could be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the =
bourgeois conception, a "free" man=20
is essentially an element of a social ma chine and has only a certain set =
of prescrib ed and delimited=20
freedoms; freedoms that are designed to serve the needs of the social =
machine more than those of the=20
individual. Thus the bourgeois's "free" man has economic freedom because =
that promotes growth and=20
progress; he has freedom of the press b ecause public criticism restrains =
misbehavio r by political leaders;=20
he has a rights to a fair trial because imprisonment at the whim of the =
powerful would be bad for the=20
system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar.=20
To him, people deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress =
(progress as conceived by the=20
bourgeois). Ot her bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom =
as a mere means to collective=20
ends. Chester C. Tan, "Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century," =
page 202, explains the=20
philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: "An individual is granted =
rights because he is a=20
member of soc iety and his community life requires such rights. By =
community Hu meant the whole=20
society of the nation." And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum =
Chang (Chang Chun-mai,=20
head of the State Socialist Party in China) freedom had to be used in the =
interest of the state and of the=20
people as a whole. But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it =
only as someone else=20
prescribes?=20
FC's conception of freedom is not that of Bolivar, Hu, Chang or other =
bourgeois theorists. The trouble with=20
such theorists is that they have made the develop ment and application of =
social theories thei r surrogate=20
activity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the needs of the =
theorists more than the needs of=20
any people who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which the =
theories are imposed.=20

98. One more point to be made in this section: It should not be assumed =
that a person has enough freedom=20
just because he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by =
psychological control of which=20
people are unconscious, and moreover many peopl e's ideas of what =
constitutes freedom are go verned=20
more by social convention than by their real needs. For example, it's =
likely that many leftists of the=20
oversocialized type would say that most people, including themselves are =
socialized too little rather than=20
too much, yet the oversocialized lefti st pays a heavy psychological price =
for his high level of socialization.=20

SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY

99. Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic =
component that consists of=20
unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular =
component that consists of long-term=20
historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends. =


100. FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term =
historical trend, then the=20
effect of that change will almost always be transitory - the trend will =
soon revert to its original state.=20
(Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a =
society rarely has more than a=20
short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption =
creeps back in. The level of political=20
corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only =
slowly with the evolution of the=20
society. Normally, a p olitical cleanup will be permanent only if a =
ccompanied by widespread social=20
changes; a SMALL change in the society won't be enough.) If a small change =
in a long-term historical=20
trend appears to be permanent, i
t is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is =
already moving, s o that the trend is=20
not altered but only pus hed a step ahead.=20

101. The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable =
with respect to small changes, it=20
would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other =
words it would not be a long-
term trend at all.=20

102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to =
alter permanently a long-term=20
historical trend, than it will alter the society as a whole. In other =
words, a society is a system in which all=20
parts are interrelated, and you can't permanently change any important part =
witho ut change all the other=20
parts as well.=20

103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter =
permanently a long-term trend,=20
then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in =
advance. (Unless various other=20
societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the =
same consequenc es, in which=20
case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes =
through the same change will be=20
like to experience similar consequences.)=20

104. FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. =
That is, you cannot plan=20
out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to =
function as it was designed to.=20

105. The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human =
societies. A change in human=20
behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; =
the economy will affect the=20
environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the =
environment will affec t human=20
behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of =
causes and effects is far too=20
complex to be untangled and understood.=20

106. FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the =
form of their society.=20
Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under =
rational human control.=20

107. The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.=20

108. To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt =
at social reform either acts in the=20
direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely =
accelerates a change that would have=20
occurred in any case) or else it o nly has a transitory effect, so that the =
soc iety soon slips back into its old=20
groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any =
important aspect of a society,=20
reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not =
necessarily involve an armed=20
uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second p rinciple, a =
revolution never changes only one=20
aspect of a society; and by the third principle changes occur that were =
never expected or desired by the=20
revolutionaries.=20
By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind =
of society, it never works out as=20
planned.=20

109. The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The =
American "Revolution" was not a=20
revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by =
a rather far-reaching political=20
reform. The Founding Fathers did not change t he direction of development =
of American soci ety, nor did=20
they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society =
from the retarding effect of=20
British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but =
only pushed American political=20
culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of =
which A merican society was an off-
shoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative =
democracy. And prior to the War=20
of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant =

degree of representative democracy in the colonial ass emblies. The =
political system established by the=20
Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial =
assemblies. With major alteration, to=20
be sure - there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important =
step. But it was a step along the=20
road the English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that =
Britai n and all of its colonies that=20
were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with =
systems of representative=20
democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding =
Fathers had lost their nerve and=20
declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today =
would not have been significantly=20
different.=20
Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had =
a Parliament and Prime=20
Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the =
American Revolution provides not a=20
counterexample to our principles but a go od illustration of them.=20

110. Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They =
are expressed in imprecise=20
language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them =
can be found. So we present these=20
principles not as inviolable laws but as rule s of thumb, or guides to =
thinking, that may provide a partial=20
antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should =
be borne constantly in mind, and=20
whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should =
carefully reexamine one's thinking=20
and retain the conclusio n only if one has good, solid reasons for do ing =
so.=20

INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE REFORMED

111. The foregoing principles help to show how hopelessly difficult it =
would be to reform the industrial=20
system in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our =
sphere of freedom. There has been=20
a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolution for =
technology to strengthen the=20
system at a high cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence any =
change designed to protect=20
freedom from technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the =
development of our society.=20

Consequently, such a change either would be a transitory one -- soon =
swamped by the tide of history -- or,=20
if large enough to be permanent would alter the nature of our whole =
society. This by the first and second=20
principles. Moreover, since society wo uld be altered in a way that could =
not be pr edicted in advance (third=20
principle) there would be great risk. Changes large enough to make a =
lasting difference in favor of freedom=20
would not be initiated because it would realized that they would gravely =
disrupt the system. So any=20
attempts at reform w ould be too timid to be effective. Even if c hanges =
large enough to make a lasting=20
difference were initiated, they would be retracted when their disruptive =
effects became apparent. Thus,=20
permanent changes=20
in favor of freedom could be brought about only by persons prepared to =
accept radical, dangero us and=20
unpredictable alteration of the entir e system. In other words, by =
revolutionaries, not reformers.=20

112. People anxious to rescue freedom without sacrificing the supposed =
benefits of technology will suggest=20
naive schemes for some new form of society that would reconcile freedom =
with technology. Apart from the=20
fact that people who make suggestions sel dom propose any practical means =
by which the new form of=20
society could be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth =
principle that even if the new form of=20
society could be once established, it either would collapse or would give =
results very different from those=20
expected.=20

113. So even on very general grounds it seems highly improbably that any =
way of changing society could=20
be found that would reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next =
few sections we will give more=20
specific reasons for concluding that freedo m and technological progress =
are incompatibl e.=20



RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY



114. As explained in paragraph 65-67, 70-73, modern man is strapped down by =
a network of rules and=20
regulations, and his fate depends on the actions of persons remote from him =
whose decisions he cannot=20
influence. This is not accidental or a result of t he arbitrariness of =
arrogant bureaucrats. I t is necessary and=20
inevitable in any technologically advanced society. The system HAS TO =
regulate human behavior closely=20
in order to function. At work, people have to do what they are told to do, =
otherwise production would be=20
thrown into chaos. Bureaucra cies HAVE TO be run according to rigid rules . =
To allow any substantial=20
personal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt the system and =
lead to charges of unfairness=20
due to differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their =
discretion.=20
It is true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but =
GENERALLY S PEAKING the=20
regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for the =
functioning of industrial-technological=20
society. The result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the average =
person. It may be, however, that=20
formal regulations will ten d increasingly to be replaced by psychologic al =
tools that make us want to do=20
what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14], educational techniques, =
"mental health" programs, etc.)=20

115. The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways that are increasingly =
remote from the natural=20
pattern of human behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, =
mathematicians and engineers. It can't=20
function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in =
these fields. It isn't natural for an=20
adolescent human being to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk =
absorbed in study. A normal=20
adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. =
Among primitive peoples the=20
things that children are trained to do are in natural harmony with natural =
h uman impulses. Among the=20
American Indians, for example, boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits =
-- just the sort of things that=20
boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical =
subjects,=20
which most do grudgingly.=20

117. In any technologically advanced society the individual's fate MUST =
depend on decisions that he=20
personally cannot influence to any great extent. A technological society =
cannot be broken down into small,=20
autonomous communities, because production de pends on the cooperation of =
very large numbe rs of=20
people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of the =
affected individuals has, on the=20
average, only a one-millionth share in making the decision. What usually =
happens in practice is that=20
decisions are made by public officials or corporation executives, or by =
technical spe cialists, but even when=20
the public votes on a decision the number of voters ordinarily is too large =
for the vote of any one individual=20
to be significant. [17]=20
Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major =
decisions that affect their l ives. Their=20
is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. =
The system tries to "solve" this=20
problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have =
been made for them, but even=20
if this "solution" were completely successful in making people feel better, =
it would be demeaning.=20

118 Conservatives and some others advocate more "local autonomy." Local =
communities once did have=20
autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local =
communities become more=20
enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, =
computer networks, highway=20
syste ms, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. =
Also operating against=20
autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects =
people at other locations far=20
away. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contam inate the =
water supply hundreds of miles=20
dow nstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.=20

119. The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, =
it is human behavior that has to=20
be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the =
political or social ideology that=20
may pretend to guide the technolog ical system. It is the fault of =
technology, because the system is guided=20
not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does =
satisfy many human needs, but=20
generally speaking it does this only to the extent that it is to the =
advantage of the system to do it. It is the=20
needs of the system that are paramount, not those of the human being. For =
example, the system provides=20
people with food because the system couldn't function if everyone starved; =

it attends to people's psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do =
so, because it couldn't=20
function if too many people be came depressed or rebellious. But the system =
, for good, solid, practical=20
reasons, must exert constant pressure on people to mold their behavior to =
the needs of the system. Too=20
much waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system, =
environmentalists,=20
everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about recycling. Need mo re =
technical personnel? A=20
chorus of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask whether =
it is inhumane to force=20
adolescents to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them =
hate. When skilled workers are=20
put out of a job by tec hnical advances and have to undergo "retrain ing," =
no one asks=20
whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in this way. It is =
simply taken for granted that=20
everyone must bow to technical necessity and for good reason: If human =
needs were put before technical=20
necessity there would be econo mic problems, unemployment, shortages or wor =
se. The concept of "mental=20
health" in our society is defined largely by the extent to which an =
individual behaves in accord with the=20
needs of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.=20

120. Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and for autonomy within =
the system are no better than a=20
joke. For example, one company, instead of having each of its employees =
assemble only one section of a=20
catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalog ue, and this was supposed to =
give them a sen se of purpose=20
and achievement. Some companies have tried to give their employees more =
autonomy in their work, but for=20
practical reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, =
and in any case employees are=20
never given autonomy as to ultima te goals -- their "autonomous" efforts =
can n ever be directed toward=20
goals that they select personally, but only toward their employer's goals, =
such as the survival and growth of=20
the company. Any company would=20
soon go out of business if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. =
Similarly, in any enterprise within a=20
socialist system, worker s must direct their efforts toward the goals of =
the enterprise, otherwise the=20
enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the system. Once again, =
for purely technical reasons it is not=20
possible for most individuals or small groups to have much autono my in =
industrial society. Even the=20
small-bus iness owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the =
necessity of government=20
regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must fit into the economic =
system and conform to its=20
requirements. For instance, when someone develops a new technology , the =
small-business person often=20
has to use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain =
competitive.=20



THE 'BAD' PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'GOOD' =
PARTS



121. A further reason why industrial society cannot be reformed in favor of =
freedom is that modern=20
technology is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one =
another. You can't get rid of the=20
"bad" parts of technology and retain only the "g ood" parts. Take modern =
medicine, for exampl e. Progress=20
in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, =
computer science and other fields.=20
Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can =
be made available only by a=20
technologically progressive, econ omically rich society. Clearly you can't =
hav e much progress in medicine=20
without the whole technological system and everything that goes with it. =


122. Even if medical progress could be maintained without the rest of the =
technological system, it would by=20
itself bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is =
discovered. People with a genetic=20
tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as well as =
an yone else. Natural selection=20
against genes for diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout =
the population. (This may be=20
occurring to some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be =
controlled through the use of=20
insulin.) The s ame thing will happen with many other diseas es =
susceptibility to which is affected by=20
genetic degradation of the population. The only solution will be some sort =
of eugenics program or=20
extensive genetic engineering of human beings,=20
so that man in the future will no longer be a creation of nature, or of =
chance, or of God (depending on your=20
rel igious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.=20

123. If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, =
just wait till the government=20
starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such =
regulation will inevitably follow the=20
introduction of genetic engineering of hum an beings, because the =
consequences of unreg ulated genetic=20
engineering would be disastrous. [19]=20

124. The usual response to such concerns is to talk about "medical ethics." =
But a code of ethics would not=20
serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only =
make matters worse. A code of=20
ethics applicable to genetic engineering wo uld be in effect a means of =
regulating the g enetic constitution=20
of human beings. Somebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would =
decide that such and such=20
applications of genetic engineering were "ethical" and others were not, so =
that in effect they would be=20
imposing their own values on th e genetic constitution of the population at =
large. Even if a code of ethics=20
were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be =
imposing their own values on any=20
minorities who might have a=20
different idea of what constituted an "ethical" use of genetic engineering. =
The only code of e thics that=20
would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic =
engineering of human beings, and=20
you can be sure that no such code will ever be applied in a technological =
society. No code that reduced=20
genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for long, because the =
temptatio n presented by the=20
immense power of biotechn ology would be irresistible, especially since to =
the majority of people many of=20
its applications will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating =
physical and mental diseases,=20
giving people the abilities they need to get along in today's world). In =
evitably, genetic engineering will be=20
used e xtensively, but only in ways consistent with the needs of the =
industrial-technological system. [20]=20

TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR=20
FREEDOM

125. It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and =
freedom, because=20
technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually =
encroaches on freedom through=20
REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at =
the outset owns the same=20
amount of land, but one of whom is more powerful than the other. The =
powerful one demands a piece of=20
the other's land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, "OK, let's =
compromise. Give me half of=20
what I asked." The weak one has little choice but to give in. Some time =
later the powerful neighbor demand=20
s another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By =
forcing a long series of compromises=20
on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his land. So it =
goes in the conflict between=20
technology and freedom.=20

126. Let us explain why technology is a more powerful social force than the =
aspiration for freedom.=20

127. A technological advance that appears not to threaten freedom often =
turns out to threaten freedom often=20
turns out to threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider =
motorized transport. A walking man=20
formerly could go where he pleased, g o at his own pace without observing =
any traf fic regulations, and=20
was independent of technological support-systems. When motor vehicles were =
introduced they appeared to=20
increase man's freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no =
one had to have an=20
automobile if he didn't want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an =
automobile could travel much=20
faster than the walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport =
soon changed society in such a=20
way as to restrict greatly man's freedom of locomotion. When automobiles =
became numerous,=20
it became necessary to regulate their use e xtensively. In a car, =
especially in densely populated areas, one=20
cannot just go where one likes at one's own pace one's movement is governed =
by the flow of traffic and by=20
various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obligations: license =
requirements, driver test, renewing=20
registration, insuran ce, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments =
on purchase price. Moreover,=20
the use of motorized transport is no longer optional. Since the =
introduction of motorized transport the=20
arrangement of our cities has changed in such a way that the majority of =
people no longer live within=20
walking di stance of their place of employment, shoppin g areas and =
recreational opportunities, so that they=20
HAVE TO depend on the automobile for transportation.=20
Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they have even =
less control over their own=20
movement than when driving a car. Even the wal ker's freedom is now greatly =
restricted. In the city he=20
continually has to stop and wait for traffic lights that are designed =
mainly to serve auto traffic. In the=20
country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along the =
highway. (Note the important=20
point we have illustrated with t he case of motorized transport: When a new =
i tem of technology is=20
introduced as an option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, =
it does not necessarily REMAIN=20
optional. In many cases the new technology changes society in such a way =
that people eventually find=20
themselves FORCED to use i t.)=20

128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE continually narrows our sphere =
of freedom, each new=20
technical advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. =
Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid=20
long-distance communications . . . how could one argue against any of these =
things, or against any other of=20
the innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would =
have been absurd to resist the=20
introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and =
no disadvantages. Yet as we=20
explained in paragraphs 59-76, all th ese technical advances taken together =
have c reated world in which=20
the average man's fate is no longer in his own hands or in the hands of his =
neighbors and friends, but in=20
those of politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous =
technicians=20
and bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] =
The same process wi ll continue=20
in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few people will =
resist the introduction of a genetic=20
technique that eliminates a hereditary disease It does no apparent harm and =
prevents much suffering. Yet a=20
large number of genetic impr ovements taken together will make the human =
being into an engineered=20
product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or whatever, =
depending on your religious beliefs).=20

129 Another reason why technology is such a powerful social force is that, =
within the context of a given=20
society, technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never =
be reversed. Once a technical=20
innovation has been introduced, people us ually become dependent on it, =
unless it is r eplaced by some still=20
more advanced innovation. Not only do people become dependent as =
individuals on a new item of=20
technology, but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. =
(Imagine what would happen=20
to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.) Thus the =
system can move in only one=20
direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces =
freedom to take a step back --=20
short of the overthrow of the whole technological system.=20

130. Technology advances with great rapidity and threatens freedom at many =
different points at the same=20
time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals =
on large organizations,=20
propaganda and other psychological techniques, g enetic engineering, =
invasion of privacy thro ugh=20
surveillance devices and computers, etc.) To hold back any ONE of the =
threats to freedom would require a=20
long different social struggle. Those who want to protect freedom are =
overwhelmed by the sheer number of=20
new attacks and the rapidity with which t hey develop, hence they become =
pathetic and no longer resist. To=20
fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success can be hoped =
for only by fighting the=20
technological system as a whole; but that is revolution not reform. =


131. Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to describe all those =
who perform a specialized task=20
that requires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their =
surrogate activity) that when a conflict=20
arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost always decide =
in fa vor of their technical=20
work. This is obvious in the case of scientists, but it also appears =
elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian=20
groups, conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or =
other psychological techniques to=20
help them achieve thei r laudable ends. Corporations and government =
agencies, when they find it useful, do=20
not hesitate to collect information about individuals without regard to =
their privacy. Law enforcement=20
agencies are=20
frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects and =
often of completely innocent=20
persons, and they do whatever they can do l egally (or sometimes illegally) =
to restrict or circumvent those=20
rights. Most of these educators, government officials and law officers =
believe in freedom, privacy and=20
constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they =
usually feel that t heir work is more=20
important.=20

132. It is well known that people generally work better and more =
persistently when striving for a reward=20
than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists =
and other technicians are=20
motivated mainly by the rewards they get throu gh their work. But those who =
oppose technilo giccal=20
invasions of freedom are working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently =
there are a few who work=20
persistently and well at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved =
a signal victory that seemed to set=20
up a solid barrier against further e rosion of freedom through =
technological prog ress, most would tend to=20
relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits. But the =
scientists would remain busy in their=20
laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways,=20
in spite of any barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals =
and make them always more=20
depend ent on the system.=20

133. No social arrangements, whether laws, institutions, customs or ethical =
codes, can provide permanent=20
protection against technology. History shows that all social arrangements =
are transitory; they all change or=20
break down eventually. But technologic al advances are permanent within the =
context of a given=20
civilization. Suppose for example that it were possible to arrive at some =
social arrangements that would=20
prevent genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent =
it from being applied in such a=20
ways as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology would remain =
waiting. Sooner or later the=20
social arrangement would break down. Probably sooner, given that pace of =
change in our society. Then=20
genetic engineering would begin to invade our=20
sphere of freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short of a =
breakdo wn of technological=20
civilization itself). An y illusions about achieving anything permanent =
through social arrangements should=20
be dispelled by what is currently happening with environmental legislation. =
A few years ago it seemed that=20
there were secure legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the w orst =
forms of environmental=20
degradation. A c hange in the political wind, and those barriers begin to =
crumble.=20

134. For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a more powerful social =
force than the aspiration for=20
freedom. But this statement requires an important qualification. It appears =
that during the next several=20
decades the industrial-technological syst em will be undergoing severe =
stresses due to economic and=20
environmental problems, and especially due to problems of human behavior =
(alienation, rebellion, hostility,=20
a variety of social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the =
stresses through which the system is=20
likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least weaken it suff =
iciently so that a revolution occurs and=20
is successful, then at that particular moment the aspiration for freedom =
will have proved more powerful=20
than technology.=20

135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak neighbor who is left =
destitute by a strong neighbor=20
who takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compromises. But =
suppose now that the strong=20
neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak =
neighbor can force the str ong one to=20
give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man =
survive and only forces him to give his=20
land back, he is a fool, because when the strong man gets well he will =
again take all the land for himself.=20
The only sensible alternat ive for the weaker man is to kill the strong one =
while he has the chance. In the=20
same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we =
compromise with it and let it=20
recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom. =


SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED INTRACTABLE

136. If anyone still imagines that it would be possible to reform the =
system in such a way as to protect=20
freedom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most =
part unsuccessfully our society=20
has dealt with other social problems that a re far more simple and =
straightforward. Amon g other things, the=20
system has failed to stop environmental degradation, political corruption, =
drug trafficking or domestic=20
abuse.=20

137. Take our environmental problems, for example. Here the conflict of =
values is straightforward:=20
economic expedience now versus saving some of our natural resources for our =
grandchildren [22] But on=20
this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfus cation from the people =
who have power, and n othing=20
like a clear, consistent line of action, and we keep on piling up =
environmental problems that our=20
grandchildren will have to live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental =
issue consist of struggles and=20
compromises between different factions, som e of which are ascendant at one =
moment, othe rs at another=20
moment. The line of struggle changes with the shifting currents of public =
opinion. This is not a rational=20
process, or is it one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful =
solution to the problem.=20
Major social problems, if they get "so lved" at all, are rarely or never =
solved thr ough any rational,=20
comprehensive plan. They just work themselves out through a process in =
which various competing groups=20
pursing their own usually short-term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by =
luck) at some more or less stable=20
modus vivendi. In fact, t he principles we formulated in paragraphs 10 =
0-106 make it seem doubtful that=20
rational, long-term social planning can EVER be successful. 138. Thus it is =
clear that the human race has at=20
best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward =
social problems. How then is it=20
going to solve the far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling =
freedom with technology?=20
Technology presents clear-cut material advantages,=20
whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different =
people, and its loss is easily=20
obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.=20

139. And note this important difference: It is conceivable that our =
environmental problems (for example)=20
may some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this =
happens it will be only because=20
it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these problems. But =
it is NOT in the interest of the=20
system to preserve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is =
in the interest of the system to=20
bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. Thus, =
while practical considerations=20
may eventually force the system to take a rational, prudent approach to =
environmental problems, equally=20
practical considerations will force the system to regulate human behavior =
ever more closely (preferably by=20
indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom.)=20
This isn't just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. =
Wilson) have stressed the importance of=20
"socializing" people more effectively.



REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM

140. We hope we have convinced the reader that the system cannot be =
reformed in a such a way as to=20
reconcile freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense with the =
industrial-technological=20
system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed =
uprising, but certainly a radical and=20
fundamental change in the nature of society.=20

141. People tend to assume that because a revolution involves a much =
greater change than reform does, it is=20
more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain =
circumstances revolution is much=20
easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can inspire =
an intensity of commitment=20
that a reform movement cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers to =
solve a particular social=20
problem A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke =
and create a whole new=20
world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great risks =
and make great sacrifices. For this=20
reasons it would be much easier to overthrow the whole technological system =
than to put effective,=20
permanent restraints on the development of application of any one segment =
of technology, s
uch as genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of =
people may devote themselves=20
passionately=20
to a revolution against the industrial-technological system. As we noted in =
paragraph 132, reformers=20
seeking to limite certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a =
negative outcome. But=20
revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward -- fulfillment of their =
revolutionary vision -- and therefore=20
work harder and more persistently than reformers do.=20

142. Reform is always restrainde by the fear of painful consequences if =
changes go too far. But once a=20
revolutionary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing to =
undergo unlimited hardships for the=20
sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian =
Revolutions. It may be that in=20
such cases only a minority of the population is really committed to the =
revolution, but this minority is=20
sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in =
society. We will have more to say=20
about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.=20



CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

143. Since the beginning of civilization, organized societies have had to =
put pressures on human beings of=20
the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures =
vary greatly from one society to=20
another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, excessive labor, =
environmental pollution), some are=20
psychological (noise, crowding, forcing humans behavior into the mold that =
society requires). In the past,=20
human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied =
only within certain bounds.=20
Consequently, societies have been able to push people only up to certain =
limits. When the limit of human=20
endurance has been passed, things start going rong: rebellion, or crime, or =
corruption, or evasion of work,=20
or depression and other mental problems,=20
or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth rate or something else, so =
that either the society breaks down,=20
or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or gradually, =
through conquest, attrition or=20
evolution) replaces by some more efficient form of society.

[25]=20

144. Thus human nature has in the past put certain limits on the =
development of societies. People coud be=20
pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because =
modern technology is=20
developing way of modifying human beings.

145. Imagine a society that subjects people to conditions that amke them =
terribley unhappy, then gives=20
them the drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is =
already happening to some extent in=20
our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression had =
been greatly increasing in recent=20
decades. We believe that this is due to disruption fo the power process, as =
explained in paragraphs 59-76.=20
But even if we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly =
the result of SOME conditions that=20
exist in today's society. Instead of removing the conditions that make =
people depressed, modern society=20
gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antidepressants area a means of =
modifying an individual's=20
internal state in such a way as to=20
enable him to toelrate social conditions that he would otherwise find =
intolerable. (Yes, we know that=20
depression is often of purely genetic origin. We are referring here to =
those cases in which environment=20
plays the predominant role.)=20

146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one example of the methods of =
controlling human behavior that=20
modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the other methods. =


147. To start with, there are the techniques of surveillance. Hidden video =
cameras are now used in most=20
stores and in many other places, computers are used to collect and process =
vast amounts of information=20
about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the =
effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law=20
enforcement).[26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which the =
mass communication media=20
provide effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for =
winning elections, selling=20
products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment industry serves as =
an important psychological tool=20
of the system, possibly even when it is dishing out large amounts of sex =
and violence. Entertainment=20
provides modern man with an essential means of escape.=20
While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, =
frustration, dissatisfaction. Many=20
primitive peoples, when they don't have work to do, are quite content to =
sit for hours at a time doing=20
nothing at all, because they are at peace with themselves and their world. =
But most modern people must be=20
contantly occupied or entertained, otherwise the get "bored," i.e., they =
get fidgety, uneasy, irritable.=20

148. Other techniques strike deeper that the foregoing. Education is no =
longer a simple affair of paddling a=20
kid's behind when he doesn't know his lessons and patting him on the head =
when he does know them. It is=20
becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child's development. =
Sylvan Learning Centers, for=20
example, have had great success in motivating children to study, and =
psychological techniques are also=20
used with more or less success in many conventional schools. "Parenting" =
techniques that are taught to=20
parents are designed to make children accept fundamental values of the =
system and behave in ways that the=20
system finds desirable. "Mental health" programs, "intervention" =
techniques, psychotherapy and so forth=20
are ostensibly designed to benefit individuals,=20
but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to =
think and behave as the system=20
requires. (There is no contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or =
behavior bring him into conflict=20
with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to =
conquer or escape from, hence he is=20
likely to suffer from stress, frustration, defeat. His path will be much =
easier if he thinks and behaves as the=20
system requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the =
individual when it brainwashes him=20
into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious forms is disapproved =
in most if not all cultures.=20
Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at all is something =
that appalls almost everyone.=20
But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is =
spanking, when used as part=20
of a rational and consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The =
question will ultimately be decided=20
by whether or not spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person =
fit in well with the existing=20
system of society. In practice, the word "abuse" tends to be interpreted to =
include any method of child-
rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they =
go beyond the prevention of=20
obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing "child abuse" are =
directed toward the control of human=20
behavior of the system.=20

149. Presumably, research will continue to increas the effectiveness of =
psychological techniques for=20
controlling human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological =
techniques alone will be=20
sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is =
creating. Biological methods=20
probably will have to be used. We have already mentiond the use of drugs in =
this connection. Neurology=20
may provide other avenues of modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering =
of human beings is already=20
beginning to occur in the form of "gene therapy," and there is no reason to =
assume the such methods will=20
not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body that affect =
mental funtioning.=20

150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial society seems likely to =
be entering a period of severe=20
stress, due in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic =
and environmental problems.=20
And a considerable proportion of the system's economic and environmental =
problems result from the way=20
human beings behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility, =
rebellion; children who won't=20
study, youth gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse , other crimes, =
unsafe sex, teen pregnancy,=20
population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic rivalry, =
bitter ideological conflict (i.e., pro-
choice vs. pro-life), political extremism, terrorism, sabotage, =
anti-government groups, hate groups. All=20
these threaten the very survival of the system.=20
The system will be FORCED to use every practical means of controlling human =
behavior.=20

151. The social disruption that we see today is certainly not the result of =
mere chance. It can only be a=20
result fo the conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We =
have argued that the most important=20
of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems =
succeeds in imposing sufficient=20
control over human behavior to assure itw own survival, a new watershed in =
human history will have=20
passed. Whereas formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits =
on the development of=20
societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), =
industrial-technological society will be able to pass=20
those limits by modifying human beings, whether by psychological methods or =
biological methods or both.=20
In the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of =
human beings.=20
Instead, human being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the =
system.

[27] 152. Generally speaking, technological control over human behavior =
will probably not be introduced=20
with a totalitarian intention or even through a conscious desire to =
restrict human freedom. [28] Each new=20
step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as a =
rational response to a problem that=20
faces society, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate or =
inducing young people to study science=20
and engineering. In many cases, there will be humanitarian justification. =
For example, when a psychiatrist=20
prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing =
that individual a favor. It would be=20
inhumane to withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send =
their children to Sylvan=20
Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic about =
their studies,=20
they do so from concern for their children's welfare. It may be that some =
of these parents wish that one=20
didn't have to have specialized training to get a job and that their kid =
didn't have to be brainwashed into=20
becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can't change society, =
and their child may be=20
unemployable if he doesn't have certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan. =


153. Thus control over human behavior will be introduced not by a =
calculated decision of the authorities=20
but through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The =
process will be impossible to=20
resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear to be =
beneficial, or at least the evil involved=20
in making the advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil =
involved in making the advance will=20
seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see =
paragraph 127). Propaganda for=20
example is used for many good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or =
race hatred. [14] Sex=20
education is obviously useful, yet the effect of sex education (to the =
extent that it is successful) is to take=20
the shaping of sexual attitudes=20
away from the family and put it into the hands of the state as represented =
by the public school system.=20

154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered that increases the likelihood =
that a child will grow up to be a=20
criminal and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] =
Of course most parents whose=20
children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would be =
inhumane to do otherwise, since=20
the child would probably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a =
criminal. But many or most primitive=20
societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, =
even though they have neither high-
tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems of punishment. Since there =
is no reason to suppose that=20
more modern men than primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the =
high crime rate of our society=20
must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people,=20
to which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to =
remove potential criminal tendencies=20
is at least in part a way of re-engineering people so that they suit the =
requirements of the system.=20

155. Our society tends to regard as a "sickness" any mode of thought or =
behavior that is inconvenient for=20
the system, and this is plausible because when an individual doesn't fit =
into the system it causes pain to the=20
individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation of an =
individual to adjust him to the=20
system is seen as a "cure" for a "sickness" and therefore as good.=20

156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use of a new item of =
technology is INITIALLY optional, it=20
does not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to =
change society in such a way=20
that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to function =
without using that technology. This=20
applies also to the technology of human behavior. In a world in which most =
children are put through a=20
program to make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be =
forced to put his kid through=20
such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow up to be, =
comparatively speaking, an=20
ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or suppose a biological treatment is =
discovered that, without=20
undesirable side-effects,=20
will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many people =
suffer in our society. If large=20
numbers of people choose to undergo the treatment, then the general level =
of stress in society will be=20
reduced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase the =
stress-producing pressures. In fact,=20
something like this seems to have happened already with one of our =
society's most important psychological=20
tools for enabling people to reduce (or at least temporarily escape from) =
stress, namely, mass entertainment=20
(see paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is "optional": No law =
requires us to watch television,=20
listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass entertainment is a means of =
escape and stress-reduction on=20
which most of us have become dependent.=20
Everyone complains about the trashiness of television, but almost everyone =
watches it. A few have kicked=20
the TV habit, but it would be a rare person who could get along today =
without using ANY form of mass=20
entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got =
along very nicely with no other=20
entertainment than that which each local community created for itself.) =
Without the entertainment industry=20
the system probably would not have been able to get away with putting as =
much stress-producing pressure=20
on us as it does.=20

157. Assuming that industrial society survives, it is likely that =
technology will eventually acquire=20
something approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been =
established beyond any rational=20
doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As =
experimenters have=20
demonstrated, feelings such as hunger, pleasure, anger and fear can be =
turned on and off by electrical=20
stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by =
damaging parts of the brain or=20
they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation. =
Hallucinations can be induced or moods=20
changed by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human soul, but if =
there is one it clearly is less=20
powerful that the biological mechanisms of human behavior.=20
For if that were not the case then researchers would not be able so easily =
to manipulate human feelings and=20
behavior with drugs and electrical currents.=20

158. It presumably would be impractical for all people to have electrodes =
inserted in their heads so that=20
they could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human =
thoughts and feelings are so open to=20
biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling human =
behavior is mainly a technical=20
problem; a problem of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind of =
problem that is accessible to=20
scientific attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving =
technical problems, it is=20
overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the control of =
human behavior.=20

159. Will public resistance prevent the introduction of technological =
control of human behavior? It=20
certainly would if an attempt were made to introduce such control all at =
once. But since technological=20
control will be introduced through a long sequence of small advances, there =
will be no rational and=20
effective public resistance. (See paragraphs 127,132, 153.)=20

160. To those who think that all this sounds like science fiction, we point =
out that yesterday's science=20
fiction is today's fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered =
man's environment and way of life,=20
and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly applied to =
the human body and mind, man=20
himself will be altered as radically as his environment and way of life =
have been.=20



HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS

161. But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one thing to develop in =
the laboratory a series of=20
psychological or biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and =
quite another to integrate=20
these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem is =
the more difficult of the two. For=20
example, while the techniques of educational psychology doubtless work =
quite well in the "lab schools"=20
where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them =
effectively throughout our educational=20
system. We all know what many of our schools are like. The teachers are too =
busy taking knives and guns=20
away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques for making them =
into computer nerds. Thus, in=20
spite of all its technical advances relating=20
to human behavior the system to date has not been impressively successful =
in controlling human beings.=20
The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the system =
are those of the type that might be=20
called "bourgeois." But there are growing numbers of people who in one way =
or another are rebels against=20
the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs cultists, satanists, nazis, =
radical environmentalists, militiamen,=20
etc..=20

162. The system is currently engaged in a desperate struggle to overcome =
certain problems that threaten its=20
survival, among which the problems of human behavior are the most =
important. If the system succeeds in=20
acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly enough, it will =
probably survive. Otherwise it=20
will break down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved within the =
next several decades, say 40 to=20
100 years.=20

163. Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next several decades. By =
that time it will have to have=20
solved, or at least brought under control, the principal problems that =
confront it, in particular that of=20
"socializing" human beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so =
that their behavior no longer=20
threatens the system. That being accomplished, it does not appear that =
there would be any further obstacle=20
to the development of technology, and it would presumably advance toward =
its logical conclusion, which is=20
complete control over everything on Earth, including human beings and all =
other important organisms. The=20
system may become a unitary, monolithic organization, or it may be more or =
less fragmented and consist of=20
a number of organizations coexisting=20
in a relationship that includes elements of both cooperation and =
competition, just as today the government,=20
the corporations and other large organizations both cooperate and compete =
with one another. Human=20
freedom mostly will have vanished, because individuals and small groups =
will be impotent vis-a-vis large=20
organizations armed with supertechnology and an arsenal of advanced =
psychological and biological tools=20
for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of surveillance and =
physical coercion. Only a small=20
number of people will have any real power, and even these probably will =
have only very limited freedom,=20
because their behavior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians =
and corporation executives can=20
retain their positions of power only as long=20
as their behavior remains within certain fairly narrow limits.=20

164. Don't imagine that the systems will stop developing further techniques =
for controlling human beings=20
and nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing =
control is no longer necessary for=20
the system's survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over the =
system will increase its control over=20
people and nature more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by =
difficulties of the kind that it is=20
currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending =
control. As we explained in=20
paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry on their work largely as =
a surrogate activity; that is, they=20
satisfy their need for power by solving technical problems. They will =
continue to do this with unabated=20
enthusiasm,=20
and among the most interesting and challenging problems for them to solve =
will be those of understanding=20
the human body and mind and intervening in their development. For the "good =
of humanity," of course.=20

165. But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of the coming decades =
prove to be too much for the=20
system. If the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a "time =
of troubles" such as those that=20
history has recorded: at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to =
predict what would emerge from such=20
a time of troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new =
chance. The greatest danger is that=20
industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself within the first few =
years after the breakdown. Certainly=20
there will be many people (power-hungry types especially) who will be =
anxious to get the factories running=20
again.=20

166. Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the =
industrial system is reducing=20
the human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within =
the system so as to increase the=20
likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a =
revolution against it becomes=20
possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that =
opposes technology and the=20
industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. =
And such an ideology will help=20
to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants =
will be smashed beyond repair, so=20
that the system cannot be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, =
technical books burned, etc.=20



HUMAN SUFFERING

167. The industrial system will not break down purely as a result of =
revolutionary action. It will not be=20
vulnerable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of =
development lead it into very serious=20
difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so either =
spontaneously, or through a process that is in=20
part spontaneous but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is =
sudden, many people will die,=20
since the world's population has become so overblown that it cannot even =
feed itself any longer without=20
advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is gradual enough so that =
reduction of the population can=20
occur more through lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the =
death rate, the process of de-
industrialization probably will=20
be very chaotic and involve much suffering. It is naive to think it likely =
that technology can be phased out=20
in a smoothly managed orderly way, especially since the technophiles will =
fight stubbornly at every step. Is=20
it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of the system? Maybe, but =
maybe not. In the first place,=20
revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down unless it is =
already in deep trouble so that there=20
would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway; =
and the bigger the system=20
grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it =
may be that revolutionaries, by=20
hastening the onset of the breakdown will be reducing the extent of the =
disaster.=20

168. In the second place, one has to balance the struggle and death against =
the loss of freedom and dignity.=20
To many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or =
avoidance of physical pain.=20
Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting =
for survival, or for a cause, than=20
to live a long but empty and purposeless life.=20

169. In the third place, it is not all certain that the survival of the =
system will lead to less suffering than the=20
breakdown of the system would. The system has already caused, and is =
continuing to cause , immense=20
suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of years =
gave p eople a satisfactory=20
relationship with each other and their environment, have been shattered by =
contact with industrial society,=20
and the result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, =
social and psychological problems.=20
One of the effects o f the intrusion of industrial society has be en that =
over much of the world traditional=20
controls on population have been thrown out of balance. Hence the =
population explosion, with all that it=20
implies.=20
Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread throughout the =
supposedly fortunate countries=20
of the West (see paragraphs 44, 4 5). No one knows what will happen as a =
result of ozone depletion, the=20
greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be =
foreseen. And, as nuclear=20
proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands of =
dictators an d irresponsible=20
Third World nations. Would you like to speculate abut what Iraq or North =
Korea will do with genetic=20
engineering?=20

170. "Oh!" say the technophiles, "Science is going to fix all that! We will =
conquer famine, eliminate=20
psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!" Yeah, sure. =
That's what they said 200 years=20
ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make =
everybody happy, etc. The actual=20
result has been quite different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or =
self-deceiving) in their=20
understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) =
the fact that when large=20
changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced into a society, =
they le ad to a long sequence of=20
other changes, most of which are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The =
result is disruption of the=20
society. So it is very probable that=20
in their attempt to end poverty and disease, engineer docile, happy =
personalities and s o forth, the=20
technophiles will create socia l systems that are terribly troubled, even =
more so that the present one. For=20
example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by creating new, =
genetically engineered food plants.=20
But this will allow the human population to keep expanding indefini tely, =
and it is well known that=20
crowding lea ds to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one =
example of the PREDICTABLE=20
problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has shown, =
technical progress will lead to=20
other new problems for society far more rapidly that it has b een solving =
old ones. Thus it will take a l ong=20
difficult period of=20
trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their Brave =
New World (if they ever do). In the=20
meantime there will be great suffering. So it is not all clear that the =
survival of industrial society would=20
involve les s suffering than the breakdown of that socie ty would. =
Technology has gotten the human race=20
into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy escape.=20



THE FUTURE

171. But suppose now that industrial society does survive the next several =
decade and that the bugs do=20
eventually get worked out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. =
What kind of system will it be? We=20
will consider several possibilities.=20

172. First let us postulate that the computer scientists succeed in =
developing intelligent machines that can=20
do all things better that human beings can do them. In that case presumably =
all work will be done by vast,=20
highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be necessary. =
Eith er of two cases might=20
occur. The machines might be permitted to make all of their own decisions =
without human oversight, or=20
else human control over the machines might be retained.=20

173. If the machines are permitted to make all their own decisions, we =
can't make any conjectures as to the=20
results, because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. =
We only point out that the fate=20
of the human race would be at the merc y of the machines. It might be =
argued that the human race would=20
never be foolish enough to hand over all the power to the machines. But we =
are suggesting neither that the=20
human race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the =
machines would willfully seize=20
power. What we do su ggest is that the human race might easily pe rmit =
itself to drift into a position of such=20
dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to =
accept all of the machines=20
decisions.=20
As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and =
machines become more and=20
more intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decision for =
them, simply because machine-
made decisions will bring better result than man-made ones. Eventually a =
stage may be reached at which=20
the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that =
human beings wi ll be incapable=20
of making them intelligently . At that stage the machines will be in =
effective control. People won't be able=20
to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them =
that turning them off would=20
amount to suicide.=20

174. On the other hand it is possible that human control over the machines =
may be retained. In that case the=20
average man may have control over certain private machines of his own, such =
as his car of his personal=20
computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in the hands =
of a tiny e lite -- just as it is=20
today, but with two difference. Due to improved techniques the elite will =
have greater control over the=20
masses; and because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will =
be superfluous, a useless=20
burden on the system. If t he elite is ruthless the may simply decide t o =
exterminate the mass of humanity.=20
If they are humane they may use propaganda or other psychological or =
biological techniques to reduce the=20
birth rate until=20
the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, =
if the elite consist of soft-hearted=20
liberals, they may decide to play the role of good shepherds to the rest of =
the human race. They will see to=20
it that everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are =
raised under psychologically hygienic=20
conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy , and that =
anyone who may become=20
dissatisfie d undergoes "treatment" to cure his "problem." Of course, life =
will be so purposeless that people=20
will have to be biologically or psychologically engineered either to remove =
their need for the power=20
process or to make them "sublimate" their drive for pow er into some =
harmless hobby. These engineer ed=20
human beings=20
may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly will not be free. =
They will have been reduced to=20
the status of domestic animals.=20

175. But suppose now that the computer scientists do not succeed in =
developing artificial intelligence, so=20
that human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more =
and more of the simpler=20
tasks so that there will be an increasing surp lus of human workers at the =
lower levels of ability. (We see=20
this happening already. There are many people who find it difficult or =
impossible to get work, because for=20
intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of =
training necessary to make themselves=20
useful in the presen t system.) On those who are employed, ever- increasing =
demands will be placed; They=20
will need more and m ore training, more and more ability, and will have to =
be ever more reliable,=20
conforming and docile,=20
because they will be more and more like cells of a giant organism. Their =
tasks will be incre asingly=20
specialized so that their work will be, in a sense, out of touch with the =
real world, being concentrated on=20
one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that I =
can, whether psychological or=20
biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that the =
syst em requires and to "sublimate"=20
their drive f or power into some specialized task. But the statement that =
the people of such a society will=20
have to be docile may require qualification. The society may find =
competitiveness useful, provided that=20
ways are found of directing competitiveness into channe ls that serve that =
needs of the system. We can=20
imagine=20
into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a future =
society in which there is endless=20
competition for positions of prestige an power. But no more than a very few =
people will ever reach the top,=20
where the only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repell ent is =
a society in which a person can=20
satisfy his needs for power only by pushing large numbers of other people =
out of the way and depriving=20
them of THEIR opportunity for power.=20

176. Once can envision scenarios that incorporate aspects of more than one =
of the possibilities that we have=20
just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will take over most =
of the work that is of real,=20
practical importance, but that human bei ngs will be kept busy by being =
given relativ ely unimportant=20
work. It has been suggested, for example, that a great development of the =
service of industries might=20
provide work for human beings. Thus people will would spend their time =
shinning each others shoes,=20
driving each other around inn taxica b, making handicrafts for one another, =
waiti ng on each other's tables,=20
etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human race to =
end up, and we doubt that many=20
people would find=20
fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, =
dangerous outlets (drugs, , crime,=20
"cults," hate groups) unless they were biol ogical or psychologically =
engineered to adapt them to such a=20
way of life.=20

177. Needless to day, the scenarios outlined above do not exhaust all the =
possibilities. They only indicate=20
the kinds of outcomes that seem to us mots likely. But wee can envision no =
plausible scenarios that are any=20
more palatable that the ones we've j ust described. It is overwhelmingly =
probabl e that if the industrial-
technological system survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that =
time have developed certain general=20
characteristics: Individuals (at least those of the "bourgeois" type, who =
are integrated into the system and=20
make it run, and who therefore have all the power) will b e more dependent =
than ever on large=20
organizations; they will be more "socialized" that ever and their physical =
and mental qualities to a=20
significant=20
extent (possibly to a very great extent ) will be those that are engineered =
into them rather than being th e=20
results of chance (or of God's will, or wh atever); and whatever may be =
left of wild nature will be reduced=20
to remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision =
and management of scientists=20
(hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long run (say a few =
centuries from no w) it is it is likely that=20
neither the human race nor any other important organisms will exist as we =
know them today, because once=20
you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is no =
reason to stop at any particular=20
point, so that the modifications will probably continue until man and other =
organisms have been utterly=20
trans formed.=20

178. Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that technology is =
creating for human begins a new=20
physical and social environment radically different from the spectrum of =
environments to which natural=20
selection has adapted the human race physically an d psychological. If man =
is not adjust to th is new=20
environment by being artificially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to =
it through a long an painful=20
process of natural selection. The former is far more likely that the =
latter.=20

179. It would be better to dump the whole stinking system and take the =
consequences.=20

STRATEGY

180. The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into =
the unknown. Many people=20
understand something of what technological progress is doing to us yet take =
a passive attitude toward it=20
because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don't think it is =
inevitable. We think it c an be stopped, and=20
we will give here some indications of how to go about stopping it.=20

181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks for the present are =
to promote social stress and=20
instability in industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology =
that opposes technology and the=20
industrial system. When the system become s sufficiently stressed and =
unstable, a revo lution against=20
technology may be possible. The pattern would be similar to that of the =
French and Russian Revolutions.=20
French society and Russian society, for several decades prior to their =
respective revolutions, showed=20
increasing signs of stress and w eakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were being =
d eveloped that offered a new=20
world view that was quite different from the old one. In the Russian case, =
revolutionaries were actively=20
working to undermine=20
the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient =
additional stress (by financial c risis in=20
France, by military defeat in Russi a) it was swept away by revolution. =
What we propose in something=20
along the same lines.=20

182. It will be objected that the French and Russian Revolutions were =
failures. But most revolutions have=20
two goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set =
up the new form of society=20
envisioned by the revolutionaries. The Fre nch and Russian revolutionaries =
failed (fort unately!) to create=20
the new kind of society of which they dreamed, but they were quite =
successful in destroying the existing=20
form of society.=20

183. But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic support, must have a =
positive ideals well as a negative=20
one; it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive =
ideal that we propose is=20
Nature. That is , WILD nature; those aspects o f the functioning of the =
Earth and its livin g things that are=20
independent of human management and free of human interference and control. =
And with wild nature we=20
include human nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of =
the human individual that are=20
not subject to regulation by o rganized society but are products of chance, =
or free will, or God (depending=20
on your religious or philosophical opinions).=20

184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several =
reasons. Nature (that which is outside=20
the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to =
expand indefinitely the power of the=20
system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has =
treme ndous popular appeal. The=20
radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and =
opposes technology. [30] It is=20
not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or =
any new kind of social order.=20
Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous creation th at existed =
long before any human society, and=20
for countless centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted =
with nature without doing it an=20
excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the =
effect of human society on nat=20
ure become really devastating. To relieve t he pressure on nature it is not =
necessary to create a special kind=20
of social system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. =
Granted, this will not solve all=20
problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous damage to nature =
and i t will take a very long=20
time for the scars t o heal. Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do =
significant damage to nature.=20
Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great =
deal. It will relieve the worst of the=20
pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the =
capacity of organized soc iety=20
to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature). =
Whatever kind of society may exist=20
after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people =
will live close to nature, because in=20
the absence of advanced technolog y there is not other way that people CAN =
liv e. To feed themselves they=20
must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter, etc., And, generally =
speaking, local autonomy should=20
tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid =
communications will limit the capacity of=20
governments o r other large organizations to control local communities. =


185. As for the negative consequences of eliminating industrial society -- =
well, you can't eat your cake and=20
have it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.=20

186. Most people hate psychological conflict. For this reason they avoid =
doing any serious thinking about=20
difficult social issues, and they like to have such issues presented to =
them in simple, black-and-white terms:=20
THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology should =
therefore be developed on two=20
levels.=20

187. On the more sophisticated level the ideology should address itself to =
people who are intelligent,=20
thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a core of people =
who will be opposed to the=20
industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appreciation =
of the problems and ambiguities=20
involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the =
system. It is particularly important to=20
attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be =
instrumental in influencing others. These=20
people should be addres sed on as rational a level as possible. Fact s =
should never intentionally be distorted=20
and intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no =
appeal can be made to the=20
emotions,=20
but in making such appeal care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting the =
truth or doing anything else t=20
hat would destroy the intellectual respectab ility of the ideology. =


188. On a second level, the ideology should be propagated in a simplified =
form that will enable the=20
unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in =
unambiguous terms. But even on this=20
second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so =
cheap, intemperate or irrational=20
that it alienates people of the thoughtful and rational type. Cheap, =
intemperate propaganda sometimes=20
achieves impressive short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in =
the long run to keep the loyalty=20
of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the =
passion s of an unthinking, fickle=20
mob who will change their attitude as soon as someone comes along with a =
better propaganda gimmick.=20
However, propaganda of the=20
rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point =
of collapse and there is a final=20
struggle between rival ideologies to d etermine which will become dominant =
when the old world-view goes=20
under.=20

189. Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to =
have a majority of people on their=20
side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the =
majority, which seldom has a clear and=20
consistent idea of what it really wan ts. Until the time comes for the =
final push toward revolution [31], the=20
task of revolutionaries will be less to win the shallow support of the =
majority than to build a small core of=20
deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make =
them aware of the existence of the=20
new ideolo gy and remind them of it frequently; though of course it will be =
desirable to get majority=20
support to the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of =
seriously committed people.=20

190. Any kind of social conflict helps to destabilize the system, but one =
should be careful about what kind=20
of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between =
the mass of the people and the=20
power-holding elite of industrial society ( politicians, scientists, =
upper-level busines s executives,=20
government officials, etc..). It should NOT be drawn between the =
revolutionaries and the mass of the=20
people. For example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to =
condemn Americans for their=20
habits of consumption. Instead, the ave rage American should be portrayed =
as a victi m of the advertising=20
and marketing industry, which has suckered him into buying a lot of junk =
that he doesn't need and that is=20
very poor compensation
for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the facts. It is =
merely a matter of attitude whether=20
you blame the advertising industry for manipulating the public or blame the =
public for allowing itself to be=20
manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the =
public.=20

191. One should think twice before encouraging any other social conflict =
than that between the power-
holding elite (which wields technology) and the general public (over which =
technology exerts its power).=20
For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the =
important conflicts (betw een power-elite=20
and ordinary people, between technology and nature); for another thing, =
other conflicts may actually tend=20
to encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants =
to use technological power to=20
gain advantages over its adve rsary. This is clearly seen in rivalries bet =
ween nations. It also appears in=20
ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America many black leaders =
are anxious to gain power for=20
African=20
Americans by placing back individuals in the technological power-elite. =
They want there to be many black=20
gov ernment officials, scientists, corporation e xecutives and so forth. In =
this way they are helping to=20
absorb the African American subculture into the technological system. =
Generally speaking, one should=20
encourage only those social conflicts that can be fitted into the framework =
of the conflicts of po wer--elite=20
vs. ordinary people, technology v s nature.=20

192. But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT through militant =
advocacy of minority rights (see=20
paragraphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that =
although minorities do suffer more=20
or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is o f peripheral significance. Our =
real enemy is the industrial-
technological system, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic =
distinctions are of no importance.=20

193. The kind of revolution we have in mind will not necessarily involve an =
armed uprising against any=20
government. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be =
a POLITICAL revolution. Its=20
focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]=20

194. Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID assuming political =
power, whether by legal or=20
illegal means, until the industrial system is stressed to the danger point =
and has proved itself to be a failure=20
in the eyes of most people. Suppose for exa mple that some "green" party =
should win cont rol of the United=20
States Congress in an election. In order to avoid betraying or watering =
down their own ideology they would=20
have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic =
shrinkage. To the average man the=20
results would appear disast rous: There would be massive unemployment, s =
hortages of commodities, etc.=20
Even if the grosser ill effects could be avoided through superhumanly =
skillful management, still people=20
would have=20
to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted. =
Dissatisfaction would grow, the=20
"green" pa rty would be voted out of of fice and the re volutionaries would =
have suffered a severe setback.=20
For this reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political =
power until the system has gotten=20
itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as resulting from =
the failures of the ind ustrial system=20
itself and not from the polic ies of the revolutionaries. The revolution =
against technology will probably=20
have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from =
above.=20

195. The revolution must be international and worldwide. It cannot be =
carried out on a nation-by-nation=20
basis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for example, should =
cut back on technological=20
progress or economic growth, people get hysteric al and start screaming =
that if we fall behin d in=20
technology the Japanese will get ahead of us. Holy robots The world will =
fly off its orbit if the Japanese=20
ever sell more cars than we do! (Nationalism is a great promoter of =
technology.) More reasonably, it is=20
argued that if the relatively democrati c nations of the world fall behind =
in techno logy while nasty,=20
dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea continue to =
progress, eventually the dictators may=20
come to dominate the world.=20
That is why the industrial system should be attacked in all nations =
simultaneously, to the extent that this=20
may be possible. True, there is no ass urance that the industrial system =
can be destroyed at approximately=20
the same time all over the world, and it is even conceivable that the =
attempt to overthrow the system could=20
lead instead to the domination of the system by dictators. That is a risk =
that has to be taken. And it is worth=20
taking, sin ce the difference between a "democratic" industrial system and =
one controlled by dictators is=20
small compared with the difference between an industrial system and a =
non-industrial one. [33] It might=20
even be argued that an industrial system controlled by di ctators would be =
preferable, because dictato=20
r-controlled systems usually have proved inefficient, hence they are =
presumably more likely to break down.=20
Look at Cuba.=20

196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures that tend to bind the =
world economy into a unified=20
whole. Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to =
the environment in the short=20
run, but in the long run they may perhaps be ad vantageous because they =
foster economic inte rdependence=20
between nations. I will be eaier to destroy the industrial system on a =
worldwide basis if he world economy=20
is so unified that its breakdown in any on major nation will lead to its =
breakdwon in al industrialized=20
nations.=20

the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic =
interdependence between=20
nations. It will be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide =
basis if the world economy is so=20
unified that its breakdown in any one major nat ion will lead to its =
breakdown in all indust rialized nations.

197. Some people take the line that modern man has too much power, too much =
control over nature; they=20
argue for a more passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best =
these people are expressing=20
themselves unclearly, because they fail to distingu ish between power for =
LARGE ORGANIZATIONS an=20
d power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for =
powerlessness and=20
passivity, because people NEED power. Modern man as a collective =
entity--that is, the industrial system--
has immense power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as e vil. But modern =
INDIVIDUALS and=20
SMALL GROUP S OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever =
did. Generally=20
speaking, the vast power of "modern man" over nature is exercised not =

by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the extent =
that the average modern=20
INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he is pe rmitted to do so =
only within narrow limits and=20
only under the supervision and control of the system. (You need a license =
for everything and with the=20
license come rules and regulations). The individual has only those =
technological powers with which the s=20
ystem chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is =
slight.

198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS actually had considerable power =
over nature; or=20
maybe it would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When primitive man =
needed food he knew how to=20
find and prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it wi th homemade =
weapons. He knew how to=20
protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But =
primitive man did relatively little damage=20
to nature because the COLLECTIVE power of primitive society was negligible =
compared to the=20
COLLECTIVE power of industrial society.

199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passivity, one should argue =
that the power of the=20
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the =
power and freedom=20
of INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS.

200. Until the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked, the =
destruction of that system must be the=20
revolutionaries' ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy =
from the main goal. More=20
importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themse lves to have any other =
goal than the destruc tion of=20
technology, they will be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching =
that other goal. If they give in to=20
that temptation, they will fall right back into the technological trap, =
because modern technology is a=20
unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain SOME =
technology , one finds oneself obliged=20
to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing only token amounts =
of technology.

201. Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took "social justice" as =
a goal. Human nature being what=20
it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to =
be enforced. In order to enforce it=20
the revolutionaries would have to ret ain central organization and control. =
For th at they would need rapid=20
long-distance transportation and communication, and therefore all the =
technology needed to support the=20
transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor people =
they would have to use=20
agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so forth. So that the attemp =
t to insure social justice would=20
force them to retain most parts of the technological system. Not that we =
have anything against social=20
justice,=20
but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get rid of the =
technological system.

202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system =
without using SOME modern=20
technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to =
spread their message. But they=20
should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the =
technological system.

203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine in front of him. =
Suppose he starts saying to himself,=20
"Wine isn't bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts =
of wine are even good for you!=20
It won't do me any harm if I take just one little drink..." Well you know =
what is g oing to happen. Never=20
forget that the human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a =
barrel of wine.

204. Revolutionaries should have as many children as they can. There is =
strong scientific evidence that=20
social attitudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests =
that a social attitude is a direct=20
outcome of a person's genetic constitution, but it appears that personality =
traits tend , within the context of=20
our society, to make a person more likely to hold this or that social =
attitude. Objections to these findings=20
have been raised, but objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically =
motivated. In any event, no one=20
denies that child ren tend on the average to hold social attit udes similar =
to those of their parents. From our=20
point of view it doesn't matter all that much whether the attitudes are =
passed on genetically or through=20
childhood training. In either case the ARE passed on.

205. The trouble is that many of the people who are inclined to rebel =
against the industrial system are also=20
concerned about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or =
no children. In this way they=20
may be handing the world over to the sort of people who support or at least =
accept th e industrial system.=20
To insure the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the =
present generation must reproduce itself=20
abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only =
slightly. And the most=20
important problem is to ge t rid of the industrial system, because once the =
industrial system is gone the=20
world's population necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, =
if the industrial system survives,=20
it will continue developing new techniques of food production that may =
enable the world's population to=20
keep i ncreasing almost indefinitely.

206. With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only points on which we =
absolutely insist are that the single=20
overriding goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no =
other goal can be allowed to=20
compete with this one. For the rest, revol utionaries should take an =
empirical approach . If experience=20
indicates that some of the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs =
are not going to give good=20
results, then those recommendations should be discarded.



TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY

207. An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is =
that it is bound to fail, because (it is=20
claimed) throughout history technology has always progressed, never =
regressed, hence technological=20
regression is impossible. But this claim is false.

208. We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call =
small-scale technology and=20
organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is technology =
that can be used by small-scale=20
communities without outside assistance. Organization -dependent technology =
is technology that de pends=20
on large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of =
regression in small-scale=20
technology. But organization-dependent technology DOES regress when the =
social organization on which=20
it depends breaks down. Example: When the Roma n Empire fell apart the =
Romans' small-scale technology=20
survived because any clever village craftsman could build, for instance, a =
water wheel, any skilled smith=20
could make steel by Roman methods,=20
and so forth. But the Romans' organization-dependent technology DID =
regress. Their aqueducts fell into=20
disrepair and were never rebuilt.=20
Their tech niques of road construction were lost. The Roman system of urban =
sanitation was forgotten, so=20
that until rather recent times did the sanitation of European cities that =
of Ancient Rome.

209. The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until =
perhaps a century or two=20
before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale =
technology. But most of the technology=20
developed since the Industrial Revolution is orga nization-dependent =
technology. Take the refr igerator for=20
example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a post-industrial =
machine shop it would be=20
virtually impossible for a handful of local craftsmen to build a =
refrigerator. If by some miracle they did=20
succeed in building one it would be useless to them without a reliable =
source o f electric power. So they=20
would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators require large =
amounts of copper wire.=20
Imagine trying to make that=20
wire without modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for =
refrigeration? It would be=20
much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or picking, as =
was done before the invention=20
of the refrigerator.

210. So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly =
broken down, refrigeration technology=20
would quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-dependent =
technology. And once this=20
technology had been lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to =
rebuild it, just as it took centuries=20
to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be few =
and scattered. An industrial=20
society, if built from scratch without outside help, can only be built in a =
series of stages: You need tools to=20
make tools to make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic =
development and progress in social=20
organization is required. And, even in the absence of an ideology opposed =
to technology, there is no reason=20
to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding industrial =
society. The enthusiasm for "progre ss"=20
is a phenomenon particular to the modern form of society, and it seems not =
to have existed prior to the 17th=20
century or thereabouts.

211. In the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were =
about equally "advanced":=20
Europe, the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). =
Three of those civilizations=20
remained more or less stable, and only Europe became dynamic. No one knows =
why Europe became dyn=20
amic at that time; historians have their theories but these are only =
speculation. At any rate, it is clear that=20
rapid development toward a technological form of society occurs only under =
special conditions. So there is=20
no reason to assume that long-lastin g technological regression cannot be =
brought about.

212. Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an =
industrial-technological form? Maybe, but=20
there is no use in worrying about it, since we can't predict or control =
events 500 or 1,000 years in the=20
future. Those problems must be dealt with by the peopl e who will live at =
that time.



THE DANGER OF LEFTISM

213. Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, =
leftists or persons of similar=20
psychological type are often unattracted to a rebellious or activist =
movement whose goals and membership=20
are not initially leftist. The resulting inf lux of leftish types can =
easily turn a non-l eftist movement into a=20
leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of =
the movement.

214. To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature and opposes technology =
must take a resolutely anti-leftist=20
stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Leftism is in the =
long run inconsistent with wild=20
nature, with human freedom and with the e limination of modern technology. =
Leftism is collectivist; it=20
seeks to bind together the entire world (both nature and the human race) =
into a unified whole. But this=20
implies management of nature and of human life by organized society, and it =
requires advanced=20
technology. You can't have a united worl d without rapid transportation and =
communica tion, you can't=20
make all people love one another without sophisticated psychological =
techniques, you can't have a=20
"planned society" without the necessary technological base.=20
Above all, leftism is driven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks =
power o n a collective basis,=20
through identification with a mass movement or an organization. Leftism is =
unlikely ever to give up=20
technology, because technology is too valuable a source of collective =
power.=20

215. The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks it on an individual =
or small-group basis; he wants=20
individuals and small groups to be able to control the circumstances of =
their own lives. He opposes=20
technology because it makes small groups dependent on large =
organizations.

216. Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but they will oppose it =
only so long as they are=20
outsiders and the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If =
leftism ever becomes dominant in=20
society, so that the technological system becomes a tool in the hands of =
leftists, they will e nthusiastically=20
use it and promote its growth. In doing this they will be repeating a =
pattern that leftism has shown again=20
and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in Russia were outsiders, they =
vigorously opposed censorship=20
and the secret police, they advocated self-determination for ethnic mino =
rities, and so forth;=20
but as soon as they came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter =
censorship and created a more=20
ruthless secret police than any that had existed under the tsars, and they =
oppressed ethnic minorities at least=20
as much as the tsars had done. In the United States, a couple of decades =
ago when leftists were a minority=20
in our universities, leftist professors were vigorous proponents of =
academic freedom, but today, in those=20
universities where leftists have become dominant, they have shown =
themselves ready to take away from=20
every one else's academic freedom. (This is "polit ical correctness.") The =
same will happen with leftists and=20
technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if they ever get it =
under their own control.

217. In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-hungry type, =
repeatedly, have first cooperated with=20
non-leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more libertarian =
inclination, and later have double-
crossed them to seize power for them selves. Robespierre did this in the =
French R evolution, the Bolsheviks=20
did it in the Russian Revolution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 =
and Castro and his followers did it=20
in Cuba. Given the past history of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for =
non-leftist revolutionaries today to=20
collabo rate with leftists.

218. Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a kind of religion. =
Leftism is not a religion in the=20
strict sense because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of =
any supernatural being. But for the=20
leftist, leftism plays a psychologica l role much like that which religion =
plays f or some people. The leftist=20
NEEDS to believe in leftism; it plays a vital role in his psychological =
economy. His beliefs are not easily=20
modified by logic or facts. He has a deep conviction that leftism is =
morally Right with a capital R, and that=20
he has no t only a right but a duty to impose leftist morality on everyone. =
(However, many of the people we=20
are referring to as "leftists" do not think of themselves as leftists and =
would not describe=20
their system of beliefs as leftism. We use the term "leftism" because we =
don't know of any better words to=20
d esignate the spectrum of related creeds that includes the feminist, gay =
rights, political correctness, etc.,=20
movements, and because these movements have a strong affinity with the old =
left. See paragraphs 227-
230.)

219. Leftism is totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is in a position of =
power it tends to invade every private=20
corner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part this is because =
of the quasi-religious character of=20
leftism; everything contrary to leftists beliefs represents Sin. More impor =
tantly, leftism is a totalitarian=20
force because of the leftists' drive for power. The leftist seeks to =
satisfy his need for power through=20
identification with a social movement and he tries to go through the power =
process by helping to pursue=20
and attain th e goals of the movement (see paragraph 83). But no matter how =
far the movement has gone in=20
attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, because his activism is =
a surrogate activity (see paragraph=20
41).=20
That is, the leftist's real motive is not to attain the ostensible goals of =
leftism; in rea lity he is motivated by=20
the sense of power h e gets from struggling for and then reaching a social =
goal.[35]

Consequently the leftist is never satisfied with the goals he has already =
attained; his need for the power=20
process leads him always to pursue some new goal. The leftist wants equal =
opportunities for minorities.=20
When that is attained he insists on statisti cal equality of achievement by =
minorities. A nd as long as=20
anyone harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude toward some =
minority, the leftist has to=20
re-educated him. And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be =
allowed to have a negative attitude=20
toward homosexuals, disabled peop le, fat people, old people, ugly people, =
and on and on and on. It's not=20
enough that the public should be informed about the hazards of smoking; a =
warning has to be stamped on=20
every package of cigarettes.=20
Then cigarette advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The =
activists will never be sati sfied until=20
tobacco is outlawed, and after t hat it will be alco hot then junk food, =
etc. Activists have fought gross child=20
abuse, which is reasonable. But now they want to stop all spanking. When =
they have done that they will=20
want to ban something else they consider unwholesome, then another thing =
and then another. They will=20
never be satisfi ed until they have complete control over all child rearing =
practices. And then they will=20
move on to another cause.=20

220. Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL the things that were =
wrong with society, and then=20
suppose you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded. It is safe =
to say that within a couple of=20
years the majority of leftists would find some thing new to complain about, =
some new social "evil" to=20
correct because, once again, the leftist is motivated less by distress at =
society's ills than by the need to=20
satisfy his drive for power by imposing his solutions on society.=20

221. Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts and behavior by =
their high level of socialization,=20
many leftists of the over-socialized type cannot pursue power in the ways =
that other people do. For them=20
the drive for power has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in =
the strugg le to impose their=20
morality on everyone.=20

222. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, are True =
Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer's=20
book, "The True Believer." But not all True Believers are of the same =
psychological type as leftists.=20
Presumably a truebelieving nazi, for instanc e is very different =
psychologically from a t ruebelieving leftist.=20
Because of their capacity for single-minded devotion to a cause, True =
Believers are a useful, perhaps a=20
necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary movement. This presents a =
problem with which we must admit=20
we don't know how to deal. We aren't sure how to harness the energies o f =
the True Believer to a revolution=20
against technology. At present all we can say is that no True Believer will =
make a safe recruit to the=20
revolution=20
unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of technology. If =
he is committed also to another=20
ideal, he may want to use technology as a t ool for pursuing that other =
ideal (see paragraphs 220, 221).

223. Some readers may say, "This stuff about leftism is a lot of crap. I =
know John and Jane who are leftish=20
types and they don't have all these totalitarian tendencies." It's quite =
true that many leftists, possibly even a=20
numerical majority, are decent pe ople who sincerely believe in tolerating =
oth ers' values (up to a point) and=20
wouldn't want to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals. Our =
remarks about leftism are not=20
meant to apply to every individual leftist but to describe the general =
character of leftism as a movement.=20
And the gene ral character of a movement is not necessari ly determined by =
the numerical proportions of=20
the various kinds of people involved in the movement.=20

224. The people who rise to positions of power in leftist movements tend to =
be leftists of the most power-
hungry type because power-hungry people are those who strive hardest to get =
into positions of power.=20
Once the power-hungry types have captured contro l of the movement, there =
are many leftists o f a gentler=20
breed who inwardly disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but =
cannot bring themselves to=20
oppose them. They NEED their faith in the movement, and because they cannot =
give up this faith they go=20
along with the leaders. True, SOME lefti sts do have the guts to oppose the =
totalitar ian tendencies that=20
emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-hungry types are better =
organized, are more ruthless=20
and Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a strong power =
base.=20

225. These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and other countries that =
were taken over by leftists.=20
Similarly, before the breakdown of communism in the USSR, leftish types in =
the West would seldom=20
criticize that country. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many =
wrong things, but then th ey=20
would try to find excuses for the communists and begin talking about the =
faults of the West. They always=20
opposed Western military resistance to communist aggression. Leftish types =
all over the world vigorously=20
protested the U.S. military action in Viet nam, but when the USSR invaded =
Afghanistan t hey did nothing.=20
Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because of their leftist =
faith, they just couldn't bear to put=20
themselves in opposition to communism.=20
Today, in those of our universities where "political correctness" has =
become dominant, there are probably=20
many leftish types who p rivately disapprove of the suppression of academic =
freedom, but they go along=20
with it anyway.=20

226. Thus the fact that many individual leftists are personally mild and =
fairly tolerant people by no means=20
prevents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian tendency.=20

227. Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It is still far from =
clear what we mean by the word=20
"leftist." There doesn't seem to be much we can do about this. Today =
leftism is fragmented into a whole=20
spectrum of activist movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, =
and some act ivist movements=20
(e.g.., radical environmentalism) seem to include both personalities of the =
leftist type and personalities of=20
thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to know better than to collaborate =
with leftists. Varieties of leftists=20
fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and we oursel ves would =
often be hard-pressed to decide=20
whether a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent that it is =
defined at all, our conception of=20
leftism=20
is defined by the discussion of it that we have given in this article, and =
we can only advise t he reader to=20
use his own judgment in decidin g who is a leftist.=20

228. But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diagnosing leftism. =
These criteria cannot be applied in a=20
cut and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of the criteria =
without being leftists, some leftists=20
may not meet any of the criteria. Ag ain, you just have to use your =
judgment.

229. The leftist is oriented toward largescale collectivism. He emphasizes =
the duty of the individual to=20
serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. He =
has a negative attitude toward=20
individualism. He often takes a moralistic ton e. He tends to be for gun =
control, for sex e ducation and=20
other psychologically "enlightened" educational methods, for planning, for =
affirmative action, for=20
multiculturalism. He tends to identify with victims. He tends to be against =
competition and against=20
violence, but he often finds excuses for th ose leftists who do commit =
violence. He is f ond of using the=20
common catch-phrases of the left like "racism, " "sexism, " "homophobia, " =
"capitalism," "imperialism,"=20
"neocolonialism " "genocide,"=20
"social change," "social justice," "social responsibility." Maybe the best =
diagnostic trait of the leftist is his=20
tendency to sympathize with the following movements: feminism, gay rights, =
ethnic rights, disabi lity=20
rights, animal rights political correct ness. Anyone who strongly =
sympathizes with ALL of these=20
movements is almost certainly a leftist. [36]=20

230. The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who are most power-hungry, =
are often characterized by=20
arrogance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However, the most =
dangerous leftists of all may be=20
certain oversocialized types who avoid irritating di splays of =
aggressiveness and refrain from ad vertising=20
their leftism, but work quietly and unobtrusively to promote collectivist =
values, "enlightened"=20
psychological techniques for socializing children, dependence of the =
individual on the system, and so forth.=20
These crypto-leftists (as we may call th em) approximate certain bourgeois =
types as f ar as practical action=20
is concerned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and motivation. =
The ordinary bourgeois tries to=20
bring people under control=20
of the system in order to protect his way of life, or he does so simply =
because his attitudes are=20
conventional. The crypto-leftist tries to br ing people under control of =
the system because he is a True=20
Believer in a collectivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated =
from the average leftist of the=20
oversocialized type by the fact that his rebellious impulse is weaker and =
he is more se curely socialized. He=20
is differentiated from the ordinary well-socialized bourgeois by the fact =
that there is some deep lack within=20
him that makes it necessary for him to devote himself to a cause and =
immerse himself in a collectivity. And=20
maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is stronger tha n that of the =
average bourgeois.

FINAL NOTE

231. Throughout this article we've made imprecise statements and statements =
that ought to have had all=20
sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and some of our =
statements may be flatly false.=20
Lack of sufficient information and the need f or brevity made it impossible =
for us to fomu late our=20
assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of =
course in a discussion of this=20

kind one must rely heavily on intuitive judgment, and that can sometimes be =
wrong. So we don't claim that=20
this article expresses more than a crude approximation to the truth. =


232. All the same we are reasonably confident that the general outlines of =
the picture we have painted here=20
are roughly correct. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form as a =
phenomenon peculiar to our time=20
and as a symptom of the disruption of the power process. But we might =
possibly be wrong about this.=20
Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing =
their morality on everyone have=20
certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role =
played by feelings of=20
inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by =
people who are not themselves=20
victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by =
people not themselves victims can=20
be seen to some extent in=20
19th century leftism and early Christianity but as far as we can make out, =
symptoms of low self-esteem,=20
etc., were not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other =
movements, as they are in modern=20
leftism. But we are not in a position to assert confidently that no such =
movements have existed prior to=20
modern leftism. This is a significant question to which historians ought to =
give their attention.=20

NOTES=20

1. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even most, bullies and =
ruthless competitors suffer from=20
feelings of inferiority.=20

2. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many oversocialized people =
suffered from serious=20
psychological problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their =
sexual feelings. Freud apparently=20
based his theories on people of this type. Today the focus of socialization =
has shifted from sex to=20
aggression.=20

3. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists in engineering =
"hard" sciences.=20

4. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the middle and upper =
classes who resist some of these=20
values, but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such =
resistance appears in the mass media only to=20
a very limited extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is in =
favor of the stated values.=20

The main reasons why these values have become, so to speak, the official =
values of our society is that they=20
are useful to the industrial system. Violence is discouraged because it =
disrupts the functioning of the=20
system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts also disrupt the =
system, and discrimination wastes=20
the talent of minority-group members who could be useful to the system. =
Poverty must be "cured" because=20
the underclass causes problems for the system and contact with the =
underclass lowers the moral of the other=20
classes. Women are encouraged to have careers because their talents are =
useful to the system and, more=20
importantly because by having regular jobs women become better integrated =
into the system and tied=20
directly to it rather than to their families.=20
This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders of the system say they =
want to strengthen the family,=20
but they really mean is that they want the family to serve as an effective =
tool for socializing children in=20
accord with the needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51,52 that the =
system cannot afford to let the=20
family or other small-scale social groups be strong or autonomous.) =


5. (Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority of people don't want =
to make their own decisions but=20
want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an element of truth in =
this. People like to make their=20
own decisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult, =
fundamental questions require facing up=20
to psychological conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict. =
Hence they tend to lean on others in=20
making difficult decisions. The majority of people are natural followers, =
not leaders, but they like to have=20
direct personal access to their leaders and participate to some extent in =
making difficult decisions. At least=20
to that degree they need autonomy.=20

6. (Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by =
caged animals.=20

To explain how these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the =
power process:=20

Common-sense understanding of human nature tells one that lack of goals =
whose attainment requires effort=20
leads to boredom and that boredom, long continued, often leads eventually =
to depression. Failure to obtain=20
goals leads to frustration and lowering of self-esteem. Frustration leads =
to anger, anger to aggression, often=20
in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been shown that long-continued =
frustration commonly leads to=20
depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep disorders, =
eating disorders and bad feelings about=20
oneself. Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure as an =
antidote; hence insatiable hedonism=20
and excessive sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. =
Boredom too tends to cause excessive=20
pleasure-seeking since,=20
lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal. See accompanying =
diagram. The foregoing is a=20
simplification. Reality is more complex, and of course deprivation with =
respect to the power process is not=20
the ONLY cause of the symptoms described. By the way, when we mention =
depression we do not=20
necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be treated by a =
psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of=20
depression are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not necessarily =
mean long-term, thought out=20
goals. For many or most people through much of human history, the goals of =
a hand-to-mouth existence=20
(merely providing oneself and one's family with food from day to day) have =
been quite sufficient.=20

7. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for a few passive, inward =
looking groups, such as the=20
Amish, which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from these, =
some genuine small-scale=20
communities do exist in America today. For instance, youth gangs and =
"cults". Everyone regards them as=20
dangerous, and so they are, because the members of these groups are loyal =
primarily to one another rather=20
than to the system, hence the system cannot control them. Or take the =
gypsies. The gypsies commonly get=20
away with theft and fraud because their loyalties are such that they can =
always get other gypsies to give=20
testimony that "proves" their innocence. Obviously the system would be in =
serious trouble if too many=20
people belonged to such groups. Some of the=20
early-20th century Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing =
China recognized the necessity=20
of breaking down small-scale social groups such as the family: "(According =
to Sun Yat-sen) The Chinese=20
people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of =
loyalty from the family to the=20
state. . .(According to Li Huang) traditional attachments, particularly to =
the family had to be abandoned if=20
nationalism were to develop to China." (Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political =
Thought in the Twentieth=20
Century," page 125, page 297.)=20

8. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, =
and serious ones, but for the=20
sake of breviety we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.=20

9. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the underclass. We are speaking of the =
mainstream.=20

10. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators, "mental health" =
professionals and the like are doing=20
their best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see to it =
that everyone has a satisfactory social=20
life.=20

11. (Paragraphs 63, 82) Is the drive for endless material acquisition =
really an artificial creation of the=20
advertising and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate human =
drive for material acquisition.=20
There have been many cultures in which people have desired little material =
wealth beyond what was=20
necessary to satisfy their basic physical needs (Australian aborigines, =
traditional Mexican peasant culture,=20
some African cultures). On the other hand there have also been many =
pre-industrial cultures in which=20
material acquisition has played an important role. So we can't claim that =
today's acquisition-oriented=20
culture is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing =
industry. But it is clear that the=20
advertising and marketing industry has had an=20
important part in creating that culture. The big corporations that spend =
millions on advertising wouldn't be=20
spending that kind of money without solid proof that they were getting it =
back in increased sales. One=20
member of FC met a sales manager a couple of years ago who was frank enough =
to tell him, "Our job is to=20
make people buy things they don't want and don't need." He then described =
how an untrained novice could=20
present people with the facts about a product, and make no sales at all, =
while a trained and experienced=20
professional salesman would make lots of sales to the same people. This =
shows that people are manipulated=20
into buying things they don't really want.=20

12. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness seems to have become less =
serious during the last 15=20
years or so, because people now feel less secure physically and =
economically than they did earlier, and the=20
need for security provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has been =
replaced by frustration over the=20
difficulty of attaining security. We emphasize the problem of =
purposelessness because the liberals and=20
leftists would wish to solve our social problems by having society =
guarantee everyone's security; but if that=20
could be done it would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The =
real issue is not whether=20
society provides well or poorly for people's security; the trouble is that =
people are dependent on the system=20
for=20
their security rather than having it in their own hands. This, by the way, =
is part of the reason why some=20
people get worked up about the right to bear arms; possession of a gun puts =
that aspect of their security in=20
their own hands.=20

13. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives' efforts to decrease the amount of =
government regulation are of little=20
benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the =
regulations can be eliminated because most=20
regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation =
affects business rather than the=20
average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the =
government and give it to private=20
corporations. What this means for the average man is that government =
interference in his life is replaced by=20
interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for e xample, =
to dump more chemicals that=20
get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just =
taking the average man for a=20
sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of =
Big Business.=20

14. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the purpose for which =
propaganda is being used in a given=20
case, he generally calls it "education" or applies to it some similar =
euphemism. But propaganda is=20
propaganda regardless of the purpose for which it i s used.=20

15. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or disapproval of the =
Panama invasion. We only use it=20
to illustrate a point.=20

16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there =
were fewer and less effective=20
legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution =
went into effect, yet there was=20
more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the =
War of Independence, than=20
there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We =
quote from "Violence in America:=20
Historical and Comparative perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and =
Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12=20
by Roger Lane, pages 476-478: "The progressive heightening of standards o f =
property, and with it the=20
increasing reliance on official law enforcement (in 19th century America). =
.. .were common to the whole=20
society. . .[T]he change in social behavior=20
is so long term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with the most =
funda mental of contemporary=20
social processes; tha t of industrial urbanization itself. . =
.."Massachusetts in 1835 had a population of some=20
660,940, 81 percent rural, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. =
It's citizens were used to=20
considerable personal freedom. Whether teamsters, farmers or artisa ns, =
they were all accustomed to setting=20
thei r own schedules, and the nature of their work made them physically =
dependent on each other. .=20
..Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not generally cause for =
wider social concern. . ."But the=20
impact of the twin movements to the city and to the fac tory, both just =
gathering force in 1835, had a=20
progressive effect on personal behavior=20
throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. The factory demanded =
regularity of behavior, a life=20
governed by obedience to the rhythms of clock and calendar, the demands of =
foreman and supervisor. In=20
the city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neighborhoods =
inhibited many actions previously=20
unobjectionable.=20

Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger establishments were =
mutually dependent on their fellows.=20
as one man's work fit into another's, so one man's business was no longer =
his own. "The results of the new=20
organization of life and work were appar ent by 1900, when some 76 percent =
of the 2,8 05,346 inhabitants=20
of Massachusetts were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular =
behavior which had been tolerable=20
in a casual, independent society was no longer acceptable in the more =
formalized, cooperative atmosphere=20
of the later period. . . The move to the cities had, in short, produc ed a =
more tractable, more socialized,=20
more 'civilized' generation than its predecessors."=20

17. (Paragraph 117) Apologists for the system are fond of citing cases in =
which elections have been=20
decided by one or two votes, but such cases are rare.=20

18. (Paragraph 119) "Today, in technologically advanced lands, men live =
very similar lives in spite of=20
geographical, religious and political differences. The daily lives of a =
Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a=20
Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo, a Communist bank clerk in Moscow are far more =
alike than the life any one=20
of them is like that of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. =
These similarities are the result of a=20
common technology. . ." L. Sprague de Camp, "The Ancient Engineers," =
Ballentine edition, page 17.=20

The lives of the three bank clerks are not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have =
SOME effect. But all=20
technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve along =
APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.=20

19. (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic engineer might =
create a lot of terrorists.=20

20. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of undesirable consequences of =
medical progress, suppose a=20
reliable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment is too =
expensive to be available to any but the=20
elite, it will greatly reduce their incen tive to stop the escape of =
carcinogens into the environment.=20

21. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that =
a large number of good things=20
can add up to a bad thing, we will illustrate with an analogy. Suppose Mr. =
A is playing chess with Mr. B.=20
Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over Mr . A's shoulder. Mr. A of course =
wants to win his game, so if Mr.=20
C points out a good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But =
suppose now that Mr. C tells Mr.=20
A how to make ALL of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A a =
favor by showing him his=20
best move, but by making AL L of his moves for him he spoils the game, s =
ince there is not point in Mr.=20
A's playing the game at all if someone else makes all his moves.=20

The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system makes =
an individual's life easier for=20
him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him of control over =
his own fate.=20

22. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the conflict of values =
within the mainstream. For the=20
sake of simplicity we leave out of the picture "outsider" values like the =
idea that wild nature is more=20
important than human economic welfare.=20

23. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MATERIAL =
self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of=20
some psychological need, for example, by promoting one's own ideology or =
religion.=20

24. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest of the system to =
permit a certain prescribed degree=20
of freedom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with suitable =
limitations and restraints) has=20
proved effective in promoting economic growth. But only planned, =
circumscribed, li mited freedom is in=20
the interest of the system. The individual must always be kept on a leash, =
even if the leash is sometimes=20
long( see paragraphs 94, 97).=20

25. (Paragraph 143) We don't mean to suggest that the efficiency or the =
potential for survival of a society=20
has always been inversely proportional to the amount of pressure or =
discomfort to which the society=20
subjects people. That is certainly not the c ase. There is good reason to =
believe that ma ny primitive=20
societies subjected people to less pressure than the European society did, =
but European society proved far=20
more efficient than any primitive society and always won out in conflicts =
with such societies because of the=20
advantages conferred by te chnology.=20

26. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law enforcement is =
unequivocally good because it=20
suppresses crime, then remember that crime as defined by the system is not =
necessarily what YOU would=20
call crime. Today, smoking marijuana is a "crime ," and, in some places in =
the U.S.., so is p ossession of=20
ANY firearm, registered or not, may be made a crime, and the same thing may =
happen with disapproved=20
methods of child-rearing, such as spanking. In some countries, expression =
of dissident political opinions is=20
a crime, and there is no certaint y that this will never happen in the =
U.S., s ince no constitution or political=20
system lasts forever.=20

If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then =
there is something gravely wrong=20
with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so =
many refuse to follow the rules, or=20
follow them only because forced. Man y societies in the past have gotten by =
with little or no formal law-
enforcement.=20

27. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have had means of =
influencing behavior, but these have been=20
primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the technological means =
that are now being developed.=20

28. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have publicly expressed =
opinions indicating their=20
contempt for human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon was quoted =
in Omni (August 1987)=20
as saying, "I visualize a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to =
humans, and I'm rooting fo r the=20
machines."=20

29. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After writing paragraph 154 =
we came across an article in=20
Scientific American according to which scientists are actively developing =
techniques for identifying=20
possible future criminals and for treating the m by a combination of =
biological and psychol ogical means.=20
Some scientists advocate compulsory application of the treatment, which may =
be available in the near=20
future. (See "Seeking the Criminal Element", by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific =
American, March 1995.)=20
Maybe you think this is OK because the trea tment would be applied to those =
who might be come drunk=20
drivers (they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who spank =
their children, then to=20
environmentalists who sabotage logging equipment,=20
eventually to anyone whose behavior is inconvenient for the system. =


30. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as a counter-ideal to =
technology is that, in many people,=20
nature inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with religion, so =
that nature could perhaps be=20
idealized on a religious basis. It is tr ue that in many societies religion =
has serve d as a support and=20
justification for the established order, but it is also true that religion =
has often provided a basis for=20
rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce a religious element into the =
rebellion against technology, the=20
more so because Weste rn society today has no strong religious fou ndation. =


Religion, nowadays either is used as cheap and transparent support for =
narrow, short-sighted selfishness=20
(some conservatives use it this way), or even is cynically exploited to =
make easy money (by many=20
evangelists), or has degenerated into crude irrati onalism (fundamentalist =
Protestant sects, "c ults"), or is=20
simply stagnant (Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing =
to a strong, widespread, dynamic=20
religion that the West has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion =
of leftism, but leftism today is=20
fragmented and has no cle ar, unified inspiring goal.=20

Thus there is a religious vaccuum in our society that could perhaps be =
filled by a religion focused on nature=20
in opposition to technology. But it would be a mistake to try to concoct =
artificially a religion to fill this=20
role. Such an invented religion would probably be a failure. Take the =
"Gaia" religion for example. Do its=20
adherents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If they are =
just play-acting their religion will=20
be a flop in the end.=20

It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into the conflict of =
nature vs. technology unless you=20
REALLY believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a deep, =
strong, genuine response in many=20
other people.=20

31. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push occurs. Conceivably the =
industrial system might be=20
eliminated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion. (see paragraphs 4, =
167 and Note 4).=20

32. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely) that the revolution =
might consist only of a massive=20
change of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively gradual and =
painless disintegration of the=20
industrial system. But if this happens we'll be very lucky. It's far more =
probably that the transition to a=20
nontechnological society will be very difficult and full of conflicts and =
disasters.=20

33. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological structure of a society =
are far more important than its=20
political structure in determining the way the average man lives (see =
paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).=20

34. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our particular brand of =
anarchism. A wide variety of social=20
attitudes have been called "anarchist," and it may be that many who =
consider themselves anarchists would=20
not accept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted, by the way, =
that there is a nonviolent=20
anarchist movement whose members probably would not accept FC as anarchist =
and certainly would not=20
approve of FC's violent methods.=20

35. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by hostility, but the =
hostility probably results in part=20
from a frustrated need for power.=20

36. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that we mean someone who =
sympathizes with these=20
MOVEMENTS as they exist today in our society. One who believes that women, =
homosexuals, etc., should=20
have equal rights is not necessarily a leftist. The f eminist, gay rights, =
etc., movements that ex ist in our=20
society have the particular ideological tone that characterizes leftism, =
and if one believes, for example, that=20
women should have equal rights it does not necessarily follow that one must =
sympathize with the feminist=20
movement as it exists today .=20

If copyright problems make it impossible for this long quotation to be =
printed, then please change Note 16=20
to read as follows:=20

16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there =
were fewer and less effective=20
legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution =
went into effect, yet there was=20
more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the =
War of Independence, than=20
there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. In =
"Violence in America: Historical and=20
Comparative Perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, =
Chapter 12 by Roger=20
Lane, it is explained how in pr e-industrial America the average person had =
greater independence and=20
autonomy than he does today, and how the process of industrialization =
necessarily led to the restriction of=20
personal freedom.


End of message.


.
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No. 7 - MIME text and attachment
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-6>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
  boundary="boundary-replacement-string-1"

This is a MIME Message

--boundary-replacement-string-1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

here is some text

--boundary-replacement-string-1
Content-Description: deisl1.isu
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="deisl1.isu"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

cagAAAECqE4CACkAU3RpcmxpbmcgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVzLCBJbmMuIChjKSAx
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JjAjGCjq0MyJ9dDMifzQzIv/08x7WBzOJg3RIysU0SMrG9EwJ4AAAAD/AAD/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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Here is some more text. The attachment is above.
--=20
The curator

--boundary-replacement-string-1--


.
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.6 - Encoded "=" characters
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-7>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The following line contains 5 "equals" characters. These should
arrive MIME-encoded.

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

End of message.

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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.5 - Empty message body
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-8>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


.
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.4 - Trailing spaces and tab characters
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-9>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

This line has 1 trailing space character >=20
This line has 2 trailing space characters> =20
This line has 3 trailing space characters>  =20
This line has 4 trailing space characters>   =20

This line has 1 trailing TAB character >=09
This line has 2 trailing TAB characters>	=09
This line has 3 trailing TAB characters>		=09
This line has 4 trailing TAB characters>			=09

End of message.

.
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.3 - Wrapped lines
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-10>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

This message contains a series of lines - which
range between 90 and 70 characters in length.


90CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
78901234567890

89CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789

88CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
789012345678

87CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
78901234567

86CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456

85CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
789012345

84CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
78901234

83CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123

82CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
789012

81CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
78901

80CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890

79CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
789

78CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
78

77CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7

76CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=


75CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345

74CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234

73CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123

72CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012

71CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901

70CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

End of message.

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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.2 - Dot stuffing test
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-11>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

This message contains a block of dot characters,=20
arranged into the shape of a triangle. There are=20
four rows in the triangle; the first row contains
4 dots, the last row contains 1 dot.

.....
....
...
..

..This line should contain a "dot" as its first character.

End of message.

.
RSET
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
DATA
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
Subject: Test message No.1 - 1000 character line in message
Date: date-replacement-string-
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-12>
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Language: i-default
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The line in the following 3 paragraphs each contain 1000 characters: =

the maximum limit of linelength for SMTP mail. Each should arrive as
one wrapped paragraph in the received message. The dot-stuffed
paragraph is the absolute maximum line length permissable in SMTP
protocol - although in practice IMCV wraps the data into shorter
lines before it is actually sent.

1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
901234567890

The following paragraph will be dot stuffed into 1001 characters:

..123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123=
4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789=
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123=
4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789=
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
890123456789

Start67890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
901234567End

End of message.

.
QUIT