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EHLO []
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RSET
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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DATA
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From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Subject: Test message No.9
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Date: date-replacement-string-
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Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-1>
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X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Language: i-default
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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This msg should be sent 4 times=20
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-Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients =
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should not appear in the msg header.
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-Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all =
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the 'To' & 'Cc'
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recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except =
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the one to=20
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whom the mail is addressed to.
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End of message.
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.
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RSET
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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DATA
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From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Subject: Test message No.9
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Date: date-replacement-string-
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Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-2>
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X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Language: i-default
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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This msg should be sent 4 times=20
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-Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients =
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should not appear in the msg header.
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-Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all =
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the 'To' & 'Cc'
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recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except =
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the one to=20
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whom the mail is addressed to.
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End of message.
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.
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RSET
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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DATA
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From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Subject: Test message No.9
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Date: date-replacement-string-
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Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-3>
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X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Language: i-default
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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This msg should be sent 4 times=20
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-Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients =
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should not appear in the msg header.
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-Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all =
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the 'To' & 'Cc'
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recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except =
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the one to=20
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whom the mail is addressed to.
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End of message.
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.
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RSET
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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DATA
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From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Cc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra, recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Bcc: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
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Subject: Test message No.9
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Date: date-replacement-string-
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Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-4>
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X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Language: i-default
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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This msg should be sent 4 times=20
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-Send one msg to 'To' & 'Cc' recipients. In this case 'Bcc' recipients =
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should not appear in the msg header.
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-Send one Msg per 'Bcc' recipient, in each msg the header will show all =
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the 'To' & 'Cc'
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recipients. All 'Bcc' recipients should not appear in the header except =
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the one to=20
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whom the mail is addressed to.
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End of message.
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.
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RSET
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MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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DATA
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From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
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To: <recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
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Subject: Test message No.8 - Long message (206KB)
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Date: date-replacement-string-
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Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-5>
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X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Language: i-default
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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INTRODUCTION
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1. The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for =
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the human race. They have=20
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greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in "advanced" =
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countries, but they have=20
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destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human =
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beings to indignities, have led to=20
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widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical =
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suffering as well) and have inflicted=20
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severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology =
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will worsen the situation. It=20
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will certainly subject human beings to greater indignities and inflict =
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greater damage on the natural world, it=20
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will probably lead to greater social disruption and psychological =
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suffering, and it may lead to increased=20
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physical suffering even in "advanced" countries.=20
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2. The industrial-technological system may survive or it may break down. If =
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it survives, it MAY eventually=20
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achieve a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after =
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passing through a long and very=20
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painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently reducing =
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human beings and many other=20
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living organisms to engineered products and mere cogs in the social =
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machine. Furthermore, if the system=20
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survives, the consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming =
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or modifying the system so as=20
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to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.=20
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3. If the system breaks down the consequences will still be very painful. =
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But the bigger the system grows=20
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the more disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to =
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break down it had best break down=20
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sooner rather than later.=20
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4. We therefore advocate a revolution against the industrial system. This =
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revolution may or may not make=20
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use of violence: it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process =
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spanning a few decades. We=20
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can't predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the =
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measures that those who hate the=20
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industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution =
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against that form of society. This=20
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is not to be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not =
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governments but the economic=20
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and technological basis of the present society.=20
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5. In this article we give attention to only some of the negative =
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developments that have grown out of the=20
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industrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention only =
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briefly or ignore altogether.=20
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This does not mean that we regard these other developments as unimportant. =
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For practical reasons we have=20
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to confine our discussion to areas that have received insufficient public =
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attention or in which we have=20
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something new to say. For example, since there are well-developed =
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environmental and wilderness=20
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movements, we have written very little about environmental degradation or =
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the destruction of wild nature,=20
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even though we consider these to be highly important.=20
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM
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6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in a deeply troubled society. =
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One of the most widespread=20
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manifestations of the craziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of =
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the psychology of leftism can=20
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serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modern =
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society in general.=20
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7. But what is leftism? During the first half of the 20th century leftism =
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could have been practically=20
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identified with socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not =
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clear who can properly be called=20
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a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we have in mind mainly =
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socialists, collectivists,=20
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"politically correct" types, feminists, gay and disability activists, =
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animal rights activists and the like. But=20
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not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is a leftist. =
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What we are trying to get at in=20
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discussing leftism is not so much a movement or an ideology as a =
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psychological type, or rather a collection=20
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of related types. Thus, what we mean by "leftism" will emerge more clearly =
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in the course of our discussion=20
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of leftist psychology (Also, see paragraphs 227-230.)=20
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8. Even so, our conception of leftism will remain a good deal less clear =
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than we would wish, but there=20
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doesn't seem to be any remedy for this. All we are trying to do is indicate =
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in a rough and approximate way=20
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the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the main driving force =
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of modern leftism. We by no=20
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means claim to be telling the WHOLE truth about leftist psychology. Also, =
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our discussion is meant to=20
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apply to modern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to =
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which our discussion could be=20
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applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th century.=20
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9. The two psychological tendencies that underlie modern leftism we call =
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"feelings of inferiority" and=20
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"oversocialization." Feelings of inferiority are characteristic of modern =
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leftism as a whole, while=20
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oversocialization is characteristic only of a certain segment of modern =
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leftism; but this segment is highly=20
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influential.=20
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FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY
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10. By "feelings of inferiority" we mean not only inferiority feelings in =
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the strictest sense but a whole=20
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spectrum of related traits: low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, =
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depressive tendencies, defeatism,=20
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guilt, self-hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have such =
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feelings (possibly more or less=20
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repressed) and that these feelings are decisive in determining the =
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direction of modern leftism.=20
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11. When someone interprets as derogatory almost anything that is said =
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about him (or about groups with=20
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whom he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low =
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self-esteem. This tendency is=20
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pronounced among minority rights advocates, whether or not they belong to =
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the minority groups whose=20
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rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the words used to =
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designate minorities. The terms=20
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"negro," "oriental," "handicapped" or "chick" for an African, an Asian, a =
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disabled person or a woman=20
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originally had no derogatory connotation. "Broad" and "chick" were merely =
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the feminine equivalents of=20
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"guy," "dude" or "fellow." The negative connotations have been attached to =
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these terms by the activists=20
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themselves. Some animal rights advocates have gone so far as to reject the =
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word "pet" and=20
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insist on its replacement by "animal companion." Leftist anthropologists go =
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to great lengths to avoid saying=20
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anything about primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as =
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negative. They want to replace=20
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the word "primitive" by "nonliterate." They seem almost paranoid about =
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anything that might suggest that=20
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any primitive culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that =
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primitive cultures ARE inferior=20
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to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish =
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anthropologists.)=20
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12. Those who are most sensitive about "politically incorrect" terminology =
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are not the average black=20
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ghetto-dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a =
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minority of activists, many of=20
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whom do not even belong to any "oppressed" group but come from privileged =
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strata of society. Political=20
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correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have secure =
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employment with comfortable=20
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salaries, and the majority of whom are heterosexual, white males from =
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middle-class families.=20
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13. Many leftists have an intense identification with the problems of =
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groups that have an image of being=20
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weak (women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals), or =
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otherwise inferior. The leftists=20
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themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They would never admit it =
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to themselves that they have such=20
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feelings, but it is precisely because they do see these groups as inferior =
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that they identify with their=20
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problems. (We do not suggest that women, Indians, etc., ARE inferior; we =
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are only making a point about=20
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leftist psychology).=20
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14. Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that women are as strong as =
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capable as men. Clearly they=20
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are nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men. =
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15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image of being strong, good =
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and successful. They hate=20
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America, they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they hate =
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rationality. The reasons that=20
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leftists give for hating the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with =
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their real motives. They SAY they hate=20
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the West because it is warlike, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so =
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forth, but where these same faults=20
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appear in socialist countries or in primitive cultures, the leftist finds =
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excuses for them, or at best he=20
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GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whereas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out =
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(and often greatly=20
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exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western civilization. Thus =
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it is clear that these faults are not=20
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the leftist's real motive for hating America and the West.
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He hates America and the West because they are strong and successful. =
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16. Words like "self-confidence," "self-reliance," "initiative", =
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"enterprise," "optimism," etc. play little role=20
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in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, =
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pro-collectivist. He wants society to=20
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solve everyone's needs for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of =
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person who has an inner sense of=20
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confidence in his own ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own =
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needs. The leftist is=20
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antagonistic to the concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels =
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like a loser.=20
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17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftist intellectuals tend to focus on =
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sordidness, defeat and despair, or=20
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else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there =
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were no hope of accomplishing=20
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anything through rational calculation and all that was left was to immerse =
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oneself in the sensations of the=20
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moment.=20
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18. Modern leftist philosophers tend to dismiss reason, science, objective =
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reality and to insist that=20
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everything is culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious =
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368 |
questions about the foundations of=20
|
|
369 |
scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of objective =
|
|
370 |
reality can be defined. But it is=20
|
|
371 |
obvious that modern leftist philosophers are not simply cool-headed =
|
|
372 |
logicians systematically analyzing the=20
|
|
373 |
foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their =
|
|
374 |
attack on truth and reality. They=20
|
|
375 |
attack these concepts because of their own psychological needs. For one =
|
|
376 |
thing, their attack is an outlet for=20
|
|
377 |
hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive =
|
|
378 |
for power. More importantly, the leftist=20
|
|
379 |
hates science and rationality because=20
|
|
380 |
they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and =
|
|
381 |
other beliefs as false (i.e. failed, inferior).=20
|
|
382 |
The leftist's feelings of inferiority run so deep that he cannot tolerate =
|
|
383 |
any classification of some things as=20
|
|
384 |
successful or superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also =
|
|
385 |
underlies the rejection by many=20
|
|
386 |
leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of IQ tests. =
|
|
387 |
Leftists are antagonistic to genetic=20
|
|
388 |
explanations of human abilities or behavior because such explanations tend =
|
|
389 |
to make some persons appear=20
|
|
390 |
superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit =
|
|
391 |
or blame for an individual's ability or=20
|
|
392 |
lack of it. Thus if a person is "inferior" it is not his fault, but =
|
|
393 |
society's, because he has not been brought up=20
|
|
394 |
properly.=20
|
|
395 |
|
|
396 |
19. The leftist is not typically the kind of person whose feelings of =
|
|
397 |
inferiority make him a braggart, an=20
|
|
398 |
egotist, a bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of =
|
|
399 |
person has not wholly lost faith in=20
|
|
400 |
himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can =
|
|
401 |
still conceive of himself as having=20
|
|
402 |
the capacity to be strong, and his efforts to make himself strong produce =
|
|
403 |
his unpleasant behavior. [1] But=20
|
|
404 |
the leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so =
|
|
405 |
ingrained that he cannot conceive of=20
|
|
406 |
himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence the collectivism of the =
|
|
407 |
leftist. He can feel strong only as=20
|
|
408 |
a member of a large organization or a mass movement with which he =
|
|
409 |
identifies himself.=20
|
|
410 |
|
|
411 |
20. Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics. Leftists protest by =
|
|
412 |
lying down in front of vehicles,=20
|
|
413 |
they intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These =
|
|
414 |
tactics may often be effective, but=20
|
|
415 |
many leftists use them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER =
|
|
416 |
masochistic tactics. Self-hatred=20
|
|
417 |
is a leftist trait.=20
|
|
418 |
|
|
419 |
21. Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated by compassion or by =
|
|
420 |
moral principle, and moral=20
|
|
421 |
principle does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But =
|
|
422 |
compassion and moral principle=20
|
|
423 |
cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent =
|
|
424 |
a component of leftist behavior;=20
|
|
425 |
so is the drive for power. Moreover, much leftist behavior is not =
|
|
426 |
rationally calculated to be of benefit to the=20
|
|
427 |
people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one =
|
|
428 |
believes that affirmative action is=20
|
|
429 |
good for black people, does it make sense to demand affirmative action in =
|
|
430 |
hostile or dogmatic terms?=20
|
|
431 |
Obviously it would be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory =
|
|
432 |
approach that would make at=20
|
|
433 |
least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that =
|
|
434 |
|
|
435 |
affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not =
|
|
436 |
take such an approach because it=20
|
|
437 |
would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black people is not their =
|
|
438 |
real goal. Instead, race problems=20
|
|
439 |
serve as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated =
|
|
440 |
need for power. In doing so they=20
|
|
441 |
actually harm black people, because the activists' hostile attitude toward =
|
|
442 |
the white majority tends to=20
|
|
443 |
intensify race hatred.=20
|
|
444 |
|
|
445 |
22. If our society had no social problems at all, the leftists would have =
|
|
446 |
to INVENT problems in order to=20
|
|
447 |
provide themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.=20
|
|
448 |
|
|
449 |
23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend to be an accurate =
|
|
450 |
description of everyone who might=20
|
|
451 |
be considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general =
|
|
452 |
tendency of leftism.=20
|
|
453 |
|
|
454 |
OVERSOCIALIZATION
|
|
455 |
|
|
456 |
24. Psychologists use the term "socialization" to designate the process by =
|
|
457 |
which children are trained to=20
|
|
458 |
think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if =
|
|
459 |
he believes in and obeys the=20
|
|
460 |
moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that =
|
|
461 |
society. It may seem senseless to say=20
|
|
462 |
that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a =
|
|
463 |
rebel. Nevertheless, the position can=20
|
|
464 |
be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.=20
|
|
465 |
|
|
466 |
25. The moral code of our society is so demanding that no one can think, =
|
|
467 |
feel and act in a completely moral=20
|
|
468 |
way. For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet almost everyone =
|
|
469 |
hates somebody at some time=20
|
|
470 |
or other, whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are so highly =
|
|
471 |
socialized that the attempt to=20
|
|
472 |
think, feel and act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order to =
|
|
473 |
avoid feelings of guilt, they=20
|
|
474 |
continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find =
|
|
475 |
moral explanations for feelings=20
|
|
476 |
and actions that in reality have a non-moral origin. We use the term =
|
|
477 |
"oversocialized" to describe such=20
|
|
478 |
people. [2]=20
|
|
479 |
|
|
480 |
26. Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a sense of =
|
|
481 |
powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of=20
|
|
482 |
the most important means by which our society socializes children is by =
|
|
483 |
making them feel ashamed of=20
|
|
484 |
behavior or speech that is contrary to society's expectations. If this is =
|
|
485 |
overdone, or if a particular child is=20
|
|
486 |
especially susceptible to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of =
|
|
487 |
HIMSELF. Moreover the thought=20
|
|
488 |
and the behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by =
|
|
489 |
society's expectations than are those of=20
|
|
490 |
the lightly socialized person. The majority of people engage in a =
|
|
491 |
significant amount of naughty behavior.=20
|
|
492 |
They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off =
|
|
493 |
at work, they hate someone, they=20
|
|
494 |
say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get ahead of the =
|
|
495 |
|
|
496 |
other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if he does =
|
|
497 |
do them he generates in himself=20
|
|
498 |
a sense of shame and self-hatred. The oversocialized person cannot even =
|
|
499 |
experience, without guilt,=20
|
|
500 |
thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot =
|
|
501 |
think "unclean" thoughts. And=20
|
|
502 |
socialization is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to =
|
|
503 |
confirm to many norms of behavior that=20
|
|
504 |
do not fall under the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person =
|
|
505 |
is kept on a psychological leash=20
|
|
506 |
and spends his life running on rails that society has laid down for him. In =
|
|
507 |
many oversocialized people this=20
|
|
508 |
results in a sense of constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe =
|
|
509 |
hardship. We suggest that=20
|
|
510 |
oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings =
|
|
511 |
inflict on one another.=20
|
|
512 |
|
|
513 |
27. We argue that a very important and influential segment of the modern =
|
|
514 |
left is oversocialized and that=20
|
|
515 |
their oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction =
|
|
516 |
of modern leftism. Leftists of the=20
|
|
517 |
oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the upper-middle =
|
|
518 |
class. Notice that university=20
|
|
519 |
intellectuals (3) constitute the most highly socialized segment of our =
|
|
520 |
society and also the most left-wing=20
|
|
521 |
segment.=20
|
|
522 |
|
|
523 |
28. The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his =
|
|
524 |
psychological leash and assert his autonomy by=20
|
|
525 |
rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most =
|
|
526 |
basic values of society. Generally=20
|
|
527 |
speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict with the =
|
|
528 |
accepted morality. On the contrary, the=20
|
|
529 |
left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then =
|
|
530 |
accuses mainstream society of=20
|
|
531 |
violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, =
|
|
532 |
helping poor people, peace as=20
|
|
533 |
opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to =
|
|
534 |
animals. More fundamentally,=20
|
|
535 |
the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take =
|
|
536 |
care of the individual. All these=20
|
|
537 |
have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle =
|
|
538 |
and=20
|
|
539 |
upper classes (4) for a long time. These values are explicitly or =
|
|
540 |
implicitly expressed or presupposed in most=20
|
|
541 |
of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and =
|
|
542 |
the educational system.=20
|
|
543 |
Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel =
|
|
544 |
against these principles but justify=20
|
|
545 |
their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that =
|
|
546 |
society is not living up to these=20
|
|
547 |
principles.=20
|
|
548 |
|
|
549 |
29. Here is an illustration of the way in which the oversocialized leftist =
|
|
550 |
shows his real attachment to the=20
|
|
551 |
conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion =
|
|
552 |
against it. Many leftists push for=20
|
|
553 |
affirmative action, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for =
|
|
554 |
improved education in black=20
|
|
555 |
schools and more money for such schools; the way of life of the black =
|
|
556 |
"underclass" they regard as a social=20
|
|
557 |
disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system, make him a =
|
|
558 |
business executive, a lawyer, a=20
|
|
559 |
scientist just like upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will =
|
|
560 |
reply that the last thing they want is to=20
|
|
561 |
make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they want to =
|
|
562 |
preserve African American culture.=20
|
|
563 |
But in what does this preservation of African American culture consist? =
|
|
564 |
|
|
565 |
It can hardly consist in anything more than eating black-style food, =
|
|
566 |
listening to black-style music, wearing=20
|
|
567 |
black-style clothing and going to a black-style church or mosque. In other =
|
|
568 |
words, it can express itself only=20
|
|
569 |
in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects more leftists of the =
|
|
570 |
oversocialized type want to make the=20
|
|
571 |
black man conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him =
|
|
572 |
study technical subjects, become=20
|
|
573 |
an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to =
|
|
574 |
prove that black people are as good=20
|
|
575 |
as white. They want to make black fathers "responsible." they want black =
|
|
576 |
gangs to become nonviolent, etc.=20
|
|
577 |
But these are exactly the values of the industrial-technological system. =
|
|
578 |
The system couldn't care less what=20
|
|
579 |
kind of music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what =
|
|
580 |
|
|
581 |
religion he believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a =
|
|
582 |
respectable job, climbs the status ladder, is a=20
|
|
583 |
"responsible" parent, is nonviolent and so forth. In effect, however much =
|
|
584 |
he may deny it, the oversocialized=20
|
|
585 |
leftist wants to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt =
|
|
586 |
its values.=20
|
|
587 |
|
|
588 |
30. We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the oversocialized =
|
|
589 |
type, NEVER rebel against the=20
|
|
590 |
fundamental values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some =
|
|
591 |
oversocialized leftists have gone so=20
|
|
592 |
far as to rebel against one of modern society's most important principles =
|
|
593 |
by engaging in physical violence.=20
|
|
594 |
By their own account, violence is for them a form of "liberation." In other =
|
|
595 |
words, by committing violence=20
|
|
596 |
they break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into =
|
|
597 |
them. Because they are=20
|
|
598 |
oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for them than for =
|
|
599 |
others; hence their need to break=20
|
|
600 |
free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion in terms of =
|
|
601 |
mainstream values. If they engage in=20
|
|
602 |
violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.=20
|
|
603 |
|
|
604 |
31. We realize that many objections could be raised to the foregoing =
|
|
605 |
thumb-nail sketch of leftist=20
|
|
606 |
psychology. The real situation is complex, and anything like a complete =
|
|
607 |
description of it would take=20
|
|
608 |
several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to =
|
|
609 |
have indicated very roughly=20
|
|
610 |
the two most important tendencies in the psychology of modern leftism. =
|
|
611 |
|
|
612 |
|
|
613 |
32. The problems of the leftist are indicative of the problems of our =
|
|
614 |
society as a whole. Low self-esteem,=20
|
|
615 |
depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though =
|
|
616 |
they are especially noticeable in=20
|
|
617 |
the left, they are widespread in our society. And today's society tries to =
|
|
618 |
socialize us to a greater extent than=20
|
|
619 |
any previous society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to =
|
|
620 |
exercise, how to make love, how to=20
|
|
621 |
raise our kids and so forth.=20
|
|
622 |
|
|
623 |
THE POWER PROCESS
|
|
624 |
|
|
625 |
33. Human beings have a need (probably based in biology) for something that =
|
|
626 |
we will call the "power=20
|
|
627 |
process." This is closely related to the need for power (which is widely =
|
|
628 |
recognized) but is not quite the=20
|
|
629 |
same thing. The power process has four elem ents. The three most clear-cut =
|
|
630 |
of these we call goal, effort=20
|
|
631 |
and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment =
|
|
632 |
requires effort, and needs to=20
|
|
633 |
succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is =
|
|
634 |
more difficult to define and may not=20
|
|
635 |
be necessary for everyone . We call it autonomy and will discuss it l ater =
|
|
636 |
(paragraphs 42-44).=20
|
|
637 |
|
|
638 |
34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can have anything he wants =
|
|
639 |
just by wishing for it. Such a=20
|
|
640 |
man has power, but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first =
|
|
641 |
he will have a lot of fun, but=20
|
|
642 |
by and by he will become acutely bor ed and demoralized. Eventually he may =
|
|
643 |
becom e clinically=20
|
|
644 |
depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies tend to become =
|
|
645 |
decadent. This is not true of fighting=20
|
|
646 |
aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, =
|
|
647 |
secure aristocracies that have no=20
|
|
648 |
need to exert themselve s usually become bored, hedonistic and demor =
|
|
649 |
alized, even though they have=20
|
|
650 |
power. This shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward =
|
|
651 |
which to exercise one's power.=20
|
|
652 |
|
|
653 |
35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the physical necessities =
|
|
654 |
of life: food, water and whatever=20
|
|
655 |
clothing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured =
|
|
656 |
aristocrat obtains these things=20
|
|
657 |
without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.=20
|
|
658 |
|
|
659 |
36. Nonattainment of important goals results in death if the goals are =
|
|
660 |
physical necessities, and in frustration=20
|
|
661 |
if nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent =
|
|
662 |
failure to attain goals throughout life=20
|
|
663 |
results in defeatism, low se lf-esteem or depression.=20
|
|
664 |
|
|
665 |
37. Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being =
|
|
666 |
needs goals whose attainment=20
|
|
667 |
requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining =
|
|
668 |
his goals.=20
|
|
669 |
|
|
670 |
SURROGATE ACTIVITIES
|
|
671 |
|
|
672 |
38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and demoralized. For =
|
|
673 |
example, the emperor Hirohito,=20
|
|
674 |
instead of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine =
|
|
675 |
biology, a field in which he became=20
|
|
676 |
distinguished. When people do not have t o exert themselves to satisfy =
|
|
677 |
their physical needs they often set=20
|
|
678 |
up artificial goals for themselves. In many cases they then pursue these =
|
|
679 |
goals with the same energy and=20
|
|
680 |
emotional involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search =
|
|
681 |
for physical necessities. Thus the=20
|
|
682 |
aristocrats of the Roman Empire had their literary pretentions; many =
|
|
683 |
European aristocrats a few centuries=20
|
|
684 |
ago invested tremendous time and energy in hunting, though they certainly =
|
|
685 |
didn't need the meat; other=20
|
|
686 |
aristocracies have competed for status through elaborate displays of =
|
|
687 |
wealth;=20
|
|
688 |
and a few aristocrats, like Hiroh ito, have turned to science.=20
|
|
689 |
|
|
690 |
39. We use the term "surrogate activity" to designate an activity that is =
|
|
691 |
directed toward an artificial goal=20
|
|
692 |
that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work =
|
|
693 |
toward, or let us say, merely=20
|
|
694 |
for the sake of the "fulfillment" th at they get from pursuing the goal. =
|
|
695 |
Here is a rule of thumb for the=20
|
|
696 |
identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much =
|
|
697 |
time and energy to the pursuit of=20
|
|
698 |
goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote most of his time and energy =
|
|
699 |
to satisfying his biological needs,=20
|
|
700 |
and if that effort required him to use his physical and mental facilities =
|
|
701 |
in a varied and interesting way,=20
|
|
702 |
would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain goal X? If the =
|
|
703 |
answer is no, then the person's=20
|
|
704 |
pursuit of a goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito's studies=20
|
|
705 |
in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity, since it is =
|
|
706 |
pretty certain that if Hirohito had had=20
|
|
707 |
to spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to =
|
|
708 |
obtain the necessities of life, he=20
|
|
709 |
would not have felt deprived because he didn't know all about the anatomy =
|
|
710 |
and life-cycles of marine=20
|
|
711 |
animals. On the other hand the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not =
|
|
712 |
a surrogate activity, because=20
|
|
713 |
most people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would =
|
|
714 |
feel deprived if they passed their=20
|
|
715 |
lives without ever having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex. =
|
|
716 |
(But pursuit of an excessive=20
|
|
717 |
amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.) =
|
|
718 |
|
|
719 |
|
|
720 |
40. In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to =
|
|
721 |
satisfy one's physical needs. It is=20
|
|
722 |
enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical =
|
|
723 |
skill, then come to work on time=20
|
|
724 |
and exert very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements =
|
|
725 |
are a moderate amount of=20
|
|
726 |
intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society =
|
|
727 |
takes care of one from cradle=20
|
|
728 |
to grave. (Yes, there is an underclass that cannot take physical =
|
|
729 |
necessities for granted, but we are speaking=20
|
|
730 |
here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern society =
|
|
731 |
is full of surrogate activities.=20
|
|
732 |
These include scientific work, athletic achievement, humanitarian work, =
|
|
733 |
artistic and literary creation,=20
|
|
734 |
climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far =
|
|
735 |
|
|
736 |
beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical =
|
|
737 |
satisfaction, and social activism when=20
|
|
738 |
it addresses issues that are not important for the activist personally, as =
|
|
739 |
in the case of white activists who=20
|
|
740 |
work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always pure =
|
|
741 |
surrogate activities, since for many=20
|
|
742 |
people they may be motivated in part by needs other than the need to have =
|
|
743 |
some goal to pursue. Scientific=20
|
|
744 |
work may be motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by =
|
|
745 |
a need to express feelings,=20
|
|
746 |
militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them, =
|
|
747 |
these activities are in large part=20
|
|
748 |
surrogate activities. For example, the majority of scientists will probably =
|
|
749 |
agree that the "fulfillment" they=20
|
|
750 |
get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they =
|
|
751 |
earn.=20
|
|
752 |
|
|
753 |
41. For many if not most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying =
|
|
754 |
than the pursuit of real goals ( that=20
|
|
755 |
is, goals that people would want to attain even if their need for the power =
|
|
756 |
process were already fulfilled).=20
|
|
757 |
One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who =
|
|
758 |
are deeply involved in surrogate=20
|
|
759 |
activities are never satisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker =
|
|
760 |
constantly strives for more and more=20
|
|
761 |
wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the =
|
|
762 |
next. The long-distance runner=20
|
|
763 |
drives himself to run always farther and faster. Many people who pursue =
|
|
764 |
surrogate activities will say that=20
|
|
765 |
they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from the =
|
|
766 |
"mundane" business of satisfying=20
|
|
767 |
their biological needs, but that it is because in our society the effort =
|
|
768 |
|
|
769 |
needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More =
|
|
770 |
importantly, in our society=20
|
|
771 |
people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by =
|
|
772 |
functioning as parts of an immense=20
|
|
773 |
social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy =
|
|
774 |
in pursuing their surrogate=20
|
|
775 |
activities. have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate =
|
|
776 |
activities.=20
|
|
777 |
|
|
778 |
AUTONOMY
|
|
779 |
|
|
780 |
42. Autonomy as a part of the power process may not be necessary for every =
|
|
781 |
individual. But most people=20
|
|
782 |
need a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. =
|
|
783 |
Their efforts must be=20
|
|
784 |
undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction =
|
|
785 |
and control. Yet most people do=20
|
|
786 |
not have to exert this initiative, direction and control as single =
|
|
787 |
individuals. It is usually enough to act as a=20
|
|
788 |
member of a SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among =
|
|
789 |
themselves and make a=20
|
|
790 |
successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power =
|
|
791 |
process will be served. But if they work=20
|
|
792 |
under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for =
|
|
793 |
autonomous decision and=20
|
|
794 |
initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served. =
|
|
795 |
|
|
796 |
The same is true when decisions are made on a collective bases if the group =
|
|
797 |
making the collective decision=20
|
|
798 |
is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant [5]=20
|
|
799 |
|
|
800 |
43. It is true that some individuals seem to have little need for autonomy. =
|
|
801 |
Either their drive for power is=20
|
|
802 |
weak or they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful =
|
|
803 |
organization to which they belong.=20
|
|
804 |
And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be satisfied with a =
|
|
805 |
purely physical sense of=20
|
|
806 |
power(the good combat soldier, who gets his sense of power by developing =
|
|
807 |
fighting skills that he is quite=20
|
|
808 |
content to use in blind obedience to his superiors).=20
|
|
809 |
|
|
810 |
44. But for most people it is through the power process-having a goal, =
|
|
811 |
making an AUTONOMOUS effort=20
|
|
812 |
and attaining t the goal-that self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of =
|
|
813 |
power are acquired. When one does=20
|
|
814 |
not have adequate opportunity to go throughout the power process the =
|
|
815 |
consequences are (depending on the=20
|
|
816 |
individual and on the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, =
|
|
817 |
demoralization, low self-esteem,=20
|
|
818 |
inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, =
|
|
819 |
hostility, spouse or child abuse,=20
|
|
820 |
insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating =
|
|
821 |
disorders, etc. [6]=20
|
|
822 |
|
|
823 |
SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS
|
|
824 |
|
|
825 |
45. Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur in any society, but in modern =
|
|
826 |
industrial society they are=20
|
|
827 |
present on a massive scale. We aren't the first to mention that the world =
|
|
828 |
today seems to be going crazy.=20
|
|
829 |
This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good reason =
|
|
830 |
to believe that primitive man=20
|
|
831 |
suffered from less stress and frustration and was better satisfied with his =
|
|
832 |
way of life than modern man is. It=20
|
|
833 |
is true that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse =
|
|
834 |
of women and common among the=20
|
|
835 |
Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among some of the =
|
|
836 |
American Indian tribes. But is=20
|
|
837 |
does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the kinds of problems that we have =
|
|
838 |
listed in the preceding=20
|
|
839 |
paragraph were far less common among primitive peoples than they are in =
|
|
840 |
modern society.=20
|
|
841 |
|
|
842 |
46. We attribute the social and psychological problems of modern society to =
|
|
843 |
the fact that that society=20
|
|
844 |
requires people to live under conditions radically different from those =
|
|
845 |
under which the human race evolved=20
|
|
846 |
and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that the =
|
|
847 |
human race developed while=20
|
|
848 |
living under the earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already =
|
|
849 |
written that we consider lack of=20
|
|
850 |
opportunity to properly experience the power process as the most important =
|
|
851 |
of the abnormal conditions to=20
|
|
852 |
which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one. Before =
|
|
853 |
dealing with disruption of the=20
|
|
854 |
power process as a source of social problems we will discuss some of the =
|
|
855 |
other sources.=20
|
|
856 |
|
|
857 |
47. Among the abnormal conditions present in modern industrial society are =
|
|
858 |
excessive density of=20
|
|
859 |
population, isolation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social =
|
|
860 |
change and the break-down of natural=20
|
|
861 |
small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the =
|
|
862 |
tribe.=20
|
|
863 |
|
|
864 |
48. It is well known that crowding increases stress and aggression. The =
|
|
865 |
degree of crowding that exists=20
|
|
866 |
today and the isolation of man from nature are consequences of =
|
|
867 |
technological progress. All pre-industrial=20
|
|
868 |
societies were predominantly rural. The industrial Revolution vastly =
|
|
869 |
increased the size of cities and the=20
|
|
870 |
proportion of the population that lives in them, and modern agricultural =
|
|
871 |
technology has made it possible for=20
|
|
872 |
the Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. =
|
|
873 |
(Also, technology exacerbates the=20
|
|
874 |
effects of crowding because it puts increased disruptive powers in people's =
|
|
875 |
hands. For example, a variety of=20
|
|
876 |
noise-making devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of =
|
|
877 |
these devices is unrestricted,=20
|
|
878 |
people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise.=20
|
|
879 |
If their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by =
|
|
880 |
the regulations... But if these=20
|
|
881 |
machines had never been invented there would have been no conflict and no =
|
|
882 |
frustration generated by=20
|
|
883 |
them.)=20
|
|
884 |
|
|
885 |
49. For primitive societies the natural world (which usually changes only =
|
|
886 |
slowly) provided a stable=20
|
|
887 |
framework and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it is =
|
|
888 |
human society that dominates nature=20
|
|
889 |
rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very rapidly =
|
|
890 |
owing to technological change.=20
|
|
891 |
Thus there is no stable framework.=20
|
|
892 |
|
|
893 |
50. The conservatives are fools: They whine about the decay of traditional =
|
|
894 |
values, yet they enthusiastically=20
|
|
895 |
support technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never =
|
|
896 |
occurs to them that you can't=20
|
|
897 |
make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a society =
|
|
898 |
with out causing rapid changes=20
|
|
899 |
in all other aspects of the society as well, and that such rapid changes =
|
|
900 |
inevitably break down traditional=20
|
|
901 |
values.=20
|
|
902 |
|
|
903 |
51.The breakdown of traditional values to some extent implies the breakdown =
|
|
904 |
of the bonds that hold=20
|
|
905 |
together traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration of =
|
|
906 |
small-scale social groups is also=20
|
|
907 |
promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt =
|
|
908 |
individuals to move to new locations,=20
|
|
909 |
separating themselves from their communities. Beyond that, a technological =
|
|
910 |
society HAS TO weaken=20
|
|
911 |
family ties and local communities if it is to function efficiently. In =
|
|
912 |
modern society an individual's loyalty=20
|
|
913 |
must be first to the system and only secondarily to a small-scale =
|
|
914 |
community, because if the internal=20
|
|
915 |
loyalties of small-scale small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty =
|
|
916 |
to the system, such=20
|
|
917 |
communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system. =
|
|
918 |
|
|
919 |
|
|
920 |
52. Suppose that a public official or a corporation executive appoints his =
|
|
921 |
cousin, his friend or his co-
|
|
922 |
religionist to a position rather than appointing the person best qualified =
|
|
923 |
for the job. He has permitted=20
|
|
924 |
personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is =
|
|
925 |
"nepotism" or "discrimination," both of=20
|
|
926 |
which are terrible sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies =
|
|
927 |
that have done a poor job of=20
|
|
928 |
subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are =
|
|
929 |
usually very inefficient. (Look at Latin=20
|
|
930 |
America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can tolerate only those =
|
|
931 |
small-scale communities that are=20
|
|
932 |
emasculated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]=20
|
|
933 |
|
|
934 |
53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of communities have been =
|
|
935 |
widely recognized as sources of=20
|
|
936 |
social problems. but we do not believe they are enough to account for the =
|
|
937 |
extent of the problems that are=20
|
|
938 |
seen today.=20
|
|
939 |
|
|
940 |
54. A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crowded, yet their =
|
|
941 |
inhabitants do not seem to have=20
|
|
942 |
suffered from psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In =
|
|
943 |
America today there still are=20
|
|
944 |
uncrowded rural areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban =
|
|
945 |
areas, though the problems tend to=20
|
|
946 |
be less acute in the rural areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the =
|
|
947 |
decisive factor.=20
|
|
948 |
|
|
949 |
55. On the growing edge of the American frontier during the 19th century, =
|
|
950 |
the mobility of the population=20
|
|
951 |
probably broke down extended families and small-scale social groups to at =
|
|
952 |
least the same extent as these=20
|
|
953 |
are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by choice in =
|
|
954 |
such isolation, having no=20
|
|
955 |
neighbors within several miles, that they belonged to no community at all, =
|
|
956 |
yet they do not seem to have=20
|
|
957 |
developed problems as a result.=20
|
|
958 |
|
|
959 |
56.Furthermore, change in American frontier society was very rapid and =
|
|
960 |
deep. A man might be born and=20
|
|
961 |
raised in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and fed largely =
|
|
962 |
on wild meat; and by the time he=20
|
|
963 |
arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in an =
|
|
964 |
ordered community with effective=20
|
|
965 |
law enforcement. This was a deeper change that that which typically occurs =
|
|
966 |
in the life of a modern=20
|
|
967 |
individual, yet it does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In =
|
|
968 |
fact, 19th century American=20
|
|
969 |
society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that of =
|
|
970 |
today's society. [8]=20
|
|
971 |
|
|
972 |
57. The difference, we argue, is that modern man has the sense (largely =
|
|
973 |
justified) that change is IMPOSED=20
|
|
974 |
on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely =
|
|
975 |
justified) that he created change=20
|
|
976 |
himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of =
|
|
977 |
his own choosing and made it into=20
|
|
978 |
a farm through his own effort. In those days an entire county might have =
|
|
979 |
only a couple of hundred=20
|
|
980 |
inhabitants and was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern =
|
|
981 |
county is. Hence the pioneer=20
|
|
982 |
farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the creation =
|
|
983 |
of a new, ordered community.=20
|
|
984 |
One may well question whether the creation of this community was an =
|
|
985 |
improvement, but at any rate it=20
|
|
986 |
satisfied the pioneer's need for the power process.=20
|
|
987 |
|
|
988 |
58. It would be possible to give other examples of societies in which there =
|
|
989 |
has been rapid change and/or=20
|
|
990 |
lack of close community ties without he kind of massive behavioral =
|
|
991 |
aberration that is seen in today's=20
|
|
992 |
industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social and =
|
|
993 |
psychological problems in=20
|
|
994 |
modern society is the fact that people have insufficient opportunity to go =
|
|
995 |
through the power process in a=20
|
|
996 |
normal way. We don't mean to say that modern society is the only one in =
|
|
997 |
which the power process has been=20
|
|
998 |
disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have interfered =
|
|
999 |
with the power ' process to a greater or=20
|
|
1000 |
lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the problem has become =
|
|
1001 |
particularly acute. Leftism, at least=20
|
|
1002 |
in its recent=20
|
|
1003 |
(mid-to-late -20th century) form, is in part a symptom of deprivation with =
|
|
1004 |
respect to the power process.=20
|
|
1005 |
|
|
1006 |
DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY
|
|
1007 |
|
|
1008 |
59. We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those drives that can be =
|
|
1009 |
satisfied with minimal effort; (2)=20
|
|
1010 |
those that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) =
|
|
1011 |
those that cannot be adequately satisfied=20
|
|
1012 |
no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is the process of =
|
|
1013 |
satisfying the drives of the=20
|
|
1014 |
second group. The more drives there are in the third group, the more there =
|
|
1015 |
is frustration, anger, eventually=20
|
|
1016 |
defeatism, depression, etc.=20
|
|
1017 |
|
|
1018 |
60. In modern industrial society natural human drives tend to be pushed =
|
|
1019 |
into the first and third groups, and=20
|
|
1020 |
the second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created =
|
|
1021 |
drives.=20
|
|
1022 |
|
|
1023 |
61. In primitive societies, physical necessities generally fall into group =
|
|
1024 |
2: They can be obtained, but only at=20
|
|
1025 |
the cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the =
|
|
1026 |
physical necessities to everyone [9] in=20
|
|
1027 |
exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed into =
|
|
1028 |
group 1. (There may be=20
|
|
1029 |
disagreement about whether the effort needed to hold a job is "minimal"; =
|
|
1030 |
but usually, in lower- to middle-
|
|
1031 |
level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of obedience. You =
|
|
1032 |
sit or stand where you are told to sit=20
|
|
1033 |
or stand and do what you are told to do in the way you are told to do it. =
|
|
1034 |
Seldom do you have to exert=20
|
|
1035 |
yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, =
|
|
1036 |
so that the need for the power=20
|
|
1037 |
process is not well served.)=20
|
|
1038 |
|
|
1039 |
62. Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often remain in group 2 in =
|
|
1040 |
modern society, depending on the=20
|
|
1041 |
situation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a =
|
|
1042 |
particularly strong drive for status, the=20
|
|
1043 |
effort required to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy =
|
|
1044 |
adequately the need for the power process.=20
|
|
1045 |
|
|
1046 |
63. So certain artificial needs have been created that fall into group 2, =
|
|
1047 |
hence serve the need for the power=20
|
|
1048 |
process. Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make =
|
|
1049 |
many people feel they need=20
|
|
1050 |
things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It =
|
|
1051 |
requires serious effort to earn enough=20
|
|
1052 |
money to satisfy these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But =
|
|
1053 |
see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern=20
|
|
1054 |
man must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of =
|
|
1055 |
the artificial needs created by=20
|
|
1056 |
the advertising and marketing industry [11], and through surrogate =
|
|
1057 |
activities.=20
|
|
1058 |
|
|
1059 |
64. It seems that for many people, maybe the majority, these artificial =
|
|
1060 |
forms of the power process are=20
|
|
1061 |
insufficient. A theme that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social =
|
|
1062 |
critics of the second half of the=20
|
|
1063 |
20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in =
|
|
1064 |
modern society. (This=20
|
|
1065 |
purposelessness is often called by other names such as "anomic" or =
|
|
1066 |
"middle-class vacuity.") We suggest=20
|
|
1067 |
that the so-called "identity crisis" is actually a search for a sense of =
|
|
1068 |
purpose, often for commitment to a=20
|
|
1069 |
suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism is in large part =
|
|
1070 |
a response to the purposelessness of=20
|
|
1071 |
modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for =
|
|
1072 |
"fulfillment." But we think that for=20
|
|
1073 |
the majority of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment=20
|
|
1074 |
(that is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satisfactory =
|
|
1075 |
fulfillment. In other words, it does not=20
|
|
1076 |
fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need =
|
|
1077 |
can be fully satisfied only=20
|
|
1078 |
through activities that have some external goal, such as physical =
|
|
1079 |
necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.=20
|
|
1080 |
|
|
1081 |
65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning money, climbing the =
|
|
1082 |
status ladder or functioning=20
|
|
1083 |
as part of the system in some other way, most people are not in a position =
|
|
1084 |
to pursue their goals=20
|
|
1085 |
AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else's employee as, as we pointed =
|
|
1086 |
out in paragraph 61,=20
|
|
1087 |
must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way they are =
|
|
1088 |
told to do it. Even most people=20
|
|
1089 |
who are in business for themselves have only limited autonomy. It is a =
|
|
1090 |
chronic complaint of small-business=20
|
|
1091 |
persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government =
|
|
1092 |
regulation. Some of these=20
|
|
1093 |
regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part government =
|
|
1094 |
regulations are essential and=20
|
|
1095 |
inevitable parts of our extremely complex society. A large portion of small =
|
|
1096 |
business today operates on the=20
|
|
1097 |
franchise system.=20
|
|
1098 |
It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that many of the =
|
|
1099 |
franchise-granting companies=20
|
|
1100 |
require applicants for franchises to take a personality test that is =
|
|
1101 |
designed to EXCLUDE those who have=20
|
|
1102 |
creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile =
|
|
1103 |
to go along obediently with the=20
|
|
1104 |
franchise system. This excludes from small business many of the people who =
|
|
1105 |
most need autonomy.=20
|
|
1106 |
|
|
1107 |
66. Today people live more by virtue of what the system does FOR them or TO =
|
|
1108 |
them than by virtue of=20
|
|
1109 |
what they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more =
|
|
1110 |
and more along channels laid=20
|
|
1111 |
down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system =
|
|
1112 |
provides, the opportunities must be=20
|
|
1113 |
exploited in accord with the rules and regulations [13], and techniques =
|
|
1114 |
prescribed by experts must be=20
|
|
1115 |
followed if there is to be a chance of success.=20
|
|
1116 |
|
|
1117 |
67. Thus the power process is disrupted in our society through a deficiency =
|
|
1118 |
of real goals and a deficiency=20
|
|
1119 |
of autonomy in pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those =
|
|
1120 |
human drives that fall into group=20
|
|
1121 |
3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how much effort =
|
|
1122 |
one makes. One of these drives=20
|
|
1123 |
is the need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by other =
|
|
1124 |
people; we have no control over these=20
|
|
1125 |
decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. ("We =
|
|
1126 |
live in a world in which=20
|
|
1127 |
relatively few people - maybe 500 or 1,00 - make the important decisions" - =
|
|
1128 |
Philip B. Heymann of Harvard=20
|
|
1129 |
Law School, quoted by Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our =
|
|
1130 |
lives depend on whether=20
|
|
1131 |
safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained;=20
|
|
1132 |
on how much pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution =
|
|
1133 |
into our air; on how skillful=20
|
|
1134 |
(or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job may depend on =
|
|
1135 |
decisions made by government=20
|
|
1136 |
economists or corporation executives; and so forth. Most individuals are =
|
|
1137 |
not in a position to secure=20
|
|
1138 |
themselves against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The =
|
|
1139 |
individual's search for security is=20
|
|
1140 |
therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of powerlessness.=20
|
|
1141 |
|
|
1142 |
68. It may be objected that primitive man is physically less secure than =
|
|
1143 |
modern man, as is shown by his=20
|
|
1144 |
shorter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than =
|
|
1145 |
the amount of insecurity that is=20
|
|
1146 |
normal for human beings. but psychological security does not closely =
|
|
1147 |
correspond with physical security.=20
|
|
1148 |
What makes us FEEL secure is not so much objective security as a sense of =
|
|
1149 |
confidence in our ability to=20
|
|
1150 |
take care of ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by =
|
|
1151 |
hunger, can fight in self-defense=20
|
|
1152 |
or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in these =
|
|
1153 |
efforts, but he is by no means helpless=20
|
|
1154 |
against the things that threaten him. The modern individual on the other =
|
|
1155 |
hand is threatened by many things=20
|
|
1156 |
against which he is helpless;=20
|
|
1157 |
nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, =
|
|
1158 |
increasing taxes, invasion of his=20
|
|
1159 |
privacy by large organizations, nation-wide social or economic phenomena =
|
|
1160 |
that may disrupt his way of=20
|
|
1161 |
life.=20
|
|
1162 |
|
|
1163 |
69. It is true that primitive man is powerless against some of the things =
|
|
1164 |
that threaten him; disease for=20
|
|
1165 |
example. But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the =
|
|
1166 |
nature of things, it is no one's fault,=20
|
|
1167 |
unless is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the =
|
|
1168 |
modern individual tend to be=20
|
|
1169 |
MAN-MADE. They are not the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by =
|
|
1170 |
other persons whose=20
|
|
1171 |
decisions he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he =
|
|
1172 |
feels frustrated, humiliated and=20
|
|
1173 |
angry.=20
|
|
1174 |
|
|
1175 |
70. Thus primitive man for the most part has his security in his own hands =
|
|
1176 |
(either as an individual or as a=20
|
|
1177 |
member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands =
|
|
1178 |
of persons or=20
|
|
1179 |
organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able =
|
|
1180 |
personally to influence them. So modern=20
|
|
1181 |
man's drive for security tends to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas =
|
|
1182 |
(food, shelter, etc.) his security is=20
|
|
1183 |
assured at the cost of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he =
|
|
1184 |
CANNOT attain security. (The foregoing=20
|
|
1185 |
greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a rough, =
|
|
1186 |
general way how the condition of=20
|
|
1187 |
modern man differs from that of primitive man.)=20
|
|
1188 |
|
|
1189 |
71. People have many transitory drives or impulses that are necessary =
|
|
1190 |
frustrated in modern life, hence fall=20
|
|
1191 |
into group 3. One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit =
|
|
1192 |
fighting. In many situations it=20
|
|
1193 |
does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one may be in =
|
|
1194 |
a hurry, or one may be in a=20
|
|
1195 |
mood to travel slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with the =
|
|
1196 |
flow of traffic and obey the=20
|
|
1197 |
traffic signals. One may want to do one's work in a different way, but =
|
|
1198 |
usually one can work only according=20
|
|
1199 |
to the rules laid down by one's employer. In many other ways as well, =
|
|
1200 |
modern man is strapped down by a=20
|
|
1201 |
network of rules and regulations (explicit or implicit) that frustrate many =
|
|
1202 |
of his impulses and thus interfere=20
|
|
1203 |
with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be disposed with, =
|
|
1204 |
|
|
1205 |
because the are necessary for the functioning of industrial society. =
|
|
1206 |
|
|
1207 |
|
|
1208 |
72. Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters =
|
|
1209 |
that are irrelevant to the=20
|
|
1210 |
functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can =
|
|
1211 |
believe in any religion we like (as=20
|
|
1212 |
long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We =
|
|
1213 |
can go to bed with anyone we=20
|
|
1214 |
like (as long as we practice "safe sex"). We can do anything we like as =
|
|
1215 |
long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But=20
|
|
1216 |
in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our =
|
|
1217 |
behavior.=20
|
|
1218 |
|
|
1219 |
73. Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by =
|
|
1220 |
the government. Control is often=20
|
|
1221 |
exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or =
|
|
1222 |
manipulation, and by=20
|
|
1223 |
organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most =
|
|
1224 |
large organizations use some=20
|
|
1225 |
form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. =
|
|
1226 |
Propaganda is not limited to=20
|
|
1227 |
"commercials" and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously =
|
|
1228 |
intended as propaganda by=20
|
|
1229 |
the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment =
|
|
1230 |
programming is a powerful form of=20
|
|
1231 |
propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we =
|
|
1232 |
have to go to work every day=20
|
|
1233 |
and follow our employer's orders. Legally there is=20
|
|
1234 |
nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people =
|
|
1235 |
or from going into business for=20
|
|
1236 |
ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and =
|
|
1237 |
there is room in the economy for only a=20
|
|
1238 |
limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only =
|
|
1239 |
as someone else's employee.=20
|
|
1240 |
|
|
1241 |
74. We suggest that modern man's obsession with longevity, and with =
|
|
1242 |
maintaining physical vigor and=20
|
|
1243 |
sexual attractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment =
|
|
1244 |
resulting from deprivation with=20
|
|
1245 |
respect to the power process. The "mid-life crisis" also is such a symptom. =
|
|
1246 |
So is the lack of interest in=20
|
|
1247 |
having children that is fairly common in modern society but almost =
|
|
1248 |
unheard-of in primitive societies.=20
|
|
1249 |
|
|
1250 |
75. In primitive societies life is a succession of stages. The needs and =
|
|
1251 |
purposes of one stage having been=20
|
|
1252 |
fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next =
|
|
1253 |
stage. A young man goes through the=20
|
|
1254 |
power process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for =
|
|
1255 |
fulfillment but to get meat that is=20
|
|
1256 |
necessary for food. (In young women the process is more complex, with =
|
|
1257 |
greater emphasis on social power;=20
|
|
1258 |
we won't discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed =
|
|
1259 |
through, the young man has no=20
|
|
1260 |
reluctance about settling down to the responsibilities of raising a family. =
|
|
1261 |
(In contrast, some modern people=20
|
|
1262 |
indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking =
|
|
1263 |
some kind of "fulfillment." We=20
|
|
1264 |
suggest that the=20
|
|
1265 |
fulfillment they need is adequate experience of the power process -- with =
|
|
1266 |
real goals instead of the artificial=20
|
|
1267 |
goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised his =
|
|
1268 |
children, going through the power=20
|
|
1269 |
process by providing them with the physi cal necessities, the primitive man =
|
|
1270 |
feels tha t his work is done and=20
|
|
1271 |
he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many =
|
|
1272 |
modern people, on the other=20
|
|
1273 |
hand, are disturbed by the prospect of death, as is shown by the amount of =
|
|
1274 |
effort they expend trying to=20
|
|
1275 |
maintain their physical condition, appearance and health. We argue t hat =
|
|
1276 |
this is due to unfulfillment=20
|
|
1277 |
resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to =
|
|
1278 |
any use, have never gone through=20
|
|
1279 |
the power process using their bodies in a serious way.=20
|
|
1280 |
It is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical =
|
|
1281 |
purposes, who fears the deteriora tion=20
|
|
1282 |
of age, but the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his body =
|
|
1283 |
beyond walking from his car to=20
|
|
1284 |
his house. It is the man whose need for the power process has been =
|
|
1285 |
satisfied during his life who is best=20
|
|
1286 |
prepared to accept the end of that life .=20
|
|
1287 |
|
|
1288 |
76. In response to the arguments of this section someone will say, "Society =
|
|
1289 |
must find a way to give people=20
|
|
1290 |
the opportunity to go through the power process." For such people the value =
|
|
1291 |
of the opportunity is destroyed=20
|
|
1292 |
by the very fact that society gives i t to them. What they need is to find =
|
|
1293 |
or make their own opportunities. As=20
|
|
1294 |
long as the system GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a =
|
|
1295 |
leash. To attain autonomy they=20
|
|
1296 |
must get off that leash. Manifesto Contents=20
|
|
1297 |
|
|
1298 |
|
|
1299 |
|
|
1300 |
HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST
|
|
1301 |
|
|
1302 |
77. Not everyone in industrial-technological society suffers from =
|
|
1303 |
psychological problems. Some people=20
|
|
1304 |
even profess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss =
|
|
1305 |
some of the reasons why people=20
|
|
1306 |
differ so greatly in their response to modern society.=20
|
|
1307 |
|
|
1308 |
78. First, there doubtless are differences in the strength of the drive for =
|
|
1309 |
power. Individuals with a weak=20
|
|
1310 |
drive for power may have relatively little need to go through the power =
|
|
1311 |
process, or at least relatively little=20
|
|
1312 |
need for autonomy in the power pro cess. These are docile types who would =
|
|
1313 |
have been happy as plantation=20
|
|
1314 |
darkies in the Old South. (We don't mean to sneer at "plantation darkies" =
|
|
1315 |
of the Old South. To their credit,=20
|
|
1316 |
most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at =
|
|
1317 |
people who ARE content with=20
|
|
1318 |
servitude.)=20
|
|
1319 |
|
|
1320 |
79. Some people may have some exceptional drive, in pursuing which they =
|
|
1321 |
satisfy their need for the power=20
|
|
1322 |
process. For example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social =
|
|
1323 |
status may spend their whole=20
|
|
1324 |
lives climbing the status ladder without ev er getting bored with that =
|
|
1325 |
game.=20
|
|
1326 |
|
|
1327 |
80. People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
|
|
1328 |
techniques. Some people are so=20
|
|
1329 |
susceptible that, even if they make a great deal of money, they cannot =
|
|
1330 |
satisfy their constant craving for the=20
|
|
1331 |
shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So =
|
|
1332 |
they always f eel hard-pressed=20
|
|
1333 |
financially even if their income is large, and their cravings are =
|
|
1334 |
frustrated.=20
|
|
1335 |
|
|
1336 |
81. Some people have low susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
|
|
1337 |
techniques. These are the people=20
|
|
1338 |
who aren't interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their =
|
|
1339 |
need for the power process.=20
|
|
1340 |
|
|
1341 |
82. People who have medium susceptibility to advertising and marketing =
|
|
1342 |
techniques are able to earn=20
|
|
1343 |
enough money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but only at =
|
|
1344 |
the cost of serious effort (putting=20
|
|
1345 |
in overtime, taking a second job, earning p romotions, etc.) Thus material =
|
|
1346 |
acquisition s erves their need for=20
|
|
1347 |
the power process. But it does not necessarily follow that their need is =
|
|
1348 |
fully satisfied. They may have=20
|
|
1349 |
insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of =
|
|
1350 |
following orders) and some of their=20
|
|
1351 |
drives may be frustrated (e.g., security, aggression). (We are guilt y of =
|
|
1352 |
oversimplification in paragraphs 80-
|
|
1353 |
82 because we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is =
|
|
1354 |
entirely a creation of the advertising=20
|
|
1355 |
and marketing industry. Of course it's not that simple.=20
|
|
1356 |
|
|
1357 |
83. Some people partly satisfy their need for power by identifying =
|
|
1358 |
themselves with a powerful organization=20
|
|
1359 |
or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or =
|
|
1360 |
an organization, adopts its=20
|
|
1361 |
goals as his own, then works toward these goals. When some of the goals are =
|
|
1362 |
attained, the individual, even=20
|
|
1363 |
though his personal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the =
|
|
1364 |
attainment of the goals, feels=20
|
|
1365 |
(through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had =
|
|
1366 |
gone through the power=20
|
|
1367 |
process. This phenomenon was e xploited by the fascists, nazis and communis =
|
|
1368 |
ts. Our society uses it, too,=20
|
|
1369 |
though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the U.S. =
|
|
1370 |
(goal: punish Noriega). The U.S.=20
|
|
1371 |
invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attainment of goal).=20
|
|
1372 |
The U.S. went through the power process and many Ame ricans, because of =
|
|
1373 |
their identification with the=20
|
|
1374 |
U.S., experienced the power process vicariously. Hence the widespread =
|
|
1375 |
public approval of the Panama=20
|
|
1376 |
invasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the same phenomenon =
|
|
1377 |
in armies, corporations,=20
|
|
1378 |
political parties, humanitarian organizations, rel igious or ideological =
|
|
1379 |
movements. In particul ar, leftist=20
|
|
1380 |
movements tend to attract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for =
|
|
1381 |
power. But for most people=20
|
|
1382 |
identification with a large organization or a mass movement does not fully =
|
|
1383 |
satisfy the need for power.=20
|
|
1384 |
|
|
1385 |
84. Another way in which people satisfy their need for the power process is =
|
|
1386 |
through surrogate activities. As=20
|
|
1387 |
we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity that is directed =
|
|
1388 |
toward an artificial goal that the=20
|
|
1389 |
individual pursues for the sake of t he "fulfillment" that he gets from =
|
|
1390 |
pursuing the goal, not because he=20
|
|
1391 |
needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is no practical motive =
|
|
1392 |
for building enormous muscles,=20
|
|
1393 |
hitting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage =
|
|
1394 |
stamps. Yet many people in our=20
|
|
1395 |
society devote t hemselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or stamp =
|
|
1396 |
collecting. Some people are more=20
|
|
1397 |
"other-directed" than others, and therefore will more readily attack =
|
|
1398 |
importance to a surrogate activity=20
|
|
1399 |
simply because the people around them treat it as important=20
|
|
1400 |
or because society tells them it is important. T hat is why some people get =
|
|
1401 |
very serious abou t essentially=20
|
|
1402 |
trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly =
|
|
1403 |
pursuits, whereas others who are=20
|
|
1404 |
more clear-sighted never see these things as anything but the surrogate =
|
|
1405 |
activities that they are, and=20
|
|
1406 |
consequently never attach enou gh importance to them to satisfy their need =
|
|
1407 |
for the power process in that=20
|
|
1408 |
way. It only remains to point out that in many cases a person's way of =
|
|
1409 |
earning a living is also a surrogate=20
|
|
1410 |
activity. Not a PURE surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the =
|
|
1411 |
activity is to gain the physical=20
|
|
1412 |
necessitie s and (for some people) social status and th e luxuries that =
|
|
1413 |
advertising makes them want. But=20
|
|
1414 |
many people put into their=20
|
|
1415 |
work far more effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status =
|
|
1416 |
they require, and this extra effort=20
|
|
1417 |
constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together with the =
|
|
1418 |
emotional investment that accompanies=20
|
|
1419 |
it, i s one of the most potent forces acting toward the continual =
|
|
1420 |
development and perfecting of the system,=20
|
|
1421 |
with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131). =
|
|
1422 |
Especially, for the most creative=20
|
|
1423 |
scientists and engineers, work tends to be large ly a surrogate activity. =
|
|
1424 |
This point is so im portant that is=20
|
|
1425 |
deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs =
|
|
1426 |
87-92).=20
|
|
1427 |
|
|
1428 |
85. In this section we have explained how many people in modern society do =
|
|
1429 |
satisfy their need for the=20
|
|
1430 |
power process to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the =
|
|
1431 |
majority of people the need for the=20
|
|
1432 |
power process is not fully satisfied. In th e first place, those who have =
|
|
1433 |
an insatiable drive for status, or who=20
|
|
1434 |
get firmly "hooked" or a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly =
|
|
1435 |
enough with a movement or=20
|
|
1436 |
organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional =
|
|
1437 |
personalities. Others are not fully=20
|
|
1438 |
satisfied with surrogate activities or by identification with an org =
|
|
1439 |
anization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the=20
|
|
1440 |
second place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit =
|
|
1441 |
regulation or through=20
|
|
1442 |
socialization,=20
|
|
1443 |
which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustration due to the =
|
|
1444 |
impossibility of attaining cer tain=20
|
|
1445 |
goals and the necessity of restraining too many impulses.=20
|
|
1446 |
|
|
1447 |
86. But even if most people in industrial-technological society were well =
|
|
1448 |
satisfied, we (FC) would still be=20
|
|
1449 |
opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider =
|
|
1450 |
it demeaning to fulfill one's=20
|
|
1451 |
need for the power process through surr ogate activities or through =
|
|
1452 |
identification w ith an organization,=20
|
|
1453 |
rather then through pursuit of real goals.=20
|
|
1454 |
|
|
1455 |
THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS
|
|
1456 |
|
|
1457 |
87. Science and technology provide the most important examples of surrogate =
|
|
1458 |
activities. Some scientists=20
|
|
1459 |
claim that they are motivated by "curiosity," that notion is simply absurd. =
|
|
1460 |
Most scientists work on highly=20
|
|
1461 |
specialized problem that are not the obje ct of any normal curiosity. For =
|
|
1462 |
example, is an astronomer, a=20
|
|
1463 |
mathematician or an entomologist curious about the properties of =
|
|
1464 |
isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course=20
|
|
1465 |
not. Only a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about =
|
|
1466 |
it only because chemistry is his=20
|
|
1467 |
surrogate activity. Is the c hemist curious about the appropriate classif =
|
|
1468 |
ication of a new species of beetle?=20
|
|
1469 |
No. That question is of interest only to the entomologist, and he is =
|
|
1470 |
interested in it only because entomology=20
|
|
1471 |
is his surrogate activity.=20
|
|
1472 |
If the chemist and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to =
|
|
1473 |
obtain th e physical necessities,=20
|
|
1474 |
and if that effort e xercised their abilities in an interesting way but in =
|
|
1475 |
some nonscientific pursuit, then they=20
|
|
1476 |
couldn't giver a damn about isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification =
|
|
1477 |
of beetles. Suppose that lack of=20
|
|
1478 |
funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist t o become an =
|
|
1479 |
insurance broker instead of a ch emist.=20
|
|
1480 |
In that case he would have been very interested in insurance matters but =
|
|
1481 |
would have cared nothing about=20
|
|
1482 |
isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to put into the =
|
|
1483 |
satisfaction of mere curiosity the=20
|
|
1484 |
amount of time and effort that scient ists put into their work. The =
|
|
1485 |
"curiosity" ex planation for the scientists'=20
|
|
1486 |
motive just doesn't stand up.=20
|
|
1487 |
|
|
1488 |
88. The "benefit of humanity" explanation doesn't work any better. Some =
|
|
1489 |
scientific work has no=20
|
|
1490 |
conceivable relation to the welfare of the human race - most of archaeology =
|
|
1491 |
or comparative linguistics for=20
|
|
1492 |
example. Some other areas of science present obvio usly dangerous =
|
|
1493 |
possibilities. Yet scientists in these=20
|
|
1494 |
areas are just as enthusiastic about their work as those who develop =
|
|
1495 |
vaccines or study air pollution.=20
|
|
1496 |
Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional =
|
|
1497 |
involvement in promoting nuclear=20
|
|
1498 |
power plants. Did this involvement stem f rom a desire to benefit humanity? =
|
|
1499 |
If so, the n why didn't Dr.=20
|
|
1500 |
Teller get emotional about other "humanitarian" causes? If he was such a =
|
|
1501 |
humanitarian then why did he=20
|
|
1502 |
help to develop the H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, =
|
|
1503 |
|
|
1504 |
it is very much open to question whether nuclear power plants ac tually do =
|
|
1505 |
benefit humanity. Does the=20
|
|
1506 |
cheap e lectricity outweigh the accumulating waste and risk of accidents? =
|
|
1507 |
Dr. Teller saw only one side of=20
|
|
1508 |
the question. Clearly his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose =
|
|
1509 |
not from a desire to "benefit=20
|
|
1510 |
humanity" but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from =
|
|
1511 |
seeing it put to practical use.=20
|
|
1512 |
|
|
1513 |
89. The same is true of scientists generally. With possible rare =
|
|
1514 |
exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity=20
|
|
1515 |
nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power =
|
|
1516 |
process: to have a goal (a scientific=20
|
|
1517 |
problem to solve), to make an eff ort (research) and to attain the goal =
|
|
1518 |
(solut ion of the problem.) Science is=20
|
|
1519 |
a surrogate activity because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment =
|
|
1520 |
they get out of the work itself.=20
|
|
1521 |
|
|
1522 |
90. Of course, it's not that simple. Other motives do play a role for many =
|
|
1523 |
scientists. Money and status for=20
|
|
1524 |
example. Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable =
|
|
1525 |
drive for status (see paragraph=20
|
|
1526 |
79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt =
|
|
1527 |
the majo rity of scientists, like=20
|
|
1528 |
the majority of the general population, are more or less susceptible to =
|
|
1529 |
advertising and marketing techniques=20
|
|
1530 |
and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus =
|
|
1531 |
science is not a PURE surrogate=20
|
|
1532 |
activity. But it is in large part a surrogate activity.=20
|
|
1533 |
|
|
1534 |
91. Also, science and technology constitute a mass power movement, and many =
|
|
1535 |
scientists gratify their need=20
|
|
1536 |
for power through identification with this mass movement (see paragraph =
|
|
1537 |
83).=20
|
|
1538 |
|
|
1539 |
92. Thus science marches on blindly, without regard to the real welfare of =
|
|
1540 |
the human race or to any other=20
|
|
1541 |
standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of =
|
|
1542 |
the government officials and=20
|
|
1543 |
corporation executives who provide the fu nds for research.=20
|
|
1544 |
|
|
1545 |
THE NATURE OF FREEDOM
|
|
1546 |
|
|
1547 |
93. We are going to argue that industrial-technological society cannot be =
|
|
1548 |
reformed in such a way as to=20
|
|
1549 |
prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But =
|
|
1550 |
because "freedom" is a word=20
|
|
1551 |
that can be interpreted in many ways, we must fi rst make clear what kind =
|
|
1552 |
of freedom we are c oncerned=20
|
|
1553 |
with.=20
|
|
1554 |
|
|
1555 |
94. By "freedom" we mean the opportunity to go through the power process, =
|
|
1556 |
with real goals not the=20
|
|
1557 |
artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, =
|
|
1558 |
manipulation or supervision from anyone,=20
|
|
1559 |
especially from any large organization. Freed om means being in control =
|
|
1560 |
(either as an indi vidual or as a=20
|
|
1561 |
member of a SMALL group) of the life-and-death issues of one's existence; =
|
|
1562 |
food, clothing, shelter and=20
|
|
1563 |
defense against whatever threats there may be in one's environment. Freedom =
|
|
1564 |
means having power; not the=20
|
|
1565 |
power to control other people but the power to control the circumstances of =
|
|
1566 |
on e's own life. One does not=20
|
|
1567 |
have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organization) has power =
|
|
1568 |
over one, no matter how=20
|
|
1569 |
benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. =
|
|
1570 |
|
|
1571 |
It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permissivene ss (see =
|
|
1572 |
paragraph 72).=20
|
|
1573 |
|
|
1574 |
95. It is said that we live in a free society because we have a certain =
|
|
1575 |
number of constitutionally guaranteed=20
|
|
1576 |
rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal =
|
|
1577 |
freedom that exists in a society=20
|
|
1578 |
is determined more by the economi c and technological structure of the =
|
|
1579 |
society than by its laws or its form=20
|
|
1580 |
of government. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England were =
|
|
1581 |
monarchies, and many of the cities=20
|
|
1582 |
of the Italian Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading =
|
|
1583 |
about these societies one gets the=20
|
|
1584 |
impression that they allowed far more personal freedom than out society =
|
|
1585 |
does. In part this was because=20
|
|
1586 |
they lacked efficient mechanisms for enforcing the ruler's will: There were =
|
|
1587 |
no modern, well-organized=20
|
|
1588 |
police forces, no rapid long-distance communications,=20
|
|
1589 |
no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of information abou t the lives of =
|
|
1590 |
average citizens. Hence it wa s=20
|
|
1591 |
relatively easy to evade control.=20
|
|
1592 |
|
|
1593 |
96. As for our constitutional rights, consider for example that of freedom =
|
|
1594 |
of the press. We certainly don't=20
|
|
1595 |
mean to knock that right: it is very important tool for limiting =
|
|
1596 |
concentration of political power and for=20
|
|
1597 |
keeping those who do have political po wer in line by publicly exposing any =
|
|
1598 |
misbeha vior on their part.=20
|
|
1599 |
But freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an =
|
|
1600 |
individual. The mass media are=20
|
|
1601 |
mostly under the control of large organizations that are integrated into =
|
|
1602 |
the system. Anyone who has a little=20
|
|
1603 |
money can have some thing printed, or can distribute it on the I nternet or =
|
|
1604 |
in some such way, but what he=20
|
|
1605 |
has to say will be swamped by the vast volume of material put out by the =
|
|
1606 |
media, hence it will have no=20
|
|
1607 |
practical effect.=20
|
|
1608 |
To make an impression on society with words is therefore almost impossible =
|
|
1609 |
for most individual s and=20
|
|
1610 |
small groups. Take us (FC) for example . If we had never done anything =
|
|
1611 |
violent and had submitted the=20
|
|
1612 |
present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been =
|
|
1613 |
accepted. If they had been accepted and=20
|
|
1614 |
published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because =
|
|
1615 |
it's more fun to watch the=20
|
|
1616 |
entertainment put out by the me dia than to read a sober essay. Even if =
|
|
1617 |
these writings had had many=20
|
|
1618 |
readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read =
|
|
1619 |
as their minds were flooded=20
|
|
1620 |
by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our =
|
|
1621 |
message before the public with=20
|
|
1622 |
some chance of makin g a lasting impression, we've had to kill people. =
|
|
1623 |
|
|
1624 |
|
|
1625 |
97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but they do not serve =
|
|
1626 |
to guarantee much more than what=20
|
|
1627 |
could be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the =
|
|
1628 |
bourgeois conception, a "free" man=20
|
|
1629 |
is essentially an element of a social ma chine and has only a certain set =
|
|
1630 |
of prescrib ed and delimited=20
|
|
1631 |
freedoms; freedoms that are designed to serve the needs of the social =
|
|
1632 |
machine more than those of the=20
|
|
1633 |
individual. Thus the bourgeois's "free" man has economic freedom because =
|
|
1634 |
that promotes growth and=20
|
|
1635 |
progress; he has freedom of the press b ecause public criticism restrains =
|
|
1636 |
misbehavio r by political leaders;=20
|
|
1637 |
he has a rights to a fair trial because imprisonment at the whim of the =
|
|
1638 |
powerful would be bad for the=20
|
|
1639 |
system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar.=20
|
|
1640 |
To him, people deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress =
|
|
1641 |
(progress as conceived by the=20
|
|
1642 |
bourgeois). Ot her bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom =
|
|
1643 |
as a mere means to collective=20
|
|
1644 |
ends. Chester C. Tan, "Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century," =
|
|
1645 |
page 202, explains the=20
|
|
1646 |
philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: "An individual is granted =
|
|
1647 |
rights because he is a=20
|
|
1648 |
member of soc iety and his community life requires such rights. By =
|
|
1649 |
community Hu meant the whole=20
|
|
1650 |
society of the nation." And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum =
|
|
1651 |
Chang (Chang Chun-mai,=20
|
|
1652 |
head of the State Socialist Party in China) freedom had to be used in the =
|
|
1653 |
interest of the state and of the=20
|
|
1654 |
people as a whole. But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it =
|
|
1655 |
only as someone else=20
|
|
1656 |
prescribes?=20
|
|
1657 |
FC's conception of freedom is not that of Bolivar, Hu, Chang or other =
|
|
1658 |
bourgeois theorists. The trouble with=20
|
|
1659 |
such theorists is that they have made the develop ment and application of =
|
|
1660 |
social theories thei r surrogate=20
|
|
1661 |
activity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the needs of the =
|
|
1662 |
theorists more than the needs of=20
|
|
1663 |
any people who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which the =
|
|
1664 |
theories are imposed.=20
|
|
1665 |
|
|
1666 |
98. One more point to be made in this section: It should not be assumed =
|
|
1667 |
that a person has enough freedom=20
|
|
1668 |
just because he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by =
|
|
1669 |
psychological control of which=20
|
|
1670 |
people are unconscious, and moreover many peopl e's ideas of what =
|
|
1671 |
constitutes freedom are go verned=20
|
|
1672 |
more by social convention than by their real needs. For example, it's =
|
|
1673 |
likely that many leftists of the=20
|
|
1674 |
oversocialized type would say that most people, including themselves are =
|
|
1675 |
socialized too little rather than=20
|
|
1676 |
too much, yet the oversocialized lefti st pays a heavy psychological price =
|
|
1677 |
for his high level of socialization.=20
|
|
1678 |
|
|
1679 |
SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY
|
|
1680 |
|
|
1681 |
99. Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic =
|
|
1682 |
component that consists of=20
|
|
1683 |
unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular =
|
|
1684 |
component that consists of long-term=20
|
|
1685 |
historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends. =
|
|
1686 |
|
|
1687 |
|
|
1688 |
100. FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term =
|
|
1689 |
historical trend, then the=20
|
|
1690 |
effect of that change will almost always be transitory - the trend will =
|
|
1691 |
soon revert to its original state.=20
|
|
1692 |
(Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a =
|
|
1693 |
society rarely has more than a=20
|
|
1694 |
short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption =
|
|
1695 |
creeps back in. The level of political=20
|
|
1696 |
corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only =
|
|
1697 |
slowly with the evolution of the=20
|
|
1698 |
society. Normally, a p olitical cleanup will be permanent only if a =
|
|
1699 |
ccompanied by widespread social=20
|
|
1700 |
changes; a SMALL change in the society won't be enough.) If a small change =
|
|
1701 |
in a long-term historical=20
|
|
1702 |
trend appears to be permanent, i
|
|
1703 |
t is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is =
|
|
1704 |
already moving, s o that the trend is=20
|
|
1705 |
not altered but only pus hed a step ahead.=20
|
|
1706 |
|
|
1707 |
101. The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable =
|
|
1708 |
with respect to small changes, it=20
|
|
1709 |
would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other =
|
|
1710 |
words it would not be a long-
|
|
1711 |
term trend at all.=20
|
|
1712 |
|
|
1713 |
102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to =
|
|
1714 |
alter permanently a long-term=20
|
|
1715 |
historical trend, than it will alter the society as a whole. In other =
|
|
1716 |
words, a society is a system in which all=20
|
|
1717 |
parts are interrelated, and you can't permanently change any important part =
|
|
1718 |
witho ut change all the other=20
|
|
1719 |
parts as well.=20
|
|
1720 |
|
|
1721 |
103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter =
|
|
1722 |
permanently a long-term trend,=20
|
|
1723 |
then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in =
|
|
1724 |
advance. (Unless various other=20
|
|
1725 |
societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the =
|
|
1726 |
same consequenc es, in which=20
|
|
1727 |
case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes =
|
|
1728 |
through the same change will be=20
|
|
1729 |
like to experience similar consequences.)=20
|
|
1730 |
|
|
1731 |
104. FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. =
|
|
1732 |
That is, you cannot plan=20
|
|
1733 |
out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to =
|
|
1734 |
function as it was designed to.=20
|
|
1735 |
|
|
1736 |
105. The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human =
|
|
1737 |
societies. A change in human=20
|
|
1738 |
behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; =
|
|
1739 |
the economy will affect the=20
|
|
1740 |
environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the =
|
|
1741 |
environment will affec t human=20
|
|
1742 |
behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of =
|
|
1743 |
causes and effects is far too=20
|
|
1744 |
complex to be untangled and understood.=20
|
|
1745 |
|
|
1746 |
106. FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the =
|
|
1747 |
form of their society.=20
|
|
1748 |
Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under =
|
|
1749 |
rational human control.=20
|
|
1750 |
|
|
1751 |
107. The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.=20
|
|
1752 |
|
|
1753 |
108. To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt =
|
|
1754 |
at social reform either acts in the=20
|
|
1755 |
direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely =
|
|
1756 |
accelerates a change that would have=20
|
|
1757 |
occurred in any case) or else it o nly has a transitory effect, so that the =
|
|
1758 |
soc iety soon slips back into its old=20
|
|
1759 |
groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any =
|
|
1760 |
important aspect of a society,=20
|
|
1761 |
reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not =
|
|
1762 |
necessarily involve an armed=20
|
|
1763 |
uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second p rinciple, a =
|
|
1764 |
revolution never changes only one=20
|
|
1765 |
aspect of a society; and by the third principle changes occur that were =
|
|
1766 |
never expected or desired by the=20
|
|
1767 |
revolutionaries.=20
|
|
1768 |
By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind =
|
|
1769 |
of society, it never works out as=20
|
|
1770 |
planned.=20
|
|
1771 |
|
|
1772 |
109. The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The =
|
|
1773 |
American "Revolution" was not a=20
|
|
1774 |
revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by =
|
|
1775 |
a rather far-reaching political=20
|
|
1776 |
reform. The Founding Fathers did not change t he direction of development =
|
|
1777 |
of American soci ety, nor did=20
|
|
1778 |
they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society =
|
|
1779 |
from the retarding effect of=20
|
|
1780 |
British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but =
|
|
1781 |
only pushed American political=20
|
|
1782 |
culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of =
|
|
1783 |
which A merican society was an off-
|
|
1784 |
shoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative =
|
|
1785 |
democracy. And prior to the War=20
|
|
1786 |
of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant =
|
|
1787 |
|
|
1788 |
degree of representative democracy in the colonial ass emblies. The =
|
|
1789 |
political system established by the=20
|
|
1790 |
Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial =
|
|
1791 |
assemblies. With major alteration, to=20
|
|
1792 |
be sure - there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important =
|
|
1793 |
step. But it was a step along the=20
|
|
1794 |
road the English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that =
|
|
1795 |
Britai n and all of its colonies that=20
|
|
1796 |
were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with =
|
|
1797 |
systems of representative=20
|
|
1798 |
democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding =
|
|
1799 |
Fathers had lost their nerve and=20
|
|
1800 |
declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today =
|
|
1801 |
would not have been significantly=20
|
|
1802 |
different.=20
|
|
1803 |
Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had =
|
|
1804 |
a Parliament and Prime=20
|
|
1805 |
Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the =
|
|
1806 |
American Revolution provides not a=20
|
|
1807 |
counterexample to our principles but a go od illustration of them.=20
|
|
1808 |
|
|
1809 |
110. Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They =
|
|
1810 |
are expressed in imprecise=20
|
|
1811 |
language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them =
|
|
1812 |
can be found. So we present these=20
|
|
1813 |
principles not as inviolable laws but as rule s of thumb, or guides to =
|
|
1814 |
thinking, that may provide a partial=20
|
|
1815 |
antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should =
|
|
1816 |
be borne constantly in mind, and=20
|
|
1817 |
whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should =
|
|
1818 |
carefully reexamine one's thinking=20
|
|
1819 |
and retain the conclusio n only if one has good, solid reasons for do ing =
|
|
1820 |
so.=20
|
|
1821 |
|
|
1822 |
INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE REFORMED
|
|
1823 |
|
|
1824 |
111. The foregoing principles help to show how hopelessly difficult it =
|
|
1825 |
would be to reform the industrial=20
|
|
1826 |
system in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our =
|
|
1827 |
sphere of freedom. There has been=20
|
|
1828 |
a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolution for =
|
|
1829 |
technology to strengthen the=20
|
|
1830 |
system at a high cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence any =
|
|
1831 |
change designed to protect=20
|
|
1832 |
freedom from technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the =
|
|
1833 |
development of our society.=20
|
|
1834 |
|
|
1835 |
Consequently, such a change either would be a transitory one -- soon =
|
|
1836 |
swamped by the tide of history -- or,=20
|
|
1837 |
if large enough to be permanent would alter the nature of our whole =
|
|
1838 |
society. This by the first and second=20
|
|
1839 |
principles. Moreover, since society wo uld be altered in a way that could =
|
|
1840 |
not be pr edicted in advance (third=20
|
|
1841 |
principle) there would be great risk. Changes large enough to make a =
|
|
1842 |
lasting difference in favor of freedom=20
|
|
1843 |
would not be initiated because it would realized that they would gravely =
|
|
1844 |
disrupt the system. So any=20
|
|
1845 |
attempts at reform w ould be too timid to be effective. Even if c hanges =
|
|
1846 |
large enough to make a lasting=20
|
|
1847 |
difference were initiated, they would be retracted when their disruptive =
|
|
1848 |
effects became apparent. Thus,=20
|
|
1849 |
permanent changes=20
|
|
1850 |
in favor of freedom could be brought about only by persons prepared to =
|
|
1851 |
accept radical, dangero us and=20
|
|
1852 |
unpredictable alteration of the entir e system. In other words, by =
|
|
1853 |
revolutionaries, not reformers.=20
|
|
1854 |
|
|
1855 |
112. People anxious to rescue freedom without sacrificing the supposed =
|
|
1856 |
benefits of technology will suggest=20
|
|
1857 |
naive schemes for some new form of society that would reconcile freedom =
|
|
1858 |
with technology. Apart from the=20
|
|
1859 |
fact that people who make suggestions sel dom propose any practical means =
|
|
1860 |
by which the new form of=20
|
|
1861 |
society could be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth =
|
|
1862 |
principle that even if the new form of=20
|
|
1863 |
society could be once established, it either would collapse or would give =
|
|
1864 |
results very different from those=20
|
|
1865 |
expected.=20
|
|
1866 |
|
|
1867 |
113. So even on very general grounds it seems highly improbably that any =
|
|
1868 |
way of changing society could=20
|
|
1869 |
be found that would reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next =
|
|
1870 |
few sections we will give more=20
|
|
1871 |
specific reasons for concluding that freedo m and technological progress =
|
|
1872 |
are incompatibl e.=20
|
|
1873 |
|
|
1874 |
|
|
1875 |
|
|
1876 |
RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
|
|
1877 |
|
|
1878 |
|
|
1879 |
|
|
1880 |
114. As explained in paragraph 65-67, 70-73, modern man is strapped down by =
|
|
1881 |
a network of rules and=20
|
|
1882 |
regulations, and his fate depends on the actions of persons remote from him =
|
|
1883 |
whose decisions he cannot=20
|
|
1884 |
influence. This is not accidental or a result of t he arbitrariness of =
|
|
1885 |
arrogant bureaucrats. I t is necessary and=20
|
|
1886 |
inevitable in any technologically advanced society. The system HAS TO =
|
|
1887 |
regulate human behavior closely=20
|
|
1888 |
in order to function. At work, people have to do what they are told to do, =
|
|
1889 |
otherwise production would be=20
|
|
1890 |
thrown into chaos. Bureaucra cies HAVE TO be run according to rigid rules . =
|
|
1891 |
To allow any substantial=20
|
|
1892 |
personal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt the system and =
|
|
1893 |
lead to charges of unfairness=20
|
|
1894 |
due to differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their =
|
|
1895 |
discretion.=20
|
|
1896 |
It is true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but =
|
|
1897 |
GENERALLY S PEAKING the=20
|
|
1898 |
regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for the =
|
|
1899 |
functioning of industrial-technological=20
|
|
1900 |
society. The result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the average =
|
|
1901 |
person. It may be, however, that=20
|
|
1902 |
formal regulations will ten d increasingly to be replaced by psychologic al =
|
|
1903 |
tools that make us want to do=20
|
|
1904 |
what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14], educational techniques, =
|
|
1905 |
"mental health" programs, etc.)=20
|
|
1906 |
|
|
1907 |
115. The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways that are increasingly =
|
|
1908 |
remote from the natural=20
|
|
1909 |
pattern of human behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, =
|
|
1910 |
mathematicians and engineers. It can't=20
|
|
1911 |
function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in =
|
|
1912 |
these fields. It isn't natural for an=20
|
|
1913 |
adolescent human being to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk =
|
|
1914 |
absorbed in study. A normal=20
|
|
1915 |
adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. =
|
|
1916 |
Among primitive peoples the=20
|
|
1917 |
things that children are trained to do are in natural harmony with natural =
|
|
1918 |
h uman impulses. Among the=20
|
|
1919 |
American Indians, for example, boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits =
|
|
1920 |
-- just the sort of things that=20
|
|
1921 |
boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical =
|
|
1922 |
subjects,=20
|
|
1923 |
which most do grudgingly.=20
|
|
1924 |
|
|
1925 |
117. In any technologically advanced society the individual's fate MUST =
|
|
1926 |
depend on decisions that he=20
|
|
1927 |
personally cannot influence to any great extent. A technological society =
|
|
1928 |
cannot be broken down into small,=20
|
|
1929 |
autonomous communities, because production de pends on the cooperation of =
|
|
1930 |
very large numbe rs of=20
|
|
1931 |
people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of the =
|
|
1932 |
affected individuals has, on the=20
|
|
1933 |
average, only a one-millionth share in making the decision. What usually =
|
|
1934 |
happens in practice is that=20
|
|
1935 |
decisions are made by public officials or corporation executives, or by =
|
|
1936 |
technical spe cialists, but even when=20
|
|
1937 |
the public votes on a decision the number of voters ordinarily is too large =
|
|
1938 |
for the vote of any one individual=20
|
|
1939 |
to be significant. [17]=20
|
|
1940 |
Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major =
|
|
1941 |
decisions that affect their l ives. Their=20
|
|
1942 |
is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. =
|
|
1943 |
The system tries to "solve" this=20
|
|
1944 |
problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have =
|
|
1945 |
been made for them, but even=20
|
|
1946 |
if this "solution" were completely successful in making people feel better, =
|
|
1947 |
it would be demeaning.=20
|
|
1948 |
|
|
1949 |
118 Conservatives and some others advocate more "local autonomy." Local =
|
|
1950 |
communities once did have=20
|
|
1951 |
autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local =
|
|
1952 |
communities become more=20
|
|
1953 |
enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, =
|
|
1954 |
computer networks, highway=20
|
|
1955 |
syste ms, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. =
|
|
1956 |
Also operating against=20
|
|
1957 |
autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects =
|
|
1958 |
people at other locations far=20
|
|
1959 |
away. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contam inate the =
|
|
1960 |
water supply hundreds of miles=20
|
|
1961 |
dow nstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.=20
|
|
1962 |
|
|
1963 |
119. The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, =
|
|
1964 |
it is human behavior that has to=20
|
|
1965 |
be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the =
|
|
1966 |
political or social ideology that=20
|
|
1967 |
may pretend to guide the technolog ical system. It is the fault of =
|
|
1968 |
technology, because the system is guided=20
|
|
1969 |
not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does =
|
|
1970 |
satisfy many human needs, but=20
|
|
1971 |
generally speaking it does this only to the extent that it is to the =
|
|
1972 |
advantage of the system to do it. It is the=20
|
|
1973 |
needs of the system that are paramount, not those of the human being. For =
|
|
1974 |
example, the system provides=20
|
|
1975 |
people with food because the system couldn't function if everyone starved; =
|
|
1976 |
|
|
1977 |
it attends to people's psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do =
|
|
1978 |
so, because it couldn't=20
|
|
1979 |
function if too many people be came depressed or rebellious. But the system =
|
|
1980 |
, for good, solid, practical=20
|
|
1981 |
reasons, must exert constant pressure on people to mold their behavior to =
|
|
1982 |
the needs of the system. Too=20
|
|
1983 |
much waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system, =
|
|
1984 |
environmentalists,=20
|
|
1985 |
everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about recycling. Need mo re =
|
|
1986 |
technical personnel? A=20
|
|
1987 |
chorus of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask whether =
|
|
1988 |
it is inhumane to force=20
|
|
1989 |
adolescents to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them =
|
|
1990 |
hate. When skilled workers are=20
|
|
1991 |
put out of a job by tec hnical advances and have to undergo "retrain ing," =
|
|
1992 |
no one asks=20
|
|
1993 |
whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in this way. It is =
|
|
1994 |
simply taken for granted that=20
|
|
1995 |
everyone must bow to technical necessity and for good reason: If human =
|
|
1996 |
needs were put before technical=20
|
|
1997 |
necessity there would be econo mic problems, unemployment, shortages or wor =
|
|
1998 |
se. The concept of "mental=20
|
|
1999 |
health" in our society is defined largely by the extent to which an =
|
|
2000 |
individual behaves in accord with the=20
|
|
2001 |
needs of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.=20
|
|
2002 |
|
|
2003 |
120. Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and for autonomy within =
|
|
2004 |
the system are no better than a=20
|
|
2005 |
joke. For example, one company, instead of having each of its employees =
|
|
2006 |
assemble only one section of a=20
|
|
2007 |
catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalog ue, and this was supposed to =
|
|
2008 |
give them a sen se of purpose=20
|
|
2009 |
and achievement. Some companies have tried to give their employees more =
|
|
2010 |
autonomy in their work, but for=20
|
|
2011 |
practical reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, =
|
|
2012 |
and in any case employees are=20
|
|
2013 |
never given autonomy as to ultima te goals -- their "autonomous" efforts =
|
|
2014 |
can n ever be directed toward=20
|
|
2015 |
goals that they select personally, but only toward their employer's goals, =
|
|
2016 |
such as the survival and growth of=20
|
|
2017 |
the company. Any company would=20
|
|
2018 |
soon go out of business if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. =
|
|
2019 |
Similarly, in any enterprise within a=20
|
|
2020 |
socialist system, worker s must direct their efforts toward the goals of =
|
|
2021 |
the enterprise, otherwise the=20
|
|
2022 |
enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the system. Once again, =
|
|
2023 |
for purely technical reasons it is not=20
|
|
2024 |
possible for most individuals or small groups to have much autono my in =
|
|
2025 |
industrial society. Even the=20
|
|
2026 |
small-bus iness owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the =
|
|
2027 |
necessity of government=20
|
|
2028 |
regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must fit into the economic =
|
|
2029 |
system and conform to its=20
|
|
2030 |
requirements. For instance, when someone develops a new technology , the =
|
|
2031 |
small-business person often=20
|
|
2032 |
has to use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain =
|
|
2033 |
competitive.=20
|
|
2034 |
|
|
2035 |
|
|
2036 |
|
|
2037 |
THE 'BAD' PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'GOOD' =
|
|
2038 |
PARTS
|
|
2039 |
|
|
2040 |
|
|
2041 |
|
|
2042 |
121. A further reason why industrial society cannot be reformed in favor of =
|
|
2043 |
freedom is that modern=20
|
|
2044 |
technology is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one =
|
|
2045 |
another. You can't get rid of the=20
|
|
2046 |
"bad" parts of technology and retain only the "g ood" parts. Take modern =
|
|
2047 |
medicine, for exampl e. Progress=20
|
|
2048 |
in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, =
|
|
2049 |
computer science and other fields.=20
|
|
2050 |
Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can =
|
|
2051 |
be made available only by a=20
|
|
2052 |
technologically progressive, econ omically rich society. Clearly you can't =
|
|
2053 |
hav e much progress in medicine=20
|
|
2054 |
without the whole technological system and everything that goes with it. =
|
|
2055 |
|
|
2056 |
|
|
2057 |
122. Even if medical progress could be maintained without the rest of the =
|
|
2058 |
technological system, it would by=20
|
|
2059 |
itself bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is =
|
|
2060 |
discovered. People with a genetic=20
|
|
2061 |
tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as well as =
|
|
2062 |
an yone else. Natural selection=20
|
|
2063 |
against genes for diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout =
|
|
2064 |
the population. (This may be=20
|
|
2065 |
occurring to some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be =
|
|
2066 |
controlled through the use of=20
|
|
2067 |
insulin.) The s ame thing will happen with many other diseas es =
|
|
2068 |
susceptibility to which is affected by=20
|
|
2069 |
genetic degradation of the population. The only solution will be some sort =
|
|
2070 |
of eugenics program or=20
|
|
2071 |
extensive genetic engineering of human beings,=20
|
|
2072 |
so that man in the future will no longer be a creation of nature, or of =
|
|
2073 |
chance, or of God (depending on your=20
|
|
2074 |
rel igious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.=20
|
|
2075 |
|
|
2076 |
123. If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, =
|
|
2077 |
just wait till the government=20
|
|
2078 |
starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such =
|
|
2079 |
regulation will inevitably follow the=20
|
|
2080 |
introduction of genetic engineering of hum an beings, because the =
|
|
2081 |
consequences of unreg ulated genetic=20
|
|
2082 |
engineering would be disastrous. [19]=20
|
|
2083 |
|
|
2084 |
124. The usual response to such concerns is to talk about "medical ethics." =
|
|
2085 |
But a code of ethics would not=20
|
|
2086 |
serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only =
|
|
2087 |
make matters worse. A code of=20
|
|
2088 |
ethics applicable to genetic engineering wo uld be in effect a means of =
|
|
2089 |
regulating the g enetic constitution=20
|
|
2090 |
of human beings. Somebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would =
|
|
2091 |
decide that such and such=20
|
|
2092 |
applications of genetic engineering were "ethical" and others were not, so =
|
|
2093 |
that in effect they would be=20
|
|
2094 |
imposing their own values on th e genetic constitution of the population at =
|
|
2095 |
large. Even if a code of ethics=20
|
|
2096 |
were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be =
|
|
2097 |
imposing their own values on any=20
|
|
2098 |
minorities who might have a=20
|
|
2099 |
different idea of what constituted an "ethical" use of genetic engineering. =
|
|
2100 |
The only code of e thics that=20
|
|
2101 |
would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic =
|
|
2102 |
engineering of human beings, and=20
|
|
2103 |
you can be sure that no such code will ever be applied in a technological =
|
|
2104 |
society. No code that reduced=20
|
|
2105 |
genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for long, because the =
|
|
2106 |
temptatio n presented by the=20
|
|
2107 |
immense power of biotechn ology would be irresistible, especially since to =
|
|
2108 |
the majority of people many of=20
|
|
2109 |
its applications will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating =
|
|
2110 |
physical and mental diseases,=20
|
|
2111 |
giving people the abilities they need to get along in today's world). In =
|
|
2112 |
evitably, genetic engineering will be=20
|
|
2113 |
used e xtensively, but only in ways consistent with the needs of the =
|
|
2114 |
industrial-technological system. [20]=20
|
|
2115 |
|
|
2116 |
TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR=20
|
|
2117 |
FREEDOM
|
|
2118 |
|
|
2119 |
125. It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and =
|
|
2120 |
freedom, because=20
|
|
2121 |
technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually =
|
|
2122 |
encroaches on freedom through=20
|
|
2123 |
REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at =
|
|
2124 |
the outset owns the same=20
|
|
2125 |
amount of land, but one of whom is more powerful than the other. The =
|
|
2126 |
powerful one demands a piece of=20
|
|
2127 |
the other's land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, "OK, let's =
|
|
2128 |
compromise. Give me half of=20
|
|
2129 |
what I asked." The weak one has little choice but to give in. Some time =
|
|
2130 |
later the powerful neighbor demand=20
|
|
2131 |
s another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By =
|
|
2132 |
forcing a long series of compromises=20
|
|
2133 |
on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his land. So it =
|
|
2134 |
goes in the conflict between=20
|
|
2135 |
technology and freedom.=20
|
|
2136 |
|
|
2137 |
126. Let us explain why technology is a more powerful social force than the =
|
|
2138 |
aspiration for freedom.=20
|
|
2139 |
|
|
2140 |
127. A technological advance that appears not to threaten freedom often =
|
|
2141 |
turns out to threaten freedom often=20
|
|
2142 |
turns out to threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider =
|
|
2143 |
motorized transport. A walking man=20
|
|
2144 |
formerly could go where he pleased, g o at his own pace without observing =
|
|
2145 |
any traf fic regulations, and=20
|
|
2146 |
was independent of technological support-systems. When motor vehicles were =
|
|
2147 |
introduced they appeared to=20
|
|
2148 |
increase man's freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no =
|
|
2149 |
one had to have an=20
|
|
2150 |
automobile if he didn't want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an =
|
|
2151 |
automobile could travel much=20
|
|
2152 |
faster than the walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport =
|
|
2153 |
soon changed society in such a=20
|
|
2154 |
way as to restrict greatly man's freedom of locomotion. When automobiles =
|
|
2155 |
became numerous,=20
|
|
2156 |
it became necessary to regulate their use e xtensively. In a car, =
|
|
2157 |
especially in densely populated areas, one=20
|
|
2158 |
cannot just go where one likes at one's own pace one's movement is governed =
|
|
2159 |
by the flow of traffic and by=20
|
|
2160 |
various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obligations: license =
|
|
2161 |
requirements, driver test, renewing=20
|
|
2162 |
registration, insuran ce, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments =
|
|
2163 |
on purchase price. Moreover,=20
|
|
2164 |
the use of motorized transport is no longer optional. Since the =
|
|
2165 |
introduction of motorized transport the=20
|
|
2166 |
arrangement of our cities has changed in such a way that the majority of =
|
|
2167 |
people no longer live within=20
|
|
2168 |
walking di stance of their place of employment, shoppin g areas and =
|
|
2169 |
recreational opportunities, so that they=20
|
|
2170 |
HAVE TO depend on the automobile for transportation.=20
|
|
2171 |
Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they have even =
|
|
2172 |
less control over their own=20
|
|
2173 |
movement than when driving a car. Even the wal ker's freedom is now greatly =
|
|
2174 |
restricted. In the city he=20
|
|
2175 |
continually has to stop and wait for traffic lights that are designed =
|
|
2176 |
mainly to serve auto traffic. In the=20
|
|
2177 |
country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along the =
|
|
2178 |
highway. (Note the important=20
|
|
2179 |
point we have illustrated with t he case of motorized transport: When a new =
|
|
2180 |
i tem of technology is=20
|
|
2181 |
introduced as an option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, =
|
|
2182 |
it does not necessarily REMAIN=20
|
|
2183 |
optional. In many cases the new technology changes society in such a way =
|
|
2184 |
that people eventually find=20
|
|
2185 |
themselves FORCED to use i t.)=20
|
|
2186 |
|
|
2187 |
128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE continually narrows our sphere =
|
|
2188 |
of freedom, each new=20
|
|
2189 |
technical advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. =
|
|
2190 |
Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid=20
|
|
2191 |
long-distance communications . . . how could one argue against any of these =
|
|
2192 |
things, or against any other of=20
|
|
2193 |
the innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would =
|
|
2194 |
have been absurd to resist the=20
|
|
2195 |
introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and =
|
|
2196 |
no disadvantages. Yet as we=20
|
|
2197 |
explained in paragraphs 59-76, all th ese technical advances taken together =
|
|
2198 |
have c reated world in which=20
|
|
2199 |
the average man's fate is no longer in his own hands or in the hands of his =
|
|
2200 |
neighbors and friends, but in=20
|
|
2201 |
those of politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous =
|
|
2202 |
technicians=20
|
|
2203 |
and bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] =
|
|
2204 |
The same process wi ll continue=20
|
|
2205 |
in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few people will =
|
|
2206 |
resist the introduction of a genetic=20
|
|
2207 |
technique that eliminates a hereditary disease It does no apparent harm and =
|
|
2208 |
prevents much suffering. Yet a=20
|
|
2209 |
large number of genetic impr ovements taken together will make the human =
|
|
2210 |
being into an engineered=20
|
|
2211 |
product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or whatever, =
|
|
2212 |
depending on your religious beliefs).=20
|
|
2213 |
|
|
2214 |
129 Another reason why technology is such a powerful social force is that, =
|
|
2215 |
within the context of a given=20
|
|
2216 |
society, technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never =
|
|
2217 |
be reversed. Once a technical=20
|
|
2218 |
innovation has been introduced, people us ually become dependent on it, =
|
|
2219 |
unless it is r eplaced by some still=20
|
|
2220 |
more advanced innovation. Not only do people become dependent as =
|
|
2221 |
individuals on a new item of=20
|
|
2222 |
technology, but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. =
|
|
2223 |
(Imagine what would happen=20
|
|
2224 |
to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.) Thus the =
|
|
2225 |
system can move in only one=20
|
|
2226 |
direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces =
|
|
2227 |
freedom to take a step back --=20
|
|
2228 |
short of the overthrow of the whole technological system.=20
|
|
2229 |
|
|
2230 |
130. Technology advances with great rapidity and threatens freedom at many =
|
|
2231 |
different points at the same=20
|
|
2232 |
time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals =
|
|
2233 |
on large organizations,=20
|
|
2234 |
propaganda and other psychological techniques, g enetic engineering, =
|
|
2235 |
invasion of privacy thro ugh=20
|
|
2236 |
surveillance devices and computers, etc.) To hold back any ONE of the =
|
|
2237 |
threats to freedom would require a=20
|
|
2238 |
long different social struggle. Those who want to protect freedom are =
|
|
2239 |
overwhelmed by the sheer number of=20
|
|
2240 |
new attacks and the rapidity with which t hey develop, hence they become =
|
|
2241 |
pathetic and no longer resist. To=20
|
|
2242 |
fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success can be hoped =
|
|
2243 |
for only by fighting the=20
|
|
2244 |
technological system as a whole; but that is revolution not reform. =
|
|
2245 |
|
|
2246 |
|
|
2247 |
131. Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to describe all those =
|
|
2248 |
who perform a specialized task=20
|
|
2249 |
that requires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their =
|
|
2250 |
surrogate activity) that when a conflict=20
|
|
2251 |
arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost always decide =
|
|
2252 |
in fa vor of their technical=20
|
|
2253 |
work. This is obvious in the case of scientists, but it also appears =
|
|
2254 |
elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian=20
|
|
2255 |
groups, conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or =
|
|
2256 |
other psychological techniques to=20
|
|
2257 |
help them achieve thei r laudable ends. Corporations and government =
|
|
2258 |
agencies, when they find it useful, do=20
|
|
2259 |
not hesitate to collect information about individuals without regard to =
|
|
2260 |
their privacy. Law enforcement=20
|
|
2261 |
agencies are=20
|
|
2262 |
frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects and =
|
|
2263 |
often of completely innocent=20
|
|
2264 |
persons, and they do whatever they can do l egally (or sometimes illegally) =
|
|
2265 |
to restrict or circumvent those=20
|
|
2266 |
rights. Most of these educators, government officials and law officers =
|
|
2267 |
believe in freedom, privacy and=20
|
|
2268 |
constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they =
|
|
2269 |
usually feel that t heir work is more=20
|
|
2270 |
important.=20
|
|
2271 |
|
|
2272 |
132. It is well known that people generally work better and more =
|
|
2273 |
persistently when striving for a reward=20
|
|
2274 |
than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists =
|
|
2275 |
and other technicians are=20
|
|
2276 |
motivated mainly by the rewards they get throu gh their work. But those who =
|
|
2277 |
oppose technilo giccal=20
|
|
2278 |
invasions of freedom are working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently =
|
|
2279 |
there are a few who work=20
|
|
2280 |
persistently and well at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved =
|
|
2281 |
a signal victory that seemed to set=20
|
|
2282 |
up a solid barrier against further e rosion of freedom through =
|
|
2283 |
technological prog ress, most would tend to=20
|
|
2284 |
relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits. But the =
|
|
2285 |
scientists would remain busy in their=20
|
|
2286 |
laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways,=20
|
|
2287 |
in spite of any barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals =
|
|
2288 |
and make them always more=20
|
|
2289 |
depend ent on the system.=20
|
|
2290 |
|
|
2291 |
133. No social arrangements, whether laws, institutions, customs or ethical =
|
|
2292 |
codes, can provide permanent=20
|
|
2293 |
protection against technology. History shows that all social arrangements =
|
|
2294 |
are transitory; they all change or=20
|
|
2295 |
break down eventually. But technologic al advances are permanent within the =
|
|
2296 |
context of a given=20
|
|
2297 |
civilization. Suppose for example that it were possible to arrive at some =
|
|
2298 |
social arrangements that would=20
|
|
2299 |
prevent genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent =
|
|
2300 |
it from being applied in such a=20
|
|
2301 |
ways as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology would remain =
|
|
2302 |
waiting. Sooner or later the=20
|
|
2303 |
social arrangement would break down. Probably sooner, given that pace of =
|
|
2304 |
change in our society. Then=20
|
|
2305 |
genetic engineering would begin to invade our=20
|
|
2306 |
sphere of freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short of a =
|
|
2307 |
breakdo wn of technological=20
|
|
2308 |
civilization itself). An y illusions about achieving anything permanent =
|
|
2309 |
through social arrangements should=20
|
|
2310 |
be dispelled by what is currently happening with environmental legislation. =
|
|
2311 |
A few years ago it seemed that=20
|
|
2312 |
there were secure legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the w orst =
|
|
2313 |
forms of environmental=20
|
|
2314 |
degradation. A c hange in the political wind, and those barriers begin to =
|
|
2315 |
crumble.=20
|
|
2316 |
|
|
2317 |
134. For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a more powerful social =
|
|
2318 |
force than the aspiration for=20
|
|
2319 |
freedom. But this statement requires an important qualification. It appears =
|
|
2320 |
that during the next several=20
|
|
2321 |
decades the industrial-technological syst em will be undergoing severe =
|
|
2322 |
stresses due to economic and=20
|
|
2323 |
environmental problems, and especially due to problems of human behavior =
|
|
2324 |
(alienation, rebellion, hostility,=20
|
|
2325 |
a variety of social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the =
|
|
2326 |
stresses through which the system is=20
|
|
2327 |
likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least weaken it suff =
|
|
2328 |
iciently so that a revolution occurs and=20
|
|
2329 |
is successful, then at that particular moment the aspiration for freedom =
|
|
2330 |
will have proved more powerful=20
|
|
2331 |
than technology.=20
|
|
2332 |
|
|
2333 |
135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak neighbor who is left =
|
|
2334 |
destitute by a strong neighbor=20
|
|
2335 |
who takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compromises. But =
|
|
2336 |
suppose now that the strong=20
|
|
2337 |
neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak =
|
|
2338 |
neighbor can force the str ong one to=20
|
|
2339 |
give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man =
|
|
2340 |
survive and only forces him to give his=20
|
|
2341 |
land back, he is a fool, because when the strong man gets well he will =
|
|
2342 |
again take all the land for himself.=20
|
|
2343 |
The only sensible alternat ive for the weaker man is to kill the strong one =
|
|
2344 |
while he has the chance. In the=20
|
|
2345 |
same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we =
|
|
2346 |
compromise with it and let it=20
|
|
2347 |
recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom. =
|
|
2348 |
|
|
2349 |
|
|
2350 |
SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED INTRACTABLE
|
|
2351 |
|
|
2352 |
136. If anyone still imagines that it would be possible to reform the =
|
|
2353 |
system in such a way as to protect=20
|
|
2354 |
freedom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most =
|
|
2355 |
part unsuccessfully our society=20
|
|
2356 |
has dealt with other social problems that a re far more simple and =
|
|
2357 |
straightforward. Amon g other things, the=20
|
|
2358 |
system has failed to stop environmental degradation, political corruption, =
|
|
2359 |
drug trafficking or domestic=20
|
|
2360 |
abuse.=20
|
|
2361 |
|
|
2362 |
137. Take our environmental problems, for example. Here the conflict of =
|
|
2363 |
values is straightforward:=20
|
|
2364 |
economic expedience now versus saving some of our natural resources for our =
|
|
2365 |
grandchildren [22] But on=20
|
|
2366 |
this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfus cation from the people =
|
|
2367 |
who have power, and n othing=20
|
|
2368 |
like a clear, consistent line of action, and we keep on piling up =
|
|
2369 |
environmental problems that our=20
|
|
2370 |
grandchildren will have to live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental =
|
|
2371 |
issue consist of struggles and=20
|
|
2372 |
compromises between different factions, som e of which are ascendant at one =
|
|
2373 |
moment, othe rs at another=20
|
|
2374 |
moment. The line of struggle changes with the shifting currents of public =
|
|
2375 |
opinion. This is not a rational=20
|
|
2376 |
process, or is it one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful =
|
|
2377 |
solution to the problem.=20
|
|
2378 |
Major social problems, if they get "so lved" at all, are rarely or never =
|
|
2379 |
solved thr ough any rational,=20
|
|
2380 |
comprehensive plan. They just work themselves out through a process in =
|
|
2381 |
which various competing groups=20
|
|
2382 |
pursing their own usually short-term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by =
|
|
2383 |
luck) at some more or less stable=20
|
|
2384 |
modus vivendi. In fact, t he principles we formulated in paragraphs 10 =
|
|
2385 |
0-106 make it seem doubtful that=20
|
|
2386 |
rational, long-term social planning can EVER be successful. 138. Thus it is =
|
|
2387 |
clear that the human race has at=20
|
|
2388 |
best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward =
|
|
2389 |
social problems. How then is it=20
|
|
2390 |
going to solve the far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling =
|
|
2391 |
freedom with technology?=20
|
|
2392 |
Technology presents clear-cut material advantages,=20
|
|
2393 |
whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different =
|
|
2394 |
people, and its loss is easily=20
|
|
2395 |
obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.=20
|
|
2396 |
|
|
2397 |
139. And note this important difference: It is conceivable that our =
|
|
2398 |
environmental problems (for example)=20
|
|
2399 |
may some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this =
|
|
2400 |
happens it will be only because=20
|
|
2401 |
it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these problems. But =
|
|
2402 |
it is NOT in the interest of the=20
|
|
2403 |
system to preserve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is =
|
|
2404 |
in the interest of the system to=20
|
|
2405 |
bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. Thus, =
|
|
2406 |
while practical considerations=20
|
|
2407 |
may eventually force the system to take a rational, prudent approach to =
|
|
2408 |
environmental problems, equally=20
|
|
2409 |
practical considerations will force the system to regulate human behavior =
|
|
2410 |
ever more closely (preferably by=20
|
|
2411 |
indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom.)=20
|
|
2412 |
This isn't just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. =
|
|
2413 |
Wilson) have stressed the importance of=20
|
|
2414 |
"socializing" people more effectively.
|
|
2415 |
|
|
2416 |
|
|
2417 |
|
|
2418 |
REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM
|
|
2419 |
|
|
2420 |
140. We hope we have convinced the reader that the system cannot be =
|
|
2421 |
reformed in a such a way as to=20
|
|
2422 |
reconcile freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense with the =
|
|
2423 |
industrial-technological=20
|
|
2424 |
system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed =
|
|
2425 |
uprising, but certainly a radical and=20
|
|
2426 |
fundamental change in the nature of society.=20
|
|
2427 |
|
|
2428 |
141. People tend to assume that because a revolution involves a much =
|
|
2429 |
greater change than reform does, it is=20
|
|
2430 |
more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain =
|
|
2431 |
circumstances revolution is much=20
|
|
2432 |
easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can inspire =
|
|
2433 |
an intensity of commitment=20
|
|
2434 |
that a reform movement cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers to =
|
|
2435 |
solve a particular social=20
|
|
2436 |
problem A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke =
|
|
2437 |
and create a whole new=20
|
|
2438 |
world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great risks =
|
|
2439 |
and make great sacrifices. For this=20
|
|
2440 |
reasons it would be much easier to overthrow the whole technological system =
|
|
2441 |
than to put effective,=20
|
|
2442 |
permanent restraints on the development of application of any one segment =
|
|
2443 |
of technology, s
|
|
2444 |
uch as genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of =
|
|
2445 |
people may devote themselves=20
|
|
2446 |
passionately=20
|
|
2447 |
to a revolution against the industrial-technological system. As we noted in =
|
|
2448 |
paragraph 132, reformers=20
|
|
2449 |
seeking to limite certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a =
|
|
2450 |
negative outcome. But=20
|
|
2451 |
revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward -- fulfillment of their =
|
|
2452 |
revolutionary vision -- and therefore=20
|
|
2453 |
work harder and more persistently than reformers do.=20
|
|
2454 |
|
|
2455 |
142. Reform is always restrainde by the fear of painful consequences if =
|
|
2456 |
changes go too far. But once a=20
|
|
2457 |
revolutionary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing to =
|
|
2458 |
undergo unlimited hardships for the=20
|
|
2459 |
sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian =
|
|
2460 |
Revolutions. It may be that in=20
|
|
2461 |
such cases only a minority of the population is really committed to the =
|
|
2462 |
revolution, but this minority is=20
|
|
2463 |
sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in =
|
|
2464 |
society. We will have more to say=20
|
|
2465 |
about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.=20
|
|
2466 |
|
|
2467 |
|
|
2468 |
|
|
2469 |
CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
|
|
2470 |
|
|
2471 |
143. Since the beginning of civilization, organized societies have had to =
|
|
2472 |
put pressures on human beings of=20
|
|
2473 |
the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures =
|
|
2474 |
vary greatly from one society to=20
|
|
2475 |
another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, excessive labor, =
|
|
2476 |
environmental pollution), some are=20
|
|
2477 |
psychological (noise, crowding, forcing humans behavior into the mold that =
|
|
2478 |
society requires). In the past,=20
|
|
2479 |
human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied =
|
|
2480 |
only within certain bounds.=20
|
|
2481 |
Consequently, societies have been able to push people only up to certain =
|
|
2482 |
limits. When the limit of human=20
|
|
2483 |
endurance has been passed, things start going rong: rebellion, or crime, or =
|
|
2484 |
corruption, or evasion of work,=20
|
|
2485 |
or depression and other mental problems,=20
|
|
2486 |
or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth rate or something else, so =
|
|
2487 |
that either the society breaks down,=20
|
|
2488 |
or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or gradually, =
|
|
2489 |
through conquest, attrition or=20
|
|
2490 |
evolution) replaces by some more efficient form of society.
|
|
2491 |
|
|
2492 |
[25]=20
|
|
2493 |
|
|
2494 |
144. Thus human nature has in the past put certain limits on the =
|
|
2495 |
development of societies. People coud be=20
|
|
2496 |
pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because =
|
|
2497 |
modern technology is=20
|
|
2498 |
developing way of modifying human beings.
|
|
2499 |
|
|
2500 |
145. Imagine a society that subjects people to conditions that amke them =
|
|
2501 |
terribley unhappy, then gives=20
|
|
2502 |
them the drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is =
|
|
2503 |
already happening to some extent in=20
|
|
2504 |
our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression had =
|
|
2505 |
been greatly increasing in recent=20
|
|
2506 |
decades. We believe that this is due to disruption fo the power process, as =
|
|
2507 |
explained in paragraphs 59-76.=20
|
|
2508 |
But even if we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly =
|
|
2509 |
the result of SOME conditions that=20
|
|
2510 |
exist in today's society. Instead of removing the conditions that make =
|
|
2511 |
people depressed, modern society=20
|
|
2512 |
gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antidepressants area a means of =
|
|
2513 |
modifying an individual's=20
|
|
2514 |
internal state in such a way as to=20
|
|
2515 |
enable him to toelrate social conditions that he would otherwise find =
|
|
2516 |
intolerable. (Yes, we know that=20
|
|
2517 |
depression is often of purely genetic origin. We are referring here to =
|
|
2518 |
those cases in which environment=20
|
|
2519 |
plays the predominant role.)=20
|
|
2520 |
|
|
2521 |
146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one example of the methods of =
|
|
2522 |
controlling human behavior that=20
|
|
2523 |
modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the other methods. =
|
|
2524 |
|
|
2525 |
|
|
2526 |
147. To start with, there are the techniques of surveillance. Hidden video =
|
|
2527 |
cameras are now used in most=20
|
|
2528 |
stores and in many other places, computers are used to collect and process =
|
|
2529 |
vast amounts of information=20
|
|
2530 |
about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the =
|
|
2531 |
effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law=20
|
|
2532 |
enforcement).[26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which the =
|
|
2533 |
mass communication media=20
|
|
2534 |
provide effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for =
|
|
2535 |
winning elections, selling=20
|
|
2536 |
products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment industry serves as =
|
|
2537 |
an important psychological tool=20
|
|
2538 |
of the system, possibly even when it is dishing out large amounts of sex =
|
|
2539 |
and violence. Entertainment=20
|
|
2540 |
provides modern man with an essential means of escape.=20
|
|
2541 |
While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, =
|
|
2542 |
frustration, dissatisfaction. Many=20
|
|
2543 |
primitive peoples, when they don't have work to do, are quite content to =
|
|
2544 |
sit for hours at a time doing=20
|
|
2545 |
nothing at all, because they are at peace with themselves and their world. =
|
|
2546 |
But most modern people must be=20
|
|
2547 |
contantly occupied or entertained, otherwise the get "bored," i.e., they =
|
|
2548 |
get fidgety, uneasy, irritable.=20
|
|
2549 |
|
|
2550 |
148. Other techniques strike deeper that the foregoing. Education is no =
|
|
2551 |
longer a simple affair of paddling a=20
|
|
2552 |
kid's behind when he doesn't know his lessons and patting him on the head =
|
|
2553 |
when he does know them. It is=20
|
|
2554 |
becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child's development. =
|
|
2555 |
Sylvan Learning Centers, for=20
|
|
2556 |
example, have had great success in motivating children to study, and =
|
|
2557 |
psychological techniques are also=20
|
|
2558 |
used with more or less success in many conventional schools. "Parenting" =
|
|
2559 |
techniques that are taught to=20
|
|
2560 |
parents are designed to make children accept fundamental values of the =
|
|
2561 |
system and behave in ways that the=20
|
|
2562 |
system finds desirable. "Mental health" programs, "intervention" =
|
|
2563 |
techniques, psychotherapy and so forth=20
|
|
2564 |
are ostensibly designed to benefit individuals,=20
|
|
2565 |
but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to =
|
|
2566 |
think and behave as the system=20
|
|
2567 |
requires. (There is no contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or =
|
|
2568 |
behavior bring him into conflict=20
|
|
2569 |
with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to =
|
|
2570 |
conquer or escape from, hence he is=20
|
|
2571 |
likely to suffer from stress, frustration, defeat. His path will be much =
|
|
2572 |
easier if he thinks and behaves as the=20
|
|
2573 |
system requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the =
|
|
2574 |
individual when it brainwashes him=20
|
|
2575 |
into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious forms is disapproved =
|
|
2576 |
in most if not all cultures.=20
|
|
2577 |
Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at all is something =
|
|
2578 |
that appalls almost everyone.=20
|
|
2579 |
But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is =
|
|
2580 |
spanking, when used as part=20
|
|
2581 |
of a rational and consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The =
|
|
2582 |
question will ultimately be decided=20
|
|
2583 |
by whether or not spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person =
|
|
2584 |
fit in well with the existing=20
|
|
2585 |
system of society. In practice, the word "abuse" tends to be interpreted to =
|
|
2586 |
include any method of child-
|
|
2587 |
rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they =
|
|
2588 |
go beyond the prevention of=20
|
|
2589 |
obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing "child abuse" are =
|
|
2590 |
directed toward the control of human=20
|
|
2591 |
behavior of the system.=20
|
|
2592 |
|
|
2593 |
149. Presumably, research will continue to increas the effectiveness of =
|
|
2594 |
psychological techniques for=20
|
|
2595 |
controlling human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological =
|
|
2596 |
techniques alone will be=20
|
|
2597 |
sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is =
|
|
2598 |
creating. Biological methods=20
|
|
2599 |
probably will have to be used. We have already mentiond the use of drugs in =
|
|
2600 |
this connection. Neurology=20
|
|
2601 |
may provide other avenues of modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering =
|
|
2602 |
of human beings is already=20
|
|
2603 |
beginning to occur in the form of "gene therapy," and there is no reason to =
|
|
2604 |
assume the such methods will=20
|
|
2605 |
not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body that affect =
|
|
2606 |
mental funtioning.=20
|
|
2607 |
|
|
2608 |
150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial society seems likely to =
|
|
2609 |
be entering a period of severe=20
|
|
2610 |
stress, due in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic =
|
|
2611 |
and environmental problems.=20
|
|
2612 |
And a considerable proportion of the system's economic and environmental =
|
|
2613 |
problems result from the way=20
|
|
2614 |
human beings behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility, =
|
|
2615 |
rebellion; children who won't=20
|
|
2616 |
study, youth gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse , other crimes, =
|
|
2617 |
unsafe sex, teen pregnancy,=20
|
|
2618 |
population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic rivalry, =
|
|
2619 |
bitter ideological conflict (i.e., pro-
|
|
2620 |
choice vs. pro-life), political extremism, terrorism, sabotage, =
|
|
2621 |
anti-government groups, hate groups. All=20
|
|
2622 |
these threaten the very survival of the system.=20
|
|
2623 |
The system will be FORCED to use every practical means of controlling human =
|
|
2624 |
behavior.=20
|
|
2625 |
|
|
2626 |
151. The social disruption that we see today is certainly not the result of =
|
|
2627 |
mere chance. It can only be a=20
|
|
2628 |
result fo the conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We =
|
|
2629 |
have argued that the most important=20
|
|
2630 |
of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems =
|
|
2631 |
succeeds in imposing sufficient=20
|
|
2632 |
control over human behavior to assure itw own survival, a new watershed in =
|
|
2633 |
human history will have=20
|
|
2634 |
passed. Whereas formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits =
|
|
2635 |
on the development of=20
|
|
2636 |
societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), =
|
|
2637 |
industrial-technological society will be able to pass=20
|
|
2638 |
those limits by modifying human beings, whether by psychological methods or =
|
|
2639 |
biological methods or both.=20
|
|
2640 |
In the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of =
|
|
2641 |
human beings.=20
|
|
2642 |
Instead, human being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the =
|
|
2643 |
system.
|
|
2644 |
|
|
2645 |
[27] 152. Generally speaking, technological control over human behavior =
|
|
2646 |
will probably not be introduced=20
|
|
2647 |
with a totalitarian intention or even through a conscious desire to =
|
|
2648 |
restrict human freedom. [28] Each new=20
|
|
2649 |
step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as a =
|
|
2650 |
rational response to a problem that=20
|
|
2651 |
faces society, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate or =
|
|
2652 |
inducing young people to study science=20
|
|
2653 |
and engineering. In many cases, there will be humanitarian justification. =
|
|
2654 |
For example, when a psychiatrist=20
|
|
2655 |
prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing =
|
|
2656 |
that individual a favor. It would be=20
|
|
2657 |
inhumane to withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send =
|
|
2658 |
their children to Sylvan=20
|
|
2659 |
Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic about =
|
|
2660 |
their studies,=20
|
|
2661 |
they do so from concern for their children's welfare. It may be that some =
|
|
2662 |
of these parents wish that one=20
|
|
2663 |
didn't have to have specialized training to get a job and that their kid =
|
|
2664 |
didn't have to be brainwashed into=20
|
|
2665 |
becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can't change society, =
|
|
2666 |
and their child may be=20
|
|
2667 |
unemployable if he doesn't have certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan. =
|
|
2668 |
|
|
2669 |
|
|
2670 |
153. Thus control over human behavior will be introduced not by a =
|
|
2671 |
calculated decision of the authorities=20
|
|
2672 |
but through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The =
|
|
2673 |
process will be impossible to=20
|
|
2674 |
resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear to be =
|
|
2675 |
beneficial, or at least the evil involved=20
|
|
2676 |
in making the advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil =
|
|
2677 |
involved in making the advance will=20
|
|
2678 |
seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see =
|
|
2679 |
paragraph 127). Propaganda for=20
|
|
2680 |
example is used for many good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or =
|
|
2681 |
race hatred. [14] Sex=20
|
|
2682 |
education is obviously useful, yet the effect of sex education (to the =
|
|
2683 |
extent that it is successful) is to take=20
|
|
2684 |
the shaping of sexual attitudes=20
|
|
2685 |
away from the family and put it into the hands of the state as represented =
|
|
2686 |
by the public school system.=20
|
|
2687 |
|
|
2688 |
154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered that increases the likelihood =
|
|
2689 |
that a child will grow up to be a=20
|
|
2690 |
criminal and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] =
|
|
2691 |
Of course most parents whose=20
|
|
2692 |
children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would be =
|
|
2693 |
inhumane to do otherwise, since=20
|
|
2694 |
the child would probably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a =
|
|
2695 |
criminal. But many or most primitive=20
|
|
2696 |
societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, =
|
|
2697 |
even though they have neither high-
|
|
2698 |
tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems of punishment. Since there =
|
|
2699 |
is no reason to suppose that=20
|
|
2700 |
more modern men than primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the =
|
|
2701 |
high crime rate of our society=20
|
|
2702 |
must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people,=20
|
|
2703 |
to which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to =
|
|
2704 |
remove potential criminal tendencies=20
|
|
2705 |
is at least in part a way of re-engineering people so that they suit the =
|
|
2706 |
requirements of the system.=20
|
|
2707 |
|
|
2708 |
155. Our society tends to regard as a "sickness" any mode of thought or =
|
|
2709 |
behavior that is inconvenient for=20
|
|
2710 |
the system, and this is plausible because when an individual doesn't fit =
|
|
2711 |
into the system it causes pain to the=20
|
|
2712 |
individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation of an =
|
|
2713 |
individual to adjust him to the=20
|
|
2714 |
system is seen as a "cure" for a "sickness" and therefore as good.=20
|
|
2715 |
|
|
2716 |
156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use of a new item of =
|
|
2717 |
technology is INITIALLY optional, it=20
|
|
2718 |
does not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to =
|
|
2719 |
change society in such a way=20
|
|
2720 |
that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to function =
|
|
2721 |
without using that technology. This=20
|
|
2722 |
applies also to the technology of human behavior. In a world in which most =
|
|
2723 |
children are put through a=20
|
|
2724 |
program to make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be =
|
|
2725 |
forced to put his kid through=20
|
|
2726 |
such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow up to be, =
|
|
2727 |
comparatively speaking, an=20
|
|
2728 |
ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or suppose a biological treatment is =
|
|
2729 |
discovered that, without=20
|
|
2730 |
undesirable side-effects,=20
|
|
2731 |
will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many people =
|
|
2732 |
suffer in our society. If large=20
|
|
2733 |
numbers of people choose to undergo the treatment, then the general level =
|
|
2734 |
of stress in society will be=20
|
|
2735 |
reduced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase the =
|
|
2736 |
stress-producing pressures. In fact,=20
|
|
2737 |
something like this seems to have happened already with one of our =
|
|
2738 |
society's most important psychological=20
|
|
2739 |
tools for enabling people to reduce (or at least temporarily escape from) =
|
|
2740 |
stress, namely, mass entertainment=20
|
|
2741 |
(see paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is "optional": No law =
|
|
2742 |
requires us to watch television,=20
|
|
2743 |
listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass entertainment is a means of =
|
|
2744 |
escape and stress-reduction on=20
|
|
2745 |
which most of us have become dependent.=20
|
|
2746 |
Everyone complains about the trashiness of television, but almost everyone =
|
|
2747 |
watches it. A few have kicked=20
|
|
2748 |
the TV habit, but it would be a rare person who could get along today =
|
|
2749 |
without using ANY form of mass=20
|
|
2750 |
entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got =
|
|
2751 |
along very nicely with no other=20
|
|
2752 |
entertainment than that which each local community created for itself.) =
|
|
2753 |
Without the entertainment industry=20
|
|
2754 |
the system probably would not have been able to get away with putting as =
|
|
2755 |
much stress-producing pressure=20
|
|
2756 |
on us as it does.=20
|
|
2757 |
|
|
2758 |
157. Assuming that industrial society survives, it is likely that =
|
|
2759 |
technology will eventually acquire=20
|
|
2760 |
something approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been =
|
|
2761 |
established beyond any rational=20
|
|
2762 |
doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As =
|
|
2763 |
experimenters have=20
|
|
2764 |
demonstrated, feelings such as hunger, pleasure, anger and fear can be =
|
|
2765 |
turned on and off by electrical=20
|
|
2766 |
stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by =
|
|
2767 |
damaging parts of the brain or=20
|
|
2768 |
they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation. =
|
|
2769 |
Hallucinations can be induced or moods=20
|
|
2770 |
changed by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human soul, but if =
|
|
2771 |
there is one it clearly is less=20
|
|
2772 |
powerful that the biological mechanisms of human behavior.=20
|
|
2773 |
For if that were not the case then researchers would not be able so easily =
|
|
2774 |
to manipulate human feelings and=20
|
|
2775 |
behavior with drugs and electrical currents.=20
|
|
2776 |
|
|
2777 |
158. It presumably would be impractical for all people to have electrodes =
|
|
2778 |
inserted in their heads so that=20
|
|
2779 |
they could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human =
|
|
2780 |
thoughts and feelings are so open to=20
|
|
2781 |
biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling human =
|
|
2782 |
behavior is mainly a technical=20
|
|
2783 |
problem; a problem of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind of =
|
|
2784 |
problem that is accessible to=20
|
|
2785 |
scientific attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving =
|
|
2786 |
technical problems, it is=20
|
|
2787 |
overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the control of =
|
|
2788 |
human behavior.=20
|
|
2789 |
|
|
2790 |
159. Will public resistance prevent the introduction of technological =
|
|
2791 |
control of human behavior? It=20
|
|
2792 |
certainly would if an attempt were made to introduce such control all at =
|
|
2793 |
once. But since technological=20
|
|
2794 |
control will be introduced through a long sequence of small advances, there =
|
|
2795 |
will be no rational and=20
|
|
2796 |
effective public resistance. (See paragraphs 127,132, 153.)=20
|
|
2797 |
|
|
2798 |
160. To those who think that all this sounds like science fiction, we point =
|
|
2799 |
out that yesterday's science=20
|
|
2800 |
fiction is today's fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered =
|
|
2801 |
man's environment and way of life,=20
|
|
2802 |
and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly applied to =
|
|
2803 |
the human body and mind, man=20
|
|
2804 |
himself will be altered as radically as his environment and way of life =
|
|
2805 |
have been.=20
|
|
2806 |
|
|
2807 |
|
|
2808 |
|
|
2809 |
HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS
|
|
2810 |
|
|
2811 |
161. But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one thing to develop in =
|
|
2812 |
the laboratory a series of=20
|
|
2813 |
psychological or biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and =
|
|
2814 |
quite another to integrate=20
|
|
2815 |
these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem is =
|
|
2816 |
the more difficult of the two. For=20
|
|
2817 |
example, while the techniques of educational psychology doubtless work =
|
|
2818 |
quite well in the "lab schools"=20
|
|
2819 |
where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them =
|
|
2820 |
effectively throughout our educational=20
|
|
2821 |
system. We all know what many of our schools are like. The teachers are too =
|
|
2822 |
busy taking knives and guns=20
|
|
2823 |
away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques for making them =
|
|
2824 |
into computer nerds. Thus, in=20
|
|
2825 |
spite of all its technical advances relating=20
|
|
2826 |
to human behavior the system to date has not been impressively successful =
|
|
2827 |
in controlling human beings.=20
|
|
2828 |
The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the system =
|
|
2829 |
are those of the type that might be=20
|
|
2830 |
called "bourgeois." But there are growing numbers of people who in one way =
|
|
2831 |
or another are rebels against=20
|
|
2832 |
the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs cultists, satanists, nazis, =
|
|
2833 |
radical environmentalists, militiamen,=20
|
|
2834 |
etc..=20
|
|
2835 |
|
|
2836 |
162. The system is currently engaged in a desperate struggle to overcome =
|
|
2837 |
certain problems that threaten its=20
|
|
2838 |
survival, among which the problems of human behavior are the most =
|
|
2839 |
important. If the system succeeds in=20
|
|
2840 |
acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly enough, it will =
|
|
2841 |
probably survive. Otherwise it=20
|
|
2842 |
will break down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved within the =
|
|
2843 |
next several decades, say 40 to=20
|
|
2844 |
100 years.=20
|
|
2845 |
|
|
2846 |
163. Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next several decades. By =
|
|
2847 |
that time it will have to have=20
|
|
2848 |
solved, or at least brought under control, the principal problems that =
|
|
2849 |
confront it, in particular that of=20
|
|
2850 |
"socializing" human beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so =
|
|
2851 |
that their behavior no longer=20
|
|
2852 |
threatens the system. That being accomplished, it does not appear that =
|
|
2853 |
there would be any further obstacle=20
|
|
2854 |
to the development of technology, and it would presumably advance toward =
|
|
2855 |
its logical conclusion, which is=20
|
|
2856 |
complete control over everything on Earth, including human beings and all =
|
|
2857 |
other important organisms. The=20
|
|
2858 |
system may become a unitary, monolithic organization, or it may be more or =
|
|
2859 |
less fragmented and consist of=20
|
|
2860 |
a number of organizations coexisting=20
|
|
2861 |
in a relationship that includes elements of both cooperation and =
|
|
2862 |
competition, just as today the government,=20
|
|
2863 |
the corporations and other large organizations both cooperate and compete =
|
|
2864 |
with one another. Human=20
|
|
2865 |
freedom mostly will have vanished, because individuals and small groups =
|
|
2866 |
will be impotent vis-a-vis large=20
|
|
2867 |
organizations armed with supertechnology and an arsenal of advanced =
|
|
2868 |
psychological and biological tools=20
|
|
2869 |
for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of surveillance and =
|
|
2870 |
physical coercion. Only a small=20
|
|
2871 |
number of people will have any real power, and even these probably will =
|
|
2872 |
have only very limited freedom,=20
|
|
2873 |
because their behavior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians =
|
|
2874 |
and corporation executives can=20
|
|
2875 |
retain their positions of power only as long=20
|
|
2876 |
as their behavior remains within certain fairly narrow limits.=20
|
|
2877 |
|
|
2878 |
164. Don't imagine that the systems will stop developing further techniques =
|
|
2879 |
for controlling human beings=20
|
|
2880 |
and nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing =
|
|
2881 |
control is no longer necessary for=20
|
|
2882 |
the system's survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over the =
|
|
2883 |
system will increase its control over=20
|
|
2884 |
people and nature more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by =
|
|
2885 |
difficulties of the kind that it is=20
|
|
2886 |
currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending =
|
|
2887 |
control. As we explained in=20
|
|
2888 |
paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry on their work largely as =
|
|
2889 |
a surrogate activity; that is, they=20
|
|
2890 |
satisfy their need for power by solving technical problems. They will =
|
|
2891 |
continue to do this with unabated=20
|
|
2892 |
enthusiasm,=20
|
|
2893 |
and among the most interesting and challenging problems for them to solve =
|
|
2894 |
will be those of understanding=20
|
|
2895 |
the human body and mind and intervening in their development. For the "good =
|
|
2896 |
of humanity," of course.=20
|
|
2897 |
|
|
2898 |
165. But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of the coming decades =
|
|
2899 |
prove to be too much for the=20
|
|
2900 |
system. If the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a "time =
|
|
2901 |
of troubles" such as those that=20
|
|
2902 |
history has recorded: at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to =
|
|
2903 |
predict what would emerge from such=20
|
|
2904 |
a time of troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new =
|
|
2905 |
chance. The greatest danger is that=20
|
|
2906 |
industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself within the first few =
|
|
2907 |
years after the breakdown. Certainly=20
|
|
2908 |
there will be many people (power-hungry types especially) who will be =
|
|
2909 |
anxious to get the factories running=20
|
|
2910 |
again.=20
|
|
2911 |
|
|
2912 |
166. Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the =
|
|
2913 |
industrial system is reducing=20
|
|
2914 |
the human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within =
|
|
2915 |
the system so as to increase the=20
|
|
2916 |
likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a =
|
|
2917 |
revolution against it becomes=20
|
|
2918 |
possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that =
|
|
2919 |
opposes technology and the=20
|
|
2920 |
industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. =
|
|
2921 |
And such an ideology will help=20
|
|
2922 |
to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants =
|
|
2923 |
will be smashed beyond repair, so=20
|
|
2924 |
that the system cannot be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, =
|
|
2925 |
technical books burned, etc.=20
|
|
2926 |
|
|
2927 |
|
|
2928 |
|
|
2929 |
HUMAN SUFFERING
|
|
2930 |
|
|
2931 |
167. The industrial system will not break down purely as a result of =
|
|
2932 |
revolutionary action. It will not be=20
|
|
2933 |
vulnerable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of =
|
|
2934 |
development lead it into very serious=20
|
|
2935 |
difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so either =
|
|
2936 |
spontaneously, or through a process that is in=20
|
|
2937 |
part spontaneous but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is =
|
|
2938 |
sudden, many people will die,=20
|
|
2939 |
since the world's population has become so overblown that it cannot even =
|
|
2940 |
feed itself any longer without=20
|
|
2941 |
advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is gradual enough so that =
|
|
2942 |
reduction of the population can=20
|
|
2943 |
occur more through lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the =
|
|
2944 |
death rate, the process of de-
|
|
2945 |
industrialization probably will=20
|
|
2946 |
be very chaotic and involve much suffering. It is naive to think it likely =
|
|
2947 |
that technology can be phased out=20
|
|
2948 |
in a smoothly managed orderly way, especially since the technophiles will =
|
|
2949 |
fight stubbornly at every step. Is=20
|
|
2950 |
it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of the system? Maybe, but =
|
|
2951 |
maybe not. In the first place,=20
|
|
2952 |
revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down unless it is =
|
|
2953 |
already in deep trouble so that there=20
|
|
2954 |
would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway; =
|
|
2955 |
and the bigger the system=20
|
|
2956 |
grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it =
|
|
2957 |
may be that revolutionaries, by=20
|
|
2958 |
hastening the onset of the breakdown will be reducing the extent of the =
|
|
2959 |
disaster.=20
|
|
2960 |
|
|
2961 |
168. In the second place, one has to balance the struggle and death against =
|
|
2962 |
the loss of freedom and dignity.=20
|
|
2963 |
To many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or =
|
|
2964 |
avoidance of physical pain.=20
|
|
2965 |
Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting =
|
|
2966 |
for survival, or for a cause, than=20
|
|
2967 |
to live a long but empty and purposeless life.=20
|
|
2968 |
|
|
2969 |
169. In the third place, it is not all certain that the survival of the =
|
|
2970 |
system will lead to less suffering than the=20
|
|
2971 |
breakdown of the system would. The system has already caused, and is =
|
|
2972 |
continuing to cause , immense=20
|
|
2973 |
suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of years =
|
|
2974 |
gave p eople a satisfactory=20
|
|
2975 |
relationship with each other and their environment, have been shattered by =
|
|
2976 |
contact with industrial society,=20
|
|
2977 |
and the result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, =
|
|
2978 |
social and psychological problems.=20
|
|
2979 |
One of the effects o f the intrusion of industrial society has be en that =
|
|
2980 |
over much of the world traditional=20
|
|
2981 |
controls on population have been thrown out of balance. Hence the =
|
|
2982 |
population explosion, with all that it=20
|
|
2983 |
implies.=20
|
|
2984 |
Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread throughout the =
|
|
2985 |
supposedly fortunate countries=20
|
|
2986 |
of the West (see paragraphs 44, 4 5). No one knows what will happen as a =
|
|
2987 |
result of ozone depletion, the=20
|
|
2988 |
greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be =
|
|
2989 |
foreseen. And, as nuclear=20
|
|
2990 |
proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands of =
|
|
2991 |
dictators an d irresponsible=20
|
|
2992 |
Third World nations. Would you like to speculate abut what Iraq or North =
|
|
2993 |
Korea will do with genetic=20
|
|
2994 |
engineering?=20
|
|
2995 |
|
|
2996 |
170. "Oh!" say the technophiles, "Science is going to fix all that! We will =
|
|
2997 |
conquer famine, eliminate=20
|
|
2998 |
psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!" Yeah, sure. =
|
|
2999 |
That's what they said 200 years=20
|
|
3000 |
ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make =
|
|
3001 |
everybody happy, etc. The actual=20
|
|
3002 |
result has been quite different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or =
|
|
3003 |
self-deceiving) in their=20
|
|
3004 |
understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) =
|
|
3005 |
the fact that when large=20
|
|
3006 |
changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced into a society, =
|
|
3007 |
they le ad to a long sequence of=20
|
|
3008 |
other changes, most of which are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The =
|
|
3009 |
result is disruption of the=20
|
|
3010 |
society. So it is very probable that=20
|
|
3011 |
in their attempt to end poverty and disease, engineer docile, happy =
|
|
3012 |
personalities and s o forth, the=20
|
|
3013 |
technophiles will create socia l systems that are terribly troubled, even =
|
|
3014 |
more so that the present one. For=20
|
|
3015 |
example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by creating new, =
|
|
3016 |
genetically engineered food plants.=20
|
|
3017 |
But this will allow the human population to keep expanding indefini tely, =
|
|
3018 |
and it is well known that=20
|
|
3019 |
crowding lea ds to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one =
|
|
3020 |
example of the PREDICTABLE=20
|
|
3021 |
problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has shown, =
|
|
3022 |
technical progress will lead to=20
|
|
3023 |
other new problems for society far more rapidly that it has b een solving =
|
|
3024 |
old ones. Thus it will take a l ong=20
|
|
3025 |
difficult period of=20
|
|
3026 |
trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their Brave =
|
|
3027 |
New World (if they ever do). In the=20
|
|
3028 |
meantime there will be great suffering. So it is not all clear that the =
|
|
3029 |
survival of industrial society would=20
|
|
3030 |
involve les s suffering than the breakdown of that socie ty would. =
|
|
3031 |
Technology has gotten the human race=20
|
|
3032 |
into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy escape.=20
|
|
3033 |
|
|
3034 |
|
|
3035 |
|
|
3036 |
THE FUTURE
|
|
3037 |
|
|
3038 |
171. But suppose now that industrial society does survive the next several =
|
|
3039 |
decade and that the bugs do=20
|
|
3040 |
eventually get worked out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. =
|
|
3041 |
What kind of system will it be? We=20
|
|
3042 |
will consider several possibilities.=20
|
|
3043 |
|
|
3044 |
172. First let us postulate that the computer scientists succeed in =
|
|
3045 |
developing intelligent machines that can=20
|
|
3046 |
do all things better that human beings can do them. In that case presumably =
|
|
3047 |
all work will be done by vast,=20
|
|
3048 |
highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be necessary. =
|
|
3049 |
Eith er of two cases might=20
|
|
3050 |
occur. The machines might be permitted to make all of their own decisions =
|
|
3051 |
without human oversight, or=20
|
|
3052 |
else human control over the machines might be retained.=20
|
|
3053 |
|
|
3054 |
173. If the machines are permitted to make all their own decisions, we =
|
|
3055 |
can't make any conjectures as to the=20
|
|
3056 |
results, because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. =
|
|
3057 |
We only point out that the fate=20
|
|
3058 |
of the human race would be at the merc y of the machines. It might be =
|
|
3059 |
argued that the human race would=20
|
|
3060 |
never be foolish enough to hand over all the power to the machines. But we =
|
|
3061 |
are suggesting neither that the=20
|
|
3062 |
human race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the =
|
|
3063 |
machines would willfully seize=20
|
|
3064 |
power. What we do su ggest is that the human race might easily pe rmit =
|
|
3065 |
itself to drift into a position of such=20
|
|
3066 |
dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to =
|
|
3067 |
accept all of the machines=20
|
|
3068 |
decisions.=20
|
|
3069 |
As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and =
|
|
3070 |
machines become more and=20
|
|
3071 |
more intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decision for =
|
|
3072 |
them, simply because machine-
|
|
3073 |
made decisions will bring better result than man-made ones. Eventually a =
|
|
3074 |
stage may be reached at which=20
|
|
3075 |
the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that =
|
|
3076 |
human beings wi ll be incapable=20
|
|
3077 |
of making them intelligently . At that stage the machines will be in =
|
|
3078 |
effective control. People won't be able=20
|
|
3079 |
to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them =
|
|
3080 |
that turning them off would=20
|
|
3081 |
amount to suicide.=20
|
|
3082 |
|
|
3083 |
174. On the other hand it is possible that human control over the machines =
|
|
3084 |
may be retained. In that case the=20
|
|
3085 |
average man may have control over certain private machines of his own, such =
|
|
3086 |
as his car of his personal=20
|
|
3087 |
computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in the hands =
|
|
3088 |
of a tiny e lite -- just as it is=20
|
|
3089 |
today, but with two difference. Due to improved techniques the elite will =
|
|
3090 |
have greater control over the=20
|
|
3091 |
masses; and because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will =
|
|
3092 |
be superfluous, a useless=20
|
|
3093 |
burden on the system. If t he elite is ruthless the may simply decide t o =
|
|
3094 |
exterminate the mass of humanity.=20
|
|
3095 |
If they are humane they may use propaganda or other psychological or =
|
|
3096 |
biological techniques to reduce the=20
|
|
3097 |
birth rate until=20
|
|
3098 |
the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, =
|
|
3099 |
if the elite consist of soft-hearted=20
|
|
3100 |
liberals, they may decide to play the role of good shepherds to the rest of =
|
|
3101 |
the human race. They will see to=20
|
|
3102 |
it that everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are =
|
|
3103 |
raised under psychologically hygienic=20
|
|
3104 |
conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy , and that =
|
|
3105 |
anyone who may become=20
|
|
3106 |
dissatisfie d undergoes "treatment" to cure his "problem." Of course, life =
|
|
3107 |
will be so purposeless that people=20
|
|
3108 |
will have to be biologically or psychologically engineered either to remove =
|
|
3109 |
their need for the power=20
|
|
3110 |
process or to make them "sublimate" their drive for pow er into some =
|
|
3111 |
harmless hobby. These engineer ed=20
|
|
3112 |
human beings=20
|
|
3113 |
may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly will not be free. =
|
|
3114 |
They will have been reduced to=20
|
|
3115 |
the status of domestic animals.=20
|
|
3116 |
|
|
3117 |
175. But suppose now that the computer scientists do not succeed in =
|
|
3118 |
developing artificial intelligence, so=20
|
|
3119 |
that human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more =
|
|
3120 |
and more of the simpler=20
|
|
3121 |
tasks so that there will be an increasing surp lus of human workers at the =
|
|
3122 |
lower levels of ability. (We see=20
|
|
3123 |
this happening already. There are many people who find it difficult or =
|
|
3124 |
impossible to get work, because for=20
|
|
3125 |
intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of =
|
|
3126 |
training necessary to make themselves=20
|
|
3127 |
useful in the presen t system.) On those who are employed, ever- increasing =
|
|
3128 |
demands will be placed; They=20
|
|
3129 |
will need more and m ore training, more and more ability, and will have to =
|
|
3130 |
be ever more reliable,=20
|
|
3131 |
conforming and docile,=20
|
|
3132 |
because they will be more and more like cells of a giant organism. Their =
|
|
3133 |
tasks will be incre asingly=20
|
|
3134 |
specialized so that their work will be, in a sense, out of touch with the =
|
|
3135 |
real world, being concentrated on=20
|
|
3136 |
one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that I =
|
|
3137 |
can, whether psychological or=20
|
|
3138 |
biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that the =
|
|
3139 |
syst em requires and to "sublimate"=20
|
|
3140 |
their drive f or power into some specialized task. But the statement that =
|
|
3141 |
the people of such a society will=20
|
|
3142 |
have to be docile may require qualification. The society may find =
|
|
3143 |
competitiveness useful, provided that=20
|
|
3144 |
ways are found of directing competitiveness into channe ls that serve that =
|
|
3145 |
needs of the system. We can=20
|
|
3146 |
imagine=20
|
|
3147 |
into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a future =
|
|
3148 |
society in which there is endless=20
|
|
3149 |
competition for positions of prestige an power. But no more than a very few =
|
|
3150 |
people will ever reach the top,=20
|
|
3151 |
where the only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repell ent is =
|
|
3152 |
a society in which a person can=20
|
|
3153 |
satisfy his needs for power only by pushing large numbers of other people =
|
|
3154 |
out of the way and depriving=20
|
|
3155 |
them of THEIR opportunity for power.=20
|
|
3156 |
|
|
3157 |
176. Once can envision scenarios that incorporate aspects of more than one =
|
|
3158 |
of the possibilities that we have=20
|
|
3159 |
just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will take over most =
|
|
3160 |
of the work that is of real,=20
|
|
3161 |
practical importance, but that human bei ngs will be kept busy by being =
|
|
3162 |
given relativ ely unimportant=20
|
|
3163 |
work. It has been suggested, for example, that a great development of the =
|
|
3164 |
service of industries might=20
|
|
3165 |
provide work for human beings. Thus people will would spend their time =
|
|
3166 |
shinning each others shoes,=20
|
|
3167 |
driving each other around inn taxica b, making handicrafts for one another, =
|
|
3168 |
waiti ng on each other's tables,=20
|
|
3169 |
etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human race to =
|
|
3170 |
end up, and we doubt that many=20
|
|
3171 |
people would find=20
|
|
3172 |
fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, =
|
|
3173 |
dangerous outlets (drugs, , crime,=20
|
|
3174 |
"cults," hate groups) unless they were biol ogical or psychologically =
|
|
3175 |
engineered to adapt them to such a=20
|
|
3176 |
way of life.=20
|
|
3177 |
|
|
3178 |
177. Needless to day, the scenarios outlined above do not exhaust all the =
|
|
3179 |
possibilities. They only indicate=20
|
|
3180 |
the kinds of outcomes that seem to us mots likely. But wee can envision no =
|
|
3181 |
plausible scenarios that are any=20
|
|
3182 |
more palatable that the ones we've j ust described. It is overwhelmingly =
|
|
3183 |
probabl e that if the industrial-
|
|
3184 |
technological system survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that =
|
|
3185 |
time have developed certain general=20
|
|
3186 |
characteristics: Individuals (at least those of the "bourgeois" type, who =
|
|
3187 |
are integrated into the system and=20
|
|
3188 |
make it run, and who therefore have all the power) will b e more dependent =
|
|
3189 |
than ever on large=20
|
|
3190 |
organizations; they will be more "socialized" that ever and their physical =
|
|
3191 |
and mental qualities to a=20
|
|
3192 |
significant=20
|
|
3193 |
extent (possibly to a very great extent ) will be those that are engineered =
|
|
3194 |
into them rather than being th e=20
|
|
3195 |
results of chance (or of God's will, or wh atever); and whatever may be =
|
|
3196 |
left of wild nature will be reduced=20
|
|
3197 |
to remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision =
|
|
3198 |
and management of scientists=20
|
|
3199 |
(hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long run (say a few =
|
|
3200 |
centuries from no w) it is it is likely that=20
|
|
3201 |
neither the human race nor any other important organisms will exist as we =
|
|
3202 |
know them today, because once=20
|
|
3203 |
you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is no =
|
|
3204 |
reason to stop at any particular=20
|
|
3205 |
point, so that the modifications will probably continue until man and other =
|
|
3206 |
organisms have been utterly=20
|
|
3207 |
trans formed.=20
|
|
3208 |
|
|
3209 |
178. Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that technology is =
|
|
3210 |
creating for human begins a new=20
|
|
3211 |
physical and social environment radically different from the spectrum of =
|
|
3212 |
environments to which natural=20
|
|
3213 |
selection has adapted the human race physically an d psychological. If man =
|
|
3214 |
is not adjust to th is new=20
|
|
3215 |
environment by being artificially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to =
|
|
3216 |
it through a long an painful=20
|
|
3217 |
process of natural selection. The former is far more likely that the =
|
|
3218 |
latter.=20
|
|
3219 |
|
|
3220 |
179. It would be better to dump the whole stinking system and take the =
|
|
3221 |
consequences.=20
|
|
3222 |
|
|
3223 |
STRATEGY
|
|
3224 |
|
|
3225 |
180. The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into =
|
|
3226 |
the unknown. Many people=20
|
|
3227 |
understand something of what technological progress is doing to us yet take =
|
|
3228 |
a passive attitude toward it=20
|
|
3229 |
because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don't think it is =
|
|
3230 |
inevitable. We think it c an be stopped, and=20
|
|
3231 |
we will give here some indications of how to go about stopping it.=20
|
|
3232 |
|
|
3233 |
181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks for the present are =
|
|
3234 |
to promote social stress and=20
|
|
3235 |
instability in industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology =
|
|
3236 |
that opposes technology and the=20
|
|
3237 |
industrial system. When the system become s sufficiently stressed and =
|
|
3238 |
unstable, a revo lution against=20
|
|
3239 |
technology may be possible. The pattern would be similar to that of the =
|
|
3240 |
French and Russian Revolutions.=20
|
|
3241 |
French society and Russian society, for several decades prior to their =
|
|
3242 |
respective revolutions, showed=20
|
|
3243 |
increasing signs of stress and w eakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were being =
|
|
3244 |
d eveloped that offered a new=20
|
|
3245 |
world view that was quite different from the old one. In the Russian case, =
|
|
3246 |
revolutionaries were actively=20
|
|
3247 |
working to undermine=20
|
|
3248 |
the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient =
|
|
3249 |
additional stress (by financial c risis in=20
|
|
3250 |
France, by military defeat in Russi a) it was swept away by revolution. =
|
|
3251 |
What we propose in something=20
|
|
3252 |
along the same lines.=20
|
|
3253 |
|
|
3254 |
182. It will be objected that the French and Russian Revolutions were =
|
|
3255 |
failures. But most revolutions have=20
|
|
3256 |
two goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set =
|
|
3257 |
up the new form of society=20
|
|
3258 |
envisioned by the revolutionaries. The Fre nch and Russian revolutionaries =
|
|
3259 |
failed (fort unately!) to create=20
|
|
3260 |
the new kind of society of which they dreamed, but they were quite =
|
|
3261 |
successful in destroying the existing=20
|
|
3262 |
form of society.=20
|
|
3263 |
|
|
3264 |
183. But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic support, must have a =
|
|
3265 |
positive ideals well as a negative=20
|
|
3266 |
one; it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive =
|
|
3267 |
ideal that we propose is=20
|
|
3268 |
Nature. That is , WILD nature; those aspects o f the functioning of the =
|
|
3269 |
Earth and its livin g things that are=20
|
|
3270 |
independent of human management and free of human interference and control. =
|
|
3271 |
And with wild nature we=20
|
|
3272 |
include human nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of =
|
|
3273 |
the human individual that are=20
|
|
3274 |
not subject to regulation by o rganized society but are products of chance, =
|
|
3275 |
or free will, or God (depending=20
|
|
3276 |
on your religious or philosophical opinions).=20
|
|
3277 |
|
|
3278 |
184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several =
|
|
3279 |
reasons. Nature (that which is outside=20
|
|
3280 |
the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to =
|
|
3281 |
expand indefinitely the power of the=20
|
|
3282 |
system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has =
|
|
3283 |
treme ndous popular appeal. The=20
|
|
3284 |
radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and =
|
|
3285 |
opposes technology. [30] It is=20
|
|
3286 |
not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or =
|
|
3287 |
any new kind of social order.=20
|
|
3288 |
Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous creation th at existed =
|
|
3289 |
long before any human society, and=20
|
|
3290 |
for countless centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted =
|
|
3291 |
with nature without doing it an=20
|
|
3292 |
excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the =
|
|
3293 |
effect of human society on nat=20
|
|
3294 |
ure become really devastating. To relieve t he pressure on nature it is not =
|
|
3295 |
necessary to create a special kind=20
|
|
3296 |
of social system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. =
|
|
3297 |
Granted, this will not solve all=20
|
|
3298 |
problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous damage to nature =
|
|
3299 |
and i t will take a very long=20
|
|
3300 |
time for the scars t o heal. Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do =
|
|
3301 |
significant damage to nature.=20
|
|
3302 |
Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great =
|
|
3303 |
deal. It will relieve the worst of the=20
|
|
3304 |
pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the =
|
|
3305 |
capacity of organized soc iety=20
|
|
3306 |
to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature). =
|
|
3307 |
Whatever kind of society may exist=20
|
|
3308 |
after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people =
|
|
3309 |
will live close to nature, because in=20
|
|
3310 |
the absence of advanced technolog y there is not other way that people CAN =
|
|
3311 |
liv e. To feed themselves they=20
|
|
3312 |
must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter, etc., And, generally =
|
|
3313 |
speaking, local autonomy should=20
|
|
3314 |
tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid =
|
|
3315 |
communications will limit the capacity of=20
|
|
3316 |
governments o r other large organizations to control local communities. =
|
|
3317 |
|
|
3318 |
|
|
3319 |
185. As for the negative consequences of eliminating industrial society -- =
|
|
3320 |
well, you can't eat your cake and=20
|
|
3321 |
have it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.=20
|
|
3322 |
|
|
3323 |
186. Most people hate psychological conflict. For this reason they avoid =
|
|
3324 |
doing any serious thinking about=20
|
|
3325 |
difficult social issues, and they like to have such issues presented to =
|
|
3326 |
them in simple, black-and-white terms:=20
|
|
3327 |
THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology should =
|
|
3328 |
therefore be developed on two=20
|
|
3329 |
levels.=20
|
|
3330 |
|
|
3331 |
187. On the more sophisticated level the ideology should address itself to =
|
|
3332 |
people who are intelligent,=20
|
|
3333 |
thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a core of people =
|
|
3334 |
who will be opposed to the=20
|
|
3335 |
industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appreciation =
|
|
3336 |
of the problems and ambiguities=20
|
|
3337 |
involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the =
|
|
3338 |
system. It is particularly important to=20
|
|
3339 |
attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be =
|
|
3340 |
instrumental in influencing others. These=20
|
|
3341 |
people should be addres sed on as rational a level as possible. Fact s =
|
|
3342 |
should never intentionally be distorted=20
|
|
3343 |
and intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no =
|
|
3344 |
appeal can be made to the=20
|
|
3345 |
emotions,=20
|
|
3346 |
but in making such appeal care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting the =
|
|
3347 |
truth or doing anything else t=20
|
|
3348 |
hat would destroy the intellectual respectab ility of the ideology. =
|
|
3349 |
|
|
3350 |
|
|
3351 |
188. On a second level, the ideology should be propagated in a simplified =
|
|
3352 |
form that will enable the=20
|
|
3353 |
unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in =
|
|
3354 |
unambiguous terms. But even on this=20
|
|
3355 |
second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so =
|
|
3356 |
cheap, intemperate or irrational=20
|
|
3357 |
that it alienates people of the thoughtful and rational type. Cheap, =
|
|
3358 |
intemperate propaganda sometimes=20
|
|
3359 |
achieves impressive short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in =
|
|
3360 |
the long run to keep the loyalty=20
|
|
3361 |
of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the =
|
|
3362 |
passion s of an unthinking, fickle=20
|
|
3363 |
mob who will change their attitude as soon as someone comes along with a =
|
|
3364 |
better propaganda gimmick.=20
|
|
3365 |
However, propaganda of the=20
|
|
3366 |
rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point =
|
|
3367 |
of collapse and there is a final=20
|
|
3368 |
struggle between rival ideologies to d etermine which will become dominant =
|
|
3369 |
when the old world-view goes=20
|
|
3370 |
under.=20
|
|
3371 |
|
|
3372 |
189. Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to =
|
|
3373 |
have a majority of people on their=20
|
|
3374 |
side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the =
|
|
3375 |
majority, which seldom has a clear and=20
|
|
3376 |
consistent idea of what it really wan ts. Until the time comes for the =
|
|
3377 |
final push toward revolution [31], the=20
|
|
3378 |
task of revolutionaries will be less to win the shallow support of the =
|
|
3379 |
majority than to build a small core of=20
|
|
3380 |
deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make =
|
|
3381 |
them aware of the existence of the=20
|
|
3382 |
new ideolo gy and remind them of it frequently; though of course it will be =
|
|
3383 |
desirable to get majority=20
|
|
3384 |
support to the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of =
|
|
3385 |
seriously committed people.=20
|
|
3386 |
|
|
3387 |
190. Any kind of social conflict helps to destabilize the system, but one =
|
|
3388 |
should be careful about what kind=20
|
|
3389 |
of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between =
|
|
3390 |
the mass of the people and the=20
|
|
3391 |
power-holding elite of industrial society ( politicians, scientists, =
|
|
3392 |
upper-level busines s executives,=20
|
|
3393 |
government officials, etc..). It should NOT be drawn between the =
|
|
3394 |
revolutionaries and the mass of the=20
|
|
3395 |
people. For example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to =
|
|
3396 |
condemn Americans for their=20
|
|
3397 |
habits of consumption. Instead, the ave rage American should be portrayed =
|
|
3398 |
as a victi m of the advertising=20
|
|
3399 |
and marketing industry, which has suckered him into buying a lot of junk =
|
|
3400 |
that he doesn't need and that is=20
|
|
3401 |
very poor compensation
|
|
3402 |
for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the facts. It is =
|
|
3403 |
merely a matter of attitude whether=20
|
|
3404 |
you blame the advertising industry for manipulating the public or blame the =
|
|
3405 |
public for allowing itself to be=20
|
|
3406 |
manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the =
|
|
3407 |
public.=20
|
|
3408 |
|
|
3409 |
191. One should think twice before encouraging any other social conflict =
|
|
3410 |
than that between the power-
|
|
3411 |
holding elite (which wields technology) and the general public (over which =
|
|
3412 |
technology exerts its power).=20
|
|
3413 |
For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the =
|
|
3414 |
important conflicts (betw een power-elite=20
|
|
3415 |
and ordinary people, between technology and nature); for another thing, =
|
|
3416 |
other conflicts may actually tend=20
|
|
3417 |
to encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants =
|
|
3418 |
to use technological power to=20
|
|
3419 |
gain advantages over its adve rsary. This is clearly seen in rivalries bet =
|
|
3420 |
ween nations. It also appears in=20
|
|
3421 |
ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America many black leaders =
|
|
3422 |
are anxious to gain power for=20
|
|
3423 |
African=20
|
|
3424 |
Americans by placing back individuals in the technological power-elite. =
|
|
3425 |
They want there to be many black=20
|
|
3426 |
gov ernment officials, scientists, corporation e xecutives and so forth. In =
|
|
3427 |
this way they are helping to=20
|
|
3428 |
absorb the African American subculture into the technological system. =
|
|
3429 |
Generally speaking, one should=20
|
|
3430 |
encourage only those social conflicts that can be fitted into the framework =
|
|
3431 |
of the conflicts of po wer--elite=20
|
|
3432 |
vs. ordinary people, technology v s nature.=20
|
|
3433 |
|
|
3434 |
192. But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT through militant =
|
|
3435 |
advocacy of minority rights (see=20
|
|
3436 |
paragraphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that =
|
|
3437 |
although minorities do suffer more=20
|
|
3438 |
or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is o f peripheral significance. Our =
|
|
3439 |
real enemy is the industrial-
|
|
3440 |
technological system, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic =
|
|
3441 |
distinctions are of no importance.=20
|
|
3442 |
|
|
3443 |
193. The kind of revolution we have in mind will not necessarily involve an =
|
|
3444 |
armed uprising against any=20
|
|
3445 |
government. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be =
|
|
3446 |
a POLITICAL revolution. Its=20
|
|
3447 |
focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]=20
|
|
3448 |
|
|
3449 |
194. Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID assuming political =
|
|
3450 |
power, whether by legal or=20
|
|
3451 |
illegal means, until the industrial system is stressed to the danger point =
|
|
3452 |
and has proved itself to be a failure=20
|
|
3453 |
in the eyes of most people. Suppose for exa mple that some "green" party =
|
|
3454 |
should win cont rol of the United=20
|
|
3455 |
States Congress in an election. In order to avoid betraying or watering =
|
|
3456 |
down their own ideology they would=20
|
|
3457 |
have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic =
|
|
3458 |
shrinkage. To the average man the=20
|
|
3459 |
results would appear disast rous: There would be massive unemployment, s =
|
|
3460 |
hortages of commodities, etc.=20
|
|
3461 |
Even if the grosser ill effects could be avoided through superhumanly =
|
|
3462 |
skillful management, still people=20
|
|
3463 |
would have=20
|
|
3464 |
to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted. =
|
|
3465 |
Dissatisfaction would grow, the=20
|
|
3466 |
"green" pa rty would be voted out of of fice and the re volutionaries would =
|
|
3467 |
have suffered a severe setback.=20
|
|
3468 |
For this reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political =
|
|
3469 |
power until the system has gotten=20
|
|
3470 |
itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as resulting from =
|
|
3471 |
the failures of the ind ustrial system=20
|
|
3472 |
itself and not from the polic ies of the revolutionaries. The revolution =
|
|
3473 |
against technology will probably=20
|
|
3474 |
have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from =
|
|
3475 |
above.=20
|
|
3476 |
|
|
3477 |
195. The revolution must be international and worldwide. It cannot be =
|
|
3478 |
carried out on a nation-by-nation=20
|
|
3479 |
basis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for example, should =
|
|
3480 |
cut back on technological=20
|
|
3481 |
progress or economic growth, people get hysteric al and start screaming =
|
|
3482 |
that if we fall behin d in=20
|
|
3483 |
technology the Japanese will get ahead of us. Holy robots The world will =
|
|
3484 |
fly off its orbit if the Japanese=20
|
|
3485 |
ever sell more cars than we do! (Nationalism is a great promoter of =
|
|
3486 |
technology.) More reasonably, it is=20
|
|
3487 |
argued that if the relatively democrati c nations of the world fall behind =
|
|
3488 |
in techno logy while nasty,=20
|
|
3489 |
dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea continue to =
|
|
3490 |
progress, eventually the dictators may=20
|
|
3491 |
come to dominate the world.=20
|
|
3492 |
That is why the industrial system should be attacked in all nations =
|
|
3493 |
simultaneously, to the extent that this=20
|
|
3494 |
may be possible. True, there is no ass urance that the industrial system =
|
|
3495 |
can be destroyed at approximately=20
|
|
3496 |
the same time all over the world, and it is even conceivable that the =
|
|
3497 |
attempt to overthrow the system could=20
|
|
3498 |
lead instead to the domination of the system by dictators. That is a risk =
|
|
3499 |
that has to be taken. And it is worth=20
|
|
3500 |
taking, sin ce the difference between a "democratic" industrial system and =
|
|
3501 |
one controlled by dictators is=20
|
|
3502 |
small compared with the difference between an industrial system and a =
|
|
3503 |
non-industrial one. [33] It might=20
|
|
3504 |
even be argued that an industrial system controlled by di ctators would be =
|
|
3505 |
preferable, because dictato=20
|
|
3506 |
r-controlled systems usually have proved inefficient, hence they are =
|
|
3507 |
presumably more likely to break down.=20
|
|
3508 |
Look at Cuba.=20
|
|
3509 |
|
|
3510 |
196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures that tend to bind the =
|
|
3511 |
world economy into a unified=20
|
|
3512 |
whole. Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to =
|
|
3513 |
the environment in the short=20
|
|
3514 |
run, but in the long run they may perhaps be ad vantageous because they =
|
|
3515 |
foster economic inte rdependence=20
|
|
3516 |
between nations. I will be eaier to destroy the industrial system on a =
|
|
3517 |
worldwide basis if he world economy=20
|
|
3518 |
is so unified that its breakdown in any on major nation will lead to its =
|
|
3519 |
breakdwon in al industrialized=20
|
|
3520 |
nations.=20
|
|
3521 |
|
|
3522 |
the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic =
|
|
3523 |
interdependence between=20
|
|
3524 |
nations. It will be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide =
|
|
3525 |
basis if the world economy is so=20
|
|
3526 |
unified that its breakdown in any one major nat ion will lead to its =
|
|
3527 |
breakdown in all indust rialized nations.
|
|
3528 |
|
|
3529 |
197. Some people take the line that modern man has too much power, too much =
|
|
3530 |
control over nature; they=20
|
|
3531 |
argue for a more passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best =
|
|
3532 |
these people are expressing=20
|
|
3533 |
themselves unclearly, because they fail to distingu ish between power for =
|
|
3534 |
LARGE ORGANIZATIONS an=20
|
|
3535 |
d power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for =
|
|
3536 |
powerlessness and=20
|
|
3537 |
passivity, because people NEED power. Modern man as a collective =
|
|
3538 |
entity--that is, the industrial system--
|
|
3539 |
has immense power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as e vil. But modern =
|
|
3540 |
INDIVIDUALS and=20
|
|
3541 |
SMALL GROUP S OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever =
|
|
3542 |
did. Generally=20
|
|
3543 |
speaking, the vast power of "modern man" over nature is exercised not =
|
|
3544 |
|
|
3545 |
by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the extent =
|
|
3546 |
that the average modern=20
|
|
3547 |
INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he is pe rmitted to do so =
|
|
3548 |
only within narrow limits and=20
|
|
3549 |
only under the supervision and control of the system. (You need a license =
|
|
3550 |
for everything and with the=20
|
|
3551 |
license come rules and regulations). The individual has only those =
|
|
3552 |
technological powers with which the s=20
|
|
3553 |
ystem chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is =
|
|
3554 |
slight.
|
|
3555 |
|
|
3556 |
198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS actually had considerable power =
|
|
3557 |
over nature; or=20
|
|
3558 |
maybe it would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When primitive man =
|
|
3559 |
needed food he knew how to=20
|
|
3560 |
find and prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it wi th homemade =
|
|
3561 |
weapons. He knew how to=20
|
|
3562 |
protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But =
|
|
3563 |
primitive man did relatively little damage=20
|
|
3564 |
to nature because the COLLECTIVE power of primitive society was negligible =
|
|
3565 |
compared to the=20
|
|
3566 |
COLLECTIVE power of industrial society.
|
|
3567 |
|
|
3568 |
199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passivity, one should argue =
|
|
3569 |
that the power of the=20
|
|
3570 |
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the =
|
|
3571 |
power and freedom=20
|
|
3572 |
of INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS.
|
|
3573 |
|
|
3574 |
200. Until the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked, the =
|
|
3575 |
destruction of that system must be the=20
|
|
3576 |
revolutionaries' ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy =
|
|
3577 |
from the main goal. More=20
|
|
3578 |
importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themse lves to have any other =
|
|
3579 |
goal than the destruc tion of=20
|
|
3580 |
technology, they will be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching =
|
|
3581 |
that other goal. If they give in to=20
|
|
3582 |
that temptation, they will fall right back into the technological trap, =
|
|
3583 |
because modern technology is a=20
|
|
3584 |
unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain SOME =
|
|
3585 |
technology , one finds oneself obliged=20
|
|
3586 |
to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing only token amounts =
|
|
3587 |
of technology.
|
|
3588 |
|
|
3589 |
201. Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took "social justice" as =
|
|
3590 |
a goal. Human nature being what=20
|
|
3591 |
it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to =
|
|
3592 |
be enforced. In order to enforce it=20
|
|
3593 |
the revolutionaries would have to ret ain central organization and control. =
|
|
3594 |
For th at they would need rapid=20
|
|
3595 |
long-distance transportation and communication, and therefore all the =
|
|
3596 |
technology needed to support the=20
|
|
3597 |
transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor people =
|
|
3598 |
they would have to use=20
|
|
3599 |
agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so forth. So that the attemp =
|
|
3600 |
t to insure social justice would=20
|
|
3601 |
force them to retain most parts of the technological system. Not that we =
|
|
3602 |
have anything against social=20
|
|
3603 |
justice,=20
|
|
3604 |
but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get rid of the =
|
|
3605 |
technological system.
|
|
3606 |
|
|
3607 |
202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system =
|
|
3608 |
without using SOME modern=20
|
|
3609 |
technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to =
|
|
3610 |
spread their message. But they=20
|
|
3611 |
should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the =
|
|
3612 |
technological system.
|
|
3613 |
|
|
3614 |
203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine in front of him. =
|
|
3615 |
Suppose he starts saying to himself,=20
|
|
3616 |
"Wine isn't bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts =
|
|
3617 |
of wine are even good for you!=20
|
|
3618 |
It won't do me any harm if I take just one little drink..." Well you know =
|
|
3619 |
what is g oing to happen. Never=20
|
|
3620 |
forget that the human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a =
|
|
3621 |
barrel of wine.
|
|
3622 |
|
|
3623 |
204. Revolutionaries should have as many children as they can. There is =
|
|
3624 |
strong scientific evidence that=20
|
|
3625 |
social attitudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests =
|
|
3626 |
that a social attitude is a direct=20
|
|
3627 |
outcome of a person's genetic constitution, but it appears that personality =
|
|
3628 |
traits tend , within the context of=20
|
|
3629 |
our society, to make a person more likely to hold this or that social =
|
|
3630 |
attitude. Objections to these findings=20
|
|
3631 |
have been raised, but objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically =
|
|
3632 |
motivated. In any event, no one=20
|
|
3633 |
denies that child ren tend on the average to hold social attit udes similar =
|
|
3634 |
to those of their parents. From our=20
|
|
3635 |
point of view it doesn't matter all that much whether the attitudes are =
|
|
3636 |
passed on genetically or through=20
|
|
3637 |
childhood training. In either case the ARE passed on.
|
|
3638 |
|
|
3639 |
205. The trouble is that many of the people who are inclined to rebel =
|
|
3640 |
against the industrial system are also=20
|
|
3641 |
concerned about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or =
|
|
3642 |
no children. In this way they=20
|
|
3643 |
may be handing the world over to the sort of people who support or at least =
|
|
3644 |
accept th e industrial system.=20
|
|
3645 |
To insure the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the =
|
|
3646 |
present generation must reproduce itself=20
|
|
3647 |
abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only =
|
|
3648 |
slightly. And the most=20
|
|
3649 |
important problem is to ge t rid of the industrial system, because once the =
|
|
3650 |
industrial system is gone the=20
|
|
3651 |
world's population necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, =
|
|
3652 |
if the industrial system survives,=20
|
|
3653 |
it will continue developing new techniques of food production that may =
|
|
3654 |
enable the world's population to=20
|
|
3655 |
keep i ncreasing almost indefinitely.
|
|
3656 |
|
|
3657 |
206. With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only points on which we =
|
|
3658 |
absolutely insist are that the single=20
|
|
3659 |
overriding goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no =
|
|
3660 |
other goal can be allowed to=20
|
|
3661 |
compete with this one. For the rest, revol utionaries should take an =
|
|
3662 |
empirical approach . If experience=20
|
|
3663 |
indicates that some of the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs =
|
|
3664 |
are not going to give good=20
|
|
3665 |
results, then those recommendations should be discarded.
|
|
3666 |
|
|
3667 |
|
|
3668 |
|
|
3669 |
TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY
|
|
3670 |
|
|
3671 |
207. An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is =
|
|
3672 |
that it is bound to fail, because (it is=20
|
|
3673 |
claimed) throughout history technology has always progressed, never =
|
|
3674 |
regressed, hence technological=20
|
|
3675 |
regression is impossible. But this claim is false.
|
|
3676 |
|
|
3677 |
208. We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call =
|
|
3678 |
small-scale technology and=20
|
|
3679 |
organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is technology =
|
|
3680 |
that can be used by small-scale=20
|
|
3681 |
communities without outside assistance. Organization -dependent technology =
|
|
3682 |
is technology that de pends=20
|
|
3683 |
on large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of =
|
|
3684 |
regression in small-scale=20
|
|
3685 |
technology. But organization-dependent technology DOES regress when the =
|
|
3686 |
social organization on which=20
|
|
3687 |
it depends breaks down. Example: When the Roma n Empire fell apart the =
|
|
3688 |
Romans' small-scale technology=20
|
|
3689 |
survived because any clever village craftsman could build, for instance, a =
|
|
3690 |
water wheel, any skilled smith=20
|
|
3691 |
could make steel by Roman methods,=20
|
|
3692 |
and so forth. But the Romans' organization-dependent technology DID =
|
|
3693 |
regress. Their aqueducts fell into=20
|
|
3694 |
disrepair and were never rebuilt.=20
|
|
3695 |
Their tech niques of road construction were lost. The Roman system of urban =
|
|
3696 |
sanitation was forgotten, so=20
|
|
3697 |
that until rather recent times did the sanitation of European cities that =
|
|
3698 |
of Ancient Rome.
|
|
3699 |
|
|
3700 |
209. The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until =
|
|
3701 |
perhaps a century or two=20
|
|
3702 |
before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale =
|
|
3703 |
technology. But most of the technology=20
|
|
3704 |
developed since the Industrial Revolution is orga nization-dependent =
|
|
3705 |
technology. Take the refr igerator for=20
|
|
3706 |
example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a post-industrial =
|
|
3707 |
machine shop it would be=20
|
|
3708 |
virtually impossible for a handful of local craftsmen to build a =
|
|
3709 |
refrigerator. If by some miracle they did=20
|
|
3710 |
succeed in building one it would be useless to them without a reliable =
|
|
3711 |
source o f electric power. So they=20
|
|
3712 |
would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators require large =
|
|
3713 |
amounts of copper wire.=20
|
|
3714 |
Imagine trying to make that=20
|
|
3715 |
wire without modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for =
|
|
3716 |
refrigeration? It would be=20
|
|
3717 |
much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or picking, as =
|
|
3718 |
was done before the invention=20
|
|
3719 |
of the refrigerator.
|
|
3720 |
|
|
3721 |
210. So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly =
|
|
3722 |
broken down, refrigeration technology=20
|
|
3723 |
would quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-dependent =
|
|
3724 |
technology. And once this=20
|
|
3725 |
technology had been lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to =
|
|
3726 |
rebuild it, just as it took centuries=20
|
|
3727 |
to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be few =
|
|
3728 |
and scattered. An industrial=20
|
|
3729 |
society, if built from scratch without outside help, can only be built in a =
|
|
3730 |
series of stages: You need tools to=20
|
|
3731 |
make tools to make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic =
|
|
3732 |
development and progress in social=20
|
|
3733 |
organization is required. And, even in the absence of an ideology opposed =
|
|
3734 |
to technology, there is no reason=20
|
|
3735 |
to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding industrial =
|
|
3736 |
society. The enthusiasm for "progre ss"=20
|
|
3737 |
is a phenomenon particular to the modern form of society, and it seems not =
|
|
3738 |
to have existed prior to the 17th=20
|
|
3739 |
century or thereabouts.
|
|
3740 |
|
|
3741 |
211. In the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were =
|
|
3742 |
about equally "advanced":=20
|
|
3743 |
Europe, the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). =
|
|
3744 |
Three of those civilizations=20
|
|
3745 |
remained more or less stable, and only Europe became dynamic. No one knows =
|
|
3746 |
why Europe became dyn=20
|
|
3747 |
amic at that time; historians have their theories but these are only =
|
|
3748 |
speculation. At any rate, it is clear that=20
|
|
3749 |
rapid development toward a technological form of society occurs only under =
|
|
3750 |
special conditions. So there is=20
|
|
3751 |
no reason to assume that long-lastin g technological regression cannot be =
|
|
3752 |
brought about.
|
|
3753 |
|
|
3754 |
212. Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an =
|
|
3755 |
industrial-technological form? Maybe, but=20
|
|
3756 |
there is no use in worrying about it, since we can't predict or control =
|
|
3757 |
events 500 or 1,000 years in the=20
|
|
3758 |
future. Those problems must be dealt with by the peopl e who will live at =
|
|
3759 |
that time.
|
|
3760 |
|
|
3761 |
|
|
3762 |
|
|
3763 |
THE DANGER OF LEFTISM
|
|
3764 |
|
|
3765 |
213. Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, =
|
|
3766 |
leftists or persons of similar=20
|
|
3767 |
psychological type are often unattracted to a rebellious or activist =
|
|
3768 |
movement whose goals and membership=20
|
|
3769 |
are not initially leftist. The resulting inf lux of leftish types can =
|
|
3770 |
easily turn a non-l eftist movement into a=20
|
|
3771 |
leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of =
|
|
3772 |
the movement.
|
|
3773 |
|
|
3774 |
214. To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature and opposes technology =
|
|
3775 |
must take a resolutely anti-leftist=20
|
|
3776 |
stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Leftism is in the =
|
|
3777 |
long run inconsistent with wild=20
|
|
3778 |
nature, with human freedom and with the e limination of modern technology. =
|
|
3779 |
Leftism is collectivist; it=20
|
|
3780 |
seeks to bind together the entire world (both nature and the human race) =
|
|
3781 |
into a unified whole. But this=20
|
|
3782 |
implies management of nature and of human life by organized society, and it =
|
|
3783 |
requires advanced=20
|
|
3784 |
technology. You can't have a united worl d without rapid transportation and =
|
|
3785 |
communica tion, you can't=20
|
|
3786 |
make all people love one another without sophisticated psychological =
|
|
3787 |
techniques, you can't have a=20
|
|
3788 |
"planned society" without the necessary technological base.=20
|
|
3789 |
Above all, leftism is driven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks =
|
|
3790 |
power o n a collective basis,=20
|
|
3791 |
through identification with a mass movement or an organization. Leftism is =
|
|
3792 |
unlikely ever to give up=20
|
|
3793 |
technology, because technology is too valuable a source of collective =
|
|
3794 |
power.=20
|
|
3795 |
|
|
3796 |
215. The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks it on an individual =
|
|
3797 |
or small-group basis; he wants=20
|
|
3798 |
individuals and small groups to be able to control the circumstances of =
|
|
3799 |
their own lives. He opposes=20
|
|
3800 |
technology because it makes small groups dependent on large =
|
|
3801 |
organizations.
|
|
3802 |
|
|
3803 |
216. Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but they will oppose it =
|
|
3804 |
only so long as they are=20
|
|
3805 |
outsiders and the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If =
|
|
3806 |
leftism ever becomes dominant in=20
|
|
3807 |
society, so that the technological system becomes a tool in the hands of =
|
|
3808 |
leftists, they will e nthusiastically=20
|
|
3809 |
use it and promote its growth. In doing this they will be repeating a =
|
|
3810 |
pattern that leftism has shown again=20
|
|
3811 |
and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in Russia were outsiders, they =
|
|
3812 |
vigorously opposed censorship=20
|
|
3813 |
and the secret police, they advocated self-determination for ethnic mino =
|
|
3814 |
rities, and so forth;=20
|
|
3815 |
but as soon as they came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter =
|
|
3816 |
censorship and created a more=20
|
|
3817 |
ruthless secret police than any that had existed under the tsars, and they =
|
|
3818 |
oppressed ethnic minorities at least=20
|
|
3819 |
as much as the tsars had done. In the United States, a couple of decades =
|
|
3820 |
ago when leftists were a minority=20
|
|
3821 |
in our universities, leftist professors were vigorous proponents of =
|
|
3822 |
academic freedom, but today, in those=20
|
|
3823 |
universities where leftists have become dominant, they have shown =
|
|
3824 |
themselves ready to take away from=20
|
|
3825 |
every one else's academic freedom. (This is "polit ical correctness.") The =
|
|
3826 |
same will happen with leftists and=20
|
|
3827 |
technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if they ever get it =
|
|
3828 |
under their own control.
|
|
3829 |
|
|
3830 |
217. In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-hungry type, =
|
|
3831 |
repeatedly, have first cooperated with=20
|
|
3832 |
non-leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more libertarian =
|
|
3833 |
inclination, and later have double-
|
|
3834 |
crossed them to seize power for them selves. Robespierre did this in the =
|
|
3835 |
French R evolution, the Bolsheviks=20
|
|
3836 |
did it in the Russian Revolution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 =
|
|
3837 |
and Castro and his followers did it=20
|
|
3838 |
in Cuba. Given the past history of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for =
|
|
3839 |
non-leftist revolutionaries today to=20
|
|
3840 |
collabo rate with leftists.
|
|
3841 |
|
|
3842 |
218. Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a kind of religion. =
|
|
3843 |
Leftism is not a religion in the=20
|
|
3844 |
strict sense because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of =
|
|
3845 |
any supernatural being. But for the=20
|
|
3846 |
leftist, leftism plays a psychologica l role much like that which religion =
|
|
3847 |
plays f or some people. The leftist=20
|
|
3848 |
NEEDS to believe in leftism; it plays a vital role in his psychological =
|
|
3849 |
economy. His beliefs are not easily=20
|
|
3850 |
modified by logic or facts. He has a deep conviction that leftism is =
|
|
3851 |
morally Right with a capital R, and that=20
|
|
3852 |
he has no t only a right but a duty to impose leftist morality on everyone. =
|
|
3853 |
(However, many of the people we=20
|
|
3854 |
are referring to as "leftists" do not think of themselves as leftists and =
|
|
3855 |
would not describe=20
|
|
3856 |
their system of beliefs as leftism. We use the term "leftism" because we =
|
|
3857 |
don't know of any better words to=20
|
|
3858 |
d esignate the spectrum of related creeds that includes the feminist, gay =
|
|
3859 |
rights, political correctness, etc.,=20
|
|
3860 |
movements, and because these movements have a strong affinity with the old =
|
|
3861 |
left. See paragraphs 227-
|
|
3862 |
230.)
|
|
3863 |
|
|
3864 |
219. Leftism is totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is in a position of =
|
|
3865 |
power it tends to invade every private=20
|
|
3866 |
corner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part this is because =
|
|
3867 |
of the quasi-religious character of=20
|
|
3868 |
leftism; everything contrary to leftists beliefs represents Sin. More impor =
|
|
3869 |
tantly, leftism is a totalitarian=20
|
|
3870 |
force because of the leftists' drive for power. The leftist seeks to =
|
|
3871 |
satisfy his need for power through=20
|
|
3872 |
identification with a social movement and he tries to go through the power =
|
|
3873 |
process by helping to pursue=20
|
|
3874 |
and attain th e goals of the movement (see paragraph 83). But no matter how =
|
|
3875 |
far the movement has gone in=20
|
|
3876 |
attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, because his activism is =
|
|
3877 |
a surrogate activity (see paragraph=20
|
|
3878 |
41).=20
|
|
3879 |
That is, the leftist's real motive is not to attain the ostensible goals of =
|
|
3880 |
leftism; in rea lity he is motivated by=20
|
|
3881 |
the sense of power h e gets from struggling for and then reaching a social =
|
|
3882 |
goal.[35]
|
|
3883 |
|
|
3884 |
Consequently the leftist is never satisfied with the goals he has already =
|
|
3885 |
attained; his need for the power=20
|
|
3886 |
process leads him always to pursue some new goal. The leftist wants equal =
|
|
3887 |
opportunities for minorities.=20
|
|
3888 |
When that is attained he insists on statisti cal equality of achievement by =
|
|
3889 |
minorities. A nd as long as=20
|
|
3890 |
anyone harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude toward some =
|
|
3891 |
minority, the leftist has to=20
|
|
3892 |
re-educated him. And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be =
|
|
3893 |
allowed to have a negative attitude=20
|
|
3894 |
toward homosexuals, disabled peop le, fat people, old people, ugly people, =
|
|
3895 |
and on and on and on. It's not=20
|
|
3896 |
enough that the public should be informed about the hazards of smoking; a =
|
|
3897 |
warning has to be stamped on=20
|
|
3898 |
every package of cigarettes.=20
|
|
3899 |
Then cigarette advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The =
|
|
3900 |
activists will never be sati sfied until=20
|
|
3901 |
tobacco is outlawed, and after t hat it will be alco hot then junk food, =
|
|
3902 |
etc. Activists have fought gross child=20
|
|
3903 |
abuse, which is reasonable. But now they want to stop all spanking. When =
|
|
3904 |
they have done that they will=20
|
|
3905 |
want to ban something else they consider unwholesome, then another thing =
|
|
3906 |
and then another. They will=20
|
|
3907 |
never be satisfi ed until they have complete control over all child rearing =
|
|
3908 |
practices. And then they will=20
|
|
3909 |
move on to another cause.=20
|
|
3910 |
|
|
3911 |
220. Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL the things that were =
|
|
3912 |
wrong with society, and then=20
|
|
3913 |
suppose you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded. It is safe =
|
|
3914 |
to say that within a couple of=20
|
|
3915 |
years the majority of leftists would find some thing new to complain about, =
|
|
3916 |
some new social "evil" to=20
|
|
3917 |
correct because, once again, the leftist is motivated less by distress at =
|
|
3918 |
society's ills than by the need to=20
|
|
3919 |
satisfy his drive for power by imposing his solutions on society.=20
|
|
3920 |
|
|
3921 |
221. Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts and behavior by =
|
|
3922 |
their high level of socialization,=20
|
|
3923 |
many leftists of the over-socialized type cannot pursue power in the ways =
|
|
3924 |
that other people do. For them=20
|
|
3925 |
the drive for power has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in =
|
|
3926 |
the strugg le to impose their=20
|
|
3927 |
morality on everyone.=20
|
|
3928 |
|
|
3929 |
222. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, are True =
|
|
3930 |
Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer's=20
|
|
3931 |
book, "The True Believer." But not all True Believers are of the same =
|
|
3932 |
psychological type as leftists.=20
|
|
3933 |
Presumably a truebelieving nazi, for instanc e is very different =
|
|
3934 |
psychologically from a t ruebelieving leftist.=20
|
|
3935 |
Because of their capacity for single-minded devotion to a cause, True =
|
|
3936 |
Believers are a useful, perhaps a=20
|
|
3937 |
necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary movement. This presents a =
|
|
3938 |
problem with which we must admit=20
|
|
3939 |
we don't know how to deal. We aren't sure how to harness the energies o f =
|
|
3940 |
the True Believer to a revolution=20
|
|
3941 |
against technology. At present all we can say is that no True Believer will =
|
|
3942 |
make a safe recruit to the=20
|
|
3943 |
revolution=20
|
|
3944 |
unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of technology. If =
|
|
3945 |
he is committed also to another=20
|
|
3946 |
ideal, he may want to use technology as a t ool for pursuing that other =
|
|
3947 |
ideal (see paragraphs 220, 221).
|
|
3948 |
|
|
3949 |
223. Some readers may say, "This stuff about leftism is a lot of crap. I =
|
|
3950 |
know John and Jane who are leftish=20
|
|
3951 |
types and they don't have all these totalitarian tendencies." It's quite =
|
|
3952 |
true that many leftists, possibly even a=20
|
|
3953 |
numerical majority, are decent pe ople who sincerely believe in tolerating =
|
|
3954 |
oth ers' values (up to a point) and=20
|
|
3955 |
wouldn't want to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals. Our =
|
|
3956 |
remarks about leftism are not=20
|
|
3957 |
meant to apply to every individual leftist but to describe the general =
|
|
3958 |
character of leftism as a movement.=20
|
|
3959 |
And the gene ral character of a movement is not necessari ly determined by =
|
|
3960 |
the numerical proportions of=20
|
|
3961 |
the various kinds of people involved in the movement.=20
|
|
3962 |
|
|
3963 |
224. The people who rise to positions of power in leftist movements tend to =
|
|
3964 |
be leftists of the most power-
|
|
3965 |
hungry type because power-hungry people are those who strive hardest to get =
|
|
3966 |
into positions of power.=20
|
|
3967 |
Once the power-hungry types have captured contro l of the movement, there =
|
|
3968 |
are many leftists o f a gentler=20
|
|
3969 |
breed who inwardly disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but =
|
|
3970 |
cannot bring themselves to=20
|
|
3971 |
oppose them. They NEED their faith in the movement, and because they cannot =
|
|
3972 |
give up this faith they go=20
|
|
3973 |
along with the leaders. True, SOME lefti sts do have the guts to oppose the =
|
|
3974 |
totalitar ian tendencies that=20
|
|
3975 |
emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-hungry types are better =
|
|
3976 |
organized, are more ruthless=20
|
|
3977 |
and Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a strong power =
|
|
3978 |
base.=20
|
|
3979 |
|
|
3980 |
225. These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and other countries that =
|
|
3981 |
were taken over by leftists.=20
|
|
3982 |
Similarly, before the breakdown of communism in the USSR, leftish types in =
|
|
3983 |
the West would seldom=20
|
|
3984 |
criticize that country. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many =
|
|
3985 |
wrong things, but then th ey=20
|
|
3986 |
would try to find excuses for the communists and begin talking about the =
|
|
3987 |
faults of the West. They always=20
|
|
3988 |
opposed Western military resistance to communist aggression. Leftish types =
|
|
3989 |
all over the world vigorously=20
|
|
3990 |
protested the U.S. military action in Viet nam, but when the USSR invaded =
|
|
3991 |
Afghanistan t hey did nothing.=20
|
|
3992 |
Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because of their leftist =
|
|
3993 |
faith, they just couldn't bear to put=20
|
|
3994 |
themselves in opposition to communism.=20
|
|
3995 |
Today, in those of our universities where "political correctness" has =
|
|
3996 |
become dominant, there are probably=20
|
|
3997 |
many leftish types who p rivately disapprove of the suppression of academic =
|
|
3998 |
freedom, but they go along=20
|
|
3999 |
with it anyway.=20
|
|
4000 |
|
|
4001 |
226. Thus the fact that many individual leftists are personally mild and =
|
|
4002 |
fairly tolerant people by no means=20
|
|
4003 |
prevents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian tendency.=20
|
|
4004 |
|
|
4005 |
227. Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It is still far from =
|
|
4006 |
clear what we mean by the word=20
|
|
4007 |
"leftist." There doesn't seem to be much we can do about this. Today =
|
|
4008 |
leftism is fragmented into a whole=20
|
|
4009 |
spectrum of activist movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, =
|
|
4010 |
and some act ivist movements=20
|
|
4011 |
(e.g.., radical environmentalism) seem to include both personalities of the =
|
|
4012 |
leftist type and personalities of=20
|
|
4013 |
thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to know better than to collaborate =
|
|
4014 |
with leftists. Varieties of leftists=20
|
|
4015 |
fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and we oursel ves would =
|
|
4016 |
often be hard-pressed to decide=20
|
|
4017 |
whether a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent that it is =
|
|
4018 |
defined at all, our conception of=20
|
|
4019 |
leftism=20
|
|
4020 |
is defined by the discussion of it that we have given in this article, and =
|
|
4021 |
we can only advise t he reader to=20
|
|
4022 |
use his own judgment in decidin g who is a leftist.=20
|
|
4023 |
|
|
4024 |
228. But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diagnosing leftism. =
|
|
4025 |
These criteria cannot be applied in a=20
|
|
4026 |
cut and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of the criteria =
|
|
4027 |
without being leftists, some leftists=20
|
|
4028 |
may not meet any of the criteria. Ag ain, you just have to use your =
|
|
4029 |
judgment.
|
|
4030 |
|
|
4031 |
229. The leftist is oriented toward largescale collectivism. He emphasizes =
|
|
4032 |
the duty of the individual to=20
|
|
4033 |
serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. He =
|
|
4034 |
has a negative attitude toward=20
|
|
4035 |
individualism. He often takes a moralistic ton e. He tends to be for gun =
|
|
4036 |
control, for sex e ducation and=20
|
|
4037 |
other psychologically "enlightened" educational methods, for planning, for =
|
|
4038 |
affirmative action, for=20
|
|
4039 |
multiculturalism. He tends to identify with victims. He tends to be against =
|
|
4040 |
competition and against=20
|
|
4041 |
violence, but he often finds excuses for th ose leftists who do commit =
|
|
4042 |
violence. He is f ond of using the=20
|
|
4043 |
common catch-phrases of the left like "racism, " "sexism, " "homophobia, " =
|
|
4044 |
"capitalism," "imperialism,"=20
|
|
4045 |
"neocolonialism " "genocide,"=20
|
|
4046 |
"social change," "social justice," "social responsibility." Maybe the best =
|
|
4047 |
diagnostic trait of the leftist is his=20
|
|
4048 |
tendency to sympathize with the following movements: feminism, gay rights, =
|
|
4049 |
ethnic rights, disabi lity=20
|
|
4050 |
rights, animal rights political correct ness. Anyone who strongly =
|
|
4051 |
sympathizes with ALL of these=20
|
|
4052 |
movements is almost certainly a leftist. [36]=20
|
|
4053 |
|
|
4054 |
230. The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who are most power-hungry, =
|
|
4055 |
are often characterized by=20
|
|
4056 |
arrogance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However, the most =
|
|
4057 |
dangerous leftists of all may be=20
|
|
4058 |
certain oversocialized types who avoid irritating di splays of =
|
|
4059 |
aggressiveness and refrain from ad vertising=20
|
|
4060 |
their leftism, but work quietly and unobtrusively to promote collectivist =
|
|
4061 |
values, "enlightened"=20
|
|
4062 |
psychological techniques for socializing children, dependence of the =
|
|
4063 |
individual on the system, and so forth.=20
|
|
4064 |
These crypto-leftists (as we may call th em) approximate certain bourgeois =
|
|
4065 |
types as f ar as practical action=20
|
|
4066 |
is concerned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and motivation. =
|
|
4067 |
The ordinary bourgeois tries to=20
|
|
4068 |
bring people under control=20
|
|
4069 |
of the system in order to protect his way of life, or he does so simply =
|
|
4070 |
because his attitudes are=20
|
|
4071 |
conventional. The crypto-leftist tries to br ing people under control of =
|
|
4072 |
the system because he is a True=20
|
|
4073 |
Believer in a collectivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated =
|
|
4074 |
from the average leftist of the=20
|
|
4075 |
oversocialized type by the fact that his rebellious impulse is weaker and =
|
|
4076 |
he is more se curely socialized. He=20
|
|
4077 |
is differentiated from the ordinary well-socialized bourgeois by the fact =
|
|
4078 |
that there is some deep lack within=20
|
|
4079 |
him that makes it necessary for him to devote himself to a cause and =
|
|
4080 |
immerse himself in a collectivity. And=20
|
|
4081 |
maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is stronger tha n that of the =
|
|
4082 |
average bourgeois.
|
|
4083 |
|
|
4084 |
FINAL NOTE
|
|
4085 |
|
|
4086 |
231. Throughout this article we've made imprecise statements and statements =
|
|
4087 |
that ought to have had all=20
|
|
4088 |
sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and some of our =
|
|
4089 |
statements may be flatly false.=20
|
|
4090 |
Lack of sufficient information and the need f or brevity made it impossible =
|
|
4091 |
for us to fomu late our=20
|
|
4092 |
assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of =
|
|
4093 |
course in a discussion of this=20
|
|
4094 |
|
|
4095 |
kind one must rely heavily on intuitive judgment, and that can sometimes be =
|
|
4096 |
wrong. So we don't claim that=20
|
|
4097 |
this article expresses more than a crude approximation to the truth. =
|
|
4098 |
|
|
4099 |
|
|
4100 |
232. All the same we are reasonably confident that the general outlines of =
|
|
4101 |
the picture we have painted here=20
|
|
4102 |
are roughly correct. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form as a =
|
|
4103 |
phenomenon peculiar to our time=20
|
|
4104 |
and as a symptom of the disruption of the power process. But we might =
|
|
4105 |
possibly be wrong about this.=20
|
|
4106 |
Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing =
|
|
4107 |
their morality on everyone have=20
|
|
4108 |
certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role =
|
|
4109 |
played by feelings of=20
|
|
4110 |
inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by =
|
|
4111 |
people who are not themselves=20
|
|
4112 |
victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by =
|
|
4113 |
people not themselves victims can=20
|
|
4114 |
be seen to some extent in=20
|
|
4115 |
19th century leftism and early Christianity but as far as we can make out, =
|
|
4116 |
symptoms of low self-esteem,=20
|
|
4117 |
etc., were not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other =
|
|
4118 |
movements, as they are in modern=20
|
|
4119 |
leftism. But we are not in a position to assert confidently that no such =
|
|
4120 |
movements have existed prior to=20
|
|
4121 |
modern leftism. This is a significant question to which historians ought to =
|
|
4122 |
give their attention.=20
|
|
4123 |
|
|
4124 |
NOTES=20
|
|
4125 |
|
|
4126 |
1. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even most, bullies and =
|
|
4127 |
ruthless competitors suffer from=20
|
|
4128 |
feelings of inferiority.=20
|
|
4129 |
|
|
4130 |
2. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many oversocialized people =
|
|
4131 |
suffered from serious=20
|
|
4132 |
psychological problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their =
|
|
4133 |
sexual feelings. Freud apparently=20
|
|
4134 |
based his theories on people of this type. Today the focus of socialization =
|
|
4135 |
has shifted from sex to=20
|
|
4136 |
aggression.=20
|
|
4137 |
|
|
4138 |
3. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists in engineering =
|
|
4139 |
"hard" sciences.=20
|
|
4140 |
|
|
4141 |
4. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the middle and upper =
|
|
4142 |
classes who resist some of these=20
|
|
4143 |
values, but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such =
|
|
4144 |
resistance appears in the mass media only to=20
|
|
4145 |
a very limited extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is in =
|
|
4146 |
favor of the stated values.=20
|
|
4147 |
|
|
4148 |
The main reasons why these values have become, so to speak, the official =
|
|
4149 |
values of our society is that they=20
|
|
4150 |
are useful to the industrial system. Violence is discouraged because it =
|
|
4151 |
disrupts the functioning of the=20
|
|
4152 |
system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts also disrupt the =
|
|
4153 |
system, and discrimination wastes=20
|
|
4154 |
the talent of minority-group members who could be useful to the system. =
|
|
4155 |
Poverty must be "cured" because=20
|
|
4156 |
the underclass causes problems for the system and contact with the =
|
|
4157 |
underclass lowers the moral of the other=20
|
|
4158 |
classes. Women are encouraged to have careers because their talents are =
|
|
4159 |
useful to the system and, more=20
|
|
4160 |
importantly because by having regular jobs women become better integrated =
|
|
4161 |
into the system and tied=20
|
|
4162 |
directly to it rather than to their families.=20
|
|
4163 |
This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders of the system say they =
|
|
4164 |
want to strengthen the family,=20
|
|
4165 |
but they really mean is that they want the family to serve as an effective =
|
|
4166 |
tool for socializing children in=20
|
|
4167 |
accord with the needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51,52 that the =
|
|
4168 |
system cannot afford to let the=20
|
|
4169 |
family or other small-scale social groups be strong or autonomous.) =
|
|
4170 |
|
|
4171 |
|
|
4172 |
5. (Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority of people don't want =
|
|
4173 |
to make their own decisions but=20
|
|
4174 |
want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an element of truth in =
|
|
4175 |
this. People like to make their=20
|
|
4176 |
own decisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult, =
|
|
4177 |
fundamental questions require facing up=20
|
|
4178 |
to psychological conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict. =
|
|
4179 |
Hence they tend to lean on others in=20
|
|
4180 |
making difficult decisions. The majority of people are natural followers, =
|
|
4181 |
not leaders, but they like to have=20
|
|
4182 |
direct personal access to their leaders and participate to some extent in =
|
|
4183 |
making difficult decisions. At least=20
|
|
4184 |
to that degree they need autonomy.=20
|
|
4185 |
|
|
4186 |
6. (Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by =
|
|
4187 |
caged animals.=20
|
|
4188 |
|
|
4189 |
To explain how these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the =
|
|
4190 |
power process:=20
|
|
4191 |
|
|
4192 |
Common-sense understanding of human nature tells one that lack of goals =
|
|
4193 |
whose attainment requires effort=20
|
|
4194 |
leads to boredom and that boredom, long continued, often leads eventually =
|
|
4195 |
to depression. Failure to obtain=20
|
|
4196 |
goals leads to frustration and lowering of self-esteem. Frustration leads =
|
|
4197 |
to anger, anger to aggression, often=20
|
|
4198 |
in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been shown that long-continued =
|
|
4199 |
frustration commonly leads to=20
|
|
4200 |
depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep disorders, =
|
|
4201 |
eating disorders and bad feelings about=20
|
|
4202 |
oneself. Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure as an =
|
|
4203 |
antidote; hence insatiable hedonism=20
|
|
4204 |
and excessive sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. =
|
|
4205 |
Boredom too tends to cause excessive=20
|
|
4206 |
pleasure-seeking since,=20
|
|
4207 |
lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal. See accompanying =
|
|
4208 |
diagram. The foregoing is a=20
|
|
4209 |
simplification. Reality is more complex, and of course deprivation with =
|
|
4210 |
respect to the power process is not=20
|
|
4211 |
the ONLY cause of the symptoms described. By the way, when we mention =
|
|
4212 |
depression we do not=20
|
|
4213 |
necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be treated by a =
|
|
4214 |
psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of=20
|
|
4215 |
depression are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not necessarily =
|
|
4216 |
mean long-term, thought out=20
|
|
4217 |
goals. For many or most people through much of human history, the goals of =
|
|
4218 |
a hand-to-mouth existence=20
|
|
4219 |
(merely providing oneself and one's family with food from day to day) have =
|
|
4220 |
been quite sufficient.=20
|
|
4221 |
|
|
4222 |
7. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for a few passive, inward =
|
|
4223 |
looking groups, such as the=20
|
|
4224 |
Amish, which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from these, =
|
|
4225 |
some genuine small-scale=20
|
|
4226 |
communities do exist in America today. For instance, youth gangs and =
|
|
4227 |
"cults". Everyone regards them as=20
|
|
4228 |
dangerous, and so they are, because the members of these groups are loyal =
|
|
4229 |
primarily to one another rather=20
|
|
4230 |
than to the system, hence the system cannot control them. Or take the =
|
|
4231 |
gypsies. The gypsies commonly get=20
|
|
4232 |
away with theft and fraud because their loyalties are such that they can =
|
|
4233 |
always get other gypsies to give=20
|
|
4234 |
testimony that "proves" their innocence. Obviously the system would be in =
|
|
4235 |
serious trouble if too many=20
|
|
4236 |
people belonged to such groups. Some of the=20
|
|
4237 |
early-20th century Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing =
|
|
4238 |
China recognized the necessity=20
|
|
4239 |
of breaking down small-scale social groups such as the family: "(According =
|
|
4240 |
to Sun Yat-sen) The Chinese=20
|
|
4241 |
people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of =
|
|
4242 |
loyalty from the family to the=20
|
|
4243 |
state. . .(According to Li Huang) traditional attachments, particularly to =
|
|
4244 |
the family had to be abandoned if=20
|
|
4245 |
nationalism were to develop to China." (Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political =
|
|
4246 |
Thought in the Twentieth=20
|
|
4247 |
Century," page 125, page 297.)=20
|
|
4248 |
|
|
4249 |
8. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, =
|
|
4250 |
and serious ones, but for the=20
|
|
4251 |
sake of breviety we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.=20
|
|
4252 |
|
|
4253 |
9. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the underclass. We are speaking of the =
|
|
4254 |
mainstream.=20
|
|
4255 |
|
|
4256 |
10. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators, "mental health" =
|
|
4257 |
professionals and the like are doing=20
|
|
4258 |
their best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see to it =
|
|
4259 |
that everyone has a satisfactory social=20
|
|
4260 |
life.=20
|
|
4261 |
|
|
4262 |
11. (Paragraphs 63, 82) Is the drive for endless material acquisition =
|
|
4263 |
really an artificial creation of the=20
|
|
4264 |
advertising and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate human =
|
|
4265 |
drive for material acquisition.=20
|
|
4266 |
There have been many cultures in which people have desired little material =
|
|
4267 |
wealth beyond what was=20
|
|
4268 |
necessary to satisfy their basic physical needs (Australian aborigines, =
|
|
4269 |
traditional Mexican peasant culture,=20
|
|
4270 |
some African cultures). On the other hand there have also been many =
|
|
4271 |
pre-industrial cultures in which=20
|
|
4272 |
material acquisition has played an important role. So we can't claim that =
|
|
4273 |
today's acquisition-oriented=20
|
|
4274 |
culture is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing =
|
|
4275 |
industry. But it is clear that the=20
|
|
4276 |
advertising and marketing industry has had an=20
|
|
4277 |
important part in creating that culture. The big corporations that spend =
|
|
4278 |
millions on advertising wouldn't be=20
|
|
4279 |
spending that kind of money without solid proof that they were getting it =
|
|
4280 |
back in increased sales. One=20
|
|
4281 |
member of FC met a sales manager a couple of years ago who was frank enough =
|
|
4282 |
to tell him, "Our job is to=20
|
|
4283 |
make people buy things they don't want and don't need." He then described =
|
|
4284 |
how an untrained novice could=20
|
|
4285 |
present people with the facts about a product, and make no sales at all, =
|
|
4286 |
while a trained and experienced=20
|
|
4287 |
professional salesman would make lots of sales to the same people. This =
|
|
4288 |
shows that people are manipulated=20
|
|
4289 |
into buying things they don't really want.=20
|
|
4290 |
|
|
4291 |
12. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness seems to have become less =
|
|
4292 |
serious during the last 15=20
|
|
4293 |
years or so, because people now feel less secure physically and =
|
|
4294 |
economically than they did earlier, and the=20
|
|
4295 |
need for security provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has been =
|
|
4296 |
replaced by frustration over the=20
|
|
4297 |
difficulty of attaining security. We emphasize the problem of =
|
|
4298 |
purposelessness because the liberals and=20
|
|
4299 |
leftists would wish to solve our social problems by having society =
|
|
4300 |
guarantee everyone's security; but if that=20
|
|
4301 |
could be done it would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The =
|
|
4302 |
real issue is not whether=20
|
|
4303 |
society provides well or poorly for people's security; the trouble is that =
|
|
4304 |
people are dependent on the system=20
|
|
4305 |
for=20
|
|
4306 |
their security rather than having it in their own hands. This, by the way, =
|
|
4307 |
is part of the reason why some=20
|
|
4308 |
people get worked up about the right to bear arms; possession of a gun puts =
|
|
4309 |
that aspect of their security in=20
|
|
4310 |
their own hands.=20
|
|
4311 |
|
|
4312 |
13. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives' efforts to decrease the amount of =
|
|
4313 |
government regulation are of little=20
|
|
4314 |
benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the =
|
|
4315 |
regulations can be eliminated because most=20
|
|
4316 |
regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation =
|
|
4317 |
affects business rather than the=20
|
|
4318 |
average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the =
|
|
4319 |
government and give it to private=20
|
|
4320 |
corporations. What this means for the average man is that government =
|
|
4321 |
interference in his life is replaced by=20
|
|
4322 |
interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for e xample, =
|
|
4323 |
to dump more chemicals that=20
|
|
4324 |
get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just =
|
|
4325 |
taking the average man for a=20
|
|
4326 |
sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of =
|
|
4327 |
Big Business.=20
|
|
4328 |
|
|
4329 |
14. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the purpose for which =
|
|
4330 |
propaganda is being used in a given=20
|
|
4331 |
case, he generally calls it "education" or applies to it some similar =
|
|
4332 |
euphemism. But propaganda is=20
|
|
4333 |
propaganda regardless of the purpose for which it i s used.=20
|
|
4334 |
|
|
4335 |
15. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or disapproval of the =
|
|
4336 |
Panama invasion. We only use it=20
|
|
4337 |
to illustrate a point.=20
|
|
4338 |
|
|
4339 |
16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there =
|
|
4340 |
were fewer and less effective=20
|
|
4341 |
legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution =
|
|
4342 |
went into effect, yet there was=20
|
|
4343 |
more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the =
|
|
4344 |
War of Independence, than=20
|
|
4345 |
there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We =
|
|
4346 |
quote from "Violence in America:=20
|
|
4347 |
Historical and Comparative perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and =
|
|
4348 |
Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12=20
|
|
4349 |
by Roger Lane, pages 476-478: "The progressive heightening of standards o f =
|
|
4350 |
property, and with it the=20
|
|
4351 |
increasing reliance on official law enforcement (in 19th century America). =
|
|
4352 |
.. .were common to the whole=20
|
|
4353 |
society. . .[T]he change in social behavior=20
|
|
4354 |
is so long term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with the most =
|
|
4355 |
funda mental of contemporary=20
|
|
4356 |
social processes; tha t of industrial urbanization itself. . =
|
|
4357 |
.."Massachusetts in 1835 had a population of some=20
|
|
4358 |
660,940, 81 percent rural, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. =
|
|
4359 |
It's citizens were used to=20
|
|
4360 |
considerable personal freedom. Whether teamsters, farmers or artisa ns, =
|
|
4361 |
they were all accustomed to setting=20
|
|
4362 |
thei r own schedules, and the nature of their work made them physically =
|
|
4363 |
dependent on each other. .=20
|
|
4364 |
..Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not generally cause for =
|
|
4365 |
wider social concern. . ."But the=20
|
|
4366 |
impact of the twin movements to the city and to the fac tory, both just =
|
|
4367 |
gathering force in 1835, had a=20
|
|
4368 |
progressive effect on personal behavior=20
|
|
4369 |
throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. The factory demanded =
|
|
4370 |
regularity of behavior, a life=20
|
|
4371 |
governed by obedience to the rhythms of clock and calendar, the demands of =
|
|
4372 |
foreman and supervisor. In=20
|
|
4373 |
the city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neighborhoods =
|
|
4374 |
inhibited many actions previously=20
|
|
4375 |
unobjectionable.=20
|
|
4376 |
|
|
4377 |
Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger establishments were =
|
|
4378 |
mutually dependent on their fellows.=20
|
|
4379 |
as one man's work fit into another's, so one man's business was no longer =
|
|
4380 |
his own. "The results of the new=20
|
|
4381 |
organization of life and work were appar ent by 1900, when some 76 percent =
|
|
4382 |
of the 2,8 05,346 inhabitants=20
|
|
4383 |
of Massachusetts were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular =
|
|
4384 |
behavior which had been tolerable=20
|
|
4385 |
in a casual, independent society was no longer acceptable in the more =
|
|
4386 |
formalized, cooperative atmosphere=20
|
|
4387 |
of the later period. . . The move to the cities had, in short, produc ed a =
|
|
4388 |
more tractable, more socialized,=20
|
|
4389 |
more 'civilized' generation than its predecessors."=20
|
|
4390 |
|
|
4391 |
17. (Paragraph 117) Apologists for the system are fond of citing cases in =
|
|
4392 |
which elections have been=20
|
|
4393 |
decided by one or two votes, but such cases are rare.=20
|
|
4394 |
|
|
4395 |
18. (Paragraph 119) "Today, in technologically advanced lands, men live =
|
|
4396 |
very similar lives in spite of=20
|
|
4397 |
geographical, religious and political differences. The daily lives of a =
|
|
4398 |
Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a=20
|
|
4399 |
Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo, a Communist bank clerk in Moscow are far more =
|
|
4400 |
alike than the life any one=20
|
|
4401 |
of them is like that of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. =
|
|
4402 |
These similarities are the result of a=20
|
|
4403 |
common technology. . ." L. Sprague de Camp, "The Ancient Engineers," =
|
|
4404 |
Ballentine edition, page 17.=20
|
|
4405 |
|
|
4406 |
The lives of the three bank clerks are not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have =
|
|
4407 |
SOME effect. But all=20
|
|
4408 |
technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve along =
|
|
4409 |
APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.=20
|
|
4410 |
|
|
4411 |
19. (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic engineer might =
|
|
4412 |
create a lot of terrorists.=20
|
|
4413 |
|
|
4414 |
20. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of undesirable consequences of =
|
|
4415 |
medical progress, suppose a=20
|
|
4416 |
reliable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment is too =
|
|
4417 |
expensive to be available to any but the=20
|
|
4418 |
elite, it will greatly reduce their incen tive to stop the escape of =
|
|
4419 |
carcinogens into the environment.=20
|
|
4420 |
|
|
4421 |
21. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that =
|
|
4422 |
a large number of good things=20
|
|
4423 |
can add up to a bad thing, we will illustrate with an analogy. Suppose Mr. =
|
|
4424 |
A is playing chess with Mr. B.=20
|
|
4425 |
Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over Mr . A's shoulder. Mr. A of course =
|
|
4426 |
wants to win his game, so if Mr.=20
|
|
4427 |
C points out a good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But =
|
|
4428 |
suppose now that Mr. C tells Mr.=20
|
|
4429 |
A how to make ALL of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A a =
|
|
4430 |
favor by showing him his=20
|
|
4431 |
best move, but by making AL L of his moves for him he spoils the game, s =
|
|
4432 |
ince there is not point in Mr.=20
|
|
4433 |
A's playing the game at all if someone else makes all his moves.=20
|
|
4434 |
|
|
4435 |
The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system makes =
|
|
4436 |
an individual's life easier for=20
|
|
4437 |
him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him of control over =
|
|
4438 |
his own fate.=20
|
|
4439 |
|
|
4440 |
22. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the conflict of values =
|
|
4441 |
within the mainstream. For the=20
|
|
4442 |
sake of simplicity we leave out of the picture "outsider" values like the =
|
|
4443 |
idea that wild nature is more=20
|
|
4444 |
important than human economic welfare.=20
|
|
4445 |
|
|
4446 |
23. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MATERIAL =
|
|
4447 |
self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of=20
|
|
4448 |
some psychological need, for example, by promoting one's own ideology or =
|
|
4449 |
religion.=20
|
|
4450 |
|
|
4451 |
24. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest of the system to =
|
|
4452 |
permit a certain prescribed degree=20
|
|
4453 |
of freedom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with suitable =
|
|
4454 |
limitations and restraints) has=20
|
|
4455 |
proved effective in promoting economic growth. But only planned, =
|
|
4456 |
circumscribed, li mited freedom is in=20
|
|
4457 |
the interest of the system. The individual must always be kept on a leash, =
|
|
4458 |
even if the leash is sometimes=20
|
|
4459 |
long( see paragraphs 94, 97).=20
|
|
4460 |
|
|
4461 |
25. (Paragraph 143) We don't mean to suggest that the efficiency or the =
|
|
4462 |
potential for survival of a society=20
|
|
4463 |
has always been inversely proportional to the amount of pressure or =
|
|
4464 |
discomfort to which the society=20
|
|
4465 |
subjects people. That is certainly not the c ase. There is good reason to =
|
|
4466 |
believe that ma ny primitive=20
|
|
4467 |
societies subjected people to less pressure than the European society did, =
|
|
4468 |
but European society proved far=20
|
|
4469 |
more efficient than any primitive society and always won out in conflicts =
|
|
4470 |
with such societies because of the=20
|
|
4471 |
advantages conferred by te chnology.=20
|
|
4472 |
|
|
4473 |
26. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law enforcement is =
|
|
4474 |
unequivocally good because it=20
|
|
4475 |
suppresses crime, then remember that crime as defined by the system is not =
|
|
4476 |
necessarily what YOU would=20
|
|
4477 |
call crime. Today, smoking marijuana is a "crime ," and, in some places in =
|
|
4478 |
the U.S.., so is p ossession of=20
|
|
4479 |
ANY firearm, registered or not, may be made a crime, and the same thing may =
|
|
4480 |
happen with disapproved=20
|
|
4481 |
methods of child-rearing, such as spanking. In some countries, expression =
|
|
4482 |
of dissident political opinions is=20
|
|
4483 |
a crime, and there is no certaint y that this will never happen in the =
|
|
4484 |
U.S., s ince no constitution or political=20
|
|
4485 |
system lasts forever.=20
|
|
4486 |
|
|
4487 |
If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then =
|
|
4488 |
there is something gravely wrong=20
|
|
4489 |
with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so =
|
|
4490 |
many refuse to follow the rules, or=20
|
|
4491 |
follow them only because forced. Man y societies in the past have gotten by =
|
|
4492 |
with little or no formal law-
|
|
4493 |
enforcement.=20
|
|
4494 |
|
|
4495 |
27. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have had means of =
|
|
4496 |
influencing behavior, but these have been=20
|
|
4497 |
primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the technological means =
|
|
4498 |
that are now being developed.=20
|
|
4499 |
|
|
4500 |
28. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have publicly expressed =
|
|
4501 |
opinions indicating their=20
|
|
4502 |
contempt for human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon was quoted =
|
|
4503 |
in Omni (August 1987)=20
|
|
4504 |
as saying, "I visualize a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to =
|
|
4505 |
humans, and I'm rooting fo r the=20
|
|
4506 |
machines."=20
|
|
4507 |
|
|
4508 |
29. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After writing paragraph 154 =
|
|
4509 |
we came across an article in=20
|
|
4510 |
Scientific American according to which scientists are actively developing =
|
|
4511 |
techniques for identifying=20
|
|
4512 |
possible future criminals and for treating the m by a combination of =
|
|
4513 |
biological and psychol ogical means.=20
|
|
4514 |
Some scientists advocate compulsory application of the treatment, which may =
|
|
4515 |
be available in the near=20
|
|
4516 |
future. (See "Seeking the Criminal Element", by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific =
|
|
4517 |
American, March 1995.)=20
|
|
4518 |
Maybe you think this is OK because the trea tment would be applied to those =
|
|
4519 |
who might be come drunk=20
|
|
4520 |
drivers (they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who spank =
|
|
4521 |
their children, then to=20
|
|
4522 |
environmentalists who sabotage logging equipment,=20
|
|
4523 |
eventually to anyone whose behavior is inconvenient for the system. =
|
|
4524 |
|
|
4525 |
|
|
4526 |
30. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as a counter-ideal to =
|
|
4527 |
technology is that, in many people,=20
|
|
4528 |
nature inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with religion, so =
|
|
4529 |
that nature could perhaps be=20
|
|
4530 |
idealized on a religious basis. It is tr ue that in many societies religion =
|
|
4531 |
has serve d as a support and=20
|
|
4532 |
justification for the established order, but it is also true that religion =
|
|
4533 |
has often provided a basis for=20
|
|
4534 |
rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce a religious element into the =
|
|
4535 |
rebellion against technology, the=20
|
|
4536 |
more so because Weste rn society today has no strong religious fou ndation. =
|
|
4537 |
|
|
4538 |
|
|
4539 |
Religion, nowadays either is used as cheap and transparent support for =
|
|
4540 |
narrow, short-sighted selfishness=20
|
|
4541 |
(some conservatives use it this way), or even is cynically exploited to =
|
|
4542 |
make easy money (by many=20
|
|
4543 |
evangelists), or has degenerated into crude irrati onalism (fundamentalist =
|
|
4544 |
Protestant sects, "c ults"), or is=20
|
|
4545 |
simply stagnant (Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing =
|
|
4546 |
to a strong, widespread, dynamic=20
|
|
4547 |
religion that the West has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion =
|
|
4548 |
of leftism, but leftism today is=20
|
|
4549 |
fragmented and has no cle ar, unified inspiring goal.=20
|
|
4550 |
|
|
4551 |
Thus there is a religious vaccuum in our society that could perhaps be =
|
|
4552 |
filled by a religion focused on nature=20
|
|
4553 |
in opposition to technology. But it would be a mistake to try to concoct =
|
|
4554 |
artificially a religion to fill this=20
|
|
4555 |
role. Such an invented religion would probably be a failure. Take the =
|
|
4556 |
"Gaia" religion for example. Do its=20
|
|
4557 |
adherents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If they are =
|
|
4558 |
just play-acting their religion will=20
|
|
4559 |
be a flop in the end.=20
|
|
4560 |
|
|
4561 |
It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into the conflict of =
|
|
4562 |
nature vs. technology unless you=20
|
|
4563 |
REALLY believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a deep, =
|
|
4564 |
strong, genuine response in many=20
|
|
4565 |
other people.=20
|
|
4566 |
|
|
4567 |
31. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push occurs. Conceivably the =
|
|
4568 |
industrial system might be=20
|
|
4569 |
eliminated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion. (see paragraphs 4, =
|
|
4570 |
167 and Note 4).=20
|
|
4571 |
|
|
4572 |
32. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely) that the revolution =
|
|
4573 |
might consist only of a massive=20
|
|
4574 |
change of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively gradual and =
|
|
4575 |
painless disintegration of the=20
|
|
4576 |
industrial system. But if this happens we'll be very lucky. It's far more =
|
|
4577 |
probably that the transition to a=20
|
|
4578 |
nontechnological society will be very difficult and full of conflicts and =
|
|
4579 |
disasters.=20
|
|
4580 |
|
|
4581 |
33. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological structure of a society =
|
|
4582 |
are far more important than its=20
|
|
4583 |
political structure in determining the way the average man lives (see =
|
|
4584 |
paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).=20
|
|
4585 |
|
|
4586 |
34. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our particular brand of =
|
|
4587 |
anarchism. A wide variety of social=20
|
|
4588 |
attitudes have been called "anarchist," and it may be that many who =
|
|
4589 |
consider themselves anarchists would=20
|
|
4590 |
not accept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted, by the way, =
|
|
4591 |
that there is a nonviolent=20
|
|
4592 |
anarchist movement whose members probably would not accept FC as anarchist =
|
|
4593 |
and certainly would not=20
|
|
4594 |
approve of FC's violent methods.=20
|
|
4595 |
|
|
4596 |
35. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by hostility, but the =
|
|
4597 |
hostility probably results in part=20
|
|
4598 |
from a frustrated need for power.=20
|
|
4599 |
|
|
4600 |
36. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that we mean someone who =
|
|
4601 |
sympathizes with these=20
|
|
4602 |
MOVEMENTS as they exist today in our society. One who believes that women, =
|
|
4603 |
homosexuals, etc., should=20
|
|
4604 |
have equal rights is not necessarily a leftist. The f eminist, gay rights, =
|
|
4605 |
etc., movements that ex ist in our=20
|
|
4606 |
society have the particular ideological tone that characterizes leftism, =
|
|
4607 |
and if one believes, for example, that=20
|
|
4608 |
women should have equal rights it does not necessarily follow that one must =
|
|
4609 |
sympathize with the feminist=20
|
|
4610 |
movement as it exists today .=20
|
|
4611 |
|
|
4612 |
If copyright problems make it impossible for this long quotation to be =
|
|
4613 |
printed, then please change Note 16=20
|
|
4614 |
to read as follows:=20
|
|
4615 |
|
|
4616 |
16. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there =
|
|
4617 |
were fewer and less effective=20
|
|
4618 |
legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution =
|
|
4619 |
went into effect, yet there was=20
|
|
4620 |
more personal freedom in pre-industria l America, both before and after the =
|
|
4621 |
War of Independence, than=20
|
|
4622 |
there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. In =
|
|
4623 |
"Violence in America: Historical and=20
|
|
4624 |
Comparative Perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, =
|
|
4625 |
Chapter 12 by Roger=20
|
|
4626 |
Lane, it is explained how in pr e-industrial America the average person had =
|
|
4627 |
greater independence and=20
|
|
4628 |
autonomy than he does today, and how the process of industrialization =
|
|
4629 |
necessarily led to the restriction of=20
|
|
4630 |
personal freedom.
|
|
4631 |
|
|
4632 |
|
|
4633 |
End of message.
|
|
4634 |
|
|
4635 |
|
|
4636 |
.
|
|
4637 |
RSET
|
|
4638 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4639 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4640 |
DATA
|
|
4641 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4642 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4643 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4644 |
Subject: Test message No. 7 - MIME text and attachment
|
|
4645 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4646 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-6>
|
|
4647 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4648 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4649 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4650 |
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
|
|
4651 |
boundary="boundary-replacement-string-1"
|
|
4652 |
|
|
4653 |
This is a MIME Message
|
|
4654 |
|
|
4655 |
--boundary-replacement-string-1
|
|
4656 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4657 |
Content-Disposition: inline
|
|
4658 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4659 |
|
|
4660 |
here is some text
|
|
4661 |
|
|
4662 |
--boundary-replacement-string-1
|
|
4663 |
Content-Description: deisl1.isu
|
|
4664 |
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
|
|
4665 |
Content-Disposition: attachment;
|
|
4666 |
filename="deisl1.isu"
|
|
4667 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
|
|
4668 |
|
|
4669 |
cagAAAECqE4CACkAU3RpcmxpbmcgVGVjaG5vbG9naWVzLCBJbmMuIChjKSAx
|
|
4670 |
OTkwLTE5OTUeANzQzSjj0Mwm6tDMJvHQzib40Dsr/9AhJwbRzCafhygA3tDP
|
|
4671 |
JjAjGCjq0MyJ9dDMifzQzIv/08x7WBzOJg3RIysU0SMrG9EwJ4AAAAD/AAD/
|
|
4672 |
AAAA//8A/wAAAP8A/wD//wAA////AHd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4673 |
d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3AAAAAAAAAAB3d3d3d3d3d4d3d3d3d3dwd3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4674 |
eP////////cHd3d3d3d3d3j////////3B3d3d3d3d3d4////////9wd3d3d3
|
|
4675 |
d3d3eP////////cHd3d3d3d3d3j4AAAAD//3B3d3d3d3d3d4+HgI9w//9wd3
|
|
4676 |
d3d3d3d3ePh4iIcP//cHd3d3d3d3d3j4d3d3ARERF3d3d3d3d3d4+H//9wzM
|
|
4677 |
zMd3d3d3d3d3ePh///cP//cHd3d3d3d3d3j4f//3D//3B3d3d3d3d3d494iI
|
|
4678 |
iP//9wd3d3d3d3d3eP////////cHd3d3d3d3d3j////////3B3d3d3d3d3d4
|
|
4679 |
//////+IiAd3d3d3d3d3eP//////j3h3d3d3d3d3d3j//////4eHd3d3d3d3
|
|
4680 |
d3d4//////+Id3d3d3d3d3d3eIiIiIiIh3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4681 |
d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3dwAAAAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiIgHd3
|
|
4682 |
d3d3d3d3d3d3d3CIiIB3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3dwiIiAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiI
|
|
4683 |
gHd3d3d3d3d3d3dwAACIiIAAAHd3d3d3d3d3cIiIiIiIiIB3d3d3d3d3d3cI
|
|
4684 |
iIiIiIgHd3d3d3d3d3d3cIiIiIiAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiIiIB3d3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4685 |
d3d3cIiIgHd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIiAd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3cIB3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4686 |
d3d3d3d3d3cHd3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3
|
|
4687 |
d3d3d3d3AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHd3d3eDMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMHd3d3i3t7e3t7e3
|
|
4688 |
t7e3tzAHd3eIe3t7e3t7e3t7e3swB3d3h7e3t7e3t7e3t7e3AAd3d4t7e3t7
|
|
4689 |
e3t7e3t7eAMHd3eHt7e3t7e3t7e3t7gDB3d4e3t7e3t7e3t7e3twgwd3eLe3
|
|
4690 |
t7e3t7e3t7e3sIMHd3h7e3t7e3t7e3t7e4CzB3d4t7e3t7e3t7e3t7eAcwd3
|
|
4691 |
eP//////////////CLMHd3eId3d3d3d3d3d3d3tzB3d3d4+3t7e3t7e3t7e3
|
|
4692 |
swd3d3ePe3t7e3t7e3t7e3MHd3d3j7e3t7e3t7e3t7ezB3d3d497e3t7e3t7
|
|
4693 |
////8Hd3d3ePt7e3t7e3uIiIiId3d3d3j/t7e3t7ewoA3NDMJkfRzSafhwoA
|
|
4694 |
3NDMJkjRzSafhz0A5NAgnFU/PZBVNs4mItHMJ/jS1CZTRj+Vdjo4jBnRQJyG
|
|
4695 |
Pz2Qhjb7i5o23iZ9Rj+VoDo4jHs2NpWxRRiMAA==
|
|
4696 |
|
|
4697 |
--boundary-replacement-string-1
|
|
4698 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4699 |
Content-Disposition: inline
|
|
4700 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4701 |
|
|
4702 |
Here is some more text. The attachment is above.
|
|
4703 |
--=20
|
|
4704 |
The curator
|
|
4705 |
|
|
4706 |
--boundary-replacement-string-1--
|
|
4707 |
|
|
4708 |
|
|
4709 |
.
|
|
4710 |
RSET
|
|
4711 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4712 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4713 |
DATA
|
|
4714 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4715 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4716 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4717 |
Subject: Test message No.6 - Encoded "=" characters
|
|
4718 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4719 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-7>
|
|
4720 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4721 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4722 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4723 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4724 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4725 |
|
|
4726 |
The following line contains 5 "equals" characters. These should
|
|
4727 |
arrive MIME-encoded.
|
|
4728 |
|
|
4729 |
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
|
|
4730 |
|
|
4731 |
End of message.
|
|
4732 |
|
|
4733 |
.
|
|
4734 |
RSET
|
|
4735 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4736 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4737 |
DATA
|
|
4738 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4739 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4740 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4741 |
Subject: Test message No.5 - Empty message body
|
|
4742 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4743 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-8>
|
|
4744 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4745 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4746 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4747 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4748 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4749 |
|
|
4750 |
|
|
4751 |
.
|
|
4752 |
RSET
|
|
4753 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4754 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4755 |
DATA
|
|
4756 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4757 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4758 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4759 |
Subject: Test message No.4 - Trailing spaces and tab characters
|
|
4760 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4761 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-9>
|
|
4762 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4763 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4764 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4765 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4766 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4767 |
|
|
4768 |
This line has 1 trailing space character >=20
|
|
4769 |
This line has 2 trailing space characters> =20
|
|
4770 |
This line has 3 trailing space characters> =20
|
|
4771 |
This line has 4 trailing space characters> =20
|
|
4772 |
|
|
4773 |
This line has 1 trailing TAB character >=09
|
|
4774 |
This line has 2 trailing TAB characters> =09
|
|
4775 |
This line has 3 trailing TAB characters> =09
|
|
4776 |
This line has 4 trailing TAB characters> =09
|
|
4777 |
|
|
4778 |
End of message.
|
|
4779 |
|
|
4780 |
.
|
|
4781 |
RSET
|
|
4782 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4783 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4784 |
DATA
|
|
4785 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4786 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4787 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4788 |
Subject: Test message No.3 - Wrapped lines
|
|
4789 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4790 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-10>
|
|
4791 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4792 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4793 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4794 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4795 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4796 |
|
|
4797 |
This message contains a series of lines - which
|
|
4798 |
range between 90 and 70 characters in length.
|
|
4799 |
|
|
4800 |
|
|
4801 |
90CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4802 |
78901234567890
|
|
4803 |
|
|
4804 |
89CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4805 |
7890123456789
|
|
4806 |
|
|
4807 |
88CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4808 |
789012345678
|
|
4809 |
|
|
4810 |
87CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4811 |
78901234567
|
|
4812 |
|
|
4813 |
86CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4814 |
7890123456
|
|
4815 |
|
|
4816 |
85CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4817 |
789012345
|
|
4818 |
|
|
4819 |
84CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4820 |
78901234
|
|
4821 |
|
|
4822 |
83CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4823 |
7890123
|
|
4824 |
|
|
4825 |
82CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4826 |
789012
|
|
4827 |
|
|
4828 |
81CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4829 |
78901
|
|
4830 |
|
|
4831 |
80CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4832 |
7890
|
|
4833 |
|
|
4834 |
79CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4835 |
789
|
|
4836 |
|
|
4837 |
78CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4838 |
78
|
|
4839 |
|
|
4840 |
77CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4841 |
7
|
|
4842 |
|
|
4843 |
76CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4844 |
|
|
4845 |
|
|
4846 |
75CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345
|
|
4847 |
|
|
4848 |
74CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234
|
|
4849 |
|
|
4850 |
73CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
|
|
4851 |
|
|
4852 |
72CHARS89012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012
|
|
4853 |
|
|
4854 |
71CHARS8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901
|
|
4855 |
|
|
4856 |
70CHARS890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
|
|
4857 |
|
|
4858 |
End of message.
|
|
4859 |
|
|
4860 |
.
|
|
4861 |
RSET
|
|
4862 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4863 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4864 |
DATA
|
|
4865 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4866 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4867 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4868 |
Subject: Test message No.2 - Dot stuffing test
|
|
4869 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4870 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-11>
|
|
4871 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4872 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4873 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4874 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4875 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4876 |
|
|
4877 |
This message contains a block of dot characters,=20
|
|
4878 |
arranged into the shape of a triangle. There are=20
|
|
4879 |
four rows in the triangle; the first row contains
|
|
4880 |
4 dots, the last row contains 1 dot.
|
|
4881 |
|
|
4882 |
.....
|
|
4883 |
....
|
|
4884 |
...
|
|
4885 |
..
|
|
4886 |
|
|
4887 |
..This line should contain a "dot" as its first character.
|
|
4888 |
|
|
4889 |
End of message.
|
|
4890 |
|
|
4891 |
.
|
|
4892 |
RSET
|
|
4893 |
MAIL FROM:<test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4894 |
RCPT TO:<recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra>
|
|
4895 |
DATA
|
|
4896 |
From: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4897 |
Reply-to: "SMTP Test1" <test@psion9.demon.co.uk>
|
|
4898 |
To: recyclebin@lon-msgtest06.intra
|
|
4899 |
Subject: Test message No.1 - 1000 character line in message
|
|
4900 |
Date: date-replacement-string-
|
|
4901 |
Message-ID: <message-id-replacement-string-12>
|
|
4902 |
X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10
|
|
4903 |
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
4904 |
Content-Language: i-default
|
|
4905 |
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
|
|
4906 |
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
4907 |
|
|
4908 |
The line in the following 3 paragraphs each contain 1000 characters: =
|
|
4909 |
|
|
4910 |
the maximum limit of linelength for SMTP mail. Each should arrive as
|
|
4911 |
one wrapped paragraph in the received message. The dot-stuffed
|
|
4912 |
paragraph is the absolute maximum line length permissable in SMTP
|
|
4913 |
protocol - although in practice IMCV wraps the data into shorter
|
|
4914 |
lines before it is actually sent.
|
|
4915 |
|
|
4916 |
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4917 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4918 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4919 |
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
|
|
4920 |
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
|
|
4921 |
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4922 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4923 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4924 |
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
|
|
4925 |
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
|
|
4926 |
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4927 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4928 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4929 |
901234567890
|
|
4930 |
|
|
4931 |
The following paragraph will be dot stuffed into 1001 characters:
|
|
4932 |
|
|
4933 |
..123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
|
|
4934 |
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
|
|
4935 |
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
|
|
4936 |
8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123=
|
|
4937 |
4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789=
|
|
4938 |
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
|
|
4939 |
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
|
|
4940 |
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
|
|
4941 |
8901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123=
|
|
4942 |
4567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789=
|
|
4943 |
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345=
|
|
4944 |
6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901=
|
|
4945 |
2345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567=
|
|
4946 |
890123456789
|
|
4947 |
|
|
4948 |
Start67890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4949 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4950 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4951 |
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
|
|
4952 |
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
|
|
4953 |
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4954 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4955 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4956 |
9012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234=
|
|
4957 |
5678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890=
|
|
4958 |
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456=
|
|
4959 |
7890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012=
|
|
4960 |
3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678=
|
|
4961 |
901234567End
|
|
4962 |
|
|
4963 |
End of message.
|
|
4964 |
|
|
4965 |
.
|
|
4966 |
QUIT
|