// Copyright (c) 2003-2009 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).

// All rights reserved.

// This component and the accompanying materials are made available

// under the terms of "Eclipse Public License v1.0"

// which accompanies this distribution, and is available

// at the URL "http://www.eclipse.org/legal/epl-v10.html".

//

// Initial Contributors:

// Nokia Corporation - initial contribution.

//

// Contributors:

//

// Description:

// Extensions (MS-CHAP) - RFC 2433, except the authenticator-controlled

// authentication retry mechanisms and the password changing mechanisms -

// this is in accordance with the requirements.

// 

//

/**

 @file

 @brief Source file for the implementation of Microsoft PPP CHAP

 @internalComponent 

*/

#include "MSCHAP.H"

#include "PPPConfig.h"

// using DES

#include <symmetric.h>

//using MD4

#include "MD4.H"

CPppMsChap::CPppMsChap()

/**

   Constructor.

   @internalComponent

*/

	: iResponseValue(KPppMsChapResponseValueSize)

	{

	}

void CPppMsChap::InitL(CPppLcp* aLcp)

/**

   @copydoc CPppChap::InitL(CPppLcp*)

   @see CPppChap::InitL(CPppLcp*)

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	CPppChap::InitL(aLcp);

#ifdef __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	iUseNTResponse = ETrue;

#endif // __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	}

CPppMsChap::~CPppMsChap()

/**

   Destructor.

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

#ifdef _UNICODE

	delete iUserName;

#endif

	}

void CPppMsChap::CheckChallengePacketL(RMBufPacket& aPacket)

/**

   @copydoc CPppChap::CheckChallengePacketL(RMBufPacket&)

   @copydoc CPppChap::CheckChallengePacketL(RMBufPacket&)

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	__ASSERT_ALWAYS(aPacket.Length() >= KPppChapCodeFieldSize +

				KPppChapIdFieldSize + 

				KPppChapLengthFieldSize +

				KPppChapValueSizeFieldSize + 

				KPppMsChapChallengeSize,

			User::Leave(KErrUnderflow));	

	__ASSERT_ALWAYS(*(aPacket.First()->Ptr() +

							KPppChapCodeFieldSize +

							KPppChapIdFieldSize +

							KPppChapLengthFieldSize) == 

						KPppMsChapChallengeSize,

				User::Leave(KErrOverflow));	

	}

void CPppMsChap::MakeResponseL(TUint8 /*aChallengeId*/, 

				const TDesC8& aChallengeValue, 

				TPtrC8& aResponseValue, 

				TPtrC8& aResponseName)

/**

   @copydoc CPppChap::MakeResponseL(TUint8, const TDesC8&, TPtrC8&, TPtrC8&)

   @see CPppChap::MakeResponseL(TUint8, const TDesC8&, TPtrC8&, TPtrC8&)

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	ASSERT(aChallengeValue.Length() == KPppMsChapChallengeSize);

    const CCredentialsConfig* credentials = iPppLcp->GetCredentials();

	const TDesC& password = credentials->GetPassword();

#ifndef __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

// The NT password shall not be longer than

// KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength

	__ASSERT_ALWAYS(password.Length() <=

				KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength,

			User::Leave(KErrTooBig));

#else // __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	if (iUseNTResponse)

// The NT password shall not be longer than

// KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength

		__ASSERT_ALWAYS(password.Length() <=

					KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength,

				User::Leave(KErrTooBig));

	else

// The LAN Manager password shall not be longer than

// KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength OEM characters

		__ASSERT_ALWAYS(password.Length() <=

				KPppMsChapMaxLANManagerPasswordLength,

				User::Leave(KErrTooBig));

#endif // __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

#ifdef _UNICODE

	TPtrC16 uniPassword(password);

#else // ! _UNICODE

// The following MS-CHAP routines require the password to be

// represented as 0-to-256-unicode-char (RFC 2433), so convert the

// password to Unicode.

	HBufC16& uniPassword = *HBufC16::NewLC(password.Length());

 	uniPassword.Des().Copy(password);

#endif // ! _UNICODE

	TPtr8 ntResponse(const_cast<TUint8*>(iResponseValue.Ptr()) +

		KPppMsChapLanManResponseSize,

		KPppMsChapNTResponseSize,

		KPppMsChapNTResponseSize);

	NTChallengeResponseL(aChallengeValue, 

				uniPassword,

				ntResponse);

	TPtr8 lmResponse(const_cast<TUint8*>(iResponseValue.Ptr()),

			KPppMsChapLanManResponseSize,

			KPppMsChapLanManResponseSize);

#ifdef __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

#ifdef _UNICODE

// The following MS-CHAP routines require the password to be

// represented as 0-to-14-oem-char (RFC 2433), so convert the

// password.

	HBufC8& oemPassword = *HBufC8::NewLC(password.Length());

 	oemPassword.Des().Copy(password);

#else // ! _UNICODE

	TPtrC8 oemPassword(password);

#endif // ! _UNICODE

	LmChallengeResponseL(aChallengeValue, 

				oemPassword,

				lmResponse);

	*(const_cast<TUint8*>(iResponseValue.Ptr()) +

			KPppMsChapLanManResponseSize +

			KPppMsChapNTResponseSize) 

		= static_cast<TUint8>(iUseNTResponse);

#else //! __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	lmResponse.FillZ();

	*(const_cast<TUint8*>(iResponseValue.Ptr()) +

			KPppMsChapLanManResponseSize +

         		KPppMsChapNTResponseSize) = 1;

#endif //! __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	aResponseValue.Set(iResponseValue);

// The NT username shall not be longer than

// KPppMsChapMaxNTUserNameLength

	const TDesC& username = credentials->GetUserName();

	__ASSERT_ALWAYS(username.Length() <=

		KPppMsChapMaxNTUserNameLength,

		User::Leave(KErrTooBig));

#ifdef _UNICODE

// The MS-CHAP routines require the username to be represented as

// 0-to-256-char (RFC 2433), so convert the username.

	delete iUserName;

	iUserName = 0;

	iUserName = HBufC8::NewL(username.Length());

	iUserName->Des().Copy(username);

	aResponseName.Set(*iUserName);

#else //! _UNICODE

	aResponseName.Set(username);

#endif //! _UNICODE

#ifdef _UNICODE

#ifdef __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__ 

	CleanupStack::PopAndDestroy(&oemPassword);

#endif // __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__ 

#else //! _UNICODE

	CleanupStack::PopAndDestroy(&uniPassword);

#endif //! _UNICODE

	ASSERT(aResponseValue.Length() == KPppMsChapResponseValueSize);

	ASSERT(aResponseName.Length() >= KPppChapMinNameSize &&

		   aResponseName.Length() <= KPppMsChapMaxNTUserNameLength);

	}

void CPppMsChap::FailureL(RMBufPacket& aPacket)

/**

   @copydoc CPppChap::FailureL(RMBufPacket&)

   @see CPppChap::FailureL(RMBufPacket&)

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	__ASSERT_ALWAYS(aPacket.Length() >= KPppChapCodeFieldSize +

					KPppChapIdFieldSize + 

					KPppChapLengthFieldSize ,

			User::Leave(KErrUnderflow));

	if (!CheckIdentifier(aPacket))

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

	TimerCancel();

	TPtrC8 failureMessage(aPacket.First()->Ptr() +

					KPppChapCodeFieldSize + 

					KPppChapIdFieldSize +

					KPppChapLengthFieldSize, 

				aPacket.Length() -

					KPppChapCodeFieldSize - 

					KPppChapIdFieldSize -

					KPppChapLengthFieldSize);

	if (failureMessage.Length()==0)

		{

		DoFail(KErrIfAuthenticationFailure);

		return;

		}

	TUint msChapError;

	TUint8 isRetryAllowed;

	TUint8 passwordProtoVersion;

	TBool hasNewChallenge;

	TInt sysError = KErrIfAuthenticationFailure;

	ProcessFailureMessageL(failureMessage, 

				msChapError,

				isRetryAllowed, 

				hasNewChallenge, 

				iChallengeRef,

				passwordProtoVersion);

	sysError = TranslateMsChapError(msChapError);

#ifndef __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

// The authenticator-controlled authentication retry mechanisms and

// the password changing mechanisms have not been implemented in this

// release - this is in accordance with the project requirements.

// Consequently simply fail.

	DoFail(sysError);

#else // __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

// The code only handles KPppMsChapAuthenticationFailure, and no other

// MS-CHAP specific errors.  In particular, this code does not handle

// KPppMsChapErrorPasswordExpired, since the password changing

// mechanisms have not been implemented in this release - this is in

// accordance with the project requirements.

	if (msChapError != KPppMsChapAuthenticationFailure)

		{

		DoFail(sysError);

		return;

		}

	if (!isRetryAllowed)

		{

		DoFail(sysError);

		return;

		}

	if (!hasNewChallenge)

		iChallengeRef[0] += 23; // magic constant from RFC 2433

	if(!iUseNTResponse)

		{

// Has already retried authentication using a LAN Manager compatible

// Challenge Response.  Have tried Microsoft Windows NT compatible

// Challenge Response and LAN Manager compatible Challenge Response,

// so fail now

		iUseNTResponse = ETrue;

		DoFail(sysError);

		return;

		}

// Retry authentication using a LAN Manager compatible Challenge

// Response.

	iUseNTResponse = EFalse;

	RetryPasswordL();

#endif //  __MS_CHAP_WITH_LAN_MANAGER__

	}

					const TDesC8& aFailureMessage,

					TUint& aErrorCode, 

					TUint8& aRetryFlag, 

					TBool& aHasNewChallenge, 

					TDes8& aChallenge, 

					TUint8&	aPasswordProtoVersion)

/**

   Processes a MS-CHAP Failure Message.

   @param aFailureMessage [in] A MS-CHAP Failure Message.  The Failure

   Message needs to be in the format specified in RFC 2433:

   "E=eeeeeeeeee R=r C=cccccccccccccccc V=vvvvvvvvvv".

   @param aErrorCode [out] The MS-CHAP Failure error code.

   @param aRetryFlag [out] The retry flag.  The flag will be set to

   "1" if a retry is allowed, and "0" if not.  When the authenticator

   sets this flag to "1" it disables short timeouts, expecting the

   peer to prompt the user for new credentials and resubmit the

   response.

   @param aHasNewChallenge [out] The flag that indicates if the

   Failure Message contains a new Challenge Value.

   @param aChallenge [out] The new Challenge Value, if the Failure

   Message contains a one.

   @param aPasswordProtoVersion [out] The password changing protocol

   supported by the peer.

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	ASSERT(aChallenge.Length() == KPppMsChapChallengeSize);

	TLex8 input(aFailureMessage);

	if (input.Get() != 'E')

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

	if (input.Get() != '=')

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

// RFC 2433: ""eeeeeeeeee" is the ASCII representation of a decimal

// error code (need not be 10 digits) corresponding to one of those

// listed below, though implementations should deal with codes not on

// this list gracefully."

	TInt ret;

	if ((ret = input.Val(aErrorCode)) != KErrNone)

		if (ret != KErrOverflow)

			User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

		else

// Gracefully handle unusually large, yet valid, MS-CHAP specific

// error code values.  This code only handles the MS-CHAP specific

// error code values specified in RFC 2433.

			aErrorCode=0;

	input.SkipSpace();

	if (input.Get() != 'R')

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

	if (input.Get() != '=')

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

	if (input.Val(aRetryFlag, EDecimal)!=KErrNone)

		User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

	input.SkipSpace();

	switch (input.Get())

		{

	case 'C':

		{		

		if (input.Get() != '=')

			User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

		TPtrC8 token(input.NextToken());

// This field is 16 hexadecimal digits representing an ASCII

// representation of a new challenge value.  Each octet is represented

// in 2 hexadecimal digits.

		if (token.Length() != KPppMsChapChallengeSize*2)

			User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

		TLex8 lex;

		TUint8 octet;

		TUint8* pChallengeOctet = 

			const_cast<TUint8*>(aChallenge.Ptr());

		TUint8 i = 0;

		do

			{

			lex.Assign(token.Mid(i*2, 2));

			if (lex.Val(octet, EHex) != KErrNone)

				User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

			*(pChallengeOctet + i) = octet;

			}

		while (++i < KPppMsChapChallengeSize);

		aHasNewChallenge = ETrue;

		input.SkipSpace();

		if (input.Get()!='V')

			{

			aPasswordProtoVersion = 1;

			User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

			}

		}

// As specified in RFC 2433, the field containing the ASCII

// representation of a new challenge value is optional, so fall

// through.

	case 'V':

// RFC 2433: "The "vvvvvvvvvv" is the decimal version code (need not

// be 10 digits) indicating the MS-CHAP protocol version supported on

// the server.  Currently, this is interesting only in selecting a

// Change Password packet type.  If the field is not present the

// version should be assumed to be 1; since use of the version 1

// Change Password packet has been deprecated, this field SHOULD

// always contain a value greater than or equal to 2."

		aHasNewChallenge = EFalse;

		if (input.Get() != '=')

			User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

		if ((ret=input.Val(aPasswordProtoVersion,

				EDecimal)) != KErrNone)

			if (ret!= KErrOverflow)

				User::Leave(KErrGeneral);

			else

// Gracefully handle unusually large, yet valid, password changing

// protocol version values.  This code only handles the password

// changing protocol version codes values specified in RFC 2433.

				aPasswordProtoVersion = 0;

		break;

	default:

		aHasNewChallenge = EFalse;

		aPasswordProtoVersion = 1;

		}

	}

/**

   Retries the authentication.

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	++iCurrentId;

	iResponseRetryCount = 0;

	RespondL();

	}

					     const TDesC16& aPassword,

					     TDes8& aResponse)

/**

   Computes a MS-CHAP Windows NT compatible Challenge Response.

   @param aChallenge [in] A MS-CHAP Challenge (8 octets).

   @param aPassword [in] The Microsoft Windows NT password (0 to 256

   Unicode char).

   @param aResponse [out] The MS-CHAP Windows NT compatible Challenge

   Response (24 octets).

   @note This function implements the NTChallengeResponse routine

   specified in RFC 2433.

   @internalComponent

*/

	{

	ASSERT(aChallenge.Length() == KPppMsChapChallengeSize);

	ASSERT(aPassword.Length() <= KPppMsChapMaxNTPasswordLength);

	ASSERT(aResponse.Length() == KPppMsChapNTResponseSize);

	HBufC8* paddedPasswordHashBuf =

			HBufC8::NewLC(KPppMsChapPaddedHashSize);

	TPtr8 paddablePasswordHash(paddedPasswordHashBuf->Des());

	paddablePasswordHash.SetLength(KPppMsChapHashSize);

	NtPasswordHashL(aPassword, paddablePasswordHash);

	ChallengeResponseL(aChallenge, 

			paddablePasswordHash,

			aResponse);

	CleanupStack::PopAndDestroy(paddedPasswordHashBuf);

	ASSERT(aResponse.Length() == KPppMsChapNTResponseSize);

	}

					TDes8& aPasswordHash)

/**

   Computes the hash of the Microsoft Windows NT password using MD4.

   @param aPassword [in] The Microsoft Windows NT password (0 to 256

   Unicode char).

   @param aPasswordHash [out] The MD4 hash of the Microsoft Windows NT

   password (16 octets).

   @note This function implements the NtPasswordHash routine specified

   in RFC 2433.

   @internalComponent

*/

	{